




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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. VII.

The Vignette on the Titlepage represents
A SILVER COIN OF SYRACUSE,
Copied from a Specimen in the British Museum.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A New Edition,
WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER, LORD REDESDALE.



IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. VII.

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
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SECTION I.

Authorities for the Sequel of Grecian History. — Sicilian Affairs following the Athenian Invasion. — Administration and Legislation of Diocles at Syracuse.

WHOEVER may engage in the investigation of Grecian history among the original authors, whether writing for others, or only reading for himself, must, at the period where we are now arrived, feel the loss of regular guidance from those contemporary with the events, citizens of the republics they describe, conversant with the politics and warfare of the time, eyewitnesses, or generally acquainted with eyewitnesses, of the facts they relate. After the death of Epaminondas, with which Xenophon's narrative ends, the only account of Grecian affairs, aiming at connection, is that of the Sicilian Diodorus, who lived above three hundred years after, in the time of Augustus Cæsar. In this long interval, the establishment, first of the Macedonian, and afterward of the Roman empire, had so altered and overwhelmed the former politics

of the civilised world that they were no more to be gathered but from books, in the age of Diodorus, than at this day.

Many valuable works of elder writers were indeed extant, of which a few sentences only, preserved in quotations, are now known to exist. Very interesting portions of Sicilian history were published by men of eminent abilities, whose means of information were not inferior to those of Xenophon and Thucydides, but whose interests and passions, according to remaining report, more tinged their narratives. Diodorus, who had these materials before him, was a scholar of some eloquence, and apparently a well-meaning man; but very ill qualified, either by experience in politics and war, or by communication among statesmen and military men, or by natural acuteness of judgment, to sift the truth from the various falsehood and sophistication in which party-writers would studiously enwrap it. The circumstances of his age also led Diodorus to prejudices. Roman liberty, never assured by a good constitution, was just then, after many bloody struggles, finally crushed by a military despotism pervading the civilised world. Men of letters, indignant at the event, were compelled to silence about it; yet when none could any longer oppose openly the gigantic tyranny, a kind of masked war was waged against it, in treating sometimes of early Roman, but oftener of Grecian history. This purpose, which may be observed extensive among the writers of both nations in the first ages of the Roman empire, is conspicuous in Diodorus. Warm in the cause of civil liberty, he has adopted, without discrimination, the party prejudices of those whom he supposed animated in the same way; though their principal object has too often been only to promote the interest, or veil the crimes, of a faction. In abridging then, as his extensive plan of universal history required, often he has evidently missed the meaning of political and military writers whom he proposed to follow: but,

far worse than this, he has often omitted leading and connecting facts, the most necessary toward a right understanding of following matter. In remark, rarely deserving attention, he is sometimes even puerile. His honesty nevertheless gives him value; and even the contradictions into which, in collecting materials from different authors, he has fallen, though vexatious and disgusting to a hasty reader, yet, while to a careful observer they often evince his honesty, they sometimes also show those truths which a more ingenious writer, with the same prejudices, would not have afforded opportunity to discover.

For the deficiencies of Diodorus's generally concise and frequently broken narrative Plutarch offers, for detached portions of history, the most copious supply remaining. Plutarch, living about a century and half later than Diodorus, possessed yet probably all the stores of former knowledge undiminished. In Sicily men versed in civil and military business had been induced, by the interest they felt in the wars and revolutions in which they bore a share, to transmit accounts of them to posterity. Meanwhile another description of writers had arisen and flourished in various parts of Greece. The numerous schools of philosophy had long been the seminaries to prepare youth for high fortune through political or military eminence. Lately they had opened means for the acquisition of great wealth by merely teaching eloquence and politics. Ingenuity, incited by the desire of gain, proceeded then to find new channels, and literature itself was made a trade; a branch of which, perhaps the most profitable, was something analogous to modern news-writing. The principal difference was that, as the news of the day could not be circulated by writing as by the press, the writer was obliged to take a more extended period; and, like our monthly and annual publishers of news, to digest his matter with more care, whence his work became

dignified with the title of history. But nothing more invites the curiosity of the many than the private history of eminent persons. Panegyric will have charms for some: but satire of eminent living characters, managed with any dexterity, is always highly alluring to the multitude, and forces the attention even of the calumniated and their friends. Greece then, divided into so many states, jealous each of its separate jurisdiction and peculiar jurisprudence, afforded extraordinary opportunity for safety to libellers; and safety not only against penalties of law, but also against that conviction of falsehood which, by overthrowing reputation, might ruin the author's trade; because, while in every republic curiosity was alive to accounts of persons eminent in any other states, means to sift the truth of any account were generally wanting. Writers of what was called the history of the times became thus very numerous, and men of great talents and acquirements were induced to engage in the business. As then the general licentiousness was excessive, the falsehood, most invidiously and wrongfully attributed by some Roman authors to Grecian history without reserve, has been fairly enough charged against those of the ages after Xenophon, who, with exception for Polybius, and perhaps some others whose works have not reached us, might perhaps be more fitly called news-writers and anecdote-writers than historians.

With such materials abounding before him, Plutarch, in the leisure of the Roman empire, under the benignant government of Trajan, conceived the design of showing the principal characters of Grecian history in advantageous comparison with the most eminent of the Roman. Viewing then with just regret the degraded state of mankind under the existing despotism, and from horrors recently past, notwithstanding the advantageous character and conduct of the reigning prince, foreboding the probability of a renewal of them, his purpose appears to have been to spread, with the fame of his own nation, a spirit of revolution and

democracy. It has been, injuriously for him, too extensively held among modern writers, that he was to be considered as an historian whose authority might be quoted for matters of fact with the same confidence as that of Thucydides or Xenophon, or Cæsar or Tacitus. Sometimes indeed he undertakes historical discussion, or, relating different reports, leaves judgment on them to his reader. When truth thus appears his object, his matter is valuable for the historian. But generally to do justice to his great work, his *Lives*, apparently it should be considered that, next at least to panegyric of his nation, example, political and moral, was his purpose, more than historical information. Indeed he has in plain terms disavowed the office of historian; he writes *Lives*, he says, and not *Histories*.¹ Yet to produce striking characters, his constant aim, he appears much to have sought private history. Authorities however for this are rarely to be found of any certainty; and little scrupulous as he has shown himself about transactions the most public, concerning which he often contradicts, without reserve or apology, not only the highest authorities, but even himself, it can hardly be supposed that he would scrutinise with great solicitude the testimonies to private anecdotes, if even sometimes he did not indulge his invention.² With the same political principles and prejudices and purposes as Diodorus, far more ingenious, he has been however, in political and military knowledge, equally de-

¹ Οὔτε γὰρ ιστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους. V. Alex. init.

² Plutarch's deficiencies, as an historian, can escape none who may have occasion to examine him critically. The notice taken of them by some writers has been mentioned on former occasions. I will add here that of a learned and acute critic, the baron de Sainte Croix: "Personne n'ignore que les vies des hommes illustres sont des tableaux peu corrects; où l'expression est supérieure à l'ordonnance. Cet historien (Plutarch) ne rassemble des faits que pour donner des leçons, et ne raconte que pour avoir l'occasion et le droit de réfléchir. Un pareil plan ne peut être que fort nuisible à l'exactitude. Quelle confusion aussi ne trouve-t-on pas dans les différens récits de cet historien!" *Examen critique des historiens d'Alexandre*, prem. sect.

ficient. Diodorus, though a zealot for democracy, or what, having never seen it, he supposed democracy to be, has sometimes described its evils in just and strong colours. Plutarch is yet more unequal and uncertain. When led by his subject to exercise his judgment, he could see that civil freedom can be no way secure but through a balance of powers in a state; or possibly he may have followed Cicero's authority in asserting that a combination of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy would make the best government; for at other times we find him an inconsiderate and even furious advocate of the pure democratical cause.

Plutarch.
v. Dion.

v. Themist.
& Timol.

The partialities then of these two writers being considered, together with the indifference of one of them to historical truth when illustration or panegyric was his object, we may generally gather where to trust and where to doubt them. When they report facts adverse to their known partialities, which happens often from the honesty of Diodorus, and sometimes from the carelessness of Plutarch, credit will be given them. But when the tale, conformed to their prejudices, bears appearance of exaggeration, distortion, or invention, whether their own or of others from whom they have gleaned, we must inquire if it accords with the course of history, with well-attested events and well-attested characters; if it is consistent with all that the author himself has related; and more especially if it is in any degree either supported or contradicted by those earlier extant writers, some of them contemporary with the transactions, from whom occasional and in some instances large assistance remains; and such must always be of high value.

One more writer, Justin, may require notice here, only because he is commonly quoted with the others. His general abridgment is too scanty and imperfect to be of much use to the historian, and his selection of more detailed matter, to

enliven it, is too commonly of extravagant tales, unknown or uncredited by other authors.

Among the deficiencies of historical materials, not least to be regretted, is the failure of means for tracing the causes of the wonderful prosperity of some of the SICILIAN cities; a prosperity so extraordinary that we might perhaps reasonably deny belief to report of it, the best attested, did not monuments yet existing, which have survived, some of them two thousand years, the ruin of those cities, afford proof incontestable. And here strikingly appears what before we have had occasion to observe, how much misfortunes, and crimes, and miseries, engage and force the notice of the contemporary recorder of events, more than blessings and virtues, and the happiness of nations. The sources of the calamities, for which the Sicilian, even more than most of the other Grecian settlements, were remarkable, are in large proportion opened to us; but to account for their prosperity, more wonderful from the frequency and magnitude of interfering troubles, we are left to conjecture, and even for conjecture sometimes hardly find probable ground.

We have formerly observed the Grecian settlements in Sicily divided into many small republics; and the same consequence resulting as in Greece itself, the inability of each to maintain the independency which was the favourite object of all. Syracuse was generally the leading state of Sicily, as Lacedæmon of Greece. When all the Grecian interest in the island was threatened with subjugation by the imperial democracy of Athens, the government of Syracuse was democratical, and, perhaps as nearly as any ever was, a pure democracy. The necessity for new subordination, arising from the pressure of the Athenian arms, produced some improvement of so licentious a constitution, and placed Hermocrates son of Hermon at the head of affairs. But as a keen feeling of great evil, and anxious

fear of greater impending, alone brought the sovereign many to that temper which enabled so excellent a man to take the lead, so, immediately as calamity and alarm subsided,

Diodor. l. 13.
c. 19. others prevailed against him. In vain he opposed

the nefarious decree for the death of the Athenian generals, and for the atrocious cruelty which followed to the captive army. The author of that decree was Diocles, already eminent for favour with the multitude, acquired by turbulent forwardness in asserting their absolute sovereignty, and violent invective against all in power. Success led to

Aristot. Polit.
l. 5. c. 4. farther success, and Diocles, quickly overthrow-

ing the government established by Hermocrates, which Aristotle has described by the respectable title of Polity, restored that tumultuary government by which the Syracusan affairs had been administered before the Athenian invasion. Under such circumstances a foreign command would be for Hermocrates a refuge. Accordingly he promoted a decree for the Syracusan state to pay its debt of gratitude to Lacedæmon by joining in offensive war against

B. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. Athens; and the armament was in consequence equipped which we have formerly seen earning

honour for its country under his orders in Asia.

Ch. 19. s. 3.
of this Hist. The result however, as also formerly seen, was unfortunate for himself. In his absence his adversaries so prevailed in Syracuse that, within the twelve-month, he was superseded in his foreign command. Still

B. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2. parties were so balanced that his friends presently procured his restoration. But soon after a more

violent effort of party not only deprived him again of his command, but condemned him, and those most attached to him, to banishment. The principal officers of his army were included in the sentence, and numbers of the citizens at home, whether by a positive decree, or by fear of consequences, were also driven from their country.

The power of the party adverse to Hermocrates being thus established, and the deficiencies of the new or restored government being abundantly obvious, Diocles ^{Diodor. 1. 13. c. 53.} took upon himself the office of legislator. The democratical form was retained as the basis of his constitution. Of his laws one only remains reported, denouncing death against any who should enter the place of civil assembly in arms. This law exhibits a striking feature of democracy, and it appears to mark in the legislator a zeal for that form of government, accompanied with a conviction of difficulty and almost impossibility to carry it through in practice. Aristotle evidently considered the ^{Aristot. Polit. 1. 5. c. 4.} change from the constitution of Hermocrates to that of Diocles as a change greatly for the worse; and Diodorus, not a panegyrist of Diocles himself, though a friend to his party, speaks of the new code as remarkable for nothing so much as the severity with which it was executed. To keep order in a democracy may require more severity than in other forms of government; and there seems ground for believing that the constitution of Diocles was not without ability adapted to the purpose. It is evident that he established some constitutional restraint upon popular extravagance: it appears even that he raised a kind of aristocratical body to great weight in the government; and, how far it was provided for by law, is not said, but he so managed that, in fact, one chief held the supreme executive authority, civil and military, and he was himself that chief.

SECTION II.

Divisions among the Sicilians. — Carthaginian Invasion under Hannibal. — Sieges of Selinus and Himera. — Return of Hermocrates to Sicily.

BUT whatever may have been the merits of the legislation of Diocles, the revolution, which gave occasion for it, pro-

duced very unfortunate consequences for the whole Grecian interest in Sicily. Under Hermocrates that interest had been united. When the democratical party prevailed against him in Syracuse, the aristocratical, though in other cities shaken, yet did not equally fall; Syracusan influence could no longer hold all united, and the Grecian cause was broken.

Ch. 18. of this
Hist.

A war, it will be remembered, between two little republics at the farther end of the island, led to that scourge of Syracuse and of Sicily, the Athenian invasion. The people of Egesta, overborne by the people of Selinus, who obtained assistance from Syracuse, were without resource but in external aid, which was sought and received from Athens. While then the Athenian arms pressed upon the Syracusans and their allies, the Egestans were relieved; but, with the catastrophe of the Athenian forces, followed by the downfall of the influence of Hermocrates, their situation became even more perilous than before; inasmuch as the exasperation of their enemies was increased, the hope of liberality from Syracuse was lessened, and all prospect of a protecting power anywhere among the Grecian states was done away. One glimpse of safety only remained: though all chance of Grecian protection failed, yet it might be possible to obtain the patronage of a barbarian power; and this was a resource which had not been scrupled sometimes by people of purer Grecian blood than

Ch. 5. s. 2. &
Ch. 10. s. 1.
of this Hist.
Ch. 10. s. 1.
of this Hist.

the Egestans, who were a mixed race. The rival city itself, Selinus, though boasting a population completely Grecian, had been, as we have formerly seen, the ally of Carthage against Syracuse; and it was the resort of an expelled party from Himera, also a Grecian city, to the same barbarian power, that produced the formidable invasion which was repressed by the memorable victory obtained under the conduct of the illustrious Gelon.

Since that victory, now above seventy years, the Carthaginian government appears to have made no considerable exertion for the recovery of its dominion in Sicily. The protection of its suffering allies of Egesta afforded no unreasonable pretext for interfering again in arms. In the third summer after the conclusion of the fatal expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse a

B. C. 410.
Ol. 92. 2-3.
Dodw. chron.
Xen.

Carthaginian army arrived, not less powerful perhaps than that whose defeat raised Gelon's military fame. The historian Ephorus, following apparently the more extravagant of the accounts which passed into Greece, ventured to state the infantry alone at two hundred thousand; the

Diod. l. 13.
c. 54—58.

horse he called four thousand. But Timæus, a Sicilian, likely to have had means of information, without partialities of any kind to induce him to underrate the Carthaginian numbers, reckoned the whole force little more than one hundred thousand. With this account Xenophon's judgment led him so far to concur

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 1. s. 27.

that, in cursory mention of the expedition, he calls the Carthaginian army a hundred thousand men, apparently still extravagant. Possibly however it may have amounted to that number, were slaves added to it who would desert to it on its arrival. The commander-in-chief was

Diod. l. 13.
c. 59.

Hannibal, grandson, according to Diodorus, of Hamilcar, who fell in the battle of Himera. The force brought from Africa was landed at the western extremity of the island, near Lilybæum. Hannibal was presently joined by the Egestans, together with the Sicilian subjects of Carthage, and he proceeded to revenge its allies by marching against Selinus. The port, situated at the mouth of the little river Mazara, yielded to his first assault, and siege was laid to the city.

What Selinus was remains to this day testified by ruins, among the most magnificent of human works existing,

though near two thousand years ago Strabo described the town as destroyed, and the place almost a desert. How a people commanding so narrow a territory, without remaining fame for commerce any more than for politics or war, acquired means to raise such works, information fails. But we learn that the public wealth, which, to a large amount, whencesoever arising, they certainly possessed, was employed more in public ornament and popular luxury than in what should have given strength to the state. Temples, baths, processions, and festivals, consumed what should have raised fortifications and maintained military discipline, which might have given security in more moderate enjoyments. Aware of the insufficiency of their own means to resist the might of Carthage, the Selinuntines implored help from all the Grecian cities of their island; urging, with evident reason, the interest of all to save them from the threatened ruin. But though their solicitations were kindly received, and the justness of their representations acknowledged, yet the many independent republics feared each to give its single assistance, and to bring them to co-operation was a complex business and slow. Agrigentum and Gela, though marked by situation for the next attack, waited for Syracuse; and Syracuse waited to collect the force of all the towns in which it had command or influence, likely all to be little enough for the occasion.

While succour was thus delayed, after a siege of only nine days, the walls of Selinus were forced. The greater part of the men in arms, assembling in the agora, were overpowered and put to the sword. Amid rapine and every sort of violence, an indiscriminate massacre followed, of both sexes and all ages. On such an occasion an army composed, after the common method of Carthage, of troops engaged by hire from various barbarous nations, was not to be readily restrained. The humanity of the general was neither slowly

nor ineffectually exerted, and yet sixteen thousand persons are said to have perished. Five thousand men were nevertheless spared as prisoners, and orders for abstaining from all violence toward the multitude of women and children who had sought refuge in the temples were duly respected. Between two and three thousand, of both sexes, escaped by flight to Agrigentum.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 57.

Information of the fate of Selinus struck terror throughout the Grecian cities of Sicily. The Agrigentine and Syracusan governments agreed in the resolution to try negotiation. A mission from them, liberally received by the Carthaginian general, failed however of its object. The subjugation of the island indeed seems to have been Hannibal's purpose; in the prosecution of which his conduct was that of the officer of a great and civilised state, and not of a leader of barbarians. The Carthaginians appear to have been not strangers to the generous policy, which we have seen ordinary among the Persians, for holding a conquered people in subjection. There was a party among the Selinuntines, apparently subsisting from Gelon's age, disposed to friendly connection with Carthage, and averse to those measures, whatever they were, which, with the vengeance of that powerful state, had now superinduced the ruin of their city. Empedion, a principal man of that party, was among those who had fled to Agrigentum. Upon the failure of the mission from that city and Syracuse, his fellow fugitives desired to commit their interests to him. They found themselves then not deceived in their hope of Hannibal's liberality. All were restored to their homes and possessions; required only to pay an annual tribute to Carthage, and forbidden to rebuild the demolished fortifications of their city.

c. 59.

Among the many Grecian republics in Sicily, claiming independency, it was seldom that some one, either through

illiberality of the government, or lawlessness of the people, was not by some injustice offending the Sican and Sicel tribes, which still held the centre of the island. Generally therefore those unfortunate barbarians preferred a connection with the powerful state of Carthage. The Sicans, who held the western parts, had mostly joined Hannibal on his arrival. His success against Selinus brought the rest, with many of the Sicels, to solicit that they also might be admitted to alliance. Strengthened with their forces, he proceeded to lay siege to Himera.

Though Syracuse held at this time no decisive lead among the Sicilian Greek cities, yet, in the pressure of danger, all looked to it with a disposition to respect its claims to authority as the most powerful state. Diocles, possessing the civil supremacy there, commanded the means for adding to

Diod. l. 13.
c. 61.

it the military; and thus he became general-in-chief of the combined forces, which marched to

relieve Himera. On his arrival he ventured a battle, in

c. 60, 61.

which, with some slaughter of the enemy, he was

however finally unsuccessful, and forced to seek shelter within the city walls.³ Rumour there met him, that the Carthaginian fleet was gone to Syracuse. In vehement alarm, probably apprehensive of some party movement not less than of the foreign enemy, he resolved to lead his forces home. Fearing however the pursuit of the victorious Carthaginians if he went by land, he commanded the attendance of the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes from different cities of the confederacy, which lay in the harbour. In vain the wretched Himeræans solicited the continuance of that

³ In this unsuccessful battle, for such it is acknowledged to have been, six thousand Carthaginians were asserted by Timæus to have fallen, and Ephorus did not scruple to say more than twenty thousand. Diod. l. 13. c. 60.—We might excuse some moderate exaggeration in Timæus as a Sicilian, but the extravagance of Ephorus in stating numbers, on this and other occasions, cannot but a little weaken his general credit.

protection which it was the purpose of the allied cities, furnishing the fleet, to afford them. In vain it was urged to him that the bodies of many Syracusans remained on the field of battle unburied. The insufficiency only of the vessels to receive at once his whole force induced him to leave half of it till the fleet might return. Some of the wives and children of the Himeræans however were taken aboard. He sailed himself with the first division.

This desertion of the man charged with the supreme care of the Grecian interest in Sicily seems to have produced that kind of dissolution of military discipline and civil order among the unfortunate Himeræans which made the defence of the place impossible. On the same night on which Diocles fled in safety by sea, numbers of the Himeræan people engaged in the hazardous attempt to fly by land; and it appears that many succeeded. Nevertheless the remainder defended the town through the next day. On the following morning, the returned fleet, after having landed Diocles, was already in sight, when the Carthaginian engines had made a breach in the wall sufficient for storming, and assault through it was successful. The same horrors ensued as on the capture of Selinus, only less extensive, as the town was smaller, and the population lessened by flight.

The authority of Hannibal however again generously exerted stopped the slaughter. Too often we find the Greek not less than the Roman writers venting most illiberal invective against the Carthaginians, and especially imputing atrocious cruelty. In loose imputation Diodorus is as vehement as any; but his honesty in narrative, correcting the injustice of his declamation, shows eulogy due where he directs his invective. What he proceeds to relate however may not be unfounded. Hannibal, he says, diligently inquired for the spot where his grandfather Hamilcar fell in the battle with Gelon; and with solemn ceremony he sacrificed

there three thousand prisoners. Exaggeration may be suspected in the number ; but the principle, we are well assured, was familiar, not only with the Carthaginians, but also with the early Greeks, and something very like it with the Romans even in their highest civilisation. Hannibal then establishing garrisons for the security of the country he had subdued, and of the people who had engaged in alliance with him, returned to Carthage.

It was in these critical circumstances that Hermocrates, furnished by the generous satrap Pharnabazus with money

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 22.

for the express purpose, according to Xenophon, of procuring a naval and military force that might re-establish him in his country, arrived at Messena, where the government was friendly to him ; and it appears probable that intelligence of this had contributed to decide Diocles to his hasty and uncreditable flight from Himera. The name of Hermocrates, alarming to Diocles and his immediate partisans, gave new hope to numbers, before despairing of the Grecian cause in Sicily. Those Himeræans who had succeeded in the hazardous measure of flying by land, instead of going to Syracuse, whither the fugitives favoured by Diocles with the passage by sea were conveyed, preferred putting themselves under the protection and command of Hermocrates at Messena.

So far the uncommon virtue of this party leader has been rewarded with uncommon good fortune that writers of all parties have borne testimony to his merit, and not one has imputed to him an evil action. The troops who served under him in Asia were ready to go all lengths with him against the party in Syracuse which had driven him into banishment ; but he declared to them his resolution to use no violence against the existing government of his country, however unjustly he and his adherents might have suffered from it. Not only Xenophon, who esteemed him highly,

bears this testimony expressly, but Diodorus, Diod. I. 13. c. 63. whose prejudices were strong in favour of the opposite party, shows that a resolution so becoming a virtuous statesman of enlarged views, and so singular among Grecian patriots, controlled the measures of Hermocrates. At Messina, favoured by its government, he built five triremes and engaged about a thousand soldiers for pay. About an equal number of fugitive Himeræans resolved, without pay, to follow his fortune. He hoped that the mere reputation of this force might have the effect of enabling his numerous friends in Syracuse to regain the ascendancy in the general assembly; but that hope failing, he turned his views another way, still with the same purpose of enabling his friends to prevail against his adversaries in legal course, through the interest that he might acquire by essential service to his city against its foreign enemies, without violence against itself.

This view was opened to him through his ancient interest among the Grecian cities, among the Sicels, and in general throughout the island. Hannibal, in returning with his victorious army to Africa, left the town of Selinus to those of its citizens, with Empedion at their head, who had shown a disposition to the Carthaginian connection. The more eminent and active of the opposite party were in exile, the fortifications in ruin. We have seen it a common policy of the Athenians, for holding conquered places in subjection, to demolish their walls; and such seems on this occasion to have been the policy of the Carthaginians. The need of Carthaginian protection would make those who held Selinus a faithful, though a weak garrison for Carthage.

On a knowledge of these circumstances, Hermocrates formed his plan. While it was yet winter he marched by the less practised inland road; and coming upon the town unexpectedly, entered it unresisted. The exiles were of

course restored. No violence appears to have followed to Empedion's party, except that of course the powers of government passed into the hands of the friends of Hermocrates. For security against the Carthaginians fortifications would now be indispensable. But the numbers that could be trusted were unequal to the defence of the wide extent of the old city. A convenient part only therefore was re-fortified, and thus a stronghold was provided for the friends of the Grecian cause on the verge of the Carthaginian part of the island.

Hermocrates proceeded then to carry hostility against the general enemies of the Greeks. He plundered successively the Motylene and the Panormitan territories; and, the people of each risking action with him separately, he defeated both. After this, no force venturing beyond the protection of walls to oppose him, he plundered and ravaged the whole of the country acknowledging the sovereignty or alliance of Carthage. Laden thus with spoil, he led back his troops highly gratified, both those who had engaged gratuitously in adventure with him, and those to whom he was bound for pay, to enjoy the rest of the winter in Selinus.

It appeared to the Sicilian people of all descriptions an interesting phenomenon, when the united Grecian interest, with the powerful Syracuse at its head, had been unable to prevent the overthrow of two principal Grecian cities by a foreign power, that, immediately after, an exile from Syracuse should not only recover one of those cities, but carry war successfully through the enemy's country. An impression strongly in favour of Hermocrates followed throughout the Grecian states and in Syracuse itself.

B. C. 408.
Ol. 92. 4—
93. 1.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 75.

He resolved to improve the impression, especially in Syracuse. Early in spring he went to Himera, and inquiring diligently for the spot

where the Syracusan troops under Diocles had fallen, he caused the bones to be carefully collected. Placing them on carriages splendidly decorated in funereal style, he conducted them, with a strong escort, to the Syracusan border. With ostentatious respect then for the laws of his country, avoiding to go himself any farther, he committed the procession to others not involved in the decree of banishment.

The arrival of this extraordinary funeral pomp at the gate of Syracuse excited strong feelings in the city. The people assembled. Diocles endeavoured to evince the absurdity of paying honours to relics sent by an unhallowed exile, which might be those, he said, of other exiles, or of any other rather than of loyal Syracusans. He could not however overcome the popular sentiment, which was so excited that not only a public burial was given to the relics, the whole people attending, but Diocles was obliged to abscond. An effort was then made by the opposing party to procure a decree for the restoration of Hermocrates : but the artful eloquence of the partisans of Diocles prevented. The merit of Hermocrates they did not deny ; but a great superiority, even of merit, they affirmed, Diodor. ut sup. was dangerous in a democracy. If he, while an exile, by his single authority and influence could raise a force to do more against the Carthaginians than all the Sicilian cities together, what could oppose him in Syracuse, were he once re-admitted there ? It was evident that he not only could, but would, and to secure himself perhaps must, they said, assume the tyranny.

Again thus disappointed, Hermocrates persevered in the resolution to avoid all violence, and withdrew quietly to Selinus. But it is unlikely that his friends in Syracuse, after what had passed, could rest in quiet there. It is unlikely that his opponents would remain satisfied with their civil victory, so hardly gained, and not follow it up with measures

against their adversaries, which might secure their tottering power. The friends of Hermocrates therefore urgently claimed the assistance and protection which the force at his command enabled him to give. Their entreaties and remonstrances at length induced him to march three thousand men through the Geloan territory to the Syracusan border. Still however he would not enter the Syracusan territory with any appearance of hostility. Leaving his troops on the frontier, he went, attended by a few friends only, to Syracuse. His friends there had taken care to secure his entrance by the gate of Achradina; but it seems to have been his own resolution still to avoid force, and trust himself to the assembled people. That he had not miscalculated his interest with the people appears from the mode of opposition used by his adversaries. In defiance of the law of Diocles an armed body entered the agora, and Hermocrates was killed. Many of his friends fell with him, and the rest saved themselves only by flight or concealment. An assembly of the people, such as might be where an armed force commanded, was then held, and decrees of death or banishment were issued, as the authors of the successful violence directed.

Whether Diocles was personally concerned in these transactions we have no direct information, nor does any mention occur of him after the death of Hermocrates. We can only on conjecture therefore attribute to this time the remarkable account given of his death by Diodorus, in treating of his

Diod. l. 13.
c. 33.

legislation. Diocles was leading the Syracusan forces out of the city, says the historian, not mentioning against what enemy, when information was brought him of tumult in the agora, with indications of sedition. In alarm he hastened thither, armed as he was, thoughtless of his own law, by which the penalty of death was decreed against those who should enter the agora with arms. Some

one observing to him that he seemed to scorn his own statute, he was so stung with the reproach that, with an oath averring he would show the force of his law, he drew his sword, and killed himself. This story, with or without ground, his friends would be likely to propagate, if he fell, as seems not improbable, in the tumult which deprived Syracuse and Sicily of the invaluable life of Hermocrates.

Nevertheless, gathering as we best may from the uncertain light afforded by Diodorus, Diocles seems to have been a man of more honest zeal in the cause of democracy than was often found among leading men in the Grecian republics; and thence perhaps the party-writers of the times, whom Diodorus and Plutarch followed, have reported his actions with less warmth of panegyric than those of some others professing the same principles, who, with less real deference to them, promoted more the private interest of their supporters. His political successes however appear to have been more owing to a forward, active, undaunted, and indefatigable boldness, than to any great talents; and as a military commander he was clearly deficient. Very unequal to the lead of the affairs of Syracuse and of Sicily, in the existing crisis, yet of a temper incapable of acting under a superior, his fall seems to have been rather a relief than a loss, perhaps even to his own party.

SECTION III.

Second Expedition of Hannibal into Sicily. — Prosperity of Agrigentum. — Siege of Agrigentum.

By the death of Hermocrates the fair hope of union among the Sicilian Greek cities, which with peace within might have given strength against enemies without, was instantly dissipated, and all the advantages which his exertions had

B. C. 407.
Ol. 93. 2.
Diod. I. 13.
c. 79.

gained to the Grecian cause were presently lost. Selinus and Himera fell again under the dominion or into the interest of Carthage. Report came of new preparations in Africa. Alarm arose everywhere, and nowhere was found a man on whose talents and character there was any public disposition to rely. The Syracusans sent a deputation to Carthage, deprecating war. Prayers are not commonly efficacious for such a purpose. The Carthaginian government dismissed the deputies with a doubtful answer, and the preparations were continued. Presently after a multitude from Africa was landed on the Sicilian coast, at a place called, from some springs of hot water, Therma, within the Selinuntine territory, now subject to Carthage, but on the border of the Agrigentine. No hostility was committed, but it was alarming enough to the Greeks, and especially the Agrigentines, to find that this multitude was to establish itself there as a Carthaginian colony.⁴

Soon however it became manifest that the purpose of the Carthaginian government was not limited to this peaceful way of extending empire. Information arrived of a vast army collecting, in the common way of Carthaginian armies, from the various shores to which the Carthaginian commerce extended, of Africa, Spain, Gaul, Italy, the Balearic islands, and perhaps Sardinia and Corsica, though of the islanders the Balearians only were of fame. A large fleet was at the same time prepared, and the whole armament was committed to the orders of Hannibal, who had commanded the late expedition into Sicily. Age and growing infirmity, it is said, induced that general to desire

Diod. I. 13.
c. 88.

⁴ Probably the Carthaginians had another name for their colony. The Grecian appellation *Θερμὰ ὕδρα*, was rather a description, till the first word came to be, for colloquial convenience, used alone as a name. We read of another Therma, near Himera.

excuse, but he obtained indulgence only so far that his kinsman Imilcon⁵, son of Hanno, was appointed his second in the command. We are however too much without information, equally of the state of politics and parties as of the interests of individuals at this time at Carthage, to appreciate the little remaining from Diodorus about them. What became notorious to the Greeks was the destination of this great armament for Sicily.

Among the Grecian cities of that island political connection was far too defective for any adequate preparation against the threatened storm. Measures of precaution indeed were not wholly neglected, but they appear to have been taken under no clear or digested plan. A fleet of observation was sent out, chiefly of Syracusan ships. Off the headland of Eryx it fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of nearly equal force. A battle ensued; the Syracusans were victorious, and took fifteen ships; and yet this event, as a decided beginning of war, seems to have diffused more alarm than encouragement among the Sicilian Greeks.

Ol. 93. 2-3.
B. C. 406.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 80.

Impelled by the pressure of circumstances, the Syracusan government now assumed a lead in the direction of the political and military concerns of the island. This was facilitated by the prevalence of the democratical cause in

⁵ This name, Imilcon, is found variously written in the copies of Diodorus, where the same person is unquestionably intended. It is first Imilcon, then Imilcas, then Amilcas, then it becomes again Imilcas, and finally resumes the first form Imilcon. Diodorus has probably, in gathering his narrative from different writers, copied the different attempts of Grecian pens to represent one and the same Phenician name, which the Romans wrote Amilcar or Hamilcar, differing only in the use or omission of the prefixed aspirate. All these forms appear to have for their root the Hebrew word *Melek*, now in Arabic *Melk*, or *Malk*, signifying King. The name which, from Carthaginian pronunciation, the Greeks wrote Ἰμύκων, and the Romans Hanno, seems to be the same with that which from Hebrew pronunciation they wrote Ἰωάννης, and Johannes, *John*. Bal, Baal, or Belus, was an added title or dignity, signifying *lord*; so that Hannibal was equivalent to Johannes dominus, *lord John*, and Asdrubal to Esdras dominus, *lord Esdras*.

most of the cities as in Syracuse, and by a sense of the same pressure in all. Ministers were despatched to every one, to exhort, says the historian, and encourage the multitude.⁶ Embassies were sent also to the Italian states and to Lacedæmon; urging the former as implicated in the danger, the latter as the patron state of the Grecian name, and especially of the Dorian. These measures appear to have been, in a general view, what the circumstances required; but the able mind, capable of conciliating adverse interests, arranging and simplifying complex and divided businesses, engaging confidence, and inciting energy, was wanting, and so the effect was small. Meanwhile, according to information which the Greeks received, the naval victory gained by them had not at all checked the Carthaginian preparations, which were of a magnitude indicating that the purpose could not be merely to support the new colony, and defend the present possessions of Carthage in Sicily, but rather to make the conquest of the whole island sure.

Numerous circumstances marked Agrigentum as the city likely first to feel the coming storm. Agrigentum was among those phenomena of political prosperity, concerning which we might most desire and least possess information. Far more known by historical fame than Selinus, yet the wonderful relics of its ancient magnificence are not needless testimonies to the truth of what history, silent about its means of acquiring, or little better than silent, has told of

its wealth and splendour.⁷ The fertility of its soil

¹*ibid.*

and the good management of its oliveyards and vineyards are mentioned without being described. More however certainly was wanting; there must have been com-

⁶ Ἐπίσταντες τοὺς παρορμήσαντας τὰ πλῆθη.

⁷ Arduus inde Acragas ostentat maxima longe
Mœnia, magnanimū quondam generator equorum.

VIRG. ÆN. 1. 3. v. 704.

merce of some other kind, to draw the concourse of freemen resident in Agrigentum, who were not Agrigentine citizens. If we may trust Diodorus, the free inhabitants were two hundred thousand; and of these the citizens were only a tenth part. If the slaves then were only four hundred thousand, the proportion would be lower than in many other Grecian republics; but we are given to believe it was higher than in most. Such then was the public wealth that the public buildings, not even now wholly destroyed, exceeded all that had to that time been seen in Grecian cities. The pillars of the temple of Jupiter were so vast that a man might stand in the flutings. This was esteemed the most magnificent of the edifices of Agrigentum, though wanting a roof, which the ensuing misfortunes of the city prevented its receiving. An artificial lake without the walls, as a luxury singular in its kind, had particular celebrity. It was six furlongs in circuit and thirty feet deep; fed by aqueducts with perpetual springs; stocked with fish and aquatic birds, especially swans. While thus it contributed largely to the public banquets, it was for the exercise of swimming, and for the amusement of walking on its banks, a favourite place of public resort. Agrigentum was also remarkable for a kind of building of most important use in great cities, which yet seems to have been little common in Greece. Not however the novelty only, but the magnitude and excellent construction of its sewers, brought fame to the architect Phæax, so that his name became the common Grecian term for a sewer.

Diod. l. 13.

l. 11. c. 25.

Ibid.

While the public wealth of the city was thus advantageously employed, the magnificence of individuals among the citizens furnished anecdotes, not only to incite panegyric in their own day, but to engage the notice even of those who lived amid all the extravagance of public splendour and private luxury in the last days of the Roman

republic and first of the empire. The hospitality of Gellias

Diod. l. 13.
c. 83.

was celebrated by poets and historians. His

house had numerous apartments appropriated to the reception of strangers, and servants were employed to inquire for those who were not fortunate enough to bring a recommendation to the magnificent owner. Where hospitality was so extensive, men on military service would

not fail of attention. A body of five hundred

horse arriving once from Gela in a violent storm, Gellias not only entertained all, but supplied every man with a change of clothing.⁸ For this anecdote Diodorus has claimed the authority of Timæus, a Sicilian writer nearly contemporary. Another writer quoted by him, Polycletus, called by military duty to Agrigentum, had personally profited from the hospitality of Gellias. In a history of his time, which he afterward wrote, he described the extraordinary extent of the cellars of his magnificent host, excavated in the rock on which the town was built, and the prodigious quantity of wine stored in them.⁹

Gellias seems to have been unrivalled in the permanent splendour of his establishment; but instances are recorded of extraordinary occasional magnificence in others. Antisthenes, at his daughter's wedding, entertained all the Agrigentine citizens, and invited besides the persons of higher rank from neighbouring cities. More than eight hundred carriages went in the nuptial procession. The time, as

⁸ Though this may appear to the modern reader a most extravagant wardrobe, it was, according to Horace, far below that of Lucullus:

. . . . Chlamydes Lucullus, ut aiunt,
Si posset centum scenæ præbere rogatus,
Qui possum tot? ait: tamen et quæram, et quot habebo
Mittam: post paulo scribit, sibi millia quinque
Esse domi chlamydam; partem, vel tolleret omnes.

Epist. l. 1. 6. 40.

⁹ According to Polycletus, three hundred cisterns, cut in the rock, were commonly kept full of wine.

usual, was evening twilight. In the moment of the bride's moving, attended by innumerable torches, all the altars in all the temples, at a signal given, and those numerous in the streets, fraught with supper for the multitude, blazed at once, producing a splendour as gratifying as it was uncommon. The return of Exænetus, victor in the chariot-race of the ninety-second Olympiad, six years only before the Carthaginian invasion, was celebrated in a manner showing rather extensive wealth among the Agrigentines than his own magnificence. Of very numerous carriages in the procession, no less than three hundred were drawn by white horses; a colour particularly esteemed for parade, and therefore sought at high prices.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 84.

There seems indeed to have been, within the narrow bounds of the Agrigentine states, as formerly in Holland, an excess of private wealth beyond reasonable objects of expenditure; and the indications of it were not of a passing kind, like the Dutch tulip-gardens, but, in the spirit of the Greek passion for lasting fame, calculated to bear testimony for centuries. The public magnificence, guided by that just taste which in this age was national among the Greeks, raised those monuments of which ruins, marking what once they were, yet exist. But architects and statuaries derived also great encouragement from the wealth and taste, and in one remarkable instance from the capricious fancy, of individuals. It became common to raise splendid monuments in the public burying places to the memory of favourite brutes; not only horses, which might have acquired renown with the reputation of something sacred, by victory in the public games, but also birds and various domestic animals.

c. 82.

In an independent state consisting of a vast city, commanding a territory scarcely equal to one of our smallest counties, with a public so wealthy and individuals so ex-

travagant, twenty thousand citizens sovereign over a hundred and eighty thousand free subjects, sovereigns and subjects both having individually under them slaves unnumbered; what was the government, how property was secured, how justice administered, how faction and civil disturbance obviated, inquiry among ancient writers is vain. In the endeavour to gain some idea from analogy, looking to Athens we find many resembling circumstances, but also many characteristical differences. That Agrigentum however had wise institutions, ably adapted to circumstances, cannot be doubted. The amount of its prosperity may alone prove it to have long enjoyed civil quiet, rare of any duration among Grecian cities. Hence a philosopher-poet of the age, celebrating the splendid hospitality of Gellias, called his house "the respected resort of strangers, which evil had never reached."¹⁰

But, in a state where the citizens were so wealthy, and, compared with the whole population, so few; where the distinction between a citizen and a free inhabitant not a citizen involved, in regard to some important points, a total separation and even opposition of interest; where citizens and free inhabitants not citizens were equally served by slaves more numerous than both, how was public defence to be provided for? How were the wealthy citizens to be made soldiers, or those not citizens, or not wealthy, to be trusted with arms? The expediency, or necessity, for the wealthy to be guardians of their own property, was obvious and generally admitted; and in the pressure of war they might be brave and diligent: but to bear continually, or to be liable continually to the requisition for bearing, the fatigue and restraint and privations incident to a soldier's duty, they might as well not be rich. Accordingly, on

¹⁰ Ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι.

Emped. ap. Diod. l. 13. c. 83.

being put to trial, the inconvenience arising to the service from the indulgences which the Agrigentines on military duty would provide for themselves was such as to make a law necessary specially to restrain it. It was decreed that no soldier, on night duty, should have a bed more furnished than with one mattress, a bolster and pillow, a blanket, and a curtain.¹¹ This, says Diodorus, being reckoned the hardest manner of resting to be required of a private soldier on duty, it may be guessed what was the attention to ease, and the refinement of luxury, where not so limited.

Such, as far as may be gathered from accounts remaining, was the internal state of Agrigentum. In regard to external politics the Agrigentines appear to have stood at this time much insulated among the Sicilian Greeks. Their government had maintained close connection with the Syracusan while Syracuse was under the administration of Hermocrates, and both cities were connected with Lacedæmon. But, when Hermocrates was banished, the connection between the Syracusan government and the Lacedæmonian seems nearly to have ceased. At the time of which we are treating Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian, charged with the care of the Lacedæmonian interests in Sicily, was residing at Gela.¹² From the same period the Agrigentine government had no cordial connection with Syracuse; but its connection with Lacedæmon remained unimpaired, and its communication with the Lacedæmonian minister in Sicily

¹¹ Perhaps a mosquito-net, or gnat-net.

¹² Diodorus says *κατασταθὴς ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων*, l. 13. c. 93. "stationed at Gela by the Syracusans." This he has gained probably from his partial guide Timæus, whom he before quotes for an account of Dexippus, c. 85. Beside the improbability that the Syracusan government, in its circumstances at the time, could direct the residence of the Lacedæmonian commissioner in Sicily, all that precedes and all that follows, in his own history, combine to show that the fact was otherwise. It is observable that Wesseling, in his Latin translation, has passed by the phrase *ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων*, which he has nevertheless noticed in a note, and yet has not a word to account for his omission of it in translating.

uninterrupted. When therefore the Agrigentines found themselves particularly threatened by the preparations at Carthage they applied to Dexippus, who gave readily his personal services. He accepted a commission for raising a force of mercenaries, for which the Lacedæmonian name would at that time afford great advantage, and with a body

Diod. var. loc. of fifteen hundred he passed to Agrigentum. In

this age Italians, under the name of Campanians, are found commonly adventuring for hire in the Sicilian wars. Eight hundred, who had been in the Carthaginian service, were now engaged by the Agrigentines for their defence against the Carthaginians.

° Diod. l. 13.
c. 85.
Ol. 93. 2-3.
B. C. 406. The army under Hannibal and Imilcon at length landed on the Sicilian shore, entered the

Agrigentine territory unopposed, and encamped near the city. The historian Ephorus did not scruple to

Diod. l. 13. report it three hundred thousand men; but the

Sicilian Timæus, with more respect for probability, reckoned it only a hundred and twenty thousand. The first measure of the Carthaginian generals however was not of hostility: they sent a deputation to the Agrigentine government with the liberal proposition of alliance and society in arms; or, that being unacceptable, peace and neutrality. How far a magnanimous and provident policy, or how far party interest decided the Agrigentines, means for discovering fail, but both the proposals were rejected.

Improvement in the art of attacking fortifications was much restrained among the Greeks by the general public poverty of their numerous little states. The Carthaginians were not so limited. A principal species of that artillery, which the Greeks afterward improved and the Romans perfected, was, according to Diodorus, already familiar with them. Moving wooden towers and battering-engines were prepared to force the walls of Agrigentum: but the garrison, in one successful sally, destroyed all. Measures were im-

mediately taken for replacing them ; but a pestilential sickness arising in the besieging army checked exertion. Hannibal himself fell under it ; but Imilcon nevertheless, as far as the weakened state of his army would allow, continued to press the siege.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 86.

Though between the Agrigentine government and those who since the expulsion of Hermocrates had ruled Syracuse there was no cordiality, yet the storm which was falling on Agrigentum too nearly threatened Syracuse to be observed with indifference there ; nor probably could the Syracusan administration avoid censure among the Syracusan people, if, in the existing crisis, they wholly omitted to support the ancient pretension of their city to be the head and protectress of Sicily. Communication therefore was held with all those Sicilian and Italian cities which had been accustomed to act in subordination, or were disposed to act in concert, with Syracuse. Auxiliaries came from Messena and from some of the Italian states. Strengthened by these, the Syracusan army marched under the orders of Daphnæus. The Camarinæan and Geloan troops arranged themselves under him as he passed their towns. And with a force thus altogether, it is said, of about thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Daphnæus hastened to relieve Agrigentum.

Ibid.

The Carthaginian army, after all the loss by sickness, if we may trust the historian, was yet so strong that, without any interruption of the siege, Imilcon could send a force outnumbering the Greeks to meet them. A battle ensued at the passage of the river Himera, on the border of the Geloan territory. The Greeks, completely victorious, pursued the Carthaginians to their own camp, which they deserted for refuge within the besieging division's lines. Daphnæus occupied the camp, and thence commanded communication with the city.

c. 87.

For the deliverance of Agrigentum now a pause of civil strife only and some military subordination seem to have been wanting. But the Agrigentine constitution, adapted to the sunshine in which it had been nurtured, was unfit for a season of storms. The triumphant arrival of the relieving army, under democratical leaders, encouraged the party in opposition to that which actually held the government; and the popular mind, impatient under the evils of the siege, was prepared for irritation. When the flight of the enemy's defeated army was observed from the walls, the exulting multitude was impatient to be led out to share in the honour of victory. Admonition of danger from the superior force of the besieging army, watching opportunities from within its lines, was heard with indignation. Even the authority of Dexippus, supported as it was by his military reputation, with the added dignity of the Lacedæmonian name, could hardly enable their generals to restrain them. Repressed at length for the occasion, in the first intercourse with the relieving army this temper (how far instigated by party art we are uninformed) broke out again with violence. Corruption was imputed to the generals. Dexippus supported them, his character was reviled with theirs, and such tumult followed that civil rule and military command failed together. At length, whether from the habit of attending to debate, or through influence of the democratical leaders, who might see opportunity for directing the tempest, the riotous crowd took some regularity of form as a popular assembly. A stranger, Menes, commander of the Camarinæan forces, was the principal speaker. In a violent invective he accused the Agrigentine generals of treachery. In vain they desired to be heard in their defence; clamour overbore their voices; noise presently led to action; four were massacred on the spot, and the fifth was spared, it is said, only in pity of his youth.

After this infuriate act of popular despotism, the multitude were not readily to be brought again to the moderation which their instigators now desired. Elated at the same time with the success of the relieving army against the foreign enemy, and with their own triumph over their unfortunate generals, and jealous of all superiors, they would submit to no restraint. Public stores were spent without economy; and what individuals possessed none ventured with any authority to inquire. Nor does there appear to have been any combination in effort with the relieving army, which, under the orders of Daphnæus, was active, and sometimes successful, in harassing the besiegers. Imilcon nevertheless, within his lines, which the Greeks dared not attack, prosecuted his works regularly and steadily; so that, in the eighth month of the siege, winter being already set in, they were completed.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 88.

Ol. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.

Thus want came upon the city when means of supply by land were stopped. The sea however was yet open, and the Syracusan government did not neglect allies whom, more particularly since the massacre of the generals, they considered as their partisans. A large convoy of provisions was sent; supposed in security under escort of the Syracusan fleet, because it was understood that the Carthaginian fleet was laid up in the harbours of Motya and Panormus for the winter. But Imilcon, watchful of events, had ordered his fleet round. The Greeks, as they approached Agrigentum, were attacked by a superior force: eight of their ships of war were sunk, the rest forced ashore, and the whole convoy was taken.

The besieging army, before suffering from scarcity, was relieved by the prizes made, and the state of the besieged was rendered hopeless.¹³ Neither the mercenaries, nor the

¹³ Though we may believe there was some scarcity in the Carthaginian camp,

Italian auxiliaries, together no inconsiderable portion of the military force in the place, appear to have had either share or interest in the massacre of the generals and the revolution ensuing. Of course they reckoned themselves not bound to bear famine for those with whom they were little satisfied, in a cause now become forlorn. Accordingly the Campanians withdrew, and, having formerly been in the Carthaginian military service, offered themselves for it again, and were accepted. The other Italian Greeks, observing opportunity for retreat yet open, marched to their several homes. This is said to have been concerted with Dexippus, who withdrew at the same time, and report was farther circulated that he took a bribe of fifteen talents (about three thousand pounds) from the Carthaginians for this service. But the circulation of such a report was a mode of party warfare so easy, and, among the Greeks, so ordinary, that the mere circumstance of its circulation cannot entitle it to credit, and other motives for the conduct of Dexippus are obvious. After the assassination of the Agrigentine generals not only his situation as an individual must have been uneasy, but, in just consideration of his public character, it might be necessary for him to quit Agrigentum.

The force however still in the place was equal to the defence of the walls, and more easily to be subsisted and more at the disposal of those who had obtained the lead, in consequence of the absence of those who had withdrawn. The scarcity however being notoriously such as to threaten famine, the popular will no longer opposed inquiry about the remaining stock, and it was found insufficient for the support of the remaining numbers for many days. Favourable terms of capitulation, little usual, were unthought of. Flight,

yet Diodorus's account of it is evidently exaggerated, for the sea was always open to Imilcon's fleet, as the land was also to his army.

under cover of a midwinter night, appeared practicable. It was accordingly resolved upon by the leading men, and seems to have been ably conducted. With necessity for their plea, and fear for their instrument, obviating opportunity for public debate, they announced, in the day, that the city must be evacuated that very evening. The desire of saving life, though with the loss of all besides, operated upon the multitude; and the greater Diod. l. 13.
c. 89. part of the citizens with their families, those able to bear arms forming a strong escort, arrived in safety at Gela. Some however, infirm through age or sickness, were unavoidably left behind; and some refused to move; preferring death, according to the historian, from their own or friendly hands, with all the comforts of their former state yet about them, to a precarious life in exile and indigence. Most of these seem to have been of the higher ranks, and of the party of the massacred generals; little hopeful of just measure, had they joined in the emigration, either from the ruling party of their own fellow-citizens, or from the democratical republics to which the flight was directed. Possibly indeed participation in the flight was denied to them. The wealthy and worthy Gellias¹⁴ was among those who could not or would not fly. With some friends he repaired to a temple of Minerva, not without hope, which might be founded on experience at Selinus and Himera, that its sanctity, or rather the humane consideration of the Carthaginian general for unarmed suppliants, would protect them. In the first moments of victory however, violence being threatened, possibly from the unruliness of Spanish, Gallic, or Numidian troops, the suppliants themselves set fire to the place, and perished with it.

The honesty of Diodorus, amid his prejudices, shows

¹⁴ Γελλίαν, τὸν πρωτεύοντα τῶν πολιτῶν πλούτῳ καὶ καλοπαγαθίᾳ. Diod. l. 13. s. 90.

Imilcon as little in any other quality as in cruelty that barbarian which the illiberality of Roman writers would represent all the Carthaginians. All valuables, of any considerable bulk or weight, had been necessarily left by the fugitives. Statues and pictures, by the best Grecian artists, abounded in Agrigentum. The most esteemed of these were selected by Imilcon to adorn Carthage. The town he carefully preserved for winter quarters for his army.

SECTION IV.

Consternation of the Sicilians. — Rise of Dionysius. — Change of the Administration of Syracuse.

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 91.

INTELLIGENCE of the fate of Agrigentum spread terror through the Grecian towns of Sicily. The second of the island having fallen, it was generally apprehended that there could be security nowhere, unless perhaps in the first, and hardly there. Many sent their families and moveable property to Syracuse, and many, for surer safety, to the Grecian towns of Italy. Fear then being more apt to be impatient than wise, there appeared everywhere a disposition to criminate past conduct of public affairs, but nowhere any just measures, and hardly proposals for a better course. The Agrigentine refugees had been removed from Gela to Syracuse; where, amid their wants and dependency, they were vehement in invective against their leaders, for whom they had massacred those under whose guidance they had prospered. Meanwhile the Syracusans, everywhere courted, were everywhere unpopular; all concurring in blame of the Syracusan administration, while all, through consciousness of inability to defend themselves, were anxious for Syracusan protection.

Nor was Syracuse itself more united or more satisfied.

So were those at the head of affairs aware of their own insufficiency for the existing crisis that all avoided a leading part in popular debate. They waited the orders of the sovereign people; and the people, unadvised by any in whom there was general confidence, could give none. Nor perhaps should this be considered as marking any great deficiency, either of ability or courage, in the individuals; for in the actual state of parties it would be difficult for them, even with very considerable abilities, to hold that leading influence among the Sicilian cities, that commanding situation with regard to the common politics, without which, to conduct the common concerns of the Grecian interest advantageously must be impossible. Hermocrates had been on the point of uniting Sicily when, by his death, his party lost an influence which their opponents did not gain, and the Grecian interest through the island remained like limbs without a head.

Fortunately the Carthaginians thought it necessary for their mercenary troops, not less than the Greeks usually for their citizens, to rest from warfare during winter. While then, observing the hesitation and indecision of those accustomed to hold the lead, all sober men in the Grecian cities looked forward with much anxiety for the events of the coming spring, a youth of Syracuse, Dionysius, by the boldness and fluency of his eloquence drew attention and acquired consideration in the assembly there. Born in the middle rank of citizens, Dionysius had been very well educated.¹⁵ At the age of only twenty-two he had attended Hermocrates

¹⁵ "Bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus, etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit." Cic. Tusc. l. 5. c. 20. Διονύσιος, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακουσίαν, καὶ τῷ γένει, καὶ τῇ δόξῃ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Isocr. ep. ad Philipp. p. 350. t. i. ed. Auger. So Oliver Cromwell might be described as πολλοστὸς. Demosthenes, disposed to revile Dionysius, calls him γεαμιματίς. Or. in Leptin. p. 506. ed. Reiske. Diodorus describes him ἐκ γεαμιματίας καὶ τοῦ τυχόντος ιδιώτου. l. 13. c. 36. It seems equally improbable that his birth was either very high or very low; but that his education was of the best, and his introduction early to the society of the first men of Syracuse, appears unquestionable.

on the unfortunate occasion when he lost his life, and had himself been then so severely wounded as to be left on the spot for dead. Possibly this circumstance saved him from the general proscription of the friends of Hermocrates, and consideration for his youth may have assisted toward his

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 92. complete pardon. In the following year he served

in the Syracusan army under Daphnæus against the Carthaginians, and distinguished himself by his activity, courage, and military skill. Among the friends of his earliest years was Philistus, a youth nearly of his own age¹⁶, of one of the wealthiest families of Syracuse. Philistus was

c. 91. eminently endowed with talents military, political,

and literary, but not with powers of eloquence to command a popular assembly. Dionysius, through his ability for supplying this deficiency, could, at the age of twenty-four, stand forward almost at once as leader of a party, in opposition to those actually at the head of affairs.

Neither the common practice of the Grecian republics, nor the example of the opponents of Hermocrates, nor the usual temper of his years, would lead Dionysius to moderation in his opposition. He daringly imputed to the Syracusan generals corruption from the enemy; and with advantage, and probably with truth, he turned against them the accusation which they or their party had been wont to urge

Diod. ut sup. against Hermocrates. "As for the cause of the

many," he said, "it is but a pretence for acquiring power, and they had long abandoned it. Power and the advantages of military and civil eminence are their objects. These attained, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, all are equal to them; they will scruple nothing that may promote their individual interests." Such invective, assisted by the general acknowledgment of necessity for new and improved

¹⁶ The age of Philistus may be nearly gathered from that of Dionysius, whom he outlived many years.

measures, made an impression on the public mind which encouraged the young orator to a very bold attempt: "Imminent," he said, "as the ruin is which threatens Syracuse and all Sicily, while Sicily is looking to Syracuse for preservation, the regular expiration of office and command ought not to be waited for. Not a moment longer should the welfare and existence of the state be trusted to weak and corrupt hands. If Syracuse and Sicily are to be saved, the people must exert their unquestioned power, and the present generals must be displaced. Their successors then should be chosen, not among those, or the friends of those, already tried, and found unable or false; they should be known friends of the people, taken from among the people."¹⁷

Against this violent proposal the generals and magistrates exclaimed, as not only, in its tenor, seditious, but a direct breach of a positive law. A prosecution was accordingly instituted against Dionysius, and he was condemned to pay the fine which the law imposed for the offence. He was however so supported by his party that not only the fine was immediately paid for him, but he was encouraged to repeat his invective in the next assembly, and even to renew the offensive motion. His party gained strength: the generals were compelled to yield their situation, and Dionysius, the leading orator of the assembly, was appointed among their successors.

Such is the amount of information, all derived from writers adverse to Dionysius, of a revolution by which that

¹⁷ It has been supposed, by some modern writers, that Dionysius, who confessedly began life in the party of Hermocrates, changed sides when he came forward as an orator, because he professed himself advocate for the power of the many against the men in administration. But for this there seems no ancient authority, nor is the conjecture at all warranted by known circumstances. Dionysius, for himself and his partisans together, sought popularity against a party which had risen by popularity; just as with us, in the two first Georges' days, the Tories, in opposition, asserted Whig principles, while the Whigs, in power, were accused of Tory measures, the parties remaining still the same.

party in Syracuse was overthrown which had been powerful enough to drive Hermocrates into banishment, to give a new constitution to the republic, and to hold the government five years. In this partial information however is fully implied what honourably distinguishes this among Grecian revolutions, that neither bloodshed attended it, nor expulsions, nor any violence upon the constitution.¹⁸ The just, humane, generous, and truly patriotic spirit of Hermocrates appears to have survived among his friends, and to have influenced all their measures. The next transaction, of which notice remains, was a measure of beneficence adapted to strengthen their new power and obviate the necessity for severities so usual among the contests of Grecian faction. Numbers of the party of Hermocrates were yet living, in exile. To move their recall in the general assembly, where their opponents had so lately borne the sway, was undertaken by Dionysius. "Those unhappy men," he said, speaking of it as a known fact, "had evinced the sincerity of their patriotism by refusing very advantageous offers from the Carthaginians. How much then, in the existing crisis, their assistance was wanted to oppose the danger impending from the enemy of the Grecian name, was too strongly and universally felt to need that he should enlarge upon it. The very fact that the aid of all the Grecian states around, as far as Italy and Peloponnesus, had been importuned by Syracuse, would alone suffice for proof. It could not therefore but be most impolitic to deny to citizens of approved merit their anxious wish to join in the defence of their country and of the Grecian cause." The arguments of

¹⁸ The worst irregularity that the defeated party could impute was that Dionysius repeatedly incurred the penalty for proposing the removal of the generals before the expiration of their term, and that Philistus had the insolence to declare himself ready to pay it as often as it might be incurred. That Philistus would be so imprudent seems unlikely enough; and that such a course would produce, as the simple Diodorus affirms, the abandonment of the prosecution by tiring the prosecutors, cannot appear very likely.

Dionysius prevailed, and the measure was regularly and quietly carried.

If indeed we might believe Diodorus for the character of the recalled exiles, they were worthless vagabonds, of the lowest of mankind. But the tenor of his own narrative sufficiently shows that this description, copied from Timæus and others, deeply interested, and therefore violent in opposition to the party of Dionysius, is utterly unjust. Such persons could have been introduced to the rights of Syracusan citizens only to support violences, which are not imputed, or to produce a change in the constitution, which evidently was not made. The popular constitution, and the jurisprudence adapted to such a constitution by Diocles, after the expulsion of Hermocrates, as far as any accounts tell, remained unaltered. We cannot but regret the want of the history of Philistus, though it would probably have its partialities, to confront with these accounts. In collating however all that remains, even from the opposite party, we find it satisfactorily shown that the principal supporters of Dionysius were the principal persons of the party of Hermocrates, and that the exiles restored by him were mostly banished for their attachment to that party, and most for some eminence in it.¹⁹

SECTION V.

Faction at Gela. — Lacedæmonian Authority there superseded by Syracusan. — Violence of the Opposition Party in Syracuse. — Dionysius and Hipparinus elected Autocrator-generals of Syracuse.

THE new administration having thus attained some stability, it was among their most pressing duties, and indeed

¹⁹ Diodorus himself relates the banishment of the friends of Hermocrates, and we have no account of any other exiles.

the very pretence and purpose of the change, to look around Sicily, and, using with diligence and prudence the state of parties in the Grecian cities, to form a confederacy under the lead of Syracuse, that might suffice to prevent the farther progress of the arms of Carthage. On the Agrigentine, the territory last conquered by the Carthaginians,

Ol. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 93.

bordered the Geloan. At Gela, on retiring from Agrigentum, the Lacedæmonian minister, Dexippus, had resumed his station. But his authority did not suffice to still the storm of faction there. He seems indeed not to have been a man of talents equal to his situation. The mercenary force he commanded, instead of preserving peace, was a principal cause of disturbances. The failure of pay, due from the late Agrigentine government, was the ground of uneasiness and pretence for tumult; while, not only to prevent disorder, but to have that force, if possible, zealous in the Grecian cause, was highly important; for Gela, next in course for attack, could ill hope with its own strength to withstand the Carthaginian arms. Dexippus urged to the Geloans the pressure of circumstances, which required the liquidation of the debt, confessedly a just demand, though not precisely due from them. One party among the Geloan people admitted the reasoning; but their opponents persuaded a majority of the short-sighted multitude to disregard the policy, and, considering the naked right only, to reject the demand.

The situation of Gela now became most critical. Threatened by a foreign foe, of such preponderant power that successful resistance could hardly be hoped from the best united efforts of its people, not only they were divided among themselves, but within their walls was a body of mercenaries readier to join the enemy than assist them. In these distressing circumstances some of the principal men addressed the Syracusan government, as the old and natural

head of the Sicilian Greek interest, soliciting its exertion for the preservation of a city so important to the Grecian cause.

Though unnoticed by the historian, it appears probable that the Syracusan government was already prepared for the event. Dionysius was appointed commissioner to assist in settling the affairs of Gela; and a force of two thousand foot, with four hundred horse, Diod. ut ant. was placed under his command for the purpose. On his arrival at Gela an assembly of the people was summoned. Both Dionysius and Dexippus attended; but information fails how far either interfered, while apparently in all constitutional form Geloan citizens, in considerable number, were accused, condemned, and executed. Thus that party which had supported Dexippus in his requisition for the arrears due to the mercenaries was established in power, and a decree of the people followed, directing that the property of the seditious, who had been executed, should be confiscated for the purpose.

The business of the commissioner of Syracuse, as head of the Grecian interest in Sicily, on such an occasion would be of great difficulty and delicacy. It was most important to court popularity. If he could obviate violence by soothing, it were well; but he must not directly and openly thwart the popular inclination. He had then another difficulty, to reconcile his authority with that of the Lacedæmonian commissioner Dexippus, who was sent by his state to assume a superiority over every other stranger, in every republic of the island. In this alone he was unsuccessful. Vexed apparently at his own experienced inability to carry his own important purpose, so connected with the safety of Gela and of the whole Grecian interest in Sicily, vexed at his obligation to a Syracusan, whose superiority, however disclaimed, was too unavoidably apparent, but especially

vexed at the gratitude demonstrated by his own mercenaries, for justice obtained through the interference of the Syracusan which he had insisted upon for them in vain, the proud Spartan returned all civilities with coldness, and even with indication of disgust. On the other hand the Geloan people, or at least the party which obtained the rule in Gela, carried far their demonstration of satisfaction with the conduct of Dionysius. After having decreed him great honours in their own city, and transmitted to Syracuse testimonies of their approbation the most unqualified and most flattering, they proceeded to evince their confidence in him by requesting that he would stay among them, to direct the defence of their city against the formidable attack expected. Circumstances in Syracuse would ill allow this; but he assured them of his readiness to return in the first moment of their danger, and of his hope that it might be with a force sufficient to give them security.

Ol. 93. 2-3.
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 93, 94.

Of the colleagues of Dionysius, remaining vested with the supreme executive power in Syracuse, a majority were not his friends. The failure of extant ancient writers to name any of them may indicate that none were of great eminence. Their actions are equally unnoticed, and remain indicated only by what is reported of the conduct of Dionysius on his return. His invectives were vehement, imputing to them at the same time weakness and treachery; and he went so far as to declare that he could no longer hold community of counsel and responsibility with them; either they must be removed, or he must resign his situation. In an assembly of the people, held for debate on these important questions, the contest of oratory was so long and so equally maintained that decision was referred to the morrow. The superiority of the party of Dionysius at length becoming manifest, some

of his adherents exclaimed, "that the dismissal of the other generals ought not to satisfy the people; they should be prosecuted for their misdeeds." Dionysius himself however and his more intimate friends, holding the principles of liberality and moderation which had always characterised the party of Hermocrates, objected to this: "Hasty prosecutions," they said, "were apt to involve injustice. Nor was the present a season for inquiries which wanted leisure, when an enemy powerful as the Carthaginians might be daily expected at their gates. A remedy for existing evils, which experience recommended, was in their power; it was no more than to appoint one efficient general with full authority, not to be thwarted in his measures for the public good by perverse or corrupt colleagues. So it was that their forefathers, under the illustrious Gelon, had defeated the countless host of Carthage at Himera."

This motion was received with acclamation. Indeed for example of a single person at the head of the Syracusan affairs, civil and military, it were needless to seek back so far as Gelon, had not the popularity and glory of his name invited; a complete precedent seems afforded in the administration of Diocles. The existing board of generals accordingly was abolished; but, whether the authority of others checked the popular extravagance and the ambition of Dionysius, or his own prudence, weighing the objections to his youth and

Diod. ut ant.
Plut. vit.
Dion. p. 959.
ed. fol.
Par. 1624.
Arist. Polit.
l. 5. c. 6.

mediocrity of birth, and the advantage to be derived from an associate superior in years and family consideration, he was not raised alone to the first magistracy; Hipparinus, first in rank and property among the Syracusans, was appointed his colleague. To them together the supreme power, civil and military, was committed, with the title of autocrator-generals; a title and power, analogous to those of dictator at Rome, which we have seen not uncommon

among the Grecian republics, in arduous and threatening circumstances.²⁰

The state of parties in Syracuse now appears to have been nearly this. The friends of Hermocrates, some with more, some with less favour toward a youth of five-and-twenty, who had so extraordinarily risen to the head of them, supported the new government. The party of Diocles, of whom Daphnæus, the late general-in-chief, was among the most eminent, submitted to it, but with minds most hostile. Dionysius had won from them the favour of a large majority of the many, whom Diocles had so successfully courted.²¹ It became of course their imputation against the new government, that it was supported only by a worthless or infatuated multitude. Calumny, so ordinary a mode of civil warfare throughout the republics, would tinge the reports of Sicilian affairs passing to Greece, the exact state and character of which would be little likely to be very well known anywhere. Nor have we means to appreciate the intimation of Aristotle,

Aristot. ut ant.

²⁰ Diodorus makes Dionysius sole autocrator-general under the circumstances of popular election related in the text, without any mention of Hipparinus. We owe to Plutarch the positive information that Hipparinus was his colleague, without which the mention of their political connection by Aristotle would be less certainly intelligible. The appearance of negative evidence, in the account of Diodorus, will be enough known, by those who may have compared his narrative of Grecian affairs with those of Thucydides or Xenophon, to be of no weight. Indeed it is little likely that Plutarch, who has so laboured his panegyric of Dion son of Hipparinus, and his invective against Dionysius, would have reported so close a political connection between his favourite hero's father and the object of his obloquy, unless the authority for it not only was good, but generally known, and not to be discredited. This ray from the biographer, incidentally thrown on a dark, yet interesting portion of Grecian history, is indeed of high value, as it assists our judgment not a little in proceeding among shapes often of uncouth and often of uncertain appearance, in the narrative of the only remaining historian.

²¹ Ταχὺ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ εἰώθασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ῥεπόντων, Διονύσιος ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. Diod. c. 94. This foul slur upon democracy, provoked from a zealous partisan of democracy, strengthens the evidence to the fact, if corroboration indeed could be wanted, that Dionysius now was supported by the great body of the Syracusan citizens, which formerly supported Diocles.

that Hipparinus was led by the embarrassment of private affairs, produced by extravagance, to associate himself in political situation with Dionysius.

But the Sicilian historian, honest amid his prejudices, shows, in his narrative of facts, that a generous and mild spirit, becoming the successors of Hermocrates, guided the measures of the new administration. Severity against opponents was avoided. None were even driven to flight. It appears to have been the purpose on the contrary by extensive conciliation of friends to obviate the necessity for violent repression of even the most determined enemies. In the general assembly Dionysius proposed an increase, Diodorus says a duplication, of the Diod. l. 15.
c. 95. ordinary pay to citizens for military service. The measure, gratifying to the many, was readily carried. This indeed was a kind of extensive bribery. But it had many examples among republics wealthy enough to have means for it, and by no statesman perhaps had been carried farther than the great Pericles; nor are means apparent for ascertaining whether it was more likely to produce political evil, or whether, in the existing circumstances, it might not have been beneficial, and even necessary.

Such measures having been taken for quiet within Syracuse, the administration proceeded in those begun for establishing, throughout the Grecian towns, such order as might best give them means to oppose the foreign enemy. The Leontine territory was held by a mixed Grecian population, of which the unfortunate refugees from Agrigentum were now perhaps the largest part. That population formed a separate republic, under that uncertain kind of subordination to Syracuse which we have seen so common among the smaller Grecian states. Its affairs requiring the interference of the superintending government, Dionysius marched from Syracuse with an escort, and encamped midway for

the night. Before morning²² he was attacked by a force from which he was compelled to fly, and, being pursued, he took refuge in the castle of Leontini. Intelligence of his danger quickly reaching Syracuse, a powerful body arrived next day, and his assailants dispersed. The enemies of Dionysius afterward asserted that this nightly attack was a mere fiction. The story altogether is the very counterpart of that of the similar attempt against Pisistratus at Athens, and the result was the same. The Syracusan people believed the assault to have been real, with the purpose of assassination and revolution; and, to give security to their commander-in-chief against future attempts, they voted him, in general assembly, a guard for his person, to the amount, it is said, of six hundred men. This mode of security for men in the first situations in a commonwealth, though affected to be considered by writers of the opposite party as marking Dionysius thenceforth decidedly a tyrant, was however neither then new, nor afterward reckoned, as we shall have occasion very particularly to see, an example unfit to be followed, or involving in any discredit the most zealous assertors of freedom. The late attempt then being esteemed proof that the liberality of the new government had gone beyond prudence, and that stronger measures were necessary to obviate the plots of the disaffected, some officers who had been of the adverse party were removed from their commands in the Syracusan troops²³, and a body of mercenaries was brought from Gela.

¹Diod. l. 13.
c. 96.

These measures of precaution being taken, a capital prosecution was instituted against the two principal men of the opposition, Daphnæus and Demarchus.

²² Diodorus relates the story of the nightly attack as if he had found it told so as not quite to suit the purpose of the enemies of Dionysius. Apparently in the desire to improve it, he has made his detail very incoherent and indistinct, and, in some parts, where intelligible, very improbable.

²³ Diodorus says all were removed who were not of known attachment to the ruling party; but in the sequel he shows, as we shall see, that it was not so.

What specific crime was alleged against them, the account coming only from the friends of their party, is not indicated, but, from that partial account, it appears to have been in all constitutional form that they were tried, condemned, and executed. According to the same account, they were the first who suffered from their political conduct after Dionysius came into power; and they suffered now, not in consequence of the revolution, but for measures directed to the overthrow of the new government, already legally and without any violence established.

It was discovered that Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian minister, had taken part in the plot of Daphnæus and Demarchus. That his connection with them was new is evident from his conduct in the Agrigentine war, and it appears to have been unauthorised by his government. The Syracusan government required him immediately to quit Sicily; and this strong measure, far from producing resentment, seems to have led to a renewal of the old connection of Lacedæmon with the party of Hermocrates. The alliance of the Lacedæmonian government with the Syracusan under Dionysius proved lasting.

At the early age of four or five and twenty Dionysius had now shown himself, in eloquence and in political business, the first man of Sicily, and perhaps of the time; and he had given promising hope of those military talents, of which the war impending from Carthage would pressingly want the exertion. To his party he was, no doubt, necessary, as his party was necessary to him. It seems therefore to have been not without the purpose of binding them more closely together, that two weddings, at any rate very creditable to him, were about this time concluded. He himself married Arete, daughter of Hermocrates, and he gave his sister to Polyxenus, brother of the widow of that revered patriot.

Diod. l. 13
c. 96.
Plut. vit.
Dion. init.

CHAPTER XXX.

AFFAIRS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SYRACUSAN GOVERNMENT, UNDER DIONYSIUS AND HIPPARINUS, TO THE RESTORATION OF THE SYRACUSAN SUPREMACY OVER THE SICILIAN, AND ITS EXTENSION OVER THE ITALIAN, GREEK CITIES.

SECTION I.

Siege of Gela by the Carthaginians. — Evacuation of Gela and Camarina. — Atrocious Violence of the Opposition at Syracuse. — Peace with Carthage.

B. C. 405.
Ol. 93. 4. SCARCELY was the government of Syracuse brought to some consistency under the administration of Dionysius and Hipparinus, and a rallying point thus provided for the Grecian interest in Sicily, when the movement of the Carthaginian army from Agrigentum spread alarm throughout the island. Imilcon, if we should believe Diodorus, in quitting Agrigentum, increased the general terror by a measure apparently adapted to that only purpose, and little consistent either with the common policy of the Carthaginians, or with his own previous conduct: he is said to have completely destroyed the town. The direction of his march, not deceiving the apprehension long entertained, was to Gela.

The fortifications of this city were probably sufficient for its defence against any ordinary Grecian power; but its government was aware that they were not equally to be

trusted against the force under Imilcon, provided with an artillery far superior to what was common among the Greeks. It had therefore been resolved that the women and children should be sent for better security to Syracuse; and as soon as the movement of the Carthaginian army and the direction of its march were ascertained, measures were taken for their removal. But the apprehension of separation from the male part of their families, to be committed to the care of strangers, operated upon the minds of the women so much more forcibly than the fear of sharing their fate that they resisted with vehemence and even with tumult. Assembling in the agora, clinging about the altars, and urging entreaty with wailing and tears, the feeling excited, and a just aversion to the use of violence, prevailed against a resolution dictated apparently by a just prudence, and they were allowed to remain.

The Syracusans meanwhile had not neglected preparation for the common defence of themselves and the Grecian interest in Sicily; and it appeared that the estimation of their government abroad was not diminished by the revolution of the preceding winter. Auxiliary forces were obtained not only from all the Sicilian, but from several of the Italian, Greek cities; and the army which marched under Dionysius to relieve Gela was, according to some writers, fifty thousand strong. We may however, on this occasion, perhaps better believe the enemy of his fame, Timæus, who reported the foot thirty thousand, and the horse one thousand. A fleet of fifty ships of war attended the movements of the army.

Such however was the force under Dionysius, and such the known superiority of the Grecian heavy-armed, that the Carthaginian general with his less regular troops, though numerous and brave, would not meet them in the field, but, secure within his lines, continued to press the siege. During

Diod. l. 13.
c. 109.

twenty days Dionysius, with the patient prudence of a veteran, abstaining from attack, directed his measures to intercept supplies while he watched opportunities. The temper of a part of his army then compelled him to change his plan: Arms seem to have been denied to no Syracusan citizen; the new administration apparently hoping that, however experience had shown the inconvenience of their first lenity and liberality, the recent execution of the chiefs, Daphnæus and Demarchus, might suffice to deter farther sedition. But the quiet watching of an enemy's motions we have often had occasion to observe borne by the troops of the Grecian republics with an impatience subversive of discipline, and the chiefs of the opposition were sedulous in using the opportunity for fomenting the ready discontent.

Dionysius thus, to obviate opportunity for sedition and mutiny among his own people, was urged to quick decision against the foreign enemy. Having determined then upon the hazardous measure of attacking the superior numbers of the Carthaginians within their lines, his disposition for it

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 110.

seems to have been able. Three assaults were to be made at once by the infantry of the army, and a fourth by the crews of the fleet, while the cavalry was to protect retreat, should it become necessary. But either through mistake, or rather, as the sequel shows probable, through treachery, concert was not duly kept. The Italian Greeks, faithful to their engagement, forced the Carthaginian lines on the side next the sea. Failing however of expected support, they were overpowered and driven out again; more than a thousand were slain, and, but for relief from the fleet, all would have been cut off. A body of Sicilian Greeks, attacking on the land side, was equally overpowered, and, after losing six hundred, compelled to withdraw into the town. The cavalry stood, looking on, till the enemy approached them, and then they also withdrew

within the walls.¹ Dionysius, with the body under his more immediate orders, all opportunity of advantage being clearly gone, was the last who retired.

Though his attack was really defeated, yet the state of his own army, rather than any amount of advantage the enemy had gained, made his circumstances now highly critical. Avoiding therefore to notice any misconduct, Dionysius assembled his confidential officers, together with those principal men of Gela, in whose fidelity he trusted, and all agreed that it was inexpedient to persevere in defending the town. Capitulations, in any degree favourable to a besieged place, were then little known; but it seems to have been held a part of the law of nations, among the Carthaginians, not less than among the Greeks, to grant a truce, upon solicitation from the enemy, for burial of their slain. On this was founded a plan for evacuating the city. In the evening a truce for the next day was applied for, to which Imilcon consented; in the same night the whole Geloan people moved under escort of the army, and, while two thousand light-armed remaining in the town deceived the enemy by lighting fires and industriously keeping up the appearance of population, they reached Syracuse unmolested: Dionysius marched to Camarina. Thither at morning dawn the troops left in Gela followed, leaving the unpeopled town to the Carthaginians. Staying only to see Camarina evacuated, which under terror of the Carthaginians was done in zealous haste, Dionysius proceeded with the people under his escort for Syracuse.

The calamity thus befalling two Grecian cities, which Dionysius was sent to protect, afforded opportunities industriously used for exciting discontent

Diod. l. 13.
c. 111.

¹ Comparing Diodorus's account of the conduct of the cavalry in the battle and after it, there seems no room to doubt but their inaction on the former occasion arose from the same motive as their exertion afterward.

in the army. Misery, among both sexes and all ages, abundantly occurring to observation, was attributed to the ambition, or the negligence, or the corruption of Dionysius.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 112.

There was a set of men among the cavalry, as the historian friend of their cause avows, who proposed to assassinate Dionysius on the march; but, though he avoided any show of precaution, yet the attachment and attention of a large majority of the army deterred the attempt.

It seems to have been his humane care of the unfortunate Camarinæans which afforded opportunity for enormities not

Diod. ut ant.
Plut. vit. Dion.

to be foreseen or suspected. Disappointed in their purpose against his person, the conspirators hastened to Syracuse; and, finding nothing prepared to resist them, went directly to his house, forced their way in, and directed their worse than brutal vengeance against his wife, the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates, to whom calumny itself has left no ill imputed. The insult with which they abused her was so shocking (historians have avoided the disgusting report of particulars) that,

Plut. vit. Dion.

unable to bear the thought of again meeting her husband and friends, according to Plutarch, she destroyed herself: Diodorus only says that she was destroyed. It

Diod. l. 14.
c. 44.

is remarkable that such an abominable tale comes from the revilers of Dionysius, advocates for his enemies, advocates even for the detestable authors of the horrid atrocity, as friends of liberty and patriots.

When Dionysius was informed of the secession of certain persons from the army whom he had occasion to suppose unfriendly, he collected instantly a select body, and proceeded to Syracuse, a distance of nearly fifty miles, it is said without halting. About midnight, arriving at the gate of that quarter of Syracuse called Achradina, he found it shut against him. Hostility was thus enough indicated,

but there appeared no sufficient guard to oppose his entrance if he could force the bar. At hand was a large pile of dry reeds, collected for burning lime, and with these he made a fire against the gate, which destroyed it. Meanwhile the infantry of his detachment arriving, he entered the town with a force which, added to that of his friends within, sufficed to overbear what his enemies had been able to collect. The tragedy within his own house was already complete. The conspirators were endeavouring, in various parts of the extensive city, to gain the people to their party. Information that he had entered spreading alarm among them, they hastened to assemble in the agora. There, after an ineffectual resistance, most were put to the sword. Some smaller parties, found in arms in other parts of the town, met the same fate. When opposition ceased, the most eminent and active of the survivors were sought in their own houses, or wherever they might be found, and some were put to death. But, in the tumult unavoidable, and amid passions so provoked, the bitterest enemies of the successful party (and it is from their enemies only we have the account) seem to have found no ground for imputing to them any cruelty or excess of vengeance. Then at length they, who had so long had a majority in the general assembly, retaliated, only in a constitutional way, upon such virulent opponents, procuring a decree of banishment against the more eminent of those who had escaped the swords which they had so incited to vengeance.

This mad effort of the defeated party, so wild in plan, so abominable in fact that, did it not come reported by their decided friends, we might perhaps reasonably withhold our belief of it, seems to have been singularly calculated for putting all Sicily at the mercy of Carthage. Even the talents of Dionysius might have been unable to maintain the Grecian cause, had not a pestilential sickness broken out in the

Diod. l. 13.
c. 114.

Carthaginian army, so rapidly fatal that Imilcon was induced to make overtures to the Syracusan government for an accommodation. Dionysius gladly met the proposal; and a treaty of peace was concluded, embracing all the interests of the island. Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera remained under the Carthaginian dominion; Camarina and Gela were restored to their former possessors, to hold under their own laws and government, but paying a tribute to Carthage, and forbidden to restore their fortifications; the Sicans were to remain under the protection of the Carthaginian government; neither Greeks nor Carthaginians were to control the Sicels; the Leontines together with the Messenians were to be independent; Syracuse was to remain subject to Dionysius. The last article is expressed evidently in the phrase of faction; the historian's own narrative abundantly showing that Dionysius's power in Syracuse never depended in any degree upon any support from Carthage, but, on the contrary, was always the greatest obstacle to the extension of the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily. For the rest the treaty went to establish nothing but what circumstances had produced. Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera would remain subject to Carthage, because the Greeks were too much divided immediately to reclaim them. The return of the Camari-næans and Geloans to their towns, situate at a distance from the other Carthaginian possessions, could not be prevented without a force constantly employed for the purpose, such that the stipulation for tribute, agreed to as the price of their future safety, was a more advantageous bargain for Carthage. The civil strife in Syracuse best secured the independency of Leontini, Messena, and the Sicels.²

² One must live among republics, or at least in a free country, to understand the language of party among republicans. Diodorus did not understand it.

SECTION II.

Fortification of the Port, and Improvement of the naval Arsenal at Syracuse. — Division of Lands. — Extensive Combination against the Administration of Dionysius. — Siege of the Citadel of Syracuse. — Defeat of the Insurgents. — Catastrophe of Entella.

THE deliverance of the Greeks of Sicily from the threatened dominion of Carthage being thus to a degree beyond recent hope effected, two pressing cares remained for the Syracusan administration. While they were to provide means for resisting future attempts of the foreign enemy, the urgency was still greater for them to secure themselves against the measures of the defeated faction, and obviate the repetition of enormities which, as the care of civil, social, and moral order, and the peace of their own families and of those of their fellow-citizens, were their duty, it was incumbent upon them to the utmost of their power to prevent. Diodorus, following Timæus and other party-writers, has imputed to Dionysius the design, from the moment of his appointment to be general, to render himself tyrant of his country, and the actual exercise of monarchical authority, and assumption of royal state, from the dismissal of his first colleagues and his elevation to the dignity of general-autocrat; or, at least, from the decree of the people for a guard for his person. This imputation, with every added calumny that party could invent and propagate, suited the purpose of Plutarch when, wanting the character of a Grecian hero and patriot to compare with the celebrated Marcus Brutus, he selected that of Dion, son

Formerly the republican Greek political dialect was unintelligible through the far greater part of modern Europe; best understood in England, yet little generally even there. France, in her late revolutions, has done much toward illustration of it.

of Hipparinus, who became the principal opponent of the family of Dionysius. But hitherto, in the strange mixture of narrative so candid with invective so illiberal as those of Diodorus, not one evil action appears fixed upon Dionysius; while on the contrary there appears in his conduct, and that of his party, a liberality and clemency unheard of in contest of faction among the Greeks since the time of the magnanimous Pericles. It will be still the duty of the modern investigator of ancient history, avoiding to be led by declamation, to pursue facts and unfold them, so that thence a just estimate may be formed of characters.

The naval force of Syracuse had been formerly very considerable, and to give any security to Sicily against an enemy so powerful by sea as Carthage, a naval force was now absolutely necessary. To this point therefore the administration diligently directed their attention.

B. C. 404.
Ol. 94. 1.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 7.

The great port of Syracuse, even for modern navies, is one of the most commodious in the world. For fleets of the ancient construction, the galley kind, drawing little water, and moved by oars, the little harbour, with all its circumstances, especially when the object was defence against an enemy of overbearing power, had singular advantages. Separated from the great harbour by the island, the site of the original city, it might be entered by two passages, but both so narrow that they might be defended by a small force against the greatest, and it was capable of containing sixty of the largest vessels of war of the age. The island itself had singular advantages for the site of a citadel, to protect the naval arsenal and both the ports.

To improve these natural advantages art was diligently and ably employed. In the island a strong citadel was built, provided with whatever might best enable a garrison to sustain a protracted blockade. Barracks, sufficient to lodge

a large force, were particularly admired for their porticos or covered galleries; highly important in a hot climate, for the health of numbers in confined space. From the citadel a bridge or dam was thrown across the inner entrance of the little harbour by which it communicated with the great port. The entrance from the sea was secured by gates, admitting one vessel only at a time; and a wall was carried from one entrance to the other on the mainland side, so that the vessels in the port were in fact within the garrison. The navy, while measures were thus taken for its security, was diligently increased with new ships.

The writers under the Roman empire, to whom we owe all account of these measures, have mentioned them as singularly calculated to rivet the chains of the Syracusans, and sufficient of themselves to mark the tyranny of Dionysius. But abundant assurance remains, from the far better authority of those who lived among the republics, that the just inference is directly the reverse. At Athens, at Corinth, at Argos, everywhere in Proper Greece, the democratical party always desired to make the state a maritime power, and, with great expense and labour, would connect the city with its port, generally at some distance, by fortifications. The oligarchal party on the contrary always, and tyrants, unless the tyrant were a demagogue, endeavoured to withhold their people from maritime affairs, and were highly averse to long walls, as they were commonly called, for connecting the city with its port. At Syracuse therefore a residence, not in the island in the midst of the seafaring multitude, which was the place appointed for the generals, but rather in Epipolæ, or on the height of Euryelus, would have been their choice. A navy, on its own account, they would have dreaded; but still more, as its expense would necessarily very much lessen their means for maintaining a

great land force of assured fidelity, which alone could give security to tyrannical power.

Diod. 1. 14.
c. 7.

The next measure of Dionysius and his party was a division of lands among the people. This has been generally a favourite measure of democracy, even where involving the grossest violation of property, and of every principle on which civil freedom can have any secure foundation. Whether property was taken from any on occasion of the division of lands at Syracuse, is not said: the historian's expression is simply that much land was given. Confiscated estates perhaps there were, of Daphnæus and Demarchus who had been executed, and of others, slain or banished in consequence of the sedition through which the unfortunate Arete perished. Probably also there were lands distant from the city unoccupied, because occupation would have been too insecure till, by a better administration, security was now provided. This measure took place a little before Critias divided the lands of Attica, under that scheme of atrocious and narrow policy of which we have noticed the overthrow and punishment. Far from any similar project, the party of Dionysius persevered in avoiding even that extent of banishment most ordinary in civil contest among the Grecian republics; pursuing still their former purpose of obviating the necessity for extensive severity by the better policy of conciliating friends enough to overbear disaffection, and by creating an extensive interest in supporting the existing government. The lands were given to citizens, to domiciliated strangers, and to manumitted slaves; to citizens evidently of all parties; for even the partial writers, from whom Diodorus drew his materials, appear to have furnished him with no other ground for invective against Dionysius on the occasion than that his friends obtained the fairest portions. Nevertheless, after having assigned several periods for the beginning of the tyranny, he

finishes with this democratical measure of the distribution of lands : thenceforth, Dionysius, he says, was supported only by a mercenary army ; but with his usual honesty he proceeds immediately to show that it was otherwise, and that the liberality of the Syracusan administration on the contrary still overstepped its policy.

An interest in the contest between the parties of Hermocrates and Diocles, as already observed, extended widely among the Grecian cities of Sicily. The revived contest, in which Dionysius, Hipparinus, and Philistus were opposed to Daphnæus and Demarchus, had hitherto shown itself almost only in Syracuse. But the party of the latter meanwhile had been neither inactive nor unsuccessful among the other cities of the island. The focus of their strength seems to have been the city of Rhegium in Italy. Through measures taken there it seems to have been that the neighbouring city of Messena, where formerly a party

Diod. l. 14.
c. 8.

so warm in the interest of Hermocrates prevailed, was gained to their cause. Nor was it apparently without support from these two states that those Syracusans, who fled on occasion of the sedition in which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates suffered, had established themselves in the town of Ætna, on the southern side of the vast mountain of that name. Thence they held communication with the neighbouring Sicel tribes, and maintained correspondence with those of their party remaining in Syracuse.

These measures were so little suspected by the Syracusan government that, when some inroads of the Sicels for plunder produced the resolution to send an army against them, no selection was used in enrolling citizens for the service. Ordinary as it was among the Grecian republics to deny arms to a defeated party, the liberal administration of Syracuse admitted citizens without distinction. The army marching, in approaching the Sicel territory the generals were assassin-

ated. Through previous concert the refugees of Ætna were at hand. Those of the army loyal to the existing government were thus completely awed ; new generals were elected, and the march was turned directly back to Syracuse. So well had matters been concerted, or so fortunate was the coincidence, that, just on their arrival, a fleet of eighty triremes from Messena and Rhegium entered the great harbour. The land force, proceeding immediately against Epipolæ, the strongest and most commanding, but least populous quarter of the city, took it with little opposition. The surprise was such that Dionysius and the principal men of his party, uncertain how far the spirit of disaffection might have been prepared among the large and various population of Tyche and Achradina, withdrew within the strong fortifications of the island, where they were presently blockaded by land and sea.³

Of the population remaining in the three large mainland quarters of Syracuse, a great part, and perhaps the greatest, was unfavourable to the party of the insurgents. Strong and rapid measures were therefore necessary for the completion of that success which their able conduct and good fortune had already carried far. While therefore they prepared to press the siege of the island, they proclaimed rewards for the assassination of Dionysius and the chiefs of his party, with assurances of kind treatment to all others

³ Pursuing and arranging, not without difficulty, the facts which Diodorus appears to have honestly recorded, and dismissing his observations, we get a tolerably consistent account of this sudden overthrow of a triumphant administration, which, on a first view of his narrative, may appear utterly unintelligible. In the course of the narrative however we find remarkable proof of the inconsistency, so usual with him, which seems to have arisen from no dishonest intention, but from deficiency of judgment in collecting and assorting his materials. He attributes the war against the Sicels to Dionysius, and assigns, as the cause of it, that they co-operated with the Carthaginians ; and yet we find him frequently attributing the power of Dionysius in Syracuse to the support of the Carthaginians. The absurdity of the latter imputation is obvious.

who would desert him. This nefarious mode of warfare however seems to have been as ineffectual as it deserved to be. On the other hand, what Dionysius and those with him wanted was time to look about them, and means to communicate with those well disposed towards them. Proposing capitulation, their proposal was attended to ; whether with any fair purpose by those whose advocates have avowed their encouragement of assassination, may perhaps not unreasonably be doubted.⁴ The purpose of Dionysius probably was only to gain time. It is said he asked permission to quit Sicily with his friends⁵, and that he was allowed to go in safety with persons and effects as far as five triremes might carry. During the negotiation opportunities were gained for communication, while among the be-
Diod. l. 14.
c. 9.
siegiers, not a regular army, but a collection of volunteers, relaxation of effort, and remissness of watchfulness grew. Meanwhile a body of Campanian horse, to the number of twelve hundred, which had been trained to war in

⁴ The expression of Diodorus would rather imply that the treaty was concluded ; but the sequel of his narrative more clearly implies the contrary.

⁵ Who were the confidential advisers of Dionysius, and what their characters, might be known, though what each said, on critical emergencies, would be little likely to come very exactly reported to the public. Thucydides and Xenophon, who had opportunities superior to most men for information, have rarely undertaken to report any but public orations of their contemporaries ; but writers, Greek and Roman, who lived three, four, or five centuries after, have not scrupled to give words spoken in private as if they had taken them in writing on the spot. Diodorus attributes to a poet, Heloris, on this distress of Dionysius, what we find by a much earlier and more authoritative writer ascribed to an unnamed person on a later occasion. It was consulted among the friends of Dionysius whether safety should not be sought either by flight, or by a composition with the enemy. Heloris, or some other, observed, that "a royal station was a noble sepulchre ;" and thus Dionysius was confirmed in his resolution to maintain his post. It seems likely that the saying originated rather among the enemies than the friends of Dionysius, in conversing on the obstinacy of his defence, and that the story, whatever may have been its foundation, was improved in Greece, so as to become such as, in the next age, it was reported by Isocrates ; and moreover that when Diodorus took it up, three centuries after, it had received the farther ornament of a speaker's name, the poet Heloris, and that the siege of the island was preferred as the fittest season for it.

the Carthaginian service, passed to Agyrium, a Sicel town near the Syracusan border, whose chief, Agyris, was friendly to Dionysius. Opportunity being then taken for proceeding by a rapid march to Syracuse, the town was entered by surprise, and the way forced (not without slaughter of some who attempted opposition) clear through into the island, the gate of whose fortification was opened to receive the welcome strangers. Soon after this, three hundred foot, engaged by Dionysius, found means to reach him by sea.

These re-enforcements, especially the cavalry, were important; less as increase of garrison to the island than as they would give means to carry war out of it; and especially as the knowledge of the acquisition would afford encouragement to numerous friends yet living in the quarters of the city possessed by the enemy. Some of these began now to venture the expression of sentiments, not of attachment to the party of Dionysius, but of dissatisfaction with the conduct of those who ruled them. The siege of the island, they said, was vain and ruinous. Treaty should be opened again with those who held it, and more liberal terms offered. The spirit of discussion, put in motion, quickly pervaded the people, and contrary opinions were contested with heat. The popular disposition being thus tried, and the strength of parties nearly ascertained, information of the state of things was communicated to the island. Dionysius then led out his forces in time and circumstances so chosen that, with little resistance, he became master of the city. The slaughter on the occasion, says the historian, as candid in relating facts as illiberal in vilifying characters, was not great; for Dionysius rode about forbidding it. More than seven thousand thus escaped unhurt to *Ætna*.

After this rapid and great success it was among the first cares of Dionysius to have all the slain, without distinction of friends and enemies, buried with due funeral pomp as

fellow-citizens. The piety of this act was what Grecian minds would be very generally ready to acknowledge: its generosity, uncommon, as we have had too much occasion to see, could not but be striking, and its policy is obvious. Singularly adapted to sooth Grecian prejudices, and not less wanted perhaps to soften the vindictive spirit of the party friendly to him than to allay the apprehensions of their adversaries, it was a most advantageous preparative for conciliation, enabling him to extend to the living the generosity which had been shown to the dead. All the fugitives were invited to return to Syracuse with assurance of pardon. Most of those who had families and possessions accepted the offered boon; and none, says the historian, found occasion to repent of their confidence in the faith of their opponents. Nevertheless some in the bitterness of party spirit, and some in the spirit of adventure, adverse to settlement under a regular government, rejected it, and replied to the arguments of those commissioned to press their acceptance of it with indecent insult. "The favour," they said, "which Dionysius had shown to their slain comrades in granting them burial was precisely that which they desired he should receive; and they prayed the gods it might be soon." Whether this, exactly as related, or not without some improvement, became a popular story, its circulation tends to mark the temper of those with whom Dionysius had to deal, and from whom almost alone any account of him has reached posterity. Yet even from those who cherished such a story we learn that he had magnanimity enough not to shut the door of mercy against the scorners, but that on the contrary he continued, not indeed directly, but obliquely, to invite their repentance.⁶

⁶ We have no intimation from Diodorus that he ever followed Philistus, or any other writer friendly to Dionysius. Nevertheless his narrative throughout his Sicilian history, from the Athenian invasion to the death of Timoleon, is

Matters being composed, the Campanian cavalry were to be dismissed, and they left Syracuse well satisfied with the reward they received. Accustomed however to adventure, and probably to waste, they seem to have had no mind to return home to subsist on their scanty savings. Possibly therefore hoping to be received again into Carthaginian pay, they returned toward the Carthaginian settlements at the western end of Sicily. On their way they were received into quarters in the Sicel town of Entella as friends. Whether then quarrel arising with the unfortunate people, or the simple desire of possessing what belonged to others instigated, they slew all the men, took the women for their wives, divided the slaves and other booty, and settled themselves in the place.

SECTION III.

Ministers from Lacedæmon and Corinth at Syracuse. — Sedition at Syracuse. — Measures for the Security and Prosperity of Syracuse. — Refugees expelled from Ætna.

B. C. 404.
Ol. 94. 1.

IT was in the year in which these great and rapid turns of fortune in the contest of parties occurred in Sicily, that in Greece the Peloponnesian war was concluded by the surrender of Athens to the Lacedæmonian arms. The Lacedæmonian government then extended its interference, with the purpose of extending command or influence, to every member of the Greek nation. Aristus

so at variance with his remarks, whether he eulogises, or whether he detracts, that they can hardly have been collected from the same sources. That narrative has evidently been taken, though mostly from a party-writer, yet from one of considerable candour; but the remarks appear to have been drawn from a declaimer, intent only on good stories and strong expressions, and regardless of foundation for his invective. The declaimer nevertheless has probably been eloquent, and his work in esteem for that merit; whence probably, for it is difficult to account for it otherwise, the obloquy of Dionysius in the works of Cicero, Seneca, and other Latin writers.

was sent as its minister to Syracuse. The assumption of authority, such as Lacedæmon exercised among the smaller Grecian states, was not there attempted; no title of harmost was assumed: the business of Aristus seems to have been precisely that of a modern foreign minister, to cultivate a good understanding with Dionysius and his party, which was the party of old connected with Lacedæmon, and to which a good understanding now with the Lacedæmonian government, the proud head of the Greek nation, could not but be flattering and advantageous.

But, in the moment when all those republics which had formerly been adverse to Lacedæmon were brought under its supremacy, a disposition to

Ch. 21. s. 3.
& Ch. 24. s. 2.
of this Hist.

enmity and resistance, as formerly observed, had arisen among those previously most attached to it, and especially in Corinth. That respect, which the people of Syracuse had always a disposition to pay to Corinth as their parent city, we have also formerly had occasion to notice. In Corinth then, under all the existing circumstances, some jealousy of the interference of Lacedæmon at Syracuse could not fail; and in Syracuse the party adverse to that which was connected with Lacedæmon would of course become the Corinthian party. Accordingly, in the year following that in which the Peloponnesian war was concluded, Nicoteles, a Corinthian, was residing in Syracuse, apparently not without some

B. C. 405.
Ol. 94. 2.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 10.

public character. He engaged however deeply in the politics of the city, and he endeavoured to gain Aristus to the party in opposition to the existing government. Aristus thus obtained information of sedition, which he communicated to those in administration; and, whatever privilege Nicoteles might claim, whether as a minister or simply a Corinthian citizen, he was condemned to death and executed.

Hitherto a scrupulous respect for all the forms of a free constitution, according even to the accounts of the most adverse writers, and a lenity singular among Grecian governments, had marked the administration of Dionysius. After such repeated experience of the inefficacy of a generous forbearance to conciliate the disaffected, or induce them to rest, measures more coercive were judged indispensable; but still the extensive executions, and even the extensive banishments, ordinary among the Grecian republics, were avoided. To obviate necessity for these it was resolved to disarm the disaffected. For this strong measure the season of harvest was chosen. It was usual for the great mass of the population then to leave the city, and live for the time in the fields. In some of the southern parts of Europe the harvest management is nearly the same at this day. Farm-houses, as in England, are not seen; even villages are rare. In a good soil and favouring climate few hands do the business of a very imperfect, and yet not unproductive husbandry, till harvest. Then the towns pour forth their inhabitants; the corn is cut, and the grain, immediately trodden out by cattle in the field, is alone brought in. This opportunity then being taken by the Syracusan administration, a general search⁷ for arms was made through the city, and all found were carried to the public armoury, to be given out for use only under direction of the government.

It was so usual among the Greeks for every party in a state to assume exclusively the title of *THE PEOPLE*, and to stigmatise as tyranny every thing adverse to their own power, that, without adverting to these circumstances, no just estimate can be formed of the value of such expressions as those with which Diodorus and Plutarch would cha-

⁷ Diodorus says that all the Syracusans were deprived of arms; but he soon after shows that it was not so.

racterise the administration of Dionysius. Looking to the facts related by them, and especially by Diodorus, the systems of law and of magistracy established by Diocles appear to have remained little if at all altered; nor is any essential difference marked between the power of Dionysius in Syracuse and that which Pericles held so long in Athens. One material change indeed had been growing among the Grecian republics, but not peculiar to Syracuse or the government of Dionysius, the employment of mercenary troops instead of trusting military service to citizens only. This change was threatening enough to the freedom of all Greece; and yet, wherever the government was liberally administered, advantages attended it so satisfactory to individuals on the score of present ease that danger in distant and uncertain prospect was comparatively disregarded. A force of mercenaries at the disposal of the administration of a republic enabled it to avoid pressing upon friends for military duty, and moreover to be lenient to foes. For, in a republic, where parties were nearly balanced, government could hardly go on. Those who held the administration must be watchful as if a foreign enemy was within the walls; and thence the frequent resort to those extensive banishments which we have seen so ordinary. But if a mercenary force was maintained, always ready at the orders of government, the adverse might be deterred from moving, though the friendly citizens rested. In consonance then to the practice of all the republics, the mercenary troops in the Syracusan service were increased, and perhaps not unnecessarily, were the purpose only to resist attack threatened from Carthage. The power of the ruling party would of course by the same measure be rendered more secure, and this double purpose was farther promoted by the addition of a second wall to the fortifications of the citadel.

The attention of the government meanwhile was directed,

and it seems to have been urgently required, toward those most implacable enemies, the refugees in Ætna; formidable apparently not by their own numbers, but by their connection with Messena and Rhegium, and by their situation overhanging the Syracusan territory. They had however ill measured their means altogether when they added contumely to scorn of their adversary's clemency. Their fortress was besieged and taken. What befel themselves, the historian, their friend, has not said; and we may thence conclude that it was no way uncredit-
Diod. l. 14.
c. 14.

able to Dionysius. From the sequel it appears probable that upon surrendering the place they were allowed to withdraw, and that they were mostly the same persons who will recur to historical notice as Syracusan refugees settled in Rhegium.

SECTION IV.

Farther Extension of the Authority of Syracuse in Sicily. — War of Rhegium and Messena against Syracuse. — Establishment of the Syracusan Empire among the Sicilian and Italian Cities.

THE distinction of the Dorian and Ionian branches of the Greek nation, as we have formerly seen, was maintained in Sicily; and in Sicily, as in Greece, a superintending power to lead in war and arbitrate in peace, among so many little independent governments of one people, with whatever inconveniences and dangers attended, was found to be often advantageous, or even necessary. Accordingly the Dorian cities, Camarina excepted, were generally ready to concede the supremacy to Syracuse, as the most powerful of the Dorian name; but the Ionian, called also Chalcidian, as having originated mostly from Chalcis in Eubœa, were generally jealous of this, and often adverse to it. None however of the Ionian cities was eminent enough to pretend

itself to any supremacy. For the common defence of the Grecian interest against an enemy powerful as Carthage therefore, if circumstances appeared at all threatening, and the Syracusan government at the time was of a character to command respect and confidence, they would acquiesce. Circumstances afforded leisure now for the Syracusan government to attend to this, with which domestic troubles had hitherto greatly interfered.

Of the Ionian cities Leontini was nearest to Syracuse, and bordering on its territory. The governing party favoured the Syracusan opposition and the refugees, but there was an opposing party friendly to the Syracusan administration. Dionysius led an army to the Leontine border, in the hope that his appearance alone might suffice to give superiority to the friendly in the popular assembly. Disappointed however, he proceeded to the Sicel town of Enna, where a strong party was adverse to Aimnestus, whom Diodorus calls tyrant of Enna, and through their disputes he became master of the place. He put the popular party in possession of the government, and delivered the tyrant to their mercy; and then, to their great surprise, led his army away without requiring a contribution, which they had supposed, as usual among the Greeks, the principal object of his expedition.

The temper of the writers from whom Diodorus drew the materials of his Sicilian history, for he seems to have had little original opinion, may be gathered from his observations on these transactions. The merit of the conduct of Dionysius, in deposing a tyrant, restoring a free government, and forbearing to use the power in his hands for taking, after the common practice of the Greeks, his own reward, he could not but acknowledge; yet he denies all merit to the man: because, he says, his conduct was founded on no regard for justice, but merely on a view to future advantage,

from the credit to be acquired and the confidence that would accrue. It is obvious that virtuous motive might on the same pretence be denied to all the virtuous deeds of men; nor should it escape observation that deposing a tyrant to establish a popular government could hardly be a tyrant's policy, but rather marks the popular leader of a popular government.

This liberality, likely to extend the reputation and influence of Syracuse, appears immediately to have produced its just reward. Dionysius proposed terms to the town of Diod. I. 14.
c. 15, 16. Erbita. Archonidas, its chief, opposed the reception of them, but they were grateful to a majority of the people. Archonidas migrating with those particularly attached to him, founded a new state at Alesa, which took from him the name of Archonidium. The terms proposed by Dionysius were then acceded to by the Erbitæans, and they were numbered among the allies of Syracuse.⁸

Catana and Naxos, the two principal cities in Sicily of the Ionian name, were the next objects of the Syracusan general. He succeeded in negotiation with both, Diodorus says, through corruption of their generals. Here first we find reported of him measures of rigour which might give some countenance to the invective with which his fame has been sullied. The adverse party of the Catanæan and Naxian people were sold to slavery; the town of Naxos was destroyed, and its territory was given to the neighbouring Sicels. In Catana a colony of Campanians was established; the town and territory probably being given them as payment for military service, to hold under the supremacy of Syracuse. The historian has omitted to say what be-

⁸ Diodorus says that Dionysius made peace with the Erbitæans after an unsuccessful attempt against them; but in a few sentences after he shows that Dionysius's purpose was fully answered, as related in the text.

came of that party among the Catanians and Naxians who had supported their generals in acceding to the Syracusan terms, but it may apparently be gathered from what he proceeds to relate of the Leontines. The reputation and the power accruing to Dionysius from his late successes, and his liberal conduct amid them, seem to have enabled the friendly in Leontini to gain proselytes to their party, so as to obtain a majority in the general assembly. The policy of Dionysius then was the same which we have seen formerly practised by Gelon. He abolished the Leontine government, and admitted the people to the rights of citizens of Syracuse.

Excessive virulence of faction, which appears to have been the common ground of this policy, may have produced the circumstances concealed by the historian, or rather perhaps by those from whom he drew, which occasioned the rigorous treatment of the adverse Catanians and Naxians. In a small city, with contending parties of nearly equal strength, no man could sleep secure. The removal of the whole population to such a town as Syracuse would remove, in a great degree, the objects contended for, and a powerful superintending government might repress the ebullitions of ordinary virulence. But Grecian history will give readily to conceive a spirit of party so violent, and provocations so immoderate, that nothing less than separating the parties completely could prevent fatal consequences; and the general spirit of the policy of Dionysius, as appears even in the accounts of writers so adverse to his fame as those from whom alone we have report of it, would not lead him to useless severities.⁹

⁹ Diodorus speaks of the selling of the Catanians and Naxians, as if the whole of both people were sold; but, as we have already had frequent occasion to observe, the people, in the language of party-writers, was a title only for those of their own party. That it was so on this occasion the historian himself shows; for he mentions friends of the generals who were Catanians and Naxians of the opposite party.

B. C. 402.
Ol. 94. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 18.

To the same adverse pens also we owe all account of the unexampled prosperity which Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, about this time attained; a prosperity, even in their account, sufficiently marking that his administration must have been not only able, but liberal, beneficent, and such as altogether clearly infused a general confidence, both among those living under it, and among foreign states. Nothing indeed among the deficiencies of Sicilian history seems so much to be regretted as the failure of information of the measures that produced this prosperity; which, in the loss of memorials from the party friendly to Dionysius, might have remained wholly hidden from us, but for the evils following from the revived ambition of Carthage. In relating the effects of that ambition, and the resistance to it, some display of the power and resources of Syracuse was unavoidable. It was generally believed, among the Sicilian Greeks, that a pestilential sickness, desolating Africa, had occasioned the delay of attack upon them, long ago threatened. The Syracusans, already enjoying a prosperity which was the envy of surrounding people, were aware that, as they had most to lose, so it behoved them to exert themselves most in guarding against the impending evil. Powerful as they were among Grecian states, their inferiority yet to the force of Carthage was such that defensive war must obviously be their business, and even the means of maintaining a siege among their first cares. Pressed by these considerations, they very generally looked to Dionysius as the only man who had shown himself qualified, by his talents and energy, to direct public measures in such threatening circumstances. Accordingly the authority of general-autocrator, which had been committed to him for the purpose of quelling sedition at home, and giving peace to Syracuse against Grecian enemies, was now continued to him for the purpose of providing defence

against the formidable foreign foe. At what time he lost his colleague Hipparinus we find no mention; but this we gather with certainty, that his friendly connection with the family of Hipparinus remained uninterrupted, and that, within his party, there was no schism.

The works that were executed, under his direction, at the expense of the Syracusan commonwealth, were of a magnitude before unknown among Grecian states. Provision had been made, as we have already seen, for the security of the island, with its port, naval arsenal, and citadel, the last resource in misfortune. It remained to give safety to the population occupying the three large quarters of the town on the mainland, which experience had shown to be very insecure. Dionysius had observed that the craggy hill of Epipolæ, overhanging the town on the northern side, might either give the greatest advantage to a besieging army, or most effectually prevent a complete blockade. Toward the country its height was hardly accessible. Its less precipitous parts wanted fortification; and to provide security for its communication with the rest of the town was important. The best military architects of the age, wherever to be found among Grecian states, were engaged to design the plan, and direct the execution. Sixty thousand Syracusan citizens, if Diodorus might be credited for the number, gave their voluntary labour to the business of building only, while another multitude wrought the stone, and attended six thousand yoke of oxen employed in drawing it. Dionysius, laying aside the severity of manner and tone of dignity which in the office of general he usually assumed, was indefatigable in the difficult task of directing just arrangement, and preserving regularity in the distribution of work among such numbers; present wherever difficulty occurred, careful to provide ready relief for the tired, and bearing, together with his friends and associates in the administration, every hard-

ship, whether of fatigue or weather, incident to the business of ordinary overseers. Such zeal altogether was excited for the accomplishment of the work that many of the labourers would not cease with daylight, but continued their toil through a part of the night. Thus in twenty days a wall of squared stones, sufficiently lofty, and of thickness to defy battering engines, with towers at short intervals, was carried the length of thirty stadia (between three and four English miles), and then the city was supposed impregnable. If there may be here some exaggeration of the hands and of the despatch, the testimony however to the ability, and still more to the popularity of Dionysius, is liable to no suspicion.¹⁰

B. C. 401.
Ol. 94. 3-4.

The quiet of Syracuse and of Sicily was now so far established that, for the year following that of the fortification of Epipolæ, distinguished by the expedition of the younger Cyrus against his brother the king of

¹⁰ The fortifying of Epipolæ having been not only popular, but a work effected only through an uncommon amount of popularity, it is obvious that the previous fortifying of the island could not have been the result of tyranny, or any indication of it. Diodorus has had no purpose of deception, or he would have reversed the order of his story; for had he related that Dionysius, having acquired an undeserved popularity, first led the people to approve and promote zealously the fortifying of Epipolæ, and then, throwing off the mask, had fortified the island to secure the tyranny, it would have been so far not inconsistent; but the incongruity of the contrary course is such that it seems to be accounted for only by the probable supposition, that Diodorus followed one writer for one transaction, and another writer for the other.

Rollin evidently has been greatly puzzled by the utter discordance of numerous facts, reported by Diodorus and Plutarch, with the invective against Dionysius, in which those writers abound. To make his own narrative consistent, it was necessary to choose between them, or it would be impossible not to contradict the character he has given of the tyrant by report of his actions. Whether tragical effect then allured, or he was in any degree biassed by a disposition to decry monarchy, which had already long infected men of letters in France, he has adopted all the invective, and omitted most of the good actions, reported of Dionysius. But he could not omit all without leaving his narrative offensively bare, so that he has not at last avoided greater inconsistency. Indeed, in this part of his work we no longer see the faithful and even judicious historian, which he has shown himself in his account of the earlier times of the republics.

Persia, we find no transaction within the island recorded ; and for the year after again, only a work of peace and prosperity, the founding of a town by Dionysius at the foot of mount Ætna, which, from a temple of some previous fame there, was called Adranum. That prosperity which afterward became remarkable among the Sicilian Greek cities in general, already thus overflowing in Syracuse, seems to have been in this season of leisure extending itself together with the popularity and consequent power of Dionysius ; though, in progress, as commonly happens, it escaped the notice of historians. The extent of his power, and of his popularity, to which he owed his power, is marked by Diodorus in the title attributed to him where he reports the extraordinary works which confessedly his popularity in Syracuse enabled him to accomplish there : he calls him not simply tyrant of Syracuse, but tyrant of the Sicilian Greeks.¹¹

Nevertheless those violent partisans of the administration of Diocles and Daphnæus, now in exile, whom no invitation could conciliate, no generosity soften, had been, with the merit at least of courage, zeal, and activity, not wholly unsuccessful in exciting enemies to the flourishing government of Syracuse. The ruling party in Rhegium, one of the most powerful of the Italian Greek towns, appears always to have favoured their cause. The Rhegians were a mixed people, Dorian and Ionian ; and as by their Dorian blood they esteemed themselves allied to the Syracusans, so by their Ionian, derived from Chalcidians of Eubœa, they

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

¹¹ Ὁ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν τύραννος. Diod. l. 14. c. 11. The Greeks distinguished between Σικελιώτης and Σικελὸς, the former meaning always a Greek, and the latter the old Sicel inhabitants of the island, who were not Greeks ; a distinction in which the Latin language failed. Diodorus seems to have given titles as he found them in the works from which he gathered, where they would vary according to the author's party. His most common description of Dionysius is "tyrant of the Syracusans," but sometimes he substitutes the title of dynast, Συρακυσίων δυνάστης. l. 14. c. 103. & 107.

held as kinsmen the expelled Naxians and Catanians. Common misfortune then uniting the Dorian exiles from Syracuse with the Ionian from Naxos and Catana, their joint influence decided the Rhegian people to assert their common cause against the existing Syracusan government, and especially against Dionysius, as a tyrant whose growing power it behoved them, for their own security, to check before it became irresistible. In the neighbouring city of Messina a large majority were satisfied with the Syracusan alliance; but some men who held leading situations undertook, through what appears to have been really a conspiracy, to bring their state to connection with Rhegium against Syracuse.

Matters being concerted, the Rhegian army crossed the strait into Sicily, to the amount, according to Diodorus, of six thousand foot and six hundred horse, attended by a fleet of fifty triremes. The Messenian leaders, aware of the unpopularity of war with Syracuse, and fearing, even now, to propose it in the general assembly, ventured with the authority of office alone to order the people under arms. The order was obeyed; about four thousand foot and four hundred horse marched, and thirty triremes joined the Rhegian fleet.

On the march however, before the army reached the Messenian border, opportunity occurring for communication, the dissatisfaction generally felt at the arbitrary conduct of their generals and magistrates was made known from one to another, and the army assumed to itself to be the popular assembly, whose authority the generals and magistrates had taken upon themselves to supersede. Laomedon, the principal speaker on the occasion, urged so impressively both the illegality of the order for their assembling and marching, and the inexpediency of the proposed war, that the resolution was taken to refuse obedience to the generals, and to return home; which accordingly was done. The

Rhegian chiefs, disappointed of their expected support, no longer hoping to prevail against the power of Syracuse, ministers from both cities were sent to treat of accommodation. Dionysius, following still a wise and liberal policy, readily forgave, and persuaded the Syracusan people to forgive, the injurious conduct of the Rhegian many and the Messenian few. The historian's silence implies that no severity was insisted on, even against the refugees, those inveterate enemies who excited the mischief. His whole account of the treaty is comprised in three words of large expression, "Peace was made." The result appears to have been that the influence of the Syracusan government, or, in the phrase which has been commonly used to express a similar influence of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, the Syracusan empire, was extended very generally over the Grecian towns of Italy; and thence Dionysius, in his capacity of autocrator-general of Syracuse, has been called sometimes tyrant, sometimes dynast, sometimes king, of Sicily and Italy.

CHAPTER XXXI.

AFFAIRS OF THE SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEK CITIES
FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYRACUSAN EMPIRE
TO THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS.

SECTION I.

*Motives and Preparations for War with Carthage. — Marriage of
Dionysius with the Daughter of Xenetus of Locri. — Injurious
Treatment of the Carthaginian Subjects in the Grecian Towns.
— Successful Beginning of the War.*

THE whole Grecian interest in Sicily being thus placed in
B. C. 400.
Ol. 95. 1.
circumstances of tranquillity and prosperity, each
city holding its separate popular government
under the superintendency of the Syracusan administration,
and the confederacy strengthened by extension to the Italian
cities, alarm nevertheless remained and was increasing from
the power and the policy, the liberal and seducing policy, of
Carthage. For though it appears that the advantages were
great, and among the Greeks uncommon, which the admini-
stration of Dionysius provided for the Sicilian towns
Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.
within the Grecian line, yet numbers of Greeks
were induced by greater advantages or more
flattering hopes, offered in the towns under the Carthaginian
dominion, to establish themselves there. It is interesting to
find from a prejudiced adversary, for such Diodorus was to
the Carthaginians as well as to Dionysius, this substantial
and unsuspecting testimony to the liberality and good faith
of a great people, whose fair fame, not probably exempt

from real stain, has however suffered singularly from invidious and base detraction.

Had the history of Philistus remained, we should probably have gained information of other circumstances which induced or impelled Dionysius to disturb the tranquillity, to check the prosperity, and to risk the utter overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by beginning war with Carthage. In the want of this there might appear some wildness of unjustifiable ambition in the measure, if the omission of Diodorus, and all other writers, to impute any blame to him on the occasion did not carry strong implication that they had nowhere found any imputed, and that none was imputable.

Carthage, according to Diodorus, was yet weak from the pestilence which had widely desolated Africa; and throughout the Sicilian Greek towns there was a strong disposition to engage in the war, with a desire that Syracuse should take the lead in it, and that Dionysius, who was universally popular, should command the forces. Thus, in the avowal of his enemies, there appears to have been enough to invite ambition. But there was probably farther cause. The power of Carthage, growing abroad by policy even during its weakness at home, could not but hold out encouragement to ambition for those who obtained the direction of it. Meanwhile the Greek cities, the more they flourished, were, under popular government, the more difficult to be kept in order. If then popular discontent grew, as the historian's account indicates, at the migrations to the Carthaginian towns, war might have followed from the indiscretion of some one state, which must in the end have involved all, or left the Grecian interest weakened by the loss of one or more members, which would have endangered all.

But whatever were the aggregate considerations, Dionysius resolved to use the concurring opportunities of the weakened

state of Carthage and his own popularity in Sicily, with the general disposition of the Sicilian Greeks toward the measure, for attacking rather than await attack. He did not however involve his country in a measure of so much hazard without the most careful circumspection, and the most diligent exertion of his own uncommon abilities in preparation.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.

From all parts of Sicily, Italy, Greece, and even from the Carthaginian dominions, were invited men of science to devise and direct, and artisans to execute, whatever might give superiority to the Syracusan armies and fleets. All the porticos or public galleries, all the gymnasia or places of exercise, and even the vestibules and opisthodomies of the temples, were filled with such men and their works. Two great improvements in the ancient art of war, one for the land service and one for the sea, according to Diodorus, had hence their origin. That artillery, which afterward so much promoted the victories of the Roman armies, machinery for shooting darts and stones of size far beyond the strength of man's arm to throw, (Diodorus calls it the catapeltic,) was now either invented, or first perfected so as to be valuable for practice. Dionysius is said himself to have devised the last great improvement of the ancient marine. Holding to the principle of the trieris or trireme, hitherto the most powerful vessel of war, against which no other could stand in contest, he improved the application of that principle by adding two benches of oars on each side of the galley. Thenceforward the trireme could no longer resist the impulse, superior both by weight and swiftness, of the penteris or quinquereme. Timber was brought from Ætna, whose sides, at this day nearly bare, then abounded with pine; and from Italy, a country yet affording in plenty the finest oak, of which France, partly owing to greater population, partly to its colder winters, requiring larger supply of fuel, has been long exhausted.

Syracuse possessed a hundred and ten ships of war. These were put under repair, and the construction of two hundred more, some of the superior rate, was undertaken. Already a hundred and fifty receptacles for securing ships against injury from weather, a sort of larger boat-houses, were among the conveniences of the naval arsenal. To make the increased strength of the navy lasting, a hundred and fifty of superior construction, and mostly capable each of containing two ships, were now added. Syracusan citizens were appointed to make half the complement of this great fleet; the other half it was proposed to supply by mercenaries.

While these things, under favour of a most extraordinary zeal among the Syracusan people, were proceeding rapidly, Dionysius directed his view diligently to all the Greek towns of Sicily and Italy, and was generally successful in cultivating their friendship.¹ His greatest anxiety, as his greatest difficulty, was to secure the fidelity of Messena and Rhegium to the common cause of the Greeks; having great reason to suspect that the party in those towns, connected with the Syracusan refugees, would not scruple to join the Carthaginians.² He

B. C. 398.
Ol. 95. 2-3.

¹ Diodorus, in his account of preparation for war with Carthage, drops many strong expressions showing the popularity of Dionysius in Syracuse and throughout the Greek towns of Sicily, and the general zeal to act under his orders: 'Απάντων σπειδόντων τέλει τὸ τεταγμένον—πολλὴ μὲν ἔρις ἐγένετο—τοσαύτη σπουδὴ τοῖς πλείεσιν ἐνεπιπτώκει, l. 14. c. 18. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαίρεσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, c. 41. Συγκαταίνους ἔλαβε τοὺς Συράκουσίους, c. 45. Ταῖς κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεις φιλανθρώπων περισφέριτο, τὴν εὐνοίαν αὐτῶν ἐκκαλοῦμενος, c. 44. Συνεστρατεύοντο γὰρ αὐτῷ προθύμως ἅπαντες, c. 47. These sentiments, if they were his own, or these expressions, whencesoever borrowed, are evidently of a different source from the obloquy with which he abounds against Dionysius. It seems as if he had quite forgotten his foregoing assertion that the Syracusans showed themselves ready to bear anything rather than obey the tyrant.

² We cannot but give credit to Diodorus for so honestly confessing that his favourite party was guilty of that very crime which he so repeatedly and so inconsistently imputes to Dionysius. The confession is explicit enough: Τοὺς δὲ Ῥηγίους τε καὶ Μεσσηνίους ὁρῶν ἰκανὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντας συνεταγμένην, ἐλάβετο μὴ ποτὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διαβάντων εἰς Σικελίαν ἐκίνοις πρόσθενται.

succeeded with the Messenians by giving them a considerable tract of land (from whom acquired the historian hath not said) as an addition to their territory. No similar opportunity being open for cultivating popularity among the Rhegians, he proposed to form a connection of interest with them in a very different way.

Ch. 26. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We have already had occasion to notice that republican jealousy which restrained social communication among the Greeks, and, especially by the interdiction of marriage between those of different republics, insulated the people of each, and made all, more than is common between great nations even of different languages, foreigners to each other. Such illiberal jealousy, and every prejudice tending to produce it, could not but operate to the hindrance of the political union necessary to maintain a nation in independency, and especially necessary now to support the Grecian interest in Sicily against the threatening superiority of Carthage. It seems to have been with a view to prepare for a union of the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities that Dionysius proposed to set an example for diffusing family connections among them. Whether the Olynthians, in their yet infant confederacy, gave the example, or whether they owed it to Dionysius, is a question involved in the same obscurity with many much more important which occur for reasonable curiosity about both the Olynthian and Syracusan governments. Nearly twenty years however before that war which produced the overthrow of the Olynthian system, and gave occasion for all the information remaining concerning it, Dionysius made a formal application to the Rhegian people for permission for himself to marry the daughter of a Rhegian citizen. Without having observed

Diod. l. 14.
c. 44. & 107.
Strab. l. 6.
p. 258. Plut.
vit. Dion.

Ἀ δὲ λίσαν ἀγωνιῶν ὁ Διονύσιος, τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἔδωκε πολλὴν τῆς ἐμέρου χώραν, ἰδίους αὐτοὺς κατασκευάζων ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις. Diod. l. 14. c. 44.

how unusual the thing was among the Greeks, it might appear equally strange that such application should have been necessary, and that it should have met, as we are assured it did, with a denial. But though it was in Rhegium that he particularly desired to cultivate an interest, yet he might promote his general purpose by taking a wife from any of the principal Italian Greek cities. Applying therefore at Locri he found more liberality. Nevertheless there, equally as at Rhegium, the people were to be assembled, and their decree was to authorise the permission. This being obtained, Xenetus, the most illustrious of the Locrians, readily betrothed his daughter Doris to Dionysius. While all the writers, from whom mention of these remarkable transactions remains, call Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, every circumstance in their report indicates a studied deference to popular government.

Dionysius also married Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, the most illustrious, wealthy, and powerful of the Syracusans, his colleague in the high office of captain-general. The story seems to have been some ages after popular that he married both these ladies on the same day; but, though adopted both by Diodorus and Plutarch, whose prejudices it suited, it appears highly improbable. The marriage with the daughter of his colleague, the first man of Syracuse in family dignity, were no prejudices shocked, were offence of no kind given by peculiar circumstances attending it, would of course carry those advantages which one in the situation of Dionysius would seek. The extension of nuptial connection to other cities also, though against the general habits and prejudices of the Greeks of his own day, was but a revival of what was enough known to have been the practice of their forefathers of the heroic ages; and a great and liberal policy is obvious in it, such as, according to all accounts, would be likely to be the

policy of Dionysius. The writers who report this bigamy mention no violence attending it, no offence taken at it. On the contrary, it appears in their account that the families of both the ladies were always upon good terms with Dionysius; so that by one match he actually strengthened his interest in Syracuse, and by the other, in Italy. According to their account also children followed immediately his marriage with the Locrian lady, but not till after some years by the daughter of Hipparinus. It seems then altogether every way probable that Doris, mother of the younger Dionysius, was dead before the nuptials took place with Aristomache, mother of the younger Hipparinus; and that the story of the bigamy originated, from something perhaps at first loosely said in the violence of the party heat which we shall see, some years after the death of the elder Dionysius, afflicted Syracuse, and, through Syracuse, all the Grecian interest in Sicily.³

Another imputation against Dionysius seems better founded, being in some degree confirmed by the venerable Athenian rhetorician his contemporary, Isocrates. Like Themistocles, a love of splendour was the weakness of his great mind. Probably however this has been exaggerated; though the gilt galley which is said to have brought one bride from Locri, and the chariot with four white horses which conducted the other from the house of her own family in Syracuse, imply nothing that will appear to the modern reader either very invidious or very extraordinary. We might therefore excuse the writers who dwell on these matters their omission of all information about the sources

³ Should it be reckoned that a supposition, howsoever supported by probabilities, ought not to be maintained against the positive assertions of Diodorus and Plutarch, with whatever improbabilities embarrassed, unless some warrant of ancient authority can be found, I would refer to Cornelius Nepos, whose account of Dionysius appears clearly to involve a virtual contradiction of the bigamy.

of private income which could supply the magnificence, if they would have given us some account of the public revenue which afforded means for the vast preparations, naval and military, at the same time made, and afforded encouragement to undertake the various expenses of the arduous war to ensue. But on this interesting subject also the information remaining is unfortunately defective. Notice of it, such as it is, may best remain for the sequel.

According to the explicit declaration of Diodorus himself, Dionysius at this time was in no shape or degree tyrant, in the ancient any more than in the modern sense of the word. The guard for his person, formerly decreed by the people, was evidently but a temporary resource, usual among the Grecian democracies, which the necessity of the moment justified. As general of the re-
Diod. l. 14. c. 18. 41. 45.

public, without a guard, and without any pomp, he superintended the business of the fortifications, the dock-yards, and the armories, conversing familiarly with the artisans, receiving those of superior merit at his table, inciting thus a zeal and diligence of which even his enemies spoke with wonder, commanding general respect through mere superiority of character, and establishing a popularity such as Grecian history nowhere else exhibits, not even in the great Pericles. In circumstances thus favourable
B. C. 398. Ol. 95. 2-3. Diod. l. 14. c. 45.

preparations being sufficiently forward, by virtue of his office he summoned the people to assemble, and proposed war with Carthage: "It was a war," he said, "not of ambition, but truly of self-defence, to which the critically advantageous opportunities of the moment invited. For that ambitious republic was yet weak through the ravages of the pestilence, and its command over the conquered Grecian cities, loosely held, might by a vigorous effort be snatched from it. But its purposes of conquest, necessarily intermitted, were not abandoned, and the means of

opposing them, which the present moment offered, if now neglected, might never recur." The Syracusan people, pre-disposed to the sentiments of their general, assented with zeal, and the decree for war was voted.⁴

⁴ Συμπεροθυμουμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, κ. τ. λ. c. 41.

The incongruity into which Diodorus has been led, apparently in collecting narrative from one writer and invective against Dionysius from others, is often curious, and not least so here. After declaring that the government of Syracuse, under Dionysius, was perfectly mild and highly popular, Ἀπειτίθετο γὰρ ἥδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ, μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἔρχετο πᾶν ὑποταγμένον, — ταχὺ συγκαταίνους ἔλαβε τοὺς Συρακουσίους, c. 45.; that the general zeal to obey his directions and gratify his wishes was extraordinary, c. 18.; that the mildness of government was extended to all, without distinction of party; that all the citizens were armed; that Dionysius avoided to use the authority of his office for engaging mercenary troops till the moment when they were wanted against the foreign enemy; and finally, that the great object of all his preparations was war with Carthage; after all this the historian proceeds to tell us that Dionysius owed his power in Syracuse to his army of mercenaries and the support of Carthage; that the Syracusans acceded to the proposal made by him for war with Carthage because they hated the Carthaginians for supporting him, and because they hoped that, as Dionysius allowed them arms, the chance of war would furnish opportunity for recovering their liberty.

The inconsistencies of Diodorus, where the thread of history depends upon his narrative, are often very vexatiously perplexing; and, in his general business of abridging, he rarely avoids some confusion; but still more, whenever he undertakes to compound, a mass of incongruity is apt to result. Nevertheless as in copying he seems always to have been faithful, not only he shows often plainly what a more artful writer, with his prejudices, would have concealed, but sometimes he furnishes a thread's end, discoverable on careful examination, to help toward some unravelling of his incongruities. Such a thread's end appears in his observation, that the Syracusans hoped, with the possession of arms, to find, among the chances of war, opportunity for recovering their liberty: "Ἡλπίζον ἑαυτοὺς, κυριεύσαντας ὅπλων, ἐὰν ἡ τύχη δῶι καιρὸν, ἀντιλήψεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Applied to the Syracusans generally, there is no guessing what this can mean in any connection with what has preceded: it is as incongruous as the notion that Dionysius depended upon Carthage for his power in Syracuse while he was taking measures for war with Carthage, and that he would quarrel with his supporters to give opportunity for resistance to his dominion. But if we take the term Syracusans to mean only the relics of that party in Syracuse which had been so obstinately and bitterly opposing him, who, in the way of party, would call themselves eminently the Syracusans; and if we take the term liberty to mean, as it so generally did, the power and prevalence of the party; then the observation will be found probably just; and the inference will be that numbers of the adverse party were yet living in Syracuse, and that all were trusted with arms. Combining it then with what precedes, we gather that, while all joined in pretending union in political sentiment with the majority of their fellow-citizens, and satisfaction with the government

On the dismissal of the assembly then, after having thus exercised their sovereign authority in legal form, the ill-thinking many, feeling their power above law, with heated minds, would exercise it in their own way. Many Carthaginian traders, residing in Syracuse, had large property in their warehouses, and many Carthaginian vessels, some richly laden, were in the harbour. Warehouses were forced, vessels were boarded, and Carthaginian property, wherever found, was the prey of unprincipled rapacity. This violence of the Syracusans was as a signal for the other Grecian towns of Sicily; and in many places the people, not confining themselves to robbery, treated the persons of the Carthaginian traders and residents with wanton and extreme cruelty. It was not indeed the proper sovereign that did this; for, in a regular democracy, then only the people were properly sovereign when they were assembled according to law, and voted according to law; but it was so large a portion of those in whom unlimited sovereign power was by the constitution vested that restraint upon them was impossible. Diodorus, who with the too commonly illiberal spirit of both Greek and Roman patriotism, seems rather to have approved the villany, allows Dionysius credit for a share in it no farther than that he took no effectual measures of prevention.

This gross violation of the law of nations and of common honesty did not immediately lead to actual war. Probably some negotiation followed, and some apology may have been made by the government for the lawless violence of the populace, though Diodorus says no more than that Dionysius considered of sending ministers to Carthage. In the next spring a herald was sent formally to announce to the Carthaginian government the

B. C. 397. Ol.
95. 3. Diod.
l. 14. c. 47.

administered by Dionysius, the gall of party remained in their minds, and they were still always ready for sedition.

decree of the Syracusan people for war; proposing, as the only condition on which it might be avoided, the renunciation of all claim over Grecian towns in Sicily. This minister, notwithstanding the atrocious conduct of the Greeks, was received by the Carthaginian government as became the government of a civilised and great people. He was allowed to deliver the writing he bore to the executive magistrates, who regularly communicated the contents to the senate and the popular assembly. Deliberation was held on the contents: the proposal was rejected, and the herald was dismissed.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 47.

On the return of the herald to Syracuse regular war began. The forces of all the Greek cities of the eastern part of the island, being assembled under Dionysius as commander-in-chief, marched by the southern coast: a fleet of two hundred ships of war and five hundred store-vessels attended. Well-conducted negotiation among the towns previously swayed by the authority or influence of Carthage had prepared all to concur in the Grecian cause. The strength of Camarina, Gela, and Agrigentum joined Dionysius as he passed; that of Himera

c. 53.

crossed the island to meet him. Even Selinus was gained, and the Sicels seem to have contributed largely to swell his numbers, reported to have amounted to eighty thousand foot with more than three thousand horse. The purpose was evidently no less than to drive out the Carthaginians, and make Sicily completely a Grecian island. At the approach of so formidable a force, no succour appearing at hand, all the Sican tribes hastened to make submission, and the town of Eryx surrendered on the first summons. Motya seems alone to have prepared for resistance. That town, singularly well built, strong by situation on a small island connected with the main by a causeway six furlongs in length, was the principal residence

of the wealthy traders of Carthage in Sicily. Dionysius, having disposed everything for the siege, left the prosecution of it, with a sufficient land force, to his brother Leptines, commander-in-chief of the fleet. Himself, with the main body of his army, marched to collect plunder; a measure to his day from that of Homer generally not less necessary for maintaining an invading army than politic as distressing the enemy. Having overrun without resistance the territories of Ancyraë, Solus, Egesta, Panormus, and Entella, he returned to press the siege of Motya.

It appears that Dionysius had not less well chosen his time than well arranged his measures. Diod. l. 14.
c. 47.

Carthage was not yet prepared to meet his extraordinary exertions. But Imilcon, again appointed commander-in-chief for the Sicilian war, showed no small amount of spirit and ability in the conduct of an inferior force against him. Instead of pressing to the point attacked, when he could give no effectual relief, he sent ten ships to surprise the harbour of Syracuse itself while the fleet was absent, and the bold attempt succeeded. Much shipping was destroyed, and the assailing squadron withdrew little injured. Probably he hoped for greater effect from his success. But Dionysius was too well assured of the people at home, too well prepared with his plans abroad, and altogether too firm to his purpose to be diverted from it, as Diocles had formerly been from the relief of Himera. Imilcon then, having collected a hundred ships, resolved to attempt the relief of Motya. But for this also management and surprise were necessary: he could not yet face the Grecian fleet at sea. But he found opportunity to fall upon a detached division of it at anchor, of which he destroyed a part and disabled most of the rest. Seizing then the favouring moment, he boldly pushed into the harbour, where, according to the usual way of the ancients, the c. 49.

rest of the galleys of war were hauled upon the beach. All the ability of Dionysius was wanted, so complete was the surprise, to repel this well-conducted attack upon a very superior fleet, within ready reach of support from a powerful land force. His resource, instead of risking to launch his galleys, and get his crews aboard amid the tumult of action, was to bring down his land force, supported by his new engine, the catapelt, and to drag his vessels to the other side of the causeway, where his crews might be collected and naval action prepared for in some leisure. His engine is said to have been of great service by the execution it did, and still more by the alarm of the enemy at a power so new to them. Imilcon, disappointed in his daring attack by the effect of this new implement of war, and by the mode of retreat adopted by Dionysius, and justly judging it imprudent to wait till a superior naval force could be brought against him, withdrew and returned to Africa.

The Motyenes, left thus to their own strength, defended the place through the summer. Toward winter, through
Diod. l. 14.
c. 53. the improved art of Dionysius, seconded by abundant force, it was carried by assault. The cruelty of the Sicilian Greeks then spared neither age nor sex. By the confession of their fellow-countryman and panegyrist, Diodorus, it was enormous. Dionysius exerted himself to restrain it, but every attempt to interfere directly by authority proved vain. Nevertheless, not abandoning his humane purpose, he sent heralds around proclaiming to the troops that the plunder of the town, from which their rage for blood had diverted their attention, was theirs, and at the same time directing the wretched suppliants and fugitives to the temples which the Greeks were most likely to respect. Thus a miserable remnant of the Motyenes was saved from slaughter, but only to be sold to slavery. Some Greeks, found bearing arms for the Carthaginians, were crucified.

Dionysius seems to have had little credit with his fellow-countrymen for his humanity toward their enemies; but his liberality and judgment in rewarding merit, wherever it had been conspicuous in his own army, were acknowledged. Having arranged other matters, he trusted the care of Motya to a garrison composed mostly of Sicels, but under a Syracusan commander. A hundred and twenty ships of war then being left under the orders of his brother Leptines, with a land force, for the blockade of Entella and Egesta, he returned home with the rest of the army and fleet for the winter.

SECTION II.

Great Preparations of Carthage. — Campaign in Sicily. — Destruction of Messina.

IF Dionysius, in beginning the war under no more pressure of immediate necessity than Diodorus has stated, may appear to have miscalculated the resources of Carthage, this will hardly afford ground for thinking lightly of his abilities or foresight. Political arithmetic had not then the grounds which the circumstances of modern Europe afford; and even in modern Europe events have often baffled all previous calculation. In the spring following the taking of Motya the Carthaginian government had collected a force greater than was probably supposed within their means. Diodorus has been desirous of credit for the report which made the troops for the Sicilian war three hundred thousand foot and four thousand horse; though he confesses that the contemporary Sicilian writer, Timæus, reckoned the army which passed from Africa only one hundred thousand, strengthened however afterward by thirty thousand Sicilians. Imilcon, still the commander, was raised on the occasion to a dignity familiar

B. C. 396.
Ol. 95. 4-96. 1.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 54.

to the Carthaginian constitution, which the Greeks often expressed by their term which corresponds with their title of King.⁵

While this great armament was yet preparing, Dionysius opened the campaign by marching again to the western end of the island, and repeating or extending plunder and waste

Diod. l. 14.
c. 54.

of the territories yet holding for Carthage. The Halicyæans obviated the evil by offers of submission, which were accepted. The collection of booty having been carried as far as conveniently might be, he sat down before Eggesta, of which it was much his object to become master. But the garrison was determined, and the operations of the siege were greatly checked by a well-conducted sally, in which fire was so spread about the station of the cavalry of the besieging army that most of the horses perished by the flames.⁶

c. 55.

Meanwhile the passage of the Carthaginians to Sicily had difficulties peculiar to the ancient naval system. The ships of war and the ships of burden, from the wide difference in their construction, were ill qualified to keep company. The former, long ships, as they were called, all row-galleys, could go any way at pleasure in a calm; but a wind the most direct in their course, unless very moderate, was formidable. On the contrary the latter, round ships, as the Greeks termed them, in form approaching our vessels for ocean navigation, wanted wind, and could bear it. Imilcon sailed with a favouring breeze, suiting both his long ships and his round ships, and it was the more

⁵ Isocrates says that in Carthage, as in Lacedæmon, the civil government was oligarchal, the military kingly. Nicocles, p. 118. t. i.

⁶ Τῶν δ' ἱππίων οἱ πλείστοι ταῖς σκηναῖς συγκατακαύθησαν. Rhodoman has ventured to render ἱππίων by the word *equorum*. Wesseling has ill altered this by substituting *equitum*. The difficulty of saving horses from fire surrounding them is well known; and it seems little doubtful but the copy of the original, and not the translation, wanted correction.

necessary for them to hold company on account of the extreme deficiency of burden of the long ships, which denied room for almost the smallest quantity of stores. But the wind shortly increased, so that the ships of war could no longer safely keep their course. The fleet therefore separated. The ships of war, bending eastward, ranged the African shore; which, with shelter from the blast, gave them also smooth water. The ships of burden meanwhile profited from the gale to cross the deep. But, to reach the Carthaginian harbours of Sicily, all on the northern coast, they must pass Motya, now the station of the Grecian fleet; and, wanting the compass, it was hazardous not to assure themselves of their course by sight of the western promontory, before they turned eastward for Panormus, their appointed port. To see, they must of course risk being seen; and Dionysius, watchful at all points, obtained intelligence that they were approaching, unprotected by ships of war. Leptines, with a ready squadron, hastened to intercept them. Had the weather fallen calm, he might probably have given an important check to the Carthaginian expedition. Adverse as the roughness of the sea was to his operations, he sunk some of the ships by the stroke of the beak, but the greater part sailed from him. On the first abatement of the wind Imilcon followed the Greeks with a force too great for them to meet, and he joined his transports and storeships in the harbour of Panormus.

The very fame of the arrival of such a force made a great change in Sicily. The fidelity of the Sicans to their new engagements with the Syracusans was at once shaken; the Halicyæans hastened to atone for their recent defection by demonstration of zeal to renew their connection with Carthage. These advantages having thus accrued without effort, Imilcon directed his first measures to the recovery of Motya, critically situated for communication with the African shore,

or, in an enemy's hands, to prevent communication between that shore and all the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily. Dionysius was pressing still the siege of Egesta. Imilcon, passing almost in sight of that place in marching to Motya, gave him no disturbance. Hasty decision by battle was not necessary to either general, as commonly it was among the little republics of Greece; and Imilcon, not less than Dionysius, seems to have been aware of a superior mode of warfare.

But the very superior force of the Carthaginians, by sea and by land, while the people of the western end of Sicily, always disposed to a preference of the Carthaginian to the Grecian connection, wanted only such encouragement to declare it, at once reduced Dionysius to great difficulties. He could not relieve Motya without a battle, in a country now to a great extent hostile, against a force which he could not prudently attack. The reduction of Egesta, if he might hope for it, would no longer answer his former views. The Sicans having universally declared for the Carthaginians, some of the Sicel tribes would be likely to join the rising power, and in all the Grecian towns the party adverse to the existing administration, a party, as we have seen, in some places holding communication with the Carthaginians, would be moving. Under these and probably still other considerations, Dionysius resolved to raise the siege of Egesta. Leaving Motya to its fate, in whose garrison of Sicels perhaps he had no perfect confidence, he proceeded to direct his more immediate care to the eastern parts of the island. Motya then soon yielded to the Carthaginian arms; nor is any retaliation for the cruelties exercised there by the Greeks imputed by the Greek historians.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 56.

Free communication with Carthage being thus restored for the Carthaginian armament, Imilcon resolved to proceed, as immediately as conveniently might

be, against Syracuse itself, whose fall would involve that of all the rest of Sicily. The situation of the Carthaginian possessions led him to take the road of the northern coast, on which those possessions extended near half the length of the island. His vast fleet attended the motions of his army. The submission of Himera, offered on his approach, was favourably received. Cephaledion, Solus, and some other small places were little capable of resistance. All the northern coast of the island yielded almost without a blow; and the Messenians, at its extremity, debated whether to follow the example of Himera. After warm contest however the resolution to resist prevailed.

But this resolution seems to have been the result of party feelings rather than of any just consideration of means. Long ill-governed, and distracted by faction, Messena was very deficiently fortified. On the western side indeed, by which the Carthaginians approached, the mountain ridge of Peloris formed a very advantageous rampart, leaving only one practicable pass, another Thermopylæ, against the sea. That pass was occupied, but to little purpose; Diod. l. 14. c. 57. for Imilcon halting his army, sent his fleet forward, which entered the harbour of Messena unopposed. The previous removal of families and effects fortunately had made the defence of the town of less importance. In the vain attempt a few only of the remaining garrison fell: the greater part escaped by flight to the neighbouring mountain fastnesses. Above two hundred, whose retreat by land was intercepted, threw themselves into the sea with the purpose of swimming to the Italian shore. About fifty succeeded; the rest were drowned.

The superiority of the Carthaginians being thus substantially demonstrated, the Sicels hastened to follow the example already set, not only by the Sicans, but by so many even of the Greeks, to make terms for them- c. 58.

selves ; the Assarine tribe alone holding faithfully their engagements with the Syracusans. Three-fourths of the island might now be considered as subdued ; and the possession of the harbour of Messena gave great opportunity for intercepting succour to the remaining Greek possessions, not only from Italy, but, according to the ordinary course of Grecian navigation, also from Peloponnesus. The means of Syracuse for defence thus were so narrowed that its fall seemed nearly assured.

Ch. 18. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Dionysius meanwhile had been diligent in arranging what yet remained in his power. The policy of Pericles, in the Peloponnesian war, voluntarily to abandon the country and confine all measures of defence to the walls of Syracuse, could not be his policy. However the walls might resist assault, the superiority of the Carthaginian fleet, excluding supplies by sea, would make such resistance finally ineffectual. But the Syracusan territory, larger than that of most of the states of Proper Greece, was not, like many of them, without refuge for its people but within the walls of the capital : it abounded with castles for the protection of its fields ; each capable of strong resistance with a very small garrison against great numbers using the ancient manner of attack. These he supplied largely with provisions. The Syracusan territory, including the subject lands of Leontini, Catana, and Naxos, was also advantageously bounded for defence. Dionysius therefore gave his particular attention to the northern border, where the mountain *Ætna* divided it from the Messenian, whence attack was expected. He carefully strengthened the citadel of Leontini as a central post, and made it a magazine whence other places might be supplied. He persuaded the Campanians, whom he had established in Catana, a place ill-fortified, and a post less important, to remove to the town of *Ætna*, lately the stronghold of the Syracusan exiles. He was not equally fortunate

in maintaining his influence with the Sicels, to whom he had given the town of Naxus, critically situated near the point where the northern root of the great mountain meets the sea. For, as Imilcon's power was alarming, so his liberality was alluring. At his invitation they broke faith with Dionysius, and, moving from Naxus, a place of little strength, they fortified for themselves a post on the neighbouring height of Taurus. Hence originated the town afterward called Tauromenium, now Taormina. To obviate then, as far as might be, the evils of this defection, Dionysius took his own station at Naxus, with an army said to have been of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; the fleet of a hundred and eighty ships of war attending to co-operate with him.

Imilcon, pursuing his purpose against Syracuse, moved his fleet and army at the same time Diod. l. 14.
c. 59. from Messina southward. But before he reached the Naxian territory, an eruption happened from Ætna, and the fiery matter, pouring toward the sea, completely stopped the march of his troops. It thus became necessary to part from his fleet, making a long circuit round the mountain's base, whose complete circumference is estimated one hundred miles.

In choice of dangers for Dionysius an opportunity thus was offered beyond his hope, though yet little affording any fair prospect of success. He nevertheless resolved to use the advantage, such as it might be, for engaging the enemy's very superior fleet during the army's absence. Leptines commanding led the charge with a courage that c. 60s earned the eulogy of those bitterest of enemies, party-enemies; but the unfortunate result gave ground for blaming his conduct. He was defeated, with the loss, it is said, of no less than a hundred ships, and two thousand men. Catana, immediately occupied by the conquerors,

was made their naval station, whence, more conveniently than from the greater distance of Messena, operations might be carried against Syracuse. Whether to punish any ill-faith of the Messenian people and hold out an example of terror, or with what other view, remaining accounts little show. Their town was, according to Diodorus, with singular accuracy of destruction levelled with the ground.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 58.

SECTION III.

Siege of Syracuse. — Retreat of the Carthaginians.

IN addition now to contention with a force very superior by land, and completely victorious by sea, all the difficulties incident to federal armies, voluntary service, and popular governments pressed upon Dionysius. A part of those under him, dreading the waste of their lands and the certain evils and incalculable dangers of a siege, were earnest for trying the fortune of the field against Imilcon's very superior numbers. But Dionysius, considering the hazard that would hang over Syracuse from the enemy's fleet, even while a victory might be gaining by the army, and the certainty of its fall, should the event of a battle be less than victory, resolved to risk all the inconveniences of withdrawing within those fortifications which with so much expense and labour he had made, in common

c. 61.

⁷ In the narrative of Diodorus occurs frequently what may indicate that, after gathering indiscriminately from different authors, telling the same story with different views and different prejudices, he never revised his work. He says Imilcon was anxious to take Messena for the singular convenience of its port and its situation for purposes of importance to his views; and then proceeds to tell that, as soon as he was master of it, he would not let one stone stand upon another, lest it might be of future use to the Greeks. It is more likely that this destruction took place after than before possession was taken of Catana: and it seems very unlikely that Imilcon then apprehended that Greeks or others could make any use of Messena which he should disapprove.

opinion, and he hoped well-founded opinion, impregnable. The result probably he in some degree foresaw. Immediately his command over a considerable part of his army ceased. Some hastened to their several cities: some threw themselves into the forts of the Syracusan territory for the better chance which they hoped for there of means to choose their farther measures than if they went into the town, where immediate blockade was to be expected. He prudently avoided to attempt any violence upon their inclinations. Confident in the attachment of numbers through their own clear interest sufficient for the garrison of the city, he had taken hostages only from the Campanians who held Ætna; a select body of whose best soldiers he also required to march with him to re-enforce the garrison of Syracuse.

Meanwhile the general conduct of Imilcon was not that of a merciless barbarian, but of a mild and politic conqueror. Having made the circuit of Ætna with his whole army, on arriving near the town of the name he sent proposal of very liberal terms to the Campanians in garrison there, and referred them to their fellow-countrymen settled in Entella, for testimony to the good faith of the Carthaginian government, and the advantages enjoyed under its protection. The Campanians, well disposed to accept his offers, were restrained by consideration for their hostages in the hands of the Syracusans.

Avoiding to waste time on small objects, Imilcon left the Campanians in their stronghold, Diod. l. 14.
c. 62. pursued his march to Syracuse, and encamped with his numerous army about two miles from the city. His fleet, entering the great harbour unresisted, seemed to fill its ample space. He had hopes that Dionysius might be rash enough, or that the people's impatience would force him, to come out and venture a battle. But the Syracusans

appear to have been, under the administration of Dionysius, not subject to passionate counsels, as when the Athenians first invaded their country. The patience of a people under reverses is indeed the best test of the popularity of a government. Not even the actual ravage of their territory, which Imilcon gave up for plunder to his army during thirty days, overcame their prudent forbearance. The siege was then regularly formed, and, before long, the division of Achradina was taken by assault.

We want the history of Philistus to do justice to the conduct of Dionysius in these arduous circumstances; but even in the account of Diodorus much foundation is shown for that eulogy of it by the great Scipio Africanus, which Polybius has reported. Early in the pressure of his affairs under the overbearing force of the Carthaginian armament he had sent his kinsman Polyxenus through the Italian Greek cities, and on to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to solicit assistance; urging for their own sake to exertion for preventing the threatened overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by a barbarian power. Polyxenus succeeded so far only as to collect about thirty triremes from different states, but with the advantage of a Lacedæmonian of rank, Pharacidas, for the commander; and he was fortunate enough to avoid opposition from the Carthaginian fleet while he conducted them into the small harbour.

Though Achradina was lost, the fortifications of the other parts of the city seemed capable of resisting the combined force and art of the besiegers, so that famine was the evil principally to be guarded against. This was a point of so much importance, and at the same time of so much difficulty, as to induce Dionysius to leave the charge of the city to others, while he went himself with Leptines to bring in a convoy. In their absence a vessel laden with corn for the

Polyb. 1. 15.
p. 721.

enemy being observed approaching without any ready protection, five triremes issuing from the little harbour took possession of her; but before they could recover their port with their prize they were attacked by a superior force. Assistance however hastening to them, while none was equally ready for the enemy, they were finally victorious, and triumphantly brought in their prize.⁸

Under the privations, hardships, and alarms inseparable from a siege, uneasiness among the people, such as produced a temporary disgrace for the great Pericles in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, though Athens was not actually besieged, could not fail to press upon Dionysius. In his absence his adversaries endeavoured to profit from the late naval success for party purposes: "The pretence that his talents were necessary for the republic's service," they said, "was now demonstrated to be unfounded. His permanence in the office of general-autocrator was not only unconstitutional, but evidently disadvantageous to the conduct of public affairs, and injurious to better men." The same opportunity of his absence was taken to excite dissatisfaction and alarm at the employment of some gold taken from the temples for the public exigencies. "How could the divine favour," it was asked, "be expected for the republic's arms, under the conduct of an impious man, notoriously guilty of sacrilege? The force of united Sicily flying from an enemy,

⁸ Such appear the probable circumstances in the wild account of Diodorus, which has evidently been gathered from some most unconscionable party-writer and puffer of the Greeks. Though a considerable part of the half-ruined fleet of Syracuse, in its best state very unequal to the Carthaginian, was absent with Dionysius and Leptines, yet the small remainder, according to Diodorus, not only took the Carthaginian admiral's ship, and destroyed or took twenty-four more, but, unsatisfied with this reasonable good success, went into the great harbour, and provoked the vast fleet there to battle; and so were the Carthaginians astonished at the heroism of which they had just been witnesses that they feared to stir; and all this heroism was owing to the absence of Dionysius. We shall see presently the testimony of the same author to what his presence could do.

Motya, Himera, Messena taken, the Sican and Sicel alliances lost, the fleet defeated, Syracuse itself besieged, all these clearly indicated the indignation of the gods against the individual commander, while the victory just obtained under others, by so small a force against so vast an armament, satisfactorily proved their kind disposition to the commonwealth,

if separated from the individual." Pericles, we have seen, gave his sanction to the application of the gold of the statue of Minerva to public purposes, and had the good fortune to escape, probably not the invective of faction at the time, yet all censure from posterity.

Dionysius, not fortunate enough to find equal candour in posterity, was happy however, it appears, in a popularity which enabled him to overbear the invective of the day. On his return, learning what had passed, in virtue of his office of general he summoned the people to assembly. In addressing them he liberally praised those who, in his absence, had restored the oppressed glory of their country's arms. He commended all for their patience under the unavoidable evils of the siege; a patience which had saved the city, and of which the advantage would soon be better seen; for he had already knowledge of circumstances, and a view to measures which, he was confident, would shortly give them complete relief.

The reply made to him by the leader of the inimical party, Theodorus, reported by the Sicilian historian, marks very satisfactorily the state of the Syracusan government at the time; showing completely that, far indeed from being tyranny in the hands of Dionysius, it was on the contrary a popular government, open to all the licence of Athens in the age of Pericles. Theodorus did not fear to use the most illiberal invective, or to make the most hostile propositions, against the general-autocrator: he called him the wickedest of citizens, the bitterest of tyrants, the most cowardly of

Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 13.
Ch. 14. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Cic. de Nat.
Deor. l. 15.
p. 83, 84.

generals; and, in conclusion, moved for his banishment and that of his principal supporters. The popularity of Dionysius, it appears, enabled him to consider foul words against him as vain breath. His revenge, and the whole consequence of the transaction, is reported by Diodorus himself thus: "After this, Dionysius made himself familiar with the people in easy and obliging conversation, and some he honoured with presents, and some he invited to his table."⁹

Meanwhile Imilcon, master of Achradina, found the skill of his engineers unavailing against the strength of the other quarters of the city and the vigilance of its defenders. Dionysius harassed him with frequent and often successful sallies, and the fortifying of Epipolæ had made a complete blockade difficult, if for his numbers it was not impossible. Nevertheless the introduction of provisions, sufficient for the numerous population within, could hardly be effected by land while a superior army was watchful without. To prevent supply by sea was what principally required the attention of the besieging army. The same views therefore led Imilcon to fix his camp and fortify posts on the unwholesome ground along the bank of the Anapus

Diod. l. 14.
c. 63.

⁹ Diodorus has reported Theodorus's speech at some length, and it is an ingenious and well-written piece of party oratory. But the story altogether is among the most inconsistent of the many inconsistent ones of that historian. The tyrant himself, as he always calls Dionysius, summoned the assembly, in which such licence might be used, and such propositions made. If the people was sovereign, and Dionysius constitutional general, this was in course; but a tyrant who, as Diodorus often says, while continually showing it otherwise, could command all by his mercenaries, would surely have done no such thing. Theodorus then, amid abundant invective against his measures, could call Dionysius *πολίτην μὲν πονηρότατον, τύραννον δὲ πικρότατον, στρατηγὸν δὲ πάντων ἀγεννίστατον*, and proceed to propose his banishment and that of all his principal associates in the administration. The prevention of this is attributed to the fear in which the mercenaries held an armed and high-spirited people, irritated by the pressure of the war, and at the same time flushed with recent success. Dionysius however, it appears, no way revenged himself against this virulent opponent and his supporters but by the opposite kind of conduct related in the text: *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, φιλανθρώποις λόγοις χρησάμενος, καθωμίλει τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τινὰς μὲν δωρεαῖς ἐτίμα, τινὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια παρελάμβανε.* Diod. l. 14. c. 70.

and the shore of the great harbour, which had directed Nicias to the same measure seventeen years before. The same calamity followed; an epidemical sickness, produced by the alternacy of the suffocating mid-day heat and chilling nightly damps¹⁰; and with a violence far exceeding what the Athenians had experienced. The historian describes it beginning generally with a catarrh and a swelling of the throat. An eruptive fever followed, often attended with dysentery. The agony was extreme, and the patient commonly died on the fifth or sixth day. The supposed malignity of the disorder soon deterred both attendance upon the sick and burial of the dead; for either of which, among hired troops of various nations, in such circumstances the general's commands might be difficult to enforce. The putrefying corpses thus, tainting the air, not a little enhanced the evil, and the mortality was very great.

Perhaps Dionysius foresaw this calamity, or possibly had intelligence that it was already begun, when he ventured to promise his people speedy relief from the siege. Informed however now how the besieging army was weakened, and what discontent and despondency pervaded the part yet healthy, he formed a plan of complex attack, apparently worthy to have been described by Xenophon or Thucydides, and even in the account of Diodorus marking in no small degree the able commander. The fleet, now amounting to

only eighty ships of war, was committed to

Leptines conjointly with the Lacedæmonian Pharacidas. Dionysius took himself the command of the land force. A dark night was chosen. He marched out by the gate farthest from the Carthaginian camp, and, dividing his forces by the way, his infantry reached the enemy's lines

¹⁰ Πρωτον μὲν, πρὶν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι, διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα τὴν ἐκ τῆς αὔρας μετὰ ὑδάτων, θρίκη κατεῖχε τὰ σώματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μισημέριαν ἡ θερμότης ἐπινγε. c.70.

about day-break, nearly at the same time, in two important points considerably distant from each other. The surprise was complete, and the cavalry keeping the Carthaginians in check in the intermediate space, the attack was successful in both places. Co-operation had been so well concerted that, in the critical moment when unexpected assault on the land side had engaged all the attention of the enemy, the fleet from the little harbour had already entered the great harbour, and, raising the shout of battle, attacked the Carthaginian fleet in its station.

Success in this point being the great object of Dionysius, he had taken upon himself the direction Diod. l. 14.
c. 73. of that division of the army which was more immediately to co-operate with the fleet. While then Leptines and Pharacidas were effectually assailing many of the ships at anchor with the stroke of the beak, his troops set fire to a division of forty, hauled on the shore. In vain a Carthaginian force, ample to have defended that division against the enemy, was quickly assembled, and exerted itself to extinguish the flames; for the conflagration, favoured by the wind, spread to the ships at anchor, and a large part of the fleet was destroyed. The success, at the same time, against the debilitated land force sufficed to encourage Dionysius, instead of withdrawing within the city walls, to encamp over-against the enemy, near Olympieum.

Such altogether were the effects of this well-concerted action that the Carthaginian general's hope to take Syracuse was gone, and it became a pressing consideration how to avoid, for himself and those under him, the calamitous fate of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. His fleet was no longer sufficient to convey his land force, nor could it any longer command the sea, but must make its way either by flight or by doubtful contest. To reach the Carthaginian settlements by land there was choice between a mountainous

way through the wild country of the Sicels and Sicans, and a circuitous way by either coast; the shortest of considerable length, the easiest of various difficulty, and both of abundant hazard. Under all these considerations, Imilcon resolved to propose treaty. Dionysius gladly listened to him; but the Corinthian party in Syracuse, now principal in opposition, stimulating the ready propensity of the popular mind to pass from despondency to presumption, made negotiation difficult. Nevertheless a treaty was concluded, in pursuance of which Imilcon paid three hundred talents, (about sixty thousand pounds sterling,) for permission for his armament to withdraw, engaging to quit entirely the Grecian part of Sicily. The conditions appear such as prudence among the Syracusans should have rejoiced in. But the leaders of opposition inciting, such became the fury of the multitude to destroy the Carthaginians, as their forefathers had destroyed the Athenians, that Dionysius was unable to provide for the exact performance. The fleet however remaining to Imilcon sufficed to carry all the Africans, the first objects of Syracusan vengeance.¹¹ Imilcon, cautiously concealing, as far as might be, the intended time of his departure, embarked by night; and yet the inflamed Syracusans, watchful of his motions, without any regular authority, launched some triremes, pursued him, and damaged some of his vessels. In the same night the Sicels and Sicans of the besieging army profited from their knowledge of the country to outstrip or elude pursuit. But a large remainder was at a loss which way to fly. The Spaniards declared firmly their determination not to quit their arms while they had life; but they were willing, they said, with their arms, to serve the Syracusans. This proposal was accepted, and they were

¹¹ The historian's account proves that the Africans were the principal objects of vengeance, though the party-writers, guides of his faith, have led him to insinuate the contrary.

taken into Syracusan pay. The various other troops surrendered themselves to Dionysius; who, though unable wholly to restrain the usually greater licentiousness of the Grecian marine, had kept order in his army: and, as nothing is said farther of their fate, it was probably, for the character of the times, not severe.¹²

¹² The treaty with Imilcon was an event apparently considered by the enemies of Dionysius as affording very favourable opportunities, which they did not fail to use against him. Diodorus, following the writers of the party, says that Dionysius received a bribe of three hundred talents from Imilcon; and has undertaken to know what Dionysius answered to the proposal, privately made, and when and how the money was conveyed; but he has totally omitted to say where he got information so little probably authenticated. A following remark strengthens the indication, which the story bears within itself, of its having been a party fabrication. Dionysius, says the historian, desired to prevent the complete overthrow of the Carthaginian power in Sicily, that so the Syracusans, in continual fear of it, might not have leisure to recover their liberty. It appears meanwhile, from his own honest narrative of facts, that licentiousness was the great enemy to freedom in Syracuse; that the regular government, even under the administration of Dionysius, was not always strong enough to prevent great disorder; that the mob was the real tyrant of Syracuse, and Dionysius the steadiest enemy of Carthage. Nevertheless it seems likely that the outline of the story may have been true, though with a shadowing and colouring wholly false. That Imilcon would desire to treat rather with one able man at the head of affairs, than with the wild assembly of the Syracusan people, is perfectly probable; and that he would propose to pay for quiet retreat is not impossible. But that the treaty was public, and that Dionysius communicated with the general assembly of the Syracusan people and their allies before anything was concluded, Diodorus has himself clearly shown; for he says, "Dionysius informed Imilcon that the Syracusans and their allies would not consent to permission for the quiet retreat of the whole army, but for the Carthaginian citizens it would be allowed." c. 75. This sentence, his own, suffices to show that all he has said of the tyranny of Dionysius and the slavery of the Syracusans under his administration has been merely the party language of the day, which he adopted. If farther evidence were needful, it is furnished in his account of the lawless pursuit of the Carthaginian fleet, which Dionysius could not prevent.

SECTION IV.

Difficulties of the Syracusan Administration. — Mercenaries settled in Leontini. — Peloponnesian Messenians settled in Sicily. — Messena restored. — War of Rhegium with Syracuse. — Defeat of Dionysius at Tauromenium.

B. C. 396.
Ol. 96. 1.

WHEN Syracuse and the Grecian interest throughout Sicily were thus fortunately delivered from subjugation or extermination, at one time seeming their only alternative, no small difficulties remained for those at the head of the government. The first and most pressing business was to satisfy and discharge the large body of mercenary troops, whose valour and discipline had contributed greatly to the happy result. Diodorus states their number at ten thousand. Many of them were Grecian citizens from the mother-country, commanded by Aristoteles, a Lacedæmonian. There is perhaps no one matter for which we should more desire and less can gather information than the revenue which enabled the Syracusan government under Dionysius to do more than the Athenian under Pericles, when Athens commanded tribute from every island of the Ægean, and almost every town of its surrounding shores; and the want of such information is the more to be regretted, because strong presumption of the merit of the financial management arises from the failure of censure of it among writers eager to seize every pretence for calumniating Dionysius. The mercenaries would of course rate their services high in some proportion to the final success; and they might also have some view to their own strength in forming the computation.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.

Aristoteles, with apparently somewhat of that arrogance which we have seen common at this time among Lacedæmonians in foreign command, encouraged them in extravagant pretensions, and menaced the

Syracusan administration. Dionysius checked the mischief by the bold measure of sending away Aristoteles to Lacedæmon to account for his conduct. The mercenaries at first showed some indignation, and threatened violence. But it was much to have deprived them of a Lacedæmonian leader. None remained equally supported by the reputation of the government whence he derived his authority, nor any who could fill the large void by his personal reputation. Dionysius fortunately found means not only to pacify but to conciliate them. The town of Leontini, with its rich territory, wanting inhabitants and cultivators, was given them for a settlement. Thus much and no more the historian tells. But it is obvious that such a present could be little advantageous for military men without the addition of means to use it; slaves and cattle must have been given, or money which might purchase them.¹³

This difficult and hazardous business however being successfully adjusted, the Syracusan administration had leisure to direct their attention to external concerns, which, both for the security of Syracuse itself, and of the general welfare of the Grecian interest in Sicily, pressingly required it. A great change in the state of politics everywhere had ensued from the Carthaginian invasion. In those towns of the northern coast which had yielded to the Carthaginians the

¹³ Diodorus says that, after disbanding these mercenaries, to the amount of ten thousand, Dionysius immediately engaged others, in sufficient number to hold the Syracusan people in unwilling subjection to himself as their tyrant. But, having told us before that the whole Syracusan people were armed, he should have informed us how Dionysius held his authority when the mercenaries were mutinous, and what gave him means to send their powerful commander out of the island. It is evident that the practice of arms and discipline, which he had introduced among the Syracusan citizens, together with his sure popularity, alone could give security to them or him against such a force as that said to have been under the command of Aristoteles, and that, when that force was disbanded, it was impossible for him to raise such another without the approbation of the armed Syracusan people. But writers of the day would call their freest armed fellow-citizens, of an adverse party, mercenaries; and this would suffice for Diodorus.

party most adverse to Syracuse would of course be most favoured by the conquerors. In the more populous and powerful cities of the southern shore the extreme suffering and expected ruin of Syracuse would give great advantage to the same party. When, on the retreat of the Carthaginians, Syracuse, without any change of administration, was restored to a condition to aspire again to the lead of the Grecian interest, this party was not insulated in every town, but connected through all. It seems however to have been least proportionably strong in the cities of the southern coast. Of these therefore, on account of the weakness of the party, and in those of the northern coast, on account of the inferiority of the cities, none could pretend to a general supremacy. But Rhegium in Italy, which, not having suffered, had perhaps profited from the Carthaginian expedition, became the head of the interest adverse to the Syracusan.

Under this consideration, among others, it was a great object for the Syracusan government to restore Messina; a work of charity which, had any common charity for one another prevailed among the Grecian cities, or any just consideration of the opposition of Grecian to barbarian interest, could not but have had also the advantage of popularity. But the Messenian people, as we have seen, were themselves much divided in politics, and a large part, inimical to Syracuse, was closely connected with Rhegium. The Syracusan administration then, adhering still to their liberal principle of avoiding the extensive proscriptions so common among the Grecian republics, would nevertheless, in restoring the Messenians generally, provide for a preponderance among

Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.

their friends. On the recent conclusion of the Peloponnesian war six hundred families of descendants of the ancient Peloponnesian Messenians had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians from their settlements at

Naupactus and in Zacynthus. These unfortunate wanderers Dionysius collecting, established them as a valuable accession of population and strength in the Sicilian Messena.

Had the Rhegians alone objected to this charitable measure, some reasonable ground for their jealousy of it would be obvious. But the efficacious persecutors of the unfortunate vagabond Messenians were still the Lacedæmonians, at this time lords of Greece. They objected to the establishment of only six hundred homeless families in a place so distant from them, because its port was of uncommon excellence, and because, for the sake of their ancient country, an influence might attach to them, which, it was apprehended, they would use against the interest of Lacedæmon. Dionysius conceded so far to the wishes of the Lacedæmonians, his powerful and steady allies, as to remove those Messenians from Messena. But he gave them a territory to themselves, on the northern coast of Sicily, over-against the Liparean islands, where they founded a new city which, with some reference apparently to some ancient tradition concerning their original Peloponnesian country, they called Tyndaris or Tyndarium.

Adversity, it appears, had not depressed, but on the contrary stimulated, the vigour of mind, while it chastened the manners, of these unfortunate people. With superior military knowledge and practice, gained in long service with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, they appear to have brought a spirit of civil order and a habit of regular administration far above what was common in the Sicilian Greek cities. The advantages of that order, which made at the same time their strength and their happiness, enabled them to increase their strength by extending the same happiness to others. They were not afraid to admit numbers, who desired association, to the rights of citizens of Tyndarium, and shortly they had more than five thousand able to bear

arms. But, with this military force, possibly their justice toward their Sicel neighbours, whom they called barbarians, may not have equalled their liberality and punctuality among Greeks. They made frequent inroads upon the Sicel lands, and they took the Sicel towns of Smeneum and Morgantium. With some of the Sicel tribes however they made treaties and kept faith. Enna, one of the principal towns of the Sicel nation, was put under their dominion by a party among its people, induced by the joint consideration of their general fair conduct, and of aversion to their own actual rulers. The Greek towns of Cephaledion and Solus, which had yielded to Imilcon, and perhaps were still governed by a party in the Carthaginian interest, passed to them in the same way. This account of the Messenians of Tyndarium, not unworthy at any rate of place in a history of the Grecian republics, becomes the more valuable from the extreme deficiency of remaining information concerning the other measures by which Dionysius proceeded to restore empire to Syracuse, and prosperity among the Grecian towns of Sicily. The year next after the retreat of the Carthaginians appears to have been employed, without material interruption from foreign or domestic enemies, in preparing that prosperity.

B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. 1-2.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.
B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 2-3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 87.

In the year following we find his influence extended as far as Agrigentum.

But the restoration of Messena, notwithstanding the removal of the Peloponnesians, gave great uneasiness in Rhegium. The return of the people to repossess their lands and rebuild their town was not a matter of avowed dissatisfaction: the Rhegian government might hope to establish its own authority over its weak neighbour, and thus profit from its future convalescence as well as its past misfortune. But the measures taken under the patronage of Syracuse to make Messena flourishing, and especially the restoration of

its fortifications, gave them great offence. Nor was this a sentiment of party only: it was popular among the Rhegians. Often indeed it appears difficult to decide how far blame should attach to the appearance of envy and narrow spirit among people so uneasily situated as the Greeks in their little republics. Messena had often been a troublesome neighbour to Rhegium; sometimes a dangerous rival. The great superiority of its port gave it advantages which its proximity made annoying; and altogether its fall could not but be relieving to the Rhegian people, and its restoration alarming. The liberality therefore of the government of Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, not only far above that of the Rhegian, but superior to what we have seen ordinary in the Athenian and Lacedæmonian, in promoting the re-fortification of a city possessing the second port of the island, if indeed their own was the first, cannot but earn our esteem.

The leaders of the party in Rhegium then, finding encouragement in the state of things around, resolved to use the spirit of resentment toward Syracuse for engaging their people in measures, not immediately of avowed hostility, but which could scarcely fail to bring on war. It was probably expected that the might of Carthage would not long acquiesce under its late heavy disappointments; or perhaps it was known that preparations were already making for revenging it. Meanwhile the arms of Syracuse were engaged in a little but troublesome war, in which they had been baffled beyond all expectation. The Sicels, who had received the fair settlement of Naxos from the bounty of the Syracusan government, and then, Ch. 30. s. 4.
& Ch. 31. s. 2.
of this Hist. deserting to the Carthaginians, had seized the strong and commanding post of Tauromenium, refused still, after the retreat of Imilcon, to quit that post. Probably they were not without encouragement both from the Cartha-

ginian officers in Sicily and from the Rhegian government. The Rhegians however resolved to profit from the circumstances. Professing the purpose of rivalling the Syracusan government in generosity and charity, they assembled the dispersed Catanians and Naxians, whom Dionysius had expelled, and established them at Mylæ, on the western verge of the Messenian territory, in a situation to intercept the communication of Messena with the new colony of Tyn-darium. This measure being executed without opposition, and the Sicels resisting still successfully in Tauromenium, the Rhegians judged the season favourable for proceeding to open and offensive war*, in which they invited by proclamation all banished Syracusans to join them. To demonstrate then how much they meant to make common cause with the Syracusans adverse to the existing government of their own city, they elected a Syracusan, Heloris, distinguished for the vehemence of his animosity against that government, to command their forces. Without loss of time, they crossed the strait, with all the strength they could raise, and laid siege to the yet incompletely fortified Messena.

Dionysius, notwithstanding the trouble which the Sicels gave, did not neglect to send assistance to the Messenians. The besieged, thus re-enforced, attacked the besiegers, and put them completely to rout. Marching then to Mylæ, and offering at once liberal terms to the new settlers, yet ill-prepared to resist them, they recovered the place. Thus the ill-concerted hostilities of the Rhegians contributed to extend and confirm the influence of Syracuse in all that part of Sicily next the strait.

[* "The *Rhegian war* began in the archonship of Aristocrates, about B. C. 399. Diod. xiv. 40. and continued till the year of Theodotus, B. C. 387. Diod. xiv. 112. cf. Polyb. i. 6." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 97. The subsequent dates therefore, to the reduction of Rhegium, p. 131., must be received with caution, as it is assigned to a wrong period, according to Mr. Clinton's chronology.]

Nevertheless the obstinate defence of the Sicels in Tauromenium disappointed, and in some degree distressed, the Syracusan government. It had been expected that men bred in the warm temperature of the Sicilian plains would be unable to persevere long through the winter season, ill-provided as they were, in a station occupied in haste on a bleak mountain summit. Midwinter however came, and no disposition to surrender appeared. Dionysius then, to relieve his troops from the pressure of a winter campaign, resolved himself to lead an attempt to surprise and storm the place. He chose a dark tempestuous night, with snow falling. The first outwork on the hill-side was carried; but such was the change of atmosphere in ascending, and so violent the storm, that in proceeding up the steep not only his people suffered, but his own eyes received lasting injury from the chilling assault of the driving sleet. Nevertheless he persevered in his purpose till, leading an attack upon the enemy, he received a blow which felled him. His armour turned the weapon, so that the wound was itself unimportant, but he narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Compelled then to retreat, under the complicated disadvantages of craggy ways, snow lying, storm beating, and an enemy occupying commanding eminences, more than six hundred men were lost, and the rest, for easier flight, mostly abandoned their arms. Himself saved only his cuirass. Report of this discomfiture, spread with exaggeration, excited everywhere the hopes and the industry of the party adverse to the Syracusan administration; and in Agrigentum that industry was so successful that a revolution was effected.¹⁴

Diod. i. 14.
c. 88.

¹⁴ In our copies of Diodorus Messena is added; but we find, in the sequel of his narrative, strong reason to believe that the name has been corrupted in transcription; for, in the repeated mention of Messena, soon following, we find it always indicated that the government was in the hands of the party friendly to Dionysius, and nowhere that any change had taken place.

SECTION V.

War renewed by Carthage against Syracuse. — Insubordination in the Syracusan Army. — Able Conduct of Dionysius; and Peace with Carthage. — Reduction of the Sicels of Tauromenium. — Settlement of Mercenaries.

Diod. 1. 14.
c. 90. SINCE the retreat of Imilcon from Syracuse the energy of the Carthaginians in Sicily had been checked by troubles in Africa. But Magon, to whom the chief command was left, appears to have been well qualified for his difficult situation. Humane and liberal, as well as politic, (for to so much even Diodorus, generally vehement in undistinguishing invective against the Carthaginians, gives testimony,) Magon preserved the attachment of the greater part of the Sicels. Enabled, with their assistance, to raise a sufficient army, he marched into the Messenian territory, B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 3-4. ravaged it, and withdrew with the booty. Dionysius, having collected the Syracusan forces, followed him into the territory of the Abacene Sicels, where a battle ensued in which the Greeks were completely victorious. Present security being thus given to the allies of Syracuse in Sicily, Dionysius sailed with a hundred ships against the Rhegians, his implacable enemies. Failing in an attempt upon the city, he however enriched his armament with the plunder of the territory, collected without resistance. Wants on both sides then produced a truce for a year, and Dionysius returned to Syracuse.¹⁵

¹⁵ It is little among the inconsistencies of honest Diodorus that he accuses Dionysius of connection with the Carthaginians, while he shows it to have been really the great object of his politics to oppose the Carthaginians, and that to him in truth was owing that Sicily was not subdued by the Carthaginians. In the sequel we find him imputing war with the Carthaginians to the ambition of Dionysius. That the Rhegians, the irreconcilable enemies of Dionysius, had connection with the Carthaginians is fully implied in his narrative.

In the next spring the Carthaginian government sent such large re-enforcement to Magon B. C. 392. Ol. 96. 4-97. 1. as to put the Grecian interest in Sicily again in danger. But Dionysius had ably profited from the delay of this measure for preparing obstacles to its success. In giving liberal assistance toward the restoration of the Grecian towns, which had suffered in the invasion under Imilcon, he had so extended the influence of Syracuse that the Grecian interest was now more united than ever before perhaps since the time of Gelon; and, not confining the liberality of his policy to those of the Grecian name, he had succeeded against the ability and liberality of Magon in conciliating the greater part of the Sicels.

Against this policy, with more powerful means, Magon directed his first measures. Instead of making his way toward Syracuse, as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly, by the line of Grecian towns on either coast, he proposed first to gain to his interest or under his authority the whole midland country, whence he might choose how he would direct operations against any of the Grecian settlements around. The allurements of his promises, assisted by the fear of his power, succeeded with most of the western Sicels, but he was not equally successful with the eastern. He resolved therefore to carry his arms against Agyris, chief of Agyrium, the principal potentate of the eastern hills, whom he found immovable in his engagements with Dionysius.

The Syracusan general hastened to support so steady an ally, in whose uprightness he had so much confidence that he did not fear to trust B. C. 392. Ol. 96. 4-97. 1. Diod. 1. 14. c. 95, 96. himself within his garrison with a very few attendants for the purpose of concerting measures.¹⁶ It was resolved be-

¹⁶ Diodorus describes Agyris as a tyrant, who amassed wealth by the murder of the richest men of his little dominion. For this imputation it may be believed that he had authority from writers of the opposite party. His honesty has led at the same time to abate its venom, by showing the confidence of such

tween them to avoid a battle, and direct all their operations to cutting off the enemy's supplies. In both purposes they succeeded, and Magon was reduced to distress. But the difficulties which had often pressed upon Hermocrates, when in the same office, now bore upon Dionysius : the sovereign people in arms would not always obey their general. The apparent want of energy in his conduct, the real wisdom of which they could not see, afforded opportunity for the adverse party to excite and spread discontent. The outcry became extensive against this tedious and inglorious warfare ; " they would be led to battle," they said, " and conquer and go home." Dionysius firmly refusing to yield to their rash requisition, a large body actually seceded, and returned to Syracuse. Dionysius, avoiding all violence against the mutineers, employed his diligence to encourage the sound remainder, to increase its real strength as far as circumstances would allow, and to obviate, as far as might be, the evils of deficiency by keeping up appearances which might assist toward holding the enemy in check. He armed a number of slaves, (according to Diodorus, those of the seceders,) promising them the rank of citizens as the reward of good conduct. The measure very completely answered his purpose. Magon, fearing to force an action on disadvantageous ground, and unable to procure supplies for his army, sent proposals for peace ; and thus Dionysius, without any effusion of blood, obtained the effect of victory. A treaty was concluded, by which it was stipulated that Carthage should interfere no more among the Sicels, and that for the rest things should remain nearly as before the war.¹⁷

a person as Dionysius in the integrity of Agyris, and the zeal of his own subjects in his service. Partisans of Agyris, reporting the matter, would assert that disturbers of the public peace were justly executed, and their property justly confiscated.

¹⁷ Ἦσαν δὲ συνθήκαι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραπλήσιας ταῖς πρότερον, Σικελούς δὲ

The immediate danger from the foreign enemy being thus obviated, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, and seems to have been not less successful in repressing the movements of faction without violence and without severity. He not only avoided all harsh measures against those who had so irregularly withdrawn from the army at Agyrium, but, according to Diodorus, he restored to them their slaves; how consistently with his promises to those unfortunate men is not said by the historian, who nevertheless has not imputed to him the blame of any breach of engagement. The quiet of Syracuse however appears to have been completely preserved, so that the government, having leisure to direct all its energy against Tauromenium, the Sicels there, deprived of assistance and hope from Carthage, were reduced before the end of the same summer. A grant of the place, with the surrounding lands, rewarded the service of the mercenaries in the Syracusan army, who seem well to have earned it by the share which their courage, discipline, and fidelity had contributed to the successes of the war.

διὴν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι. Those from whom Diodorus took this account, if they used the phrase ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, can have meant no other subjection of the Sicels to Dionysius than such as that of the Corinthians and other allies to Lacedæmon, the head of their confederacy. With regard to former treaties, to which the first member of the sentence may refer, two have been already noticed; one with Hannibal, after the taking of Gela and Camarina, and the other with Imilcon, previous to his retreat from Syracuse. The former, according to Diodorus, left the Sicels to the Grecian alliance; of the other he has not given the terms.

Diodorus calls the seceders from the army at Agyrium *the Syracusans*, as if they were all the Syracusans of the army. If so, the success of Dionysius against the Carthaginians would have been indeed extraordinary. But, in the mean time, if Dionysius was the hated tyrant, as Diodorus seems to have been persuaded to believe, what prevented a revolution in Syracuse he has totally omitted to show. It is evident that a large majority of the Syracusans supported Dionysius, and that the historian has used the language of the minority.

SECTION VI.

Peace throughout Sicily. — Confederacy of the Lucanians against the Italian Greeks. — Ill-constituted Confederacy of the Italian Greeks. — War of Thurium with the Lucanians. — Thurium gained to the Syracusan Confederacy. — War of Rhegium and Crotona with Syracuse. — Generosity of Dionysius. — Siege of Rhegium.

B. C. 391.
Ol. 97.1-2.

DURING the year following the treaty of Agyrion and the taking of Tauromenium, the quiet of Syracuse and of the Grecian interest throughout Sicily under the administration of Dionysius, seems to have denied

materials to the historian of wars and troubles. In the next year affairs in Italy called the attention of the Syracusan government. The Greek settlements, both in Italy and Sicily, had been made, as we have formerly seen, by forcible intrusion upon the former inhabitants. These, in Sicily, surrounded by foreign establishments, Greek or Carthaginian, had been reduced to an impotence from which they had no means to emerge. But in Italy they had larger range: and while every Greek city, in captious jealousy even of fellow-countrymen, insulating its political existence, would be an independent state, the Lucanians, robbed of their coast and confined to their mountains, but improved in policy by the necessities of their circumstances, and in military art by practice against the intruders, had instituted a confederacy such that no single Grecian city of Italy was any longer able to contend with them.

Polyb. 1. 2.
p. 126.

Polybius attributes the first example of confederate government among the Grecian republics, (not such as that of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, where one was supreme and the others subordinate, but confederacy upon equal terms,) to the Achæans of Peloponnesus. In imitation of these, and borrowing their laws

of union, he says, the Crotoniats, Sybarites, and Caulonians of Italy formed a confederacy, and for the place of their assembly dedicated a piece of ground with a temple to Homorian Jupiter, the Jupiter of those who lived within one common boundary. Whether the historian speaks of the ancient Sybaris, destroyed by the Crotoniats, or a remnant of its people of a faction friendly to the Crotoniats, and settled elsewhere under their protection, is not clear ; but from Diodorus it appears that afterward other confederacies were instituted, of the most powerful of which Rhegium was a principal member. Here however we find nothing of the wisdom of the Achæan constitution. Widely and variously as the governments of the Grecian republics differed, they seem to have had this almost universally in common, that in time of war the commander-in-chief was first-magistrate. Among the Italian republics then a very extraordinary responsibility was imposed upon those military first-magistrates : if any republic of the confederacy was attacked by the Lucanians, the generals of all the others were to answer with their lives for the omission, or even delay, of assistance. The strange confusion of powers, here indicated, is perhaps less to be attributed to deficient penetration or deficient judgment in the leading men than to the inherent and irremediable inconveniences of the Greek republican system.

Rhegium we have seen always vehemently adverse to Dionysius. The Grecian confederacy in Italy next in power was that of which Locri was the head, and there Dionysius had always maintained friendly connection. Among these circumstances arose causes, not explained to us, which induced Dionysius to lead an armament against Rhegium. He debarked and plundered the territory, but a storm so injured his fleet as to disable him for besieging the town. The expedition nevertheless was not fruitless. Withdraw-

ing to Messena he entered into negotiation with the Lucanians, who, it appears, were not altogether averse to friendly connection with Greeks, and an alliance resulted.

Diod. 1. 14.
c. 101.

It was about the time of this transaction that the Lucanians invaded and ravaged a part of the Thurian territory, perhaps esteeming the whole properly their own. Thurium was a member of the Rhegian confederacy; but, being able to take the field, it is said, with fourteen thousand foot and a thousand horse, the people, impatient for revenge, would pursue the Lucanians without waiting for their allies. Entering the Lucanian country they took a fastness, where they found considerable booty. Not however thus satisfied, but rather incited, they resolved to proceed to the enemy's principal hold among the mountains, where they expected great plunder. Enter-

c. 102.

ing incautiously a narrow valley, they were at once opposed in front and attacked in flank from every height that commanded the way. More than ten thousand are said to have been killed, either on the spot, or in their flight, which was directed toward the coast. The remainder reaching advantageous ground near the sea, were encouraged to vigorous resistance by the sight of a fleet at hand, supposed to be of their Rhegian friends. A small number, by a bold effort, gaining the shore, swam aboard, but, to their utter consternation, found it the Syracusan fleet, under the command of Leptines. That gallant officer however presently calmed their fears; not only receiving them with kindness, but immediately interposing his friendly offices with the Lucanians in favour of their comrades, who were yet defending themselves, but without hope of sustaining the contest much longer. The Lucanians consented to their redemption as prisoners at a mina a head, and Leptines generously engaging for the payment, the Lucanians were satisfied, and the prisoners were set at liberty. The oppor-

tunity thus afforded, by a very extraordinary and most unexpected emergency, to extend the credit and influence of the Syracusan government, Leptines, with equal readiness of ability and liberality, seems to have profited from to the utmost: mediating between the Lucanians and the Thurians, he established peace between them.¹⁸ Thurium thus was gained to the Syracusan alliance; but Rhegium not the less persevered in enmity, in which it was seconded by Crotona, the most populous and powerful of the Italian Greek cities.¹⁹

Diod. l. 14.
c. 103.

Of the state and views of parties in those cities, and how party-connection extended thence through the Grecian cities of Sicily, some idea may be gathered from the circumstance that the governments of Rhegium and Crotona concurred in appointing to the chief command of their united forces, not one of their own citizens, not an Italian Greek, not even one whom former success could recommend, but the Syracusan Heloris, who had already been defeated in the attempt against Messena, and whose merit seems, in the account of Diodorus, to have consisted wholly in the vehemence of his animosity against the existing administration of Syracuse. But the specific objects of the Rhegian and Crotoniat governments the defective narrative of Diodorus does not unfold. It is however evident that the friends of

¹⁸ Diodorus says Dionysius was so dissatisfied with his brother for this liberal and truly politic conduct that he removed him from the command of the fleet, which was committed to another brother, Thearides. It was the desire of Dionysius, he adds, for the purpose of holding the Italian Greeks at his devotion, to have unceasing enmity between them and the Lucanians. But all this is sufficiently contradicted by the sequel of his own narrative, which represents Dionysius presently following up the every way excellent policy of Leptines, and Leptines again in high command under his brother. That the fleet, or a division of it, was committed to another brother for a particular expedition, is no proof of any quarrel with Leptines.

¹⁹ Rhegium was in the territory called by the Roman writers Brutium or Bruttium. Diodorus extends the Lucanian name over that country, though, in the sequel of his history, (l. 16. c. 15.) he relates the origin of the name Bruttium.

B. C. 389. Ol.
97. 3-4. Diod.
l. 14. c. 103,
104, 105.

Syracuse in Italy were threatened when, in the spring of the year following the defeat of the

Thurians by the Lucanians, Dionysius led a powerful armament for their protection. Stopping at Messina, he detached his brother Thearides to the Liparean islands in quest of a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, which were all taken, with their crews. Passing with his army then into Italy he laid siege to Caulonia, a town on the coast between Locri and Scyllacium. Heloris marched to its relief with superior numbers. Dionysius, well provided with intelligence, attacked him on the way with such circumstances of advantage that Heloris was killed and his army put to flight. A large body gained an eminence where it could not easily be forced. Dionysius disposed his troops in blockade around, and so rested. The Rhegians and Crotoniats, destitute of both food and water, sent next day to treat for their surrender. Dionysius required that it should be unconditional. At this they hesitated; but toward evening, worn with hunger and still more with thirst, they submitted themselves to his mercy. Being commanded to march in regular order down the hill, their numbers were ascertained, as they passed, to be more than ten thousand. When all were assembled at the bottom, Dionysius addressed them, and to their surprise scarcely less than to their joy told them "that he should neither detain them prisoners, nor require ransom; they were all free."

This generosity, so superior to any thing heard of in his own, or reported of any former age, procured him at the

Diod. l. 14.
c. 105.

time the credit its just due. Thanks the most cordial and panegyric the most sincere were profusely poured; and golden crowns, often given, as it became popular to remark, to other conquerors by those for whom they conquered, were presented to Dionysius, with grateful

hearts, by the conquered themselves. His generosity to individuals he proceeded to follow up by liberality to their several cities, granting favourable terms of peace, without an attempt to press upon their independency. But this humane and magnanimous policy, so much above the common temper of his age, is not all that we have to admire on this occasion in Dionysius. We want information how he found means to exert virtues which perhaps others in eminent stations possessed, unable equally to show them. We have seen Athenian generals cruelly called to account by the sovereign people for very inferior generosity, and we have seen the Syracusans perhaps exceeding the Athenians in illiberality, and even Hermocrates unable to lead them to a better temper.²⁰

The generosity of Dionysius seems to have subdued the enmity of all the Italian Greeks, except the Rhegians. Closely connected with the Syracusan exiles, they persevered in hostility till threatened with a siege. Aware then, as the historian their partisan confesses for them, that, should they persevere farther, and finally be overcome, no pretence to ask mercy would remain, they resolved to endeavour to use what opportunity might yet be open. Even now they did not hope that a proposal for negotiation upon any equal terms could claim attention. They addressed therefore an humble petition

Diod. l. 14.
c. 106.

²⁰ Diodorus, though often before candidly reporting the generous, humane, and popular conduct of Dionysius, while he was calling him a cruel and detested tyrant, seems nevertheless here astonished at what he had to report, and labouring for expression that might obviate the appearance of gross inconsistency, while he honestly related facts, without retracting his opinion of character, which they so directly contradict: καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποπετυόντων τὸ θηριώδες, &c. τ. λ. c. 105. Always before giving Dionysius the title of tyrant, he has avoided it here, and concludes the account with coldly remarking, that "this was esteemed altogether the finest action of Dionysius's life." Indeed I believe a parallel to it is not to be found among all Plutarch's worthies.

to Dionysius, invoking his humanity, and leaving the conditions for him to name. He required all their ships, with three hundred talents (about sixty thousand pounds) for the expenses of the war, and a hundred hostages.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 107.

Dionysius stayed the winter in Italy to make the various arrangements likely to be wanting toward the permanence of civil order and political union among so many independent cities, with two parties in every one, each holding communication through all. He removed the people of the two small towns of Caulonia and Hipponium to Syracuse, and gave their territory to the Locrians. We have observed many similar instances of removals, and we have yet no more than ground for some conjecture about the general policy of them. No severity has on this occasion been intended to the people removed; for they received not only the rights of Syracusan citizens, but the privilege of exemption from taxes for five years; a privilege of which, not less than of the policy of the removal, we should desire an explanation which the ancient writers have not given.

But the measures of Dionysius for ensuring the peaceful conduct of the Rhegians apparently did not suffice. Diodorus, copying his traducers, says that he made peace with them only with a view to break it, when, through the possession of their ships and hostages, he could make war on them more advantageously. But all the facts, which he proceeds honestly to report, continue to mark good faith and liberality in Dionysius, and to throw every suspicion of ill faith on those who led the Rhegians. Diodorus avows that against compact they refused a market for the Syracusan troops, while the peace was yet unbroken; and, on the contrary, Dionysius, when he resolved upon renewing hostilities against them, not only showed himself anxious that his measures should appear just and dignified in the

public eye ²¹, but gave a new instance of uncommon generosity, in restoring to them all their hostages.

The Rhegians meanwhile had so provided themselves that they seem not to have been without ground for some reasonable confidence of being able to resist successfully the siege of their town, which was presently formed. In one of their many vigorous sallies Dionysius was wounded in the groin with a spear so severely that his recovery was slow, and for some time doubtful. His perseverance however was firm; and about the eleventh month provisions began to fail in the place. A bushel of wheat had B. C. 385.
Ol. 98. 1-2.
[See p. 131.] been sold for five mines (about fifteen guineas), and was now no longer to be bought. The horses and all domestic animals were consumed. The despair nevertheless, arising from consciousness of having forfeited all claim to mercy, still incited to resistance, while leather was sodden for food, and, all herbage within the place failing, men would occasionally venture out, at the risk of their lives, to snatch the grass and weeds on the outer foot of the walls. This however was no sooner observed than the besiegers destroyed the resource by turning cattle under the walls at night. Thus at length worn out, the besieged surrendered to the mercy of the conqueror. In number more than six thousand they were sent prisoners to Syracuse; but not, as former prisoners, condemned to perish by slow torments in the stone-quarries, all were allowed to redeem themselves at the price of a mina (scarcely three guineas) each. Those unable to raise so small a sum, little able of course to find an honest livelihood in freedom where hire for labour was rare, were sold to slavery.²² Phyton,

²¹ Ἐξήτει προφασιν εὐλογον, δι' ἧς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν ἰδίαν δόξει λειλυμένας τὰς συνθήκας.

²² We find mention of the sale of the Rhegians, by Aristotle, with the addition that it was against his word given. Aristot. Œcon. l. 2. p. 688. t. 3. ed.

who commanded during the siege, was alone reserved for a severer fate. If Diodorus might be believed, he was put to death under the immediate direction of Dionysius, with circumstances of cruelty, not only the most illiberal, but the most impolitic; having shocked the soldiers appointed to attend it. What cruelty may not have been retorted, on such an occasion, by a democratical army or a democratical assembly of the people, the tenor of Grecian history, and especially of Syracusan history, will make difficult for satisfactory conjecture; but the tenor of the conduct of Dionysius, and the result of his conduct, as reported by, unfortunately for his fame, his only remaining historian, show it very improbable that any cruelty, but especially such impolitic cruelty, could be fairly imputed to him.²³

Paris. That such report might pass to Greece from the enemies of Dionysius is quite likely; but the Sicilian historian's account appears ample refutation of it.

²³ It is remarkable enough, in the account of Diodorus, that the first instance of cruelty in Dionysius which, in following the writers of the adverse party, he has been able to specify, is the destruction of the vegetables under the town-wall of Rhegium; and the manner in which he has noticed the fact, especially considering what has preceded and what follows, is truly curious: "So far," he says, "was Dionysius from pitying those whose sufferings drove them to such resources, that he sent cattle to consume their last remaining relief. Thus, overborne by distress, they surrendered themselves and their city to the tyrant's mercy." He proceeds then, with simple honesty, to show that the tyrant had mercy, which not only the Syracusans but the Athenian democracy too often wanted, as he had before shown how little those with whom the tyrant had to deal often deserved mercy. For this honesty we cannot but give him credit, even while we recollect that he has related the horrid treatment of the daughter of Hermocrates without expressing any disapprobation, and the massacre of the Carthaginians of both sexes and all ages in Motya as matter of glory.

When, after the death of Dionysius, it became the object of a powerful and at length triumphant party to vilify his fame, excessive animosity against the Rhegians was ascribed to him, and attributed to a very puerile cause. When he applied to the Rhegian people for leave to take a wife among them, it is said he received for answer, in pursuance of a vote of their assembly, that he might have their hangman's daughter. The story perhaps is as little creditable to the Rhegian people as to Dionysius; but, beside its inherent improbability, the omission of all notice of it by Diodorus in its proper place, and the insertion of it afterward, seems to mark that he had not found it in any regular

SECTION VII.

Peace throughout the Grecian Settlements of Sicily and Italy. — Piracy of the Tuscans repressed. — Invasion of Sicily and Italy by the Carthaginians. — Treaty with Carthage.

By the reduction of Rhegium the power of the party which banished Hermocrates and murdered his daughter was suppressed²⁴, and the result was peace, internal and external, for all the Grecian cities of Sicily and Italy. It was about the same time that the treaty of Antalcidas gave a short and imperfect repose to Greece.²⁵ Prosperity attended the better tranquillity of the Italian and Sicilian cities. Even Rhegium, however the historian's account of its capture may appear to imply its desolation, flourished, as we learn from the sequel of his narrative, under the administration of that party among its citizens which was friendly to Dionysius. The extensive popularity of the Syracusan administration meanwhile is evinced by the effects which it produced. Formerly the advantage of living

B. C. 385.
Ol. 98. 1-2.
Diod. 1. 15.
c. 6.
[B. C. 387.
Cl.]
Ch. 25. s. 7.
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 16.

history, but among some popular anecdotes only. Nevertheless it may have been not wholly groundless. A passionate speech of a violent party man, in the assembly or out of the assembly, at the time or long after, reported from mouth to mouth, may have been gradually, and yet perhaps rapidly, improved into the story which has been transmitted. The real object of the Rhegian war appears, in the result, fairly enough, though defectively, reported by Diodorus.

²⁴ The murder of the daughter was the immediate act of only a few, but the manner in which it is mentioned by the writers friendly to the party too strongly marks a general concurrence of that party in the disposition and principles which led to it.

²⁵ Diodorus places the peace of Antalcidas and the taking of Rhegium in the same year. Dodwell, in his Xenophontean chronology, ascribes the negotiation of Antalcidas at the Persian court to the year to which Diodorus gives the taking of Rhegium, and the establishment of the peace in Greece to the following year. Diodorus adds to the remarkable events of this year the sack of Rome by the Gauls. [It has been already shown that the peace of Antalcidas was concluded B. C. 387, according to Mr. Clinton. See Vol. VI. p. 76.]

under the Carthaginian government was alluring even to
Diod. l. 15.
c. 15. Greeks. Now, on the contrary, even old allies
 and subjects of Carthage showed a preference for
 the Grecian connection, and some entered into negotiation
 for engaging in it.

How far Dionysius was honest or how far politic in the
 encouragement which he is said to have given to this dis-
 position among the allies of Carthage, which would scarcely
 fail to superinduce a new rupture with that preponderant
 power, the very defective account of Diodorus will scarcely
 enable to judge. But as it was hardly possible but rupture
 with that power, whatever caution were used to avoid it,
 would sooner or later come, Syracuse and the whole Grecian
 interest of Sicily and Italy seem to have owed much to the
 ability, the diligence, the provident circumspection, with
 which Dionysius sought and used every opportunity to
 provide means for effectual resistance. Among these the
 most important by far was that which also most contributed
 to the prosperity and happiness of the Greeks among them-
 selves, the concord produced and maintained among all their
 establishments throughout Sicily and Italy, which brought
 that high eulogy remaining from the contemporary Athenian,

Isocr. Or.
ad Philipp. the patriotic Isocrates proposing Dionysius as an
 example for Philip king of Macedonia to follow
 for the benefit of Greece. After this, what in remaining
 accounts appear most prominent, are his measures for raising
 the Sicilian navy to a force unknown before among the
 Greeks. He established a colony at Lissus, on the Italian
 shore, where naval stores abounded. He cultivated alliance

Diod. l. 15.
c. 13. with the Illyrians of the opposite shore of the
 Adriatic, whose country was fruitful in similar
 production, and he extended still the Syracusan interest on
 that continent by co-operating in the restoration of Alcetas,
 the expelled prince of the Molossians.

But the relics of the party of Diocles, active still in slander when impotent for other exercise of enmity, endeavoured to excite alarm by representing it as the purpose of Dionysius to gain access for an army, which he would send from Sicily, to plunder the temple of Delphi. The simple historian, who believed this absurd calumny, has proceeded fairly to show the real purpose, by relating what was done, and what followed, marking the just policy which directed the measures. The advantages derived from the colony of Lissus, abounding with ship-timber, gave means for building two hundred ship-houses around the Syracusan harbour, and ships to occupy them: the colonies and connections in Italy and on the opposite shores of Epirus and Illyria commanded the communication with Greece; and this, provided the temple of Delphi were respected, and public faith maintained with the principal Grecian republics, might, in case of pressure from Carthage, be of incalculable advantage.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 13.

Occasion has occurred formerly to observe that the Tuscans were principal pirates of the western parts of the Mediterranean. As the trade of Syracuse increased, their depredations becoming more annoying, Dionysius undertook himself an expedition to suppress them. He was successful, and, after the ordinary manner of ancient war, much booty was taken. But in the course of the expedition a temple, of some fame for its wealth, was plundered by his troops. Hence occasion was taken, by the enemies of his fame, to spread report in Sicily and in Greece, that the sacrilegious robbery, meditated against Apollo at Delphi, had been actually executed against the rich temple of Leucothea in Tuscany. That the man who had united under his command the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, repressed the might of Carthage, made Syracuse

Ch. 10. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 14.

Diod. ut sup.

Aristot.
Econ. 1. 2.

the first city of the Grecian name, and prepared the way for the very uncommon political tranquillity which followed, would leave to others the care of his great interests at home for the little, uncreditable, and apparently impolitic purpose of plundering a temple on the Tuscan shore, seems too obviously improbable to need refutation.²⁶ The pillage which we may believe to have been sacrilegiously taken by a licentious part of his army, his command over the sound, we are told, enabled him to make them surrender; but whether his farther disposal of it was honourable or otherwise, remaining accounts will hardly warrant any judgment.²⁷

B. C. 383.
Ol. 99. 2.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 15.

In the scarcely avoidable clashing of the Grecian and Carthaginian interests in Sicily a new rupture with Carthage was now impending. Diodorus attributes this to encouragement given by the Syracusan government for allies and subjects of Carthage in Sicily to desert the Carthaginian for the Grecian connection; implying thus that the Syracusan government bore at least the character of mildness and beneficence. A requisition was made by Carthage with which the Syracusans refused to comply, and war was declared. Magon, who had succeeded Imilcon in that high rank which the Greeks

²⁶ The passage, coming from such a reviler of Dionysius, who had just before stated robbery and sacrilege as the only purpose of the colonisation on the Adriatic shore, is, in its own language, very remarkable:

Οὗτος (ὁ Διονύσιος) ἀποικίαν ἀπεισतालκῶς εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον ἔτεσιν, ἐκτικῶς ἦν τὴν πόλιν τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Λισσόν. Ἐκ ταύτης οὖν ὀρμώμενος Διονύσιος, σχολὴν ἄγων, κατεσκεύασε νεώρια διακοσίαις τείχεσσι, καὶ τῷχος περιέβαλε τῇ πόλει, τηλικαῦτο τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι τὸν περίβολον μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων· κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ γυμνάσια μεγάλα παρὰ τὸν Ἀναπον ποταμόν· θιῶν τε ναοὺς κατεσκεύασε, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ συντίνοντα πρὸς αὐξήσιν πόλεως καὶ δόξαν.

It is sometimes the unfortunate fancy of learned men to show their talents by maintaining absurdities: the very learned Cellarius would have it that this description relates to Lissus, a new colony in a wild country. Wesseling has well observed that Syracuse alone can have been, and most clearly has been intended.

²⁷ Farther notice of the passage of Aristotle, mentioning this sacrilege, will be found in a note shortly to follow.

described by the title of king, took the command of a very large force, with which Sicily and Italy were at the same time invaded. Dionysius provided effectual resistance in both countries. He himself opposed Magon in Sicily, and the armies coming to a general action at Cabala, he gained a complete victory. Magon was one of ten thousand said to have been killed; and five thousand are reported to have been made prisoners. Nevertheless the power of Carthage enabled the son of Magon, in the same summer, according to the historian, to revenge his father's death. He met the Greeks at Cronium, and directing his great effort against the wing commanded by Leptines, brother of Dionysius, he overpowered it, and Leptines himself fell. Dionysius, unable either to protect the defeated part of his army, or to oppose effectual resistance to the conquerors, retreated, and, the Carthaginians giving no quarter, the Sicilian slain are said to have been fourteen thousand. The loss of Leptines, whose great and good qualities appear to have been universally acknowledged, would alone have been heavy to the Grecian cause in Sicily, and especially to Dionysius, in whose confidence none equalled him, unless perhaps Philistus. It seems however probable that the battle was very obstinately fought, and that the loss of the conquerors also was great; for, instead of pursuing success, the Carthaginian general withdrew to Panormus and sent proposals of peace. These Dionysius readily met, and a treaty was soon concluded. If Diodorus may be trusted for the terms, Selinus and that part of the Agrigentine territory which lay westward of the river Halychus were yielded to Carthage: the Grecian interest was confirmed where else it had before extended; but a thousand talents (about two hundred thousand pounds) were paid to the Carthaginians for the expenses of the war.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 16, 17.

Ibid.

SECTION VIII.

Peace of sixteen Years. — Syracuse enlarged and embellished. — Syracusan Revenue. — Literature encouraged. — Assistance from Syracuse to Lacedæmon against Thebes. — War renewed between Syracuse and Carthage. — Truce. — Death of Dionysius.

THOUGH the historian's account of what led to the treaty of peace is very defective, yet his report of the terms, as an outline, carries the appearance of being reasonable and correct, and we derive from him testimony of very high value for what followed. The Grecian cities of Sicily and Italy, united under the superintending administration of Syracuse, enjoyed during the long period of sixteen years such quiet that a perfect void in the military and political history of those countries ensues; only for their prosperity we find them noticed by ancient writers. The circumstances are unparalleled in Grecian history, and, for the tranquillity alone, were there no evidence of the prosperity, might be esteemed a phenomenon of the rarest and most worthy of admiration. In the loss of all accounts from the party friendly to Dionysius we owe to the method only of Diodorus, arranging his narrative in the way of annals, the unsuspecting information that a period so fortunate and of such a length existed. Without this sort of negative history, the allusions to such a golden age, found among other writers, and especially the contemporary Athenian Isocrates, would have appeared inexplicable.

Able, active, and intrepid as, according to all accounts, Dionysius was in war, it is yet not lightly indicated that he had a stronger inclination for the arts of peace. Among all the troubles of his preceding administration we find him executing great works for the improvement of the town of Syracuse. But hitherto the necessary object was to give

it strength: now he could attend to its embellishment. Flourishing in peace it acquired that extent which vestiges even at this day show, and that population which made it the wonder then and of aftertimes. Under the direction of Dionysius, temples were built, and whatever else, in the historian's expression, for convenience or for splendour, became the greatness of the city, was done. Nor did the wide circuit of the walls suffice for the public edifices: magnificent places of exercise, of the kind called by the Greeks *gymnasia*, were raised without it, on the bank of the Anapus. In extent altogether of buildings, in extent of fortifications, in population, in number of ships of war, and in every convenience of ports and naval arsenals, Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, was unequalled throughout the countries occupied by the Greeks.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 13.

The revenue, through which such mighty things were done, in peace and war, by a state of very narrow empire, is much an object of curiosity, for which remaining means of gratification are very scanty. Xenophon's treatise on the Athenian revenue, whence best a general idea of the financial systems of the republics may be gathered, has been formerly noticed. The little work on public revenue remaining from Aristotle, not a treatise, but rather notes for a treatise, principally of expedients used in emergencies by many different governments, notices some used by Dionysius of Syracuse. Of the ordinary revenue of the Syracusan state unfortunately no mention is found. When public purposes required money beyond what the ordinary revenue supplied, recourse, it appears, was had to the general assembly. Thus it is fully indicated that the government under Dionysius was democratical.²⁸ We have

Ch. 21. s. 1.
of this Hist.
Aristot. Econ.
l. 2.

²⁸ Διονύσιος Συρακούσιος, βουλόμενος χρέματα συναγαγεῖν, ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσας, ἔφησιν — Τρεῖς μὲν δὲ ναυπηγήσιν μέλλων, ἤδει ὅτι δεοίσαιντο χρημάτων. Ἐκκλη-

already seen largely, in the history of Athens, and the sequel will yet largely show, how difficult was the task of the minister of a democracy when public exigencies required that money should be raised from the people; how hardly consent could be obtained for any burden upon the people at large; what heartburnings arose in consequence between the rich and the poor; what evasions were practised by some of the wealthy; what frequent and violent oppression fell upon others. With this we have seen also another inconvenience; how rarely that secrecy, in communication with friendly states, or in purposes against the hostile, could be preserved, which, for any reasonable hope of success, was often indispensable. The measures of Dionysius reported by Aristotle, as worthy the notice of future politicians, are all of a tendency to obviate the inherent evils of democracy, without trenching upon democracy itself.

A poll-tax appears to have been a common expedient of the Syracusan government in emergencies. This concurs with other circumstances to mark that, though the form was democratical, the higher orders had considerable weight in the Syracusan government; for a poll-tax is comparatively light on the rich, and heavy on the poor; but it brings money immediately, and in amount nearly certain. Apparently for the Carthaginian war²⁹, some command of such a resource for emergencies being needful, Dionysius had recourse to an artifice. Assembling the people he told them that opportunity offered of most important advantage for the state, no less than to gain a considerable city to the Syracusan confederacy, if the treasury might be sufficiently supplied for the purpose; and he accordingly desired a contri-

σίαν οὖν συναγαγὼν, ἔφη — Οὐκ εὐπορῶν δὲ ἀργυρίου, νόμισμα ἔκοψε πασσατίτζου, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, πολλὰ τοῦ πεκομμένου νομίσματος ὑπερεῖπεν· οἱ δ' ἐψηφίσαντο, κ. τ. λ. Aristot. Œcon. l. 2. p. 688. t. 3. ed. Paris.

²⁹ Τρεῖς ναυπηγήσειν μέλλον, is the want assigned by Aristotle.

bution of two staters (perhaps two pounds sterling) from every citizen. His arguments and his character prevailed: the decree for the contribution passed, and the money was paid. A few days after, assembling the people again, he told them that adverse circumstances, not to be foreseen, had defeated the project, but every contributor should immediately have his money returned; and this was done punctually. None could tell what had been really in view; but the consequence was a general confidence in Dionysius³⁰, such that, in following emergencies, without disclosing the secrets of administration, a poll-tax could always be obtained.

But, in a republic, to obtain from the wealthy their reasonable share, without resorting to the violences practised at Athens, artifice seems to have been necessary. At a time therefore when money was much wanted for public purposes Dionysius declared, in the general assembly, that he had seen the goddess Ceres, who required that the women should deposit all their jewels and golden ornaments in her temple. The women of his family, he said, had already obeyed the divine behest, and those who failed would assuredly incur the goddess's anger. General obedience to the injunction being thus obtained, he made a solemn sacrifice, at the conclusion of which he declared that the goddess had kindly consented to lend the dedicated valuables for the use of the republic. The ground thus gained he proceeded to use as foundation for a permanent tax, in its kind certainly the least possibly oppressive, enacting that women, who would wear costly ornaments, should pay to the goddess a sum equal to their value.

Free gifts also, as at Athens, were in use at Syracuse. But it was the misfortune of this mode of taxation, espe-

³⁰ *Ἀνεκτίσαστο τοὺς πολίτας*. A stronger phrase to express general popularity the Greek language itself would hardly furnish.

cially in a government less arbitrary than the Athenian, that, while real patriots paid, the disaffected avoided payment. Free gifts being proposed, many, of supposed wealth, pleaded poverty. Dionysius gave out that he also was poor, but he would nevertheless find means to contribute to the support of the commonwealth. Accordingly directing the most valuable of his moveable effects to be put to auction, pretenders to poverty were found to be among the purchasers. It was then ordered that the price paid should go to the public treasury, and that the goods should be restored to Dionysius's house.³¹

In a time when a real scarcity of money prevented the necessary exertions of government he proposed a coinage of pewter to pass at the value of silver. Much argument was necessary to prevail upon the assembly to ratify this measure: the people, says Aristotle, chose rather to have silver than pewter; yet Dionysius at length obtained the decree he desired. Perhaps in no other way that the circumstances of the age admitted could he equally have attained for the Syracusan state the modern advantage of

³¹ It is obvious that such a measure, as applicable generally to the citizens, if at all practicable, could not be within the policy of the man to whom public confidence was so great an object, and so successfully attained, as is indicated in the preceding example. But used against a disaffected or disingenuous few only, it would obtain ready confirmation from the decrees of a majority in the general assembly. So it may be observed also of a measure of military discipline, reported by Aristotle of Dionysius, on occasion of the plunder of a temple in Tuscany, already noticed in the text. He commanded that every man should deliver up one half of what he had so irregularly taken. The plunderers, hoping, from the terms of the order, that they should not only escape punishment, but be allowed to retain the other half, with more or less exactness obeyed the requisition. But Dionysius, having thus gained a considerable amount of the information he wanted, then issued a second order for the other half to be brought in. For Aristotle's purpose, in a collection of notes, it sufficed to mention the soldiers or sailors generally. But such a measure, calling a whole armament to account, would evidently have been impracticable. Of course therefore the words must be taken as applying only to a dissolute part of an armament, whose general good discipline and good disposition alone could give means for carrying such a measure into execution against any part.

paper money. If, on another occasion, to pay a public debt he used the more exceptionable method of requiring the current coin to be taken at twice its former value, it should be considered what the difficulties of administration must have been in the pressure of a Carthaginian war.

A tax on cattle, which of course would excite uneasiness among landowners, appears, in the philosopher's account, to have carried more impolicy than any of the others. Several successive regulations became necessary to obviate great inconveniences, and even to make it productive; but, in the end, it should seem that Dionysius succeeded. Such a tax, levied in the way of tithe, and bearing the name, seems to have been, ordinarily among the Greeks, imposed only on conquered countries.³² Possibly this tax, however regularly laid by a decree of the general assembly, and however necessary toward preserving all the lands of the Sicilian Greeks from such an impost under the arbitrary order of a Carthaginian general, may have contributed largely to extend the title of tyrant as a common addition to the name of Dionysius.

Among reports which passed to Greece from the adverse party, it was said that distress only, arising from waste of private fortune, induced Hipparinus to connect his political interest with that of Dionysius. It is not improbable that the pride of Hipparinus may have been hurt at finding it expedient, whether from private or political necessities, to become in a manner dependent upon the abilities and popularity of one so inferior in years and in family importance. Nevertheless the silence of the adverse historian, and the still more adverse biographer, not lightly implies that no discord between the autocrator-generals

Arist. Polit.
l. 5. p. 526.
ed. Paris.

³² Aristotle reckons this tax in that class which he distinguishes by the title of *Οἰκονομία σατραπικῇ*, of which is *ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία καὶ ΔΕΚΑΨΤΗ καλουμένη*.

interrupted public business. The marriage of Dionysius with the daughter of Hipparinus, unless his consent to that also should be attributed to private necessities (which other accounts, especially Plutarch's, tend to contradict), would mark rather private esteem as well as political concord. When Hipparinus died we do not learn ; but it seems likely to have been before his son Dion was of an age to warrant any pretension immediately to offer himself for popular choice to succeed to the first civil and military office of the republic. Former precedents were rather in favour of one than of two in that high situation ; those especially of Gelon and Hieron formerly, and latterly of Diocles and Daphnæus. Dionysius however, after the death of Hipparinus, remained without a colleague in the supreme magistracy. If in this invidious situation he had cause to fear the interfering pretensions of any, Dion apparently would be the foremost object of his jealousy. Nevertheless that he remained the friend of the family of Hipparinus, that he was kind to Dion, that, whatever may have been the derangement of the father's affairs, the son inherited and enjoyed a very large patrimony, and was put forward, by the surviving general-autocrator, in civil and in military office, is allowed by the most adverse writers, and denied by none.

Dionysius had a strong propensity to literature ; and the busiest life commonly affords portions of leisure, in which an active mind will still be employed, and the change of employment serves for relaxation and rest. He delighted particularly in poetry, and was himself a poet. The weakness of his character seems to have been, like that of the great Themistocles, vanity and ostentatiousness. Like his predecessor in command, Hieron, he would send his chariots to the Olympian games. The power of his arms by sea and land so commanded the Adriatic sea and its shores that,

according to Strabo, his principal breeding stud was in the Venetian territory. But this, in itself doubtful, seems rendered more so by what the geographer also relates, that Ancona was a colony of Syracusans who withdrew from his tyranny; unless indeed they withdrew with his consent; which indeed may seem implied in the information that Ancona, like Lissus, on the same coast, was settled under the protection of the Syracusan government.

Strab. l. 5.
p. 212.

p. 241.

Sect. 7. of
this chap.

But Dionysius is said to have been most anxious to shine as a poet; and probably his poetical talents were considerable; for Isocrates mentions that a tragedy of his composition won the prize in the great field of contention for poetical fame, the theatre of Athens. At Olympia he was less fortunate, having apparently sent both his verses and his horses thither in unto-ward season, when politics would be likely to interfere with the decision on poetical merit; for those who then held the Elean government and swayed the Elean people were, together with the greatest part of Peloponnesus, highly hostile to Lacedæmon, then in close alliance with Syracuse. If besides literary fame, and the simple glory of a victor in the games, he had a political purpose, which is probable, neither was he in that successful; for an invective against him, composed by Lysias, the celebrated rhetorician, and pronounced before the meeting, coinciding more with the political sentiments of the majority, he was abused as a tyrant, and his poetry was reviled.

Isocr. Pancg.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 74.

Gratified however with the conversation of lettered men, he gathered about him all the principal literary characters of the time; drawn perhaps less by his munificence than by the superior quiet and security of the residence of Syracuse in that troubled age. A most improbable story is told of his treatment of Plato, who was among the visitors he most

honoured. In consequence of offence puerilely taken, it is said he caused the philosopher to be exposed in the common slave-market, and actually sold. But the accounts of the same writers show that the society of literary men remained in Syracuse and about Dionysius; and that, as far as the influence of his administration extended in Italy as well as in Sicily, the towns were seats of learning, with exception for Athens only, more than any others of the Greek nation. The tale indeed involves its own contradiction; proceeding to say that Plato was redeemed by a subscription of philosophers residing in the Sicilian and Italian cities; of course under the protection of that superintending government, by the chief administrator of which it is pretended the injurious violence was committed.³³

³³ The story of the sale of Plato, as given by Diodorus, has such confirmation as it may derive from the letters attributed to Plato himself, and printed with his dialogues. Those letters seem to have been acknowledged by Plutarch, and thence probably have obtained credit among the modern learned. Barthelemi has admitted them implicitly, note, p. 548. 13th ed. 8vo. Their authenticity, so supported, it cannot but be hazardous to question; and yet, the character of spuriousness they exhibit being to my mind convincing, I should be wanting in the duty I have undertaken if I attributed any authority to them, and perhaps if I wholly decline saying why I refuse it. Not however to enter into long argument, it should seem that to Diodorus, though he tells the same story of the sale of Plato, they were either unknown, or known to be spurious: for they tell of three voyages made by Plato to Sicily, and Diodorus believed in only one. But the very inanity of those letters seems enough to mark them for supposititious. Considering the person pretended writing, the persons addressed, the subjects of the letters, and the circumstances of the times, it is surely impossible to read them without the utmost disappointment. Is it imaginable that such letters could have been written by Plato, not containing one syllable of information that might not have been written as well four hundred years after, by any sophist, the most ignorant, not only of the private affairs of the individuals concerned, but of the public circumstances of Sicily and Greece in their time? Between the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch to arraign arbitrary power directly we know was necessarily to be avoided; but oblique attack, a kind of *velitatio*, under the mask of Grecian story, was much in vogue. The letters then are in consonance with Plutarch's purpose in his *Life of Dion*, and with Barthelemi's in his *Anacharsis*. But the whole story of the sale of Plato, and his redemption by the philosophers, unmentioned by the contemporaries Xenophon, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and virtually contradicted by Isocrates, seems too absurd almost to deserve even the notice here taken of it.

For these sixteen years of settled peace and prosperity, which the malice of disappointed faction seems to have resented more than actual injury, we especially want the history of Philistus. Of political and military occurrences within Sicily or Italy, during the term, no information remains. In Greece the pause of arms, produced by the peace of Antalcidas, immediately preceded it. That pause of hardly three years, though without settled peace throughout the republics, was, for that country of troubles, an uncommon period of quiet. Soon after the settlement of the peace of Sicily, it was partially interrupted by the war which Lacedæmon carried against Olynthus; and presently all was embroiled again, through the seizure of the citadel of Thebes by the Lacedæmonians, producing, in a long series of complicated hostilities, the fatal consequences which we have seen to Lacedæmon itself.

Sicily, and the Grecian settlements in Italy, had already enjoyed six years of tranquillity, when the Lacedæmonians, pressed by the united arms of Thebes and Athens, and fearful of the preponderance of the Athenian navy and the extension of the Athenian influence among the islands of the western sea, applied to Syracuse for assistance to prevent them; urging not only the claim of an allied power, but the clear interest of the Sicilian Greeks as requiring it. Accordingly ten ships were sent to re-enforce the Lacedæmonian fleet at Corcyra, but, immediately on reaching the island, nine were intercepted by the able Athenian commander Iphicrates. Soon after this the Athenians renounced the Theban alliance, and engaged in confederacy with Lacedæmon against Thebes. Then Syracuse also seems to have become the ally of Athens, and Dionysius was so received into favour by the Athenian people, that, on what precise occasion we are uninformed, the privileges of an

B. C. 373.
Ol. 100. 4. 1

Ch. 26. s. 8. of
this Hist.

Ep. Philip. ad
Athen. ap.
Demosth.

Athenian citizen were given to himself and all his posterity. Of any farther auxiliary force sent from Syracuse no notice occurs till about eight years after, in the heavy pressure upon Lacedæmon after the fatal battle of Leuctra, and its sequel the invasion of Laconia, when Epaminondas a second

B. C. 368. Ol.
102.4—103.1.
Ch. 27. s. 4.
of this Hist.

time entered Peloponnesus with the assembled strength of the Theban confederacy. Faithful then to its ancient ally in distress, the Syracusan government sent twenty triremes and a body of foot and horse; the foot Spaniards and Gauls, possibly those which had been received into the Syracusan service on the retreat of the Carthaginian besieging army; the horse probably native Syracusans, who compensated the smallness of their number by their activity and the superiority of their discipline.

B. C. 366.*
Ol. 103. 2-3.

About two years after, when Greece was in that confusion of war and politics which preceded the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court, war broke out between the Sicilians and Carthaginians. Diodorus and

Diod. l. 15.
c. 73.
Plutarch. vit.
Dion. p. 693.

Plutarch impute the calamity to the ambition of Dionysius; careless of reconciling this with their imputations against him of dependency upon Carthage. Diodorus however acknowledges the pretence at least of a just cause, in the incursions from Carthaginian settlements upon Grecian lands; and Plutarch proceeds to assert, what cannot but be esteemed eulogy of the Syracusan administration, that the Grecian forces, which it could now assemble and carry into action, amounted to a hundred

[* Mr. Clinton places the death of the elder Dionysius B. C. 367. "He died after a dramatic victory at the *Lenæa*: Diod. xv. 74.: consequently after Anthesterion, or the eighth month of Nausigenes. [Feb. B. C. 367.] He was still living when the Syracusan auxiliaries were in Peloponnesus: (*ἡ δευτέρα βοήθεια*. Xen. Hel. vii. l. 28.) which also brings down his death to the end of the year of Nausigenes. When succours were sent a third time, in the next campaign, B. C. 366, Xenophon (Hel. vii. 4. 12.) attests that Dionysius was dead: *σχισδὸν περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* [the conclusion of the peace between Corinth and Thebes] *τετελευτηκότος ἤδη τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου, ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ πέμπει βοήθειαν.*" Fasti Hellen. p. 114.]

thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and five hundred ships of war. Diodorus states the armament, which actually moved under the orders of Dionysius, to have consisted of thirty thousand foot, three thousand horse, and three hundred ships of war; which may perhaps be no great exaggeration. Selinus, Eryx, and even Entella, which had formerly baffled his efforts, now yielded to him. In an attempt upon Lilybæum he failed; and the stormy season then approaching, its dangers for the ancient vessels of war induced him to remand the greater part of his fleet to Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in an unexpected attack upon the squadron left in the port of Eryx, took several ships. In the course of the winter negotiation was opened, which produced a truce; and soon after Dionysius was seized with a disorder of which he died.

APPENDIX TO THE THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER.

Of the Character of the elder Dionysius, and of his Government.

THOUGH it has been carefully endeavoured, in the three last chapters, to give the fairest account that could be elicited from ancient memorials of an interesting portion of the Grecian republics during an interesting period, yet it may be not wholly unnecessary, both toward establishing the faith of the foregoing, and clearing the way for the coming narrative, to take some farther notice of obscurities left and extravagances warranted by writers of high authority, through which this part of history has been singularly clouded and disguised. Already much has been noticed, and in the sequel much more will appear, of the origin of those odious pictures of Dionysius which have been transmitted, incidentally however only, and without historical connection, by most respectable ancient authors. It requires

observation, and occasion will occur to repeat the remark, that even under the republics, while history was scanty and books altogether rare, the numerous philosophers, and even the greatest, wanting a statement of facts for ground or for illustration of an argument, took ordinarily any popular report, without care of its authenticity. When books afterward multiplied, the despotism, first of the successors of Alexander, and then much more that of the Roman empire, stopping the political career which was before open, the busy-minded, educated for that career under the philosophers, turned their talents and their ingenuity to idle disputation. Stories invented by party malignity, offering the highest-coloured pictures, seem without regard for their origin generally to have been preferred; and for this merit those disseminated by the enemies of Dionysius appear to

Cic. de Orat.
l. 2. c. 13.
de Clar. Or.
c. 85.
de Divin.
l. 1. c. 20.

have earned singular favour. Even Cicero gave in to this practice of the philosophers, with whom he was fond of associating himself, and example of it remains from him not a little remarkable.

Philistus, the friend, the assistant in peace and war, and the historian of Dionysius, is mentioned, in Cicero's didactic and critical works, as among the first historical writers; not only admirable for his style and manner, but worthy of confidence for his ability, diligence, and means of acquaintance with the facts he related.³⁴ Nevertheless when, among his philosophical questions, he wanted an example of a horrid tyrant, setting aside Philistus, he gives from the opposite party-writers, with all the deformity of their colouring, the odious pictures that his immediate purpose

³⁴ "Syracusius Philistus, qui, cum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumsit in historiâ scribendâ, maximeque Thucydidem est, sicut mihi videtur, imitatus." Cic. de Orat. l. 2. c. 13. "Philistum, doctum hominem et diligentem, et æqualem temporum illorum." De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. "Catonem cum Phillisto et Thucydide comparares? — quos enim ne e Græcis quisquam imitari potest." De Clar. Or. c. 85.

required. He does not indeed there profess to write history; he merely draws example, such as he found to his immediate purpose among historical writers, and not without acknowledgment that different representations existed. These stories, thus related by Cicero, afford very satisfactory evidence that they were in his time extant in works of literary merit enough to have fame, but none that he gave them credit against the contrary testimonies also extant.

Plutarch's account however must be otherwise considered. Not professing to write connected history, he professes nevertheless to extract from it the lives of eminent men, and represent their characters fairly. Of the public conduct of Dionysius, how he acquired his power, how he administered the complex affairs of a state or confederacy composed of all the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities, how he managed its revenue, how he combined and directed its force, so as to excite the admiration of the great Scipio Africanus at his success in the wars with Carthage, and to draw confession, even from

Polyb. l. 15.
p. 721.

Plutarch, of the singularly flourishing state of Syracuse under him, Plutarch appears to have thought himself not at all bound to show. But he has entered into the private life, the domestic affairs and the closest conversations of this extraordinary tyrant, which he has undertaken to know, without at all saying how they became known. The man whom Scipio professed to admire as one of the greatest men, not only of his own but of any age, who, in the testimony of Cicero, governed Syracuse eight-and-thirty years, who, having defended his country in arms against the most formidable power then upon earth, maintained it in a peace and tranquillity unknown elsewhere among the Greeks, and provided so that this happy period should extend far beyond his own life, this man

Cic. Tusc.
l. 5. c. 20.

Plutarch has represented as a compound of the foulest vices and basest weaknesses. "So suspicious," Plut. vit. Dion. he says, "and fearful of all men, was the first Dionysius, that he would not allow scissors to be used about his head, but his hair was kept in form with a burning coal. No person, not his brother, not his son, was allowed to come into his presence without previously stripping himself before the guard, for assurance against secreted weapons. His brother Leptines, for taking a spear from an attending guardsman to point out the situation of places in a country which was the subject of conversation, incurred his heavy displeasure, and the guardsman was put to death for parting with his spear. Marsyas, whom he had raised to a high military command, relating that he had dreamed of having killed Dionysius, was executed for the evil disposition so indicated."

Arist. Pol.
l. 5. c. 5.
Econ. l. 2.
p. 392.

To refute such tales it is hardly necessary to refer to the account of Diodorus, confirmed by Aristotle, of the popularity by which Dionysius acquired his power, and of his free and confidential communication with all ranks of people when in full possession of it: the poet's reason, formerly noticed, might suffice against the philosophical biographer's extravagances. Sophocles. Œd. Tyr. v. 540. "Is it not absurd to aim at sovereignty without friends and without popularity?" What little circumstances may have assisted invention for such tales it were waste of time to inquire. One only, reported by Cicero, for its intrinsic merit, through which it has acquired a just celebrity, may deserve notice, that of the feast of Damocles. If, in conversation at table, Dionysius only said, "Could you, Damocles, enjoy the most delicious feast, in the most engaging company, with a sword suspended over your head by a single horse-hair?" the foundation would be abundant for the ingenious story which has been transmitted to posterity.

From the earlier and more impartial Roman biographer we have, not a life, but a character of Dionysius, which may deserve to be reported as nearly as may be in his own words: "Dionysius," he says, "was among the Corn. Nep. de Regibus. princes known to history most eminent for the glory of their actions; a brave soldier, an able general, and, what is rarely found in a tyrant, above the temptations of lust, luxury, avarice, and every other vice, except the thirst of sovereign power, which led him to cruelty. In his constant purpose of strengthening his authority he spared the life of none whom he suspected of plotting against him. Nevertheless the tyranny which he acquired by his virtue and bravery he retained with extraordinary felicity, and dying at the age of more than sixty years, left behind him a flourishing kingdom."

Here we find a man described who might defend Sicily against Carthage, and gain the admiration of a great Roman. Yet it seems due to the character of Dionysius to observe that, in the whole detail of the Sicilian historian, often imputing cruelty in general terms, and showing clemency, liberality, and generosity in specific instances, no instance of cruelty is specified, but in the very doubtful case of Phyton, general of the Rhegians, where exaggeration is evident. If to this be added the total failure of notice of the cruelty of Dionysius by the very eminent contemporary writers by whom he remains mentioned, Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Aristotle, and to this negative testimony be joined that rather positive, so strongly Epist. ad Philip. implied in the recommendation of his example by Isocrates for the common benefit of Greece, the inference seems reasonable, that the tales of that excavation among the quarries of Syracuse, called still the ear of Dionysius, and all those which Cicero, and Plutarch, and Seneca, and philosophical fablers of later ages have reported of the

singularly tyrannical character of his government, however become popular and almost proverbial, have originated only in the malice of party-spirit.

It is obvious that there would be always, among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, a party desirous of propagating opinions of Dionysius such as Plutarch has transmitted, and that party we shall see becoming the ruling party; but how the disposition passed, as in a certain degree evidently it did, to Athens, and extensively over Greece, is not so obvious. There remains however, from a most respectable contemporary writer, what will not only throw light on this subject, but assist toward a just general view of the politics of the age, and a just estimation of the accounts transmitted by later authors. The discourse of Isocrates, known by the name of the Panegyric Oration, really a political pamphlet, was published when the conduct of the Lacedæmonians in

the punishment of Mantinea, in the seizure of the
Ch. 26. s. 1,
2, 3. of this
Hist. citadel of Thebes, and in the wars which presently followed with Phlius and Olynthus, excited just indignation and alarm among thinking men throughout Greece; and hence it was an object for general patriotism to excite opposition to their ambitious views and oppressive measures. Syracuse, the ancient ally of Lacedæmon, continued to be such while Dionysius directed its government; and, of course, throughout the extensive party among the Grecian republics adverse to Lacedæmon, there would be some fellow-feeling with the party in Italy and Sicily adverse to Dionysius. Of this temper Isocrates endeavoured to avail himself in that oration. Among a laboured collection of reproaches against Lacedæmon, deduced from earliest history, he asserts it to have been through the cordial co-operation of the Lacedæmonian government that Dionysius made himself tyrant of Sicily. But when the Theban democracy, after having successfully resisted oppression,

aspired to a tyrannical command over other states, friendly connection being then formed between Athens and Lacedæmon, Dionysius, already the ally of Lacedæmon, apparently became also the ally of Athens; for the freedom of the city, as already mentioned, was given him for himself and all his posterity.

Ep. Philip.
ap. Demosth.
p. 161.
ed. Reiske.

Then an Athenian might be allowed to eulogise Dionysius, though a tyrant. "He found the rest of Sicily," says a contemporary rhetorician, "desolated, and Syracuse severely pressed by war. Every danger he met and averted, and made Syracuse the greatest of Grecian cities."³⁵ Isocrates did not scruple to avow correspondence with Dionysius, "when he held the tyranny³⁶;" and must surely have depended, not merely upon his own opinion, but upon some extensive estimation of the beneficial conduct of the tyrant, when he ventured to propose it among examples to be followed for the common good of Greece. Nevertheless wherever the Theban interest prevailed, the name of Dionysius, as the friend of Lacedæmon, would be still unpopular, and all the prejudices and all the calumnies of the party adverse to him, in Sicily and Italy, would find ready reception.

Isocr. Nicocl.
p. 118. t. 1.

Isocr. Or.
ad Philip.
p. 360. t. 1.

p. 350.

It might be much an object to know what that government really was (evidently superior, at least in point of administration, to anything common with the Greeks), which, among so many cities, habituated each to its separate republican independency, and much habituated to political contest and sedition, could maintain concord during sixteen years, and still hold all so ready and zealous to co-operate in war

³⁵ The tract called Nicocles, transmitted among the works of Isocrates, if it should not carry the authority of his name, seems however entitled to that of his age.

³⁶ Διονύσιον τὸν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον.

as to form a sufficient balance to the power, and an effectual check to the ambition, of Carthage. In Proper Greece, since the Trojan times at least, such union had not been seen, nor had any influence been able to collect and direct such a force as that which enabled the Sicilian Greeks to withstand the Carthaginian invasion. Should Plutarch be believed, a mercenary army held the Sicilian Greeks in absolute subjection. But how a mercenary army could be maintained, sufficient at the same time to hold the Greeks in subjection and to defend them against the Carthaginians, was, in his plan of history, needless to explain. The less artful Sicilian compiler Diodorus however sufficiently shows that the fact was otherwise. The citizens in arms, and especially the Syracusans, it is evident from his account, formed the great body of the armies that opposed the foreign enemy. Indeed the very amount of the military force of Syracuse, stated by Plutarch himself, may be esteemed no small degree of evidence that the citizens must have borne arms. Mercenaries were beside entertained, as they were by the Athenian and almost every other principal republic of the age. But, as occasion has occurred often to observe, among the Greeks a naval force was always held highly adverse to the security of either oligarchy, or tyrannical monarchy. When Critias proposed to make himself lord of Athens he renounced maritime power. Among all the maritime republics it was the constant object of the democratical party to hold the city connected with the fleet; of the oligarchal to keep them separate. The Lacedæmonian government, often compelled to mix in maritime war, and even to take a lead in it, never persevered in any effort for raising a Lacedæmonian navy. But Dionysius evidently lived in no fear of what Thucydides has called the nautic multitude; a description of men far different from the British seaman, whose home is on the ocean: the Greek

seaman, if he ought to be called so, fed and slept ashore, and went aboard almost only for action. But in the midst of that generally troublesome multitude in the island which separated the two harbours of Syracuse Dionysius chose his residence. At one time we have seen a part of that multitude breaking loose from just authority, to act as in the impulse of the moment they thought the good of their country required: at another time we have seen a part of the Syracusan people in the land service more directly and more perseveringly disobeying the commander-in-chief. But as far as Dionysius ruled, whether legally or with authority more than legal, it appears to have been always through the support of the great body of Syracusan citizens, who composed the fleets and armies of the republic. In Syracuse he assembled a vast population, removing thither the people of other towns of Sicily and of Italy. To govern by a force of mercenaries he should rather have divided them. For keeping order in the mixed multitude the mercenaries might sometimes be useful, and to relieve the friendly party in restraining the adverse they would probably be sometimes employed; but not to hold in subjection that party by which Dionysius acquired, and without which he could not maintain, his power. For it appears, on numerous occasions, that not only all the forms of republican government were constantly maintained, but the actual exercise of sovereign authority by the general assembly gave continual opportunity for opposition to the administration of Dionysius.

The whole executive government, with powers not likely to have been very accurately defined, was apparently directed by the general-autocrator. He was regularly accountable to the assembly of the people; but that assembly must have been a most unwieldy body, little fit to execute the powers, either of legislation, or of control over an executive government which extended over numerous cities holding each its

separate legislative power. One man therefore, for all those cities, first civil magistrate and commander-in-chief of army and navy, popular and politic, the greatest general and the greatest orator of his age, in such a government would and must hold the effectual exercise of absolute power ; and thus Dionysius seems to have been not untruly called, in the original sense of the term, Tyrant of Syracuse and of Sicily and Italy.

CHAPTER XXXII.

AFFAIRS OF THE GRECIAN SETTLEMENTS OF SICILY AND ITALY FROM THE DEATH OF THE FIRST DIONYSIUS TO THE RESTORATION OF THE SECOND DIONYSIUS.

SECTION I.

Election of the second Dionysius to the Dignity of General-Autocrat. — Peace of Eleven Years. — Parties in Opposition under Dion and Heraclides. — Banishment of Dion and Heraclides.

THE discussion of the character of the elder Dionysius and of his government, longer perhaps and more particular than would generally become historical composition, seemed warranted, and even required, by the importance of the portion of history, and by the obscurity and contradictions in which that portion of history hath been enwrapped; nor may it be less necessary toward exhibiting in just light an important sequel.

On the death of a man who had presided over the government so many years, with uncommon ability, and perhaps yet more uncommon success, it was matter of most serious consideration for all the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, but especially the Syracusans, and most especially those who had been his principal supporters, how and by whom the administration should in future be directed. To preserve peace and union, and means for common exertion against a threatening common enemy, among so many portions of the little empire, long habituated to discord within each and among all, it seems to have been extensively felt that one chief, with some permanence of power, was necessary, and that, for such a chief, eminence of birth was an

important qualification. With these views the family of the late general-autocrator would stand among the foremost for public notice. Dionysius had left by Doris, daughter of Xenetus of Locri, a son also named Dionysius, already advanced in manhood; and by Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, his late colleague in the office of general-autocrator, two sons, Hipparinus and Narsæus, yet under age. But the elder Hipparinus had also left a son, Dion; and the family of Hipparinus was the first, or among the first, of Syracuse. Dion then was some years older than the younger Dionysius: with considerable talents, cultivated under the first

Diod. Plut.
vit. Dion.

philosophers of the age, and especially Plato, he had the farther advantage, derived from his late brother-in-law's favour, of having been versed in high employments military and civil; and to these he added that of possessing the largest patrimonial fortune of the Sicilian

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

Greeks. Thus eminent, he aspired to the first eminence, and before the death of the elder Dionysius he had begun the secret practices to prepare the way for stepping into his place.

The younger Dionysius was not his equal either in ability or in ambition. But Dion had made himself obnoxious by a morose and haughty temper. Dionysius was more popular among the many through his father's popularity, and more agreeable to the principal men for his pleasanter manners. Philistus especially supported him.¹ But the important election was to be made, as in a democracy, by the voice of

¹ The story told by Plutarch of Dionysius having given the tyranny of Syracuse and Sicily by a testamentary devise is so little consonant with what was either usual among the Greeks, or likely to have happened in his particular circumstances, that the clear testimony of Diodorus to a more probable and ordinary course of things is hardly necessary for its refutation. Plutarch's idea seems to have been drawn from Roman times, or Greek after the conquest of the Persian empire. For the age of Dionysius, he should still have attended to the tragic poet's information of what tyranny was, and how to be acquired, with which the account of Diodorus perfectly accords. The phrase *περὶ τὰ πλῆθη συναγαγών*, and indeed the whole account of Diodorus, shows that not only the form, but the reality, of popular sovereignty remained.

the sovereign people. The general assembly was convened. Young Dionysius, addressing the multitude, solicited that good will which he said he hoped, little as he had yet had opportunity to earn it, would attach to him for his father's merits, and pass to him as an inheritance. Of any opposition on the occasion we have no account.

B. C. 364.
Ol. 102.4—
103.1. Diod.
l. 15. c. 74.
[B. C. 367. Cl.
See c. 31. s. 8.]

The silence of the adverse writers concerning transactions in Sicily, during eleven years after the accession of the younger Dionysius to the supreme power in Syracuse, forms no small eulogy of his administration, and reflects very great credit on that of his predecessor, who had established the advantageous order of things which gave means for such a phenomenon in Grecian history. While the mild temper of the government provoked no enemies, the naval and military force, ready at his command, deterred aggression. Respected abroad and cherished at home, the only murmurs, noticed even by adverse writers, were of restless spirits, who reprobed that want of energy, as they called it, which allowed the Carthaginians to hold their Sicilian possessions; while sober men could not but consider the maintenance of peace with that preponderant power, unsullied by any degrading concession, as indicating political conduct the most beneficial and praiseworthy. In the uncommon peace thus enjoyed, the Sicilian towns, and especially Syracuse, flourished beyond example; and the benefits appear to have been in no small degree extended to the Italian cities, which acquiesced under the superintending authority of the younger, as before of the elder, Dionysius. The many self-governed little states, thus united under one executive administration, in the manner nearly of the Athenian confederacy under Pericles, formed one state altogether the most powerful at that time existing in Europe.² The peace

² Μεγίστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπῃ δυναστειῶν ἀρχή. Diod. l. 16. c. 5. Τυραννίδι τῇ πασῶν ἐπιφανιστάτῃ καὶ μεγίστῃ. Plut. vit. Timol. p. 242.

of Sicily appears to have remained wholly undisturbed. In Italy hostilities occurred only with the Lucanians. The Syracusan government undertook the conduct of the war, and the younger Dionysius has the credit of having commanded in some successful actions which brought the enemy to submission. The moderation and generosity which restrained ambition and rapacity, and gave easy terms to the conquered, were taken by the ill-affected as ground, apparently in the scarcity of other ground, for invective against the administration. Except in this little war, the growth of piracy in the Adriatic alone gave occasion for any use of arms. That evil was repressed by the Syracusan fleets; and, to prevent more effectually the renewal of maritime depredation in those seas, two towns were founded, in places commodious for naval stations, on the coast of Apulia.

The advantages however of the administration of the younger Dionysius appear to have been little owing to his own character, but much to the able men who had been his father's friends and assistants, and especially the venerable Philistus. If Dionysius had himself talents for business, he appears to have had little disposition to use them. All his father's passion for literature indeed he seems to have had, but with an excessive propensity, which, if his father ever had, his great mind overbore it³, for pleasure and dissipation. That he had some quickness of judgment as well as of wit, much good humour, and a temper not easily ruffled, appears from anecdotes of his later life, preserved with a purpose very wide of flattery. Easiness and generosity are also marked in him in the course of the narrative of Diodorus, and remain attested even by his contemporary enemy Timæus.

Arist. Polit.
I. 5. c. 10.

But his dissipation, and especially his drunkenness, made him contemptible.

³ "Minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus." Corn. Nep. de reg.

With such a character at the head of a government, whether tyranny, aristocracy, or democracy, (and the government of Syracuse seems clearly to have been compounded of the three, with the addition, from the Sicilian and Italian cities, of a large portion of what has been called federalism,) it may well be wondered that quiet could be maintained so long, but not that troubles should at length arise. Philistus, who seems chiefly to have directed things, would be sometimes ill-supported, and always envied. Two principal men opposed him, Dion and Heraclides. The former, maternal uncle of Dionysius, was in character the reverse of his nephew, ambitious, active, austere, singularly austere, and haughty. He had some popular virtues; and, for the sake of power, he cultivated popularity; but his political principles were aristocratical, and his temper, perhaps yet more than his political principles, was adverse to the acquisition of any extensive and dangerous popularity. Heraclides was more of the courtier. With much ambition, much courage, much activity, he had a temper that could accommodate itself to acquire the favour equally of prince and people. Through the favour of the general-autocrator he was next in military command under him: through the favour of the people he was the most dangerous man in Syracuse to his government.

Plut. v. Dion.

Of Heraclides we have very little account: and of Dion in some respects too little, in other more than enough; for much from Plutarch is evidently fable. Nevertheless in comparing Plutarch with the honest though prejudiced Diodorus, and both, as opportunity offers, with other writers, means are found for appreciating, in considerable amount, what is related by all. It seems probable that the elder Dionysius had taken measures for securing to his son the succession to the high rank which himself held, by the favour both of the principal men and of the multitude.

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

We owe to the Roman biographer, less a party writer than either Diodorus or Plutarch, the information that Dion, even before his brother-in-law's death, engaged in secret measures for supplanting his nephew. This was discovered, yet the easy liberality of the younger Dionysius forgave it, and Dion was not only still admitted to his society and counsels, but was among the most respected and favoured in both. It was at the instance of Dion, it is said, that Plato was invited to revisit Syracuse, and assist in improving the laws and constitution. However doubtful may be the accounts of Plato's voyages to Sicily, and of the circumstances of his residence there, yet this may deserve notice concerning them. If they are true, it follows that the government of Syracuse remained in a great degree popular under each Dionysius; for the very purpose for which the philosopher is said to have been invited was to arrange a free government. But if the accounts are fictitious, they show that the author of the fiction, which has obtained so much credit, either was aware that the government of Syracuse was free, or considered it as general opinion, which, to make his fiction popular, it would be necessary to respect.

It is likely nevertheless that Dion had reason to be dissatisfied with his nephew's conduct, as it tended to weaken and expose to ruin the well-combined system of government under which Sicily had so long flourished; and it is moreover likely that his haughty and austere manner in remonstrance might make his counsels daily less acceptable to the general-autocrator. Philistus then enjoying the greatest favour with the first magistrate, and Heraclides with the people, Dion with much uneasiness found himself in an inferior situation, where he reckoned he ought to have held the first. Thus disappointed and soured, he was led to a line of conduct which nothing could justify, engaging in secret correspondence with the governor of the Carthaginian settle-

ments in Sicily. Some of his letters were intercepted and delivered to Dionysius. From these it was discovered that while, for a blind, formal communication was carried on by the Carthaginian governor with the Syracusan administration, secret negotiation was going forward with Dion. Of its tenor information from ancient writers fails, but that the purpose was the advancement of Dion's power in Syracuse, to the overthrow of that of Dionysius and his immediate friends, is clearly implied. Dionysius, before aware, as the Roman biographer says, that Dion excelled him in talents, and was gaining upon him in popularity, now saw that it was no longer possible for both to live in Sicily.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 963.

Plut. & Corn.
Nep. vit. Dion.
Diod. i. 16.

Occasion has occurred heretofore to observe that it was too much the way of writers of the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch, deficient in their accounts of public affairs, to relate secret transactions and private conversation, the most unlikely to become known, with as much confidence as if they had been present. Plutarch has undertaken to say what passed between Dion and Philistus concerning the intercepted letters, and he has reported, in still more detail, a conversation between Dion and Dionysius on the same occasion. What concurrent testimonies speak to is, that Dion was detected in a conspiracy for overthrowing the existing administration of Syracuse, and establishing himself in the chief authority; that he was in consequence banished, and that Heraclides was banished about the same time. It seems probable that the sentence against both was given, with all constitutional formality, by a decree of the people; the interest of the administration, directed more by the able and active Philistus than by the dissipated general-autocrator, overbearing the divided causes of the leaders of opposing parties.

Aristot. Polit.
i. 5. c. 10.
Diod. i. 16.
Corn. Nep. &
Plut. vit.
Dion. Justin.
B. C. 359.
Ol. 105. 2-3.
[See p. 166.]

The generosity of Dionysius, on this occasion, remains

authenticated by the unsuspicious testimony of a contemporary historian of the adverse party. To soften the fate of his uncle, consistently as far as might be with his own safety, he ordered a trireme for his accommodation to carry him to Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse, the place he chose for his residence. Thither his large income was regularly remitted to him, and he is said to have lived in a style of princely splendour, new in Peloponnesus. Meanwhile his wife and children, remaining in Syracuse, were taken by Dionysius into his own house, and treated with the kindness and respect becoming such near relations.

Timæus, ap.
Plut. vit. Dion.
p. 963, 964,
965.

SECTION II.

Measures of Dion for War against Dionysius. — New Settlement of Naxos under Andromachus. — Return of Dion to Sicily in Arms. — Return of Heraclides in Arms. — Dionysius besieged in the Citadel. — Death of Philistus.

THE gratitude of Dion, even according to his panegyrist, did not at all correspond with the liberal generosity of Dionysius. Proposing to use the means which he owed to it for raising troops to make war against his benefactor, it is said he consulted Plato on the subject, whose scholar and friend it was his boast to have been. Plato strongly dissuaded, but Dion nevertheless persevered. At this time more than a thousand Sicilian exiles were living in Greece. It seems probable that the greater number, or perhaps all, were a relic of the party in the several cities, which we have seen so virulent and inflexible in animosity against the elder Dionysius. Scarcely thirty could be engaged to follow Dion, who had been so many years a principal person of the opposite party. Many seem to have been of those expelled from Naxos; and

Plut. vit. Dion.
p. 967.

these, holding together under an eminent man of their own city, Andromachus, whom wealth enabled and talents qualified to be a chief in adventure, drew many others with them. The colony, established in the Naxian territory after the expulsion of the rebellious Sicels, in the neglect of the Syracusan government, distracted through the dissipated character of the general-autocrator, seems to have been at this time in decay. Andromachus, using a favourable opportunity, and being well seconded by the zeal of his followers, possessed himself of the height of Taurus, where the Sicels had so long resisted the elder Dionysius; and from that commanding situation he vindicated for his followers in a great degree the possession and enjoyment of the whole Naxian territory. His circumstances made the lofty fastness preferable to the otherwise far more convenient situation of the old town of Naxus below it; and under his able direction his settlement, retaining the name of Tauromenium, quickly became a flourishing republic. Timæus, whose Sicilian history is now unfortunately known only by quotations of other writers, was a son of the founder of the republic of Tauromenium.

Meanwhile both Dion and Heraclides had been levying forces in Peloponnesus, for the purpose of re-establishing themselves in Syracuse; and as the deranged state of the government there had afforded encouragement and opportunity for Andromachus, so his success would afford encouragement and promote opportunity for the Syracusan exiles. Intelligence of their preparations, and of the actual seizure of Tauromenium by Andromachus, alarmed the Syracusan administration. The direct passage from Peloponnesus across the Ionian sea to Sicily was rarely ventured by the ancient ships of war: they commonly, as occasion has occurred formerly to observe, ranged the coast of Epirus till opposite the Iapygian promontory, and then proceeded by

the Italian headlands to the Sicilian shore. The occupation of Tauromenium, if its occupiers, as might reasonably be apprehended, were in concert with Dion and Heraclides, would give facility to invasion on that side, and perhaps might afford opportunity also to detach some of the Italian cities from the Syracusan alliance. The danger appeared so threatening that Dionysius and Philistus went together to Italy to provide against it.

Meanwhile Dion, far less successful than Heraclides in engaging Sicilian refugees, yet having collected some mercenary troops, and holding

intelligence in Sicily, resolved upon a measure which has been celebrated for its novelty and boldness. The direct

passage, very hazardous for the ancient ships of war, was far from being equally so for the ships

of burthen. Dion therefore embarked his troops in merchant vessels, and steered to the south of Sicily;

but, avoiding the Grecian towns, he held on his course to Africa; forced thither, as his friends gave out, by the wind. Thence however he proceeded, not to any Grecian settlement, but to Minoa, a Carthaginian garrison in the Agrigentine territory. There he was received as a friend by the Carthaginian governor, who gave him important assistance for the prosecution of his purpose. Dion hastened his march with his small force toward Syracuse, and the Carthaginian governor meanwhile managed for him conveyance of arms, which he brought to distribute among his partisans in the island. The friendship of Carthage moreover would procure him the friendly aid of all the Sicans, and probably some of the Sicels, and perhaps even some Greeks; for few of the Grecian towns, especially of the west of the island, were without a Carthaginian party.⁴

⁴ It seems probable that, if the history of Philistus had remained to us, we should have seen that the Carthaginian connection was the popular topic, urged

But everywhere all who were adverse to the ruling party, and all who apprehended that the administration of Dionysius was tottering, would be half prepared to join him. In a proclamation adapted to the general temper, or to the temper of a large part of the Sicilian Greeks, Dion declared that his purpose was to give liberty to all; and before he reached Syracuse he had collected an army, it is said, of twenty thousand men.

Probable as it is that, with all the advantage which Dionysius had in the able advice of Philistus, there would be considerable errors in his administration, it is remarkable enough that none regarding public measures are specified by the adverse historians. They pry into his house and his family for accusation against him. They say that, when Dion's purpose of bringing war against his country was ascertained by open preparation, Dionysius, in revenge for his ingratitude and perfidy, compelled his sister, Dion's wife, to repudiate her husband and take another. The credit due to such an account from an adverse faction, whether for the manner and circumstances, or for the fact itself, is hardly to be estimated. But the administration, in the absence of Dionysius and Philistus, remained certainly in hands either weak or faithless. Dion became master of the city without a blow, the island only excepted. The numerous population, some part always disposed to Dion, a greater part indisposed to the existing administration, and expecting the desired arrival of Heracles, some swayed by the alarm and some by the encouragement of the moment, all flocked out to meet and earn the favour or allay the resentment of the rising power.

Diod. i. 16.
c. 10.

by the party of Dionysius, that pressed most against Dion; and it seems to have been to counterwork this that the accusation was retorted, evidently enough without foundation, and yet ingeniously enough to have perhaps some effect upon the popular mind at the time, as applicable to the elder Dionysius.

Plut. vit. Dion. Dion, in a sort of royal, or as it would be called by an adverse party, tyrannical state, conspicuous for his fine armour, and surrounded by a body-guard of foreigners, addressed the obsequious multitude, and recommended the immediate election of commanders, fit, he said, in the style commonly used for alluring the multitude, to lead them to the overthrow of tyranny and the establishment of freedom. The choice, under the existing circumstances, could not be doubtful; universal acclamation raised Dion and his brother Megacles to the high office of autocrator-generals, and a body-guard was allowed them, as appurtenant to that dignity. No symptom of opposition appearing, they led the way, in a kind of triumph, through Achradina to the agora.

Plut. vit. Dion. p. 972. E. Diod. l. 16. c. 11. Sacrifices, thanksgivings, festivals, whatever might encourage among the people the hope and imagination of great advantages in the revolution, followed; and, while the informed and serious looked with anxious apprehension to the future, the thoughtless multitude enjoyed for the moment a real happiness, for which they paid Dion with the grossest flattery, equalling him with the gods.

But that government which had made Syracuse the greatest city of the Greek nation, the capital of the flourishing settlements of Sicily and Italy, and had been able to maintain it so many years in so uncommon a tranquillity, though thus violently interrupted and put in imminent danger, was not so to be in a moment overthrown and annihilated. Dionysius and Philistus, returning not till seven days after Dion had been in possession of the city, found themselves nevertheless, by the command of the strong fortress of the island, by the attachment of the fleet, and by an interest yet among those who had submitted to Dion, in circumstances to propose an accommodation by which civil war might have been avoided. But Dion, haughty and unbending, for so

much even his panegyrists allow, would accede to no equal terms, and yet feared the unpopularity likely to be incurred by the refusal of them. To obviate this his partisans imputed insincerity to their adversaries in proposing negotiation. Arms then being resorted to, and Dion, while his troops were roughly handled, being himself severely wounded, his partisans reproached Dionysius for breach of faith, as if a treaty had been going forward or even concluded. Nevertheless Dionysius again invited negotiation, which Dion persevered in avoiding, while he diligently prosecuted works for blockading the fortress. Composition, even his encomiasts avow, was not his purpose; he would compel Dionysius either to surrender at discretion or quit Sicily.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 12.

c. 13.

The rapidity and the amount of Dion's first success had brought unexpected credit to his cause; but when the extent of his design became more manifest, and men had leisure to reflect upon the probable and even necessary consequences of a revolution, his progress was presently checked, and it appeared that an adverse party, or even more than one adverse party, remained, capable of contending with him for superiority. The fleet continued faithful to the old government; and Philistus, passing again to Italy, where also its interest was yet good, procured from Rhegium alone, flourishing under the party established in power by the elder Dionysius, five hundred horse. He did not fear then to return to Syracuse by land; and Leontini having declared for Dion, he made a vigorous assault upon it. He was repelled, but he proceeded without any check to his march, and joined Dionysius in the citadel.

c. 16.

Meanwhile in the city things had taken a new face. Dion had quickly ceased to be the god who could command the minds of all men. Already symptoms of dissatisfaction had appeared among the multitude, when Heraclides arrived

from Peloponnesus, and was received with extensive satisfaction. He pretended the same zeal with Dion for what they called the popular cause, against Dionysius; but with little disposition to coalesce with Dion, and none to act under his orders. He had found among the Sicilian exiles, and in the Peloponnesian states, a favour which Dion could not obtain. He brought a force with him considerably greater; and the popularity of his character seems to have produced shortly some desertion in the Syracusan fleet, which Dion had vainly tempted. Nor was Heraclides sup-

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.
Plut. vit.
Dion. p. 972.

ported only by the multitude. Those of higher rank, either disgusted with the haughty manner, or fearing the imperious temper of Dion, concurred in the policy of supporting a rival. Dion was compelled to concede, so far that, the command in chief of the land force remaining to him, Heraclides was appointed, by a popular decree, to the independent command of the fleet.

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

Dion had assumed a guard for his person, and a similar guard, by a vote of the people, was allowed to Heraclides. Jointly they seem to have been deficient in nothing that might give them, equally at least with either Dionysius, a claim to the title of tyrants of Syracuse.

Heraclides soon collected a fleet such that he could offer battle, and he gained a decisive victory. The veteran Philistus, who commanded against him, fell. Plutarch has related his fate as reported by Timonides, an associate in arms of Dion, to his friend the philosopher Speusippus in

Plut. vit.
Dion. p. 975,
976.

Italy. According to his account, Philistus was made prisoner in the ship in which, now in his eightieth year*, he had bravely fought. Neither his age, nor the courage which at that age he had demonstrated,

[* "Mr. Mitford, quoting Plutarch, describes Philistus as *now in his eightieth year*. But this is not to be found in Plutarch." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 127.]

nor the universally acknowledged merit of fidelity to principle and steadiness in friendship through so long and active a life, moved any spark of generosity in his illiberal victors, the friends of the reporter. Stript naked, his body, shrunk and shrivelled with years, while his mind remained so vigorous, was exhibited to the derision of the thoughtless multitude, and, not till they were sated with the abominable joke, he was deliberately put to death. Boys were then encouraged to drag the corpse about the city, and the odious scene was concluded by tumbling it, denied the rites of burial, into the stone-quarries. It marks a strong stain in the character of the times, perhaps even more than of the man, that such a person as Timæus, son of the respectable chief of Naxus, giving a similar account of this base revenge, testified a malignant satisfaction in it which has drawn censure even from Plutarch. The historian Ephorus, Plut. ut ant. also a contemporary, seems to have been unwilling to allow that Philistus, whose character he admired, and whose fate he lamented, would submit to be taken alive. Diodorus, apparently following his account, says Diod. l. 16. c. 16. that Philistus, seeing resistance useless, and escape impossible, to avoid the indignities expected from such rancorous enemies, destroyed himself. Concerning the scandalous insults to the dead body, avowed as matter of triumph by the victorious party, all have agreed. The superiority of character of the venerable sufferer seems to have been hardly less generally acknowledged. The cause indeed, in which his talents were exerted, would of course bring on him reprobation from its opponents; yet his high merit with the party with which through a long life he acted has been admitted by all.⁵ The loss therefore of his history of Sicilian affairs, which Cicero esteemed highly for style and

⁵ Πλείστας μὲν καὶ μεγίστας χεῖρας παρειαχημένους τοῖς τυράννοις, πιστότατος δὲ τῶν φίλων τοῖς δυνάσταις γεγονώς. Diod. l. 16. c. 16.

manner as well as for the matter, will be esteemed among the greatest suffered from the barbarism of the middle ages.⁶

SECTION III.

Declining Popularity of Dion. — Advancing Influence of Heraclides. — Retreat of Dion from Syracuse. — Ill Success of Heraclides. — Recall of Dion, and Failure again of Popularity. — Interference of the Lacedæmonians. — Surrender of the Citadel to Dion.

By the defeat of the fleet, and the loss of the man who, equally for politics and war, was his ablest and most faithful adviser, Dionysius was reduced to a situation of extreme peril and difficulty. Immediately he again tried negotiation; founding some hope perhaps in the knowledge of dissension among his enemies. Dion, pressed by the popularity of Heraclides, was now disposed to moderation toward Dionysius. Claiming to be the deliverer of Syracuse, he had demanded public pay for more than three thousand mercenaries engaged in his service; but thwarted by the influence of Heraclides, he could not obtain the necessary sanction of a popular vote. His situation in consequence, pledged as he was to the troops, became highly distressing. In

Diod. l. 16. this state of things Dionysius offered a sum equal to c. 16.

Plut. vit. Dion. five months' pay, for the mercenaries, and to surrender the island and citadel upon condition of being allowed to pass to Italy, and enjoy there, under security of the Syracusan government, the revenue of his lands in Sicily. Dion exerted his influence to have the proposal accepted; but, in the debate on the question in the general assembly, free vent was given to the harshest invective against him and his

⁶ "Philistum, doctum hominem et diligentem." De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. "Catonem cum Philisto et Thucydide comparares? — quos enim ne e Græcis quisquam imitari potest." De Clar. Or. c. 85.

foreign troops ; and to this the people so listened that he was unable to carry his proposal. The tricks to which democratical government is peculiarly liable, if his panegyrist may be trusted, were resorted to for bringing farther discredit upon him. A man named Sosis, in the course of a bitter harangue, accused him of aiming at the ^{Plut. vit. Dion. p. 972.} tyranny. The next day the same man came bloody into the agora, asserting that he had been wounded by Dion's foreign soldiers, and hardly escaped assassination. Freedom of speech, he said, and all freedom would shortly be banished from Syracuse, if such crimes went unpunished. Inquiry being immediately instituted, the falsehood of the story was fully proved, and Sosis, in due course of law, condemned to death for the attempted imposture, was executed. Whether however Sosis were false or Plutarch misguided, the story assists to mark the state of Syracuse. Its happy days were gone by ; and the time was come for citizens to be liable to insult and violence from foreign troops, and for the sovereign assembly to be misled by impostors.

But popular suspicion of Dion, and dislike of his foreign troops, did not die with Sosis. While ^{p. 973. F.} he was in vain endeavouring to obtain an allowance from the public that might enable him to discharge his engagements, a measure was proposed which might straiten his private means. Citizens, it was said in the general assembly, who had deserved well and were in want, should be provided with the necessary before foreign mercenaries were rewarded. A division of lands was accordingly decreed ; how far to the injury of legal property, and how far to the particular injury of Dion, who seems to have been the greatest landed proprietor among the Syracusans, we want information. A measure however followed which deprived Dion of all official authority : it was decreed that there should be a new election of generals, and that instead of one, or two, there

should be no less than twenty-five. Heraclides was chosen of this numerous board, and Dion omitted.

Dion's situation was now highly critical. Fortunately for him, while the favour of the Syracusan citizens so failed, the conduct of his adversaries rendered it the more necessary for his mercenary army to make common cause with him. Confident in the superiority which discipline and practice in war would give to their small number over the Syracusan multitude, which had been habituated to a relaxed military system in an uncommon length of peace, they proposed to right themselves and their commander by force. Dion however would not, with a band of foreigners, begin hostilities against his country, whose deliverer it had been his boast to be. He persuaded his little army to abstain from violence, and march under his orders to Leontini, where he could ensure it a favourable reception. Probably Heraclides was unable to keep equal order among the Syracusans ; taught by himself to believe that they had a right to exercise sovereign authority under no rule but their fancy. Under no regular command accordingly they pursued Dion ; and, treating with scorn his admonition to forbear violence, they made it necessary for his troops to chastise their injurious aggression. He interfered with politic humanity to check the slaughter while they directed their precipitate flight to Syracuse, and he pursued his march to Leontini.

The dissension among those who claimed to be assertors of the liberties of Syracuse had afforded some relief to Dionysius and his friends in the island. The blockade indeed was continued, so that a failure of provisions threatened ; but, notwithstanding the enemy's decided naval superiority since the battle in which Philistus fell, opportunity was found for Dionysius himself to go in quest of supplies to Italy, where his interest was yet good.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 17.

Plut. ut sup.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 17.

The command of the garrison meanwhile was committed to his son Apollocrates ; and its numbers and fidelity, with the natural and artificial strength of the place, sufficed to make assault vain. Want however became pressing, and a negotiation for its surrender was going forward when a convoy from Locri came in sight. The Syracusans launched and manned their triremes, and proceeded against it as to a sure prey. But Nysius, a man of approved valour and talent, who commanded, conducted the contest so ably against a very superior force that, though with the loss of four triremes, he carried in his whole convoy.

Heraclides is said to have been supported by a considerable number of principal men⁷, but all accounts indicate that the power, which enabled him at the same time to contend with Dionysius and drive Dion from Syracuse, was acquired principally by excessive indulgence and flattery to the multitude. The people, in consequence, became utterly unruly; they would consider the destruction or capture of four triremes, in the late action, as a victory important enough to be celebrated by a public festival; and their generals, whether accommodating themselves to the popular fancy, or following their own inclination, are said to have joined in the dissolution of moral order and military discipline, so as to have disabled themselves by inebriety. Nysius, watchful, and supplied with intelligence, sallying in a critical moment with his whole garrison, became master of the two quarters of the city adjoining the harbour.⁸

Diod. l. 16.
c. 18, 19.
Plut. vit. Dion.
p. 974, 5, 6.

⁷ "Neque is minus valebat apud optimates, quorum consensu præerat classi." Corn. Nep. vit. Dion.

⁸ Plutarch, who commonly paints with a broad brush, regardless of nice distinctions, and often indulges in a very indiscriminate use of hard names and foul language, calls Nysius's troops altogether barbarians. But Diodorus's narrative, and the tenor even of Plutarch's account, marks them to have been mostly Sicilian and Italian Greeks; though possibly, with the Locrian troops, there may have been some Lucanians, and possibly a few Gauls or Spaniards.

The friends of Dion who had remained in Syracuse, encouraged by this misfortune to the government of Heraclides, now ventured again, in conversation and in debate, to push the interest of their party through that of its chief. "It was become evident," they said, "that there was but one man capable of averting from Syracuse the horror of returning under the odious tyranny of Dionysius. Another indeed in his circumstances might think only of revenge for the gross ill-usage he had received; but Dion's magnanimity and patriotism, it need not be doubted, would forgive the offence of the Syracusan people, and receive them as repentant children." The defect of the policy of Heraclides, just before experienced in prosperity, now equally showed itself in adversity. He was obliged to concur in an invitation, in the name of the people, for Dion to return to Syracuse. There could indeed be no reasonable doubt of Dion's readiness to grant the request, which was, with the restoration of his property, to raise him again to the first situation in the commonwealth.⁹ To obtain such advantages his proud mind did not disdain a compromise with Heraclides. The board of twenty-five generals was dissolved of course; Dion was elected general-autocrator, with Heraclides, as the elder Dionysius had been formerly with Hipparinus, and it was settled that the land force should be under Dion's orders, the independent command of the fleet remaining to Heraclides, still the popular character, especially with the seamen. Dion immediately proceeded to use the well-disciplined troops which had returned with him against Dionysius, and with such effect that Nysius was soon compelled to abandon his conquest, and withdraw again within the island.¹⁰

⁹ Plutarch describes much good acting on the occasion, with considerable stage effect; but the story is not fit for serious history.

¹⁰ Plutarch pretends that Dion's return was opposed by Heraclides, who was made prisoner by him, and owed life and liberty to his generosity. His

The zeal of Dion's friends, on his return, but still more on this success, broke out in gross extravagances. They paid him divine honours; Diodorus says as a hero, or demigod: Plutarch, to whom, under the Roman empire, the absurd profaneness was familiar, says they called him a god. Such extravagance could not but maintain and increase jealousy among the friends of Heraclides. It was indeed an ill-fated city whose internal peace depended upon the agreement of rival chiefs, supported by parties old in mutual animosity. Dion was still bent upon that scheme of an improved constitution, said to have been Plut. vit. Dion. p. 981. D. concerted with Plato. For whatever cause this was disapproved by the first Dionysius, under whom it seems to have been conceived, or by the second, to whom Dion, according to his panegyrist, would allow no rest for his urgency to carry it into execution, it was not a plan for increasing, but for checking, the popular power. After his master Plato, Dion called democracy not a go- Plut. ibid. vernment, but a market for governors; or, if a phrase, the only apposite one our language affords, might be allowed, a job-market. But the power, and of course the safety, of Heraclides and his principal supporters depended upon their influence among the great body of the people. Any check therefore upon the authority of the general assembly they were led by the most pressing interest to

own account of transactions, confused and sometimes contradictory as it is, shows this very little likely; and from Diodorus and Nepos it appears clearly untrue. But Plutarch, without such improvement of the genuine accounts of Dion's life, would have wanted ground for some fine declamation which he has introduced on clemency and magnanimity. Yet, however admirable such declamation may be, to found it on the demolition of the truth and even probability of history, is a practice surely not without inconvenience; and the invective against Heraclides as a popular leader on one hand, and against each Dionysius as tyrants, on the other, is so marked with malignity, and, as not only Diodorus and Nepos, but also those more respectable writers Isocrates and Polybius, show, so unsupported by fact, that even the moral tendency of the tale seems at best very questionable.

Plut. vit. Dion. p. 979. C. oppose. Dion, supported by his mercenary army, resisted the execution of the decree, which had actually passed, for the partition of lands and distribution of houses. Perhaps his end was just and patriotic, but his measure appears to have been violent and tyrannical. He could not conceal his dissatisfaction with the appointment of Heraclides to the independent command of the fleet.

Corn. Nep. vit. Dion. A phrase of Homer, much noticed in ancient and in modern times, was frequently in his mouth, which Pope has well, though strongly turned, "That worst of tyrants, an usurping crowd:" and this, with the comment which ingenious opponents could add, did him great injury in popular estimation.

Syracuse thus, with two parties only not at open war within the city, and a third against which both carried arms in the citadel, could not be the flourishing and commanding state which it had been under either Dionysius; and yet among the Sicilian cities Syracuse remained powerful. Among all those cities also was yet a relic of the party of Dionysius. This, the party which, from of old, had principally maintained the connection of Syracuse with Lacedæmon, seems, in its existing distress, to have engaged the attention of the Lacedæmonian government, to which it

Plut. vit. Dion. p. 979. E. had occasionally afforded assistance. Pharax, a Lacedæmonian, charged with the interests of Lacedæmon in Sicily, was in the Agrigentine territory with some troops under his command.¹¹ This was considered by the Syracusan government as highly threatening to their interest. Plutarch, commonly careless of coherency, and here more than commonly defective and confused, assigns no cause for their alarm, but proceeds to relate that, ceasing to press the siege of the island, they sent the greatest part of

¹¹ We are here reduced to depend upon Plutarch, all notice of Sicilian affairs failing, in extant copies of Diodorus, for nearly four years.

their force, the army under Dion, the fleet under Heraclides, to oppose Pharax. Between such rivals as Dion and Heraclides just co-operation could hardly be. Dion then, compelled by the impatience of his licentious army to fight at disadvantage, was defeated. Heraclides, presently after, without communicating his purpose to the commander of the land force, sailed eastward. Dion, apprehending he was gone for Syracuse, in extreme jealousy so hastened thither with his cavalry that, though it was night before he moved, he arrived by a march reckoned of eighty miles at the third hour of the next day.

This appears to have been esteemed by Dion's partisans a very meritorious exploit. Whether it was on any fair ground to be justified means to judge fail, but clearly it was a great party stroke for Heraclides; and his principal friends were excluded from the city. Nevertheless it was far from placing Dion and his party in any easy circumstances there; deprived of all co-operation from the fleet, which remained strongly attached to Heraclides. But the fleet felt the want of the city not less than the city of the fleet. The inducements to accommodation thus being mutual, and a Lacedæmonian, Gæsylus, becoming mediator, a reconciliation, for the present, between the rival chiefs was effected.

What was the policy of the Lacedæmonian government at this time in regard to Sicilian affairs, or what the views of either Pharax or Gæsylus, its officers and ministers, does not appear. No consequences of the victory obtained by Pharax against Dion are mentioned. The reported conduct of Gæsylus however shows that the old connection of Lacedæmon with the party of Dionysius no longer subsisted, and that on the contrary its weight was rather given to the opposite scale. Pressed then by sea and land, former friends having become adverse, and means no longer occurring to avert threatened famine, Apollocrates negotiated for

a capitulation with Dion in preference to Heraclides. Surrendering then the island and citadel, he was allowed to withdraw with his followers to his father in Italy.

SECTION IV.

Power of Dion. — Measures for reforming the Constitution. — Assassination of Heraclides. — Tyranny and Assassination of Dion.

THE reconciliation of Dion and Heraclides having been produced merely by political necessity, when that necessity ceased their contest for superiority was renewed. Dion

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 980. A. represented to the people that the expense of the fleet, which pressed heavily upon them, might now be spared. The fleet accordingly was laid up, and Heraclides its commander reduced to a private station; Dion remaining general-autocrator, without any other in a situation to balance his authority.¹²

Dion was now, as far as may be gathered from ancient writers, not less than either Dionysius had been, king or tyrant of Syracuse; differing principally in the want of that popularity through which the first Dionysius had executed such great things in peace and in war, at home and abroad, and extended the supremacy of Syracuse over the whole Grecian interest in Sicily and in Italy, to the great advantage of all; a popularity which, passing as a kind of inheritance to his son, and adhering to him even under great

¹² In Plutarch's account the reduction of the fleet is stated first, and the surrender of the island afterward; but he is always careless of any other order in his narrative than what may set a particular fact in a striking point of view. He wanted to pass at once from the surrender of the island to a display of Dion's greatness and glory, and for this advantage he would dispense with any explanation to his reader on what ground his hero could pretend to the people, or even with a view to his own interest desire them, to believe that the fleet was no longer wanted, while the close blockade of the island was so great an object for all, and without the fleet impossible.

deficiencies of conduct, maintained him so long, and long so peacefully, in his high situation. Plutarch, amid the most extravagant panegyric of Dion, has avowed in plain terms, that the Syracusans hated him.¹³ Dion was aware of his own unpopularity, and yet, what can be well done only through the highest popularity, he would persevere in a reformation of the constitution. So bent he was upon his project that, seeing his party weak, he endeavoured to strengthen himself by foreign aid, seeking assistance from Corinth, where the title of parent-city might soften the prejudice that would attach against any other foreign power.

Vit. Dion.
p. 975. A.

p. 980. F.

What has been really the merit or demerit of his plan we have no information. It may be however not unreasonable to believe that a man, as he was, of acknowledged talents, who had studied under one of the greatest philosophers, and acted many years under one of the greatest politicians of his own or any age, would, in altering, considerably improve a constitution such as was then the Syracusan, sunk as it was through interested flattery and indulgence to the multitude, to a state apparently not better than that in which it was on the first rise of Hermocrates, at the time of the Athenian invasion. But in carrying this plan into execution he was evidently indiscreet; highly indiscreet and highly arbitrary. He seems clearly not to have profited from that admonition of the tragic poet to which we have already more than once adverted. When alarm and indignation at his conduct were manifested among the people, instead of endeavouring to appease he would overbear. Heraclides, reduced as he was to a private situation, found means to profit from Dion's indiscretion so as

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

¹³ Ἐμίσειον τὸν Δίωνα, p. 975. A. On the other occasions Plutarch is generally a preacher of democratical doctrine, but here, to revenge his hero, he is severe upon democracy.

to be still formidable by his popularity, which increased as Dion's waned. Whatever the general-autocrator proposed in the assembly was thwarted by the favourite of the people. Dion's proud spirit could ill brook this revived opposition from a fallen rival, and his philosophy was weak against the alluring proposal to still the annoyance by the base crime of assassination. Heraclides was murdered in his own house, by persons commissioned by Dion for the purpose.

Corn. Nep. &
Plut. vit. Dion.
p. 981. D.

This atrocious deed, as even Plutarch has been fair enough to acknowledge, excited great and general indignation in Syracuse. Yet in the existing lawlessness, unless it should be rather called the existing tyranny, no judicial inquiry seems to have followed. Dion, known as he was for the murderer, proposed to allay the popular anger by a show of respect for the dead body. It was buried with great pomp under his direction, himself attending. But his panegyrist, to whom we owe this curious particular, has been true enough to a better morality to avow that conscience of the wickedness embittered all Dion's following days.¹⁴

It has been apparently in tenderness for his hero's reputation that Plutarch has omitted all account of transactions in Syracuse from the death of Heraclides to the completion of the tragedy by the death of Dion; a short but interesting period, reported succinctly by the more impartial Roman biographer thus: "No man any longer now thought himself safe in Syracuse, when Dion, after the removal of his opponent, in a still more arbitrary

Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

¹⁴ Barthelemi, in his learned romance of Anacharsis, has taken Dion as a favourite hero, and even outstripped Plutarch in extravagance of panegyric, concealing many of the disadvantageous truths which Plutarch has revealed. Thus far, were romance only his purpose and not history, he might be excused. But he admits the consent of Dion to the assassination of Heraclides for the purpose of justifying it. His unfortunate nephew has probably seen and felt enough not to be so fond of those principles which the uncle, and his great patron the duke of Choiseul, contributed to spread in France.—(This note was written when Barthelemi, the nephew, was exiled to Cayenne.)

manner than before, seized and divided among his soldiers the property of any whom he supposed his adversaries. Nevertheless, with all the confiscations, the expenses of this arbitrary government so exceeded the income that he was driven to press upon the purses of his friends; and thus dissatisfaction was extended among the wealthy and powerful." Information, much to be desired, fails us, what was become of the revenue with which the first Dionysius had done such mighty things. "But Dion," continues the biographer, "irritated more than admonished by the appearance of ill-humour among all ranks, inveighed most impatiently against the unsteadiness of men, now thwarting his best purposes, who a little before were promising him every support, and equalling him with the gods. Such reproaches gained him no party; and, when the dissatisfaction of the most powerful men became generally known, while the discontent of the military was made public by petulant clamours for pay long in arrear, the body of the people freely vented their sentiments, calling Dion a tyrant no longer to be borne."

Plutarch, desirous of softening the tyrannical character of his hero, which he knew not how entirely to conceal, says that, mistrusting and scorning his fellow-citizens, he sent for Corinthians to be his associates in council and in authority.¹⁵ The reality and the character of his tyranny are thus largely shown. Yet the association of Dorians, in the government of a Dorian state, would be less generally offensive than the administration of Ionians; and a Corinthian, as of the mother-city of Syracuse, would be more acceptable than any other Dorian. But Dion's most confidential assistant in civil and in military business, (so far Plutarch and Nepos agree,) was

Corn. Nep.,
vit. Dion.
Plut. vit.
Dion. p. 982.

¹⁵ Μετατίμπεται δ' ἐκ Κορίνθου συμβούλους καὶ συνάροντας, ἀπαξιών τοὺς πολίτας. Plut. v. Dion. p. 981. C.

Callippus an Athenian. His popularity was so completely gone, and his mistrust of his fellow-citizens such, that he employed Callippus as a spy among them, to discover and report their sentiments and their purposes. To enable a foreigner, and one so known to have been in his confidence, to execute effectually such an office, a plan of dissimulation was agreed upon between them: Callippus was to pretend concurrence with those most dissatisfied with Dion, who was equally to profess dissatisfaction with him. But in the course of this employment Callippus found that, if he remained faithful to Dion, he must probably fall with him, whereas by betraying him he might rise on his ruin. Daring, cunning, and unprincipled, (if we may trust the panegyrist of Dion, from whom alone report of his character and actions hath reached us,) he resolved upon the latter. Example for assassination, a crime to which the Syracusans were perhaps before but too prone, had been given by Dion himself. A plot was formed against him, and there seems to have been a very large number of persons so far engaged as to give it their approbation. Rumour of it got abroad, and reached Dion's family. Confiding in his supposed friend, or at a loss for another in whom he might confide, he would himself take no measures of prevention: but his wife and sister, it is said, communicated their suspicions to Callippus, nor would be satisfied with his assurances of fidelity till he had sworn it before them in the temple of Proserpine, with every ceremony supposed to give firmest sanction to an oath, covered with the goddess's purple robe, and bearing a flaming torch in his hand.

But Callippus having advanced too far to retreat with any safety, the discovery that he was suspected was admonition to hasten the execution of the plot. A day of public festivity was chosen, when the people would be collected where it was known Dion would avoid attending. For

security against commotion, commanding points in the city were occupied by troops in the confidence of the conspirators, and a trireme was prepared in the harbour for ready flight, should it become desirable. Matters being thus arranged, some Zacynthian soldiers went without arms to Dion's house, and pretending an errand to speak with him on business of the mercenary troops, pushed into the room where he was, and immediately shut the door. His very guards, according to Nepos, had they had any disposition to it, might easily have saved him; for tumult was heard while Dion for some time resisted his unarmed assailants; yet none moved to his relief. The business of murder was at length completed with a sword which Lycon, a Syracusan, handed to the foreign assassins through a window. Thus with his life ended the administration of Dion, about four years after his return from Peloponnesus, and about the fifty-fifth of his age; a man whose eulogy among ancient writers has far exceeded what any remaining account of his actions can justify.

B. C. 352.
Ol. 106. 2-3.
[B. C. 353. Cl.]
Diod. l. 16.
c. 31.
Corn. Nep.
vit. Dion.

SECTION V.

The Athenian Callippus General-Autocrator of Syracuse. — Hipparinus General-Autocrator. — Ill Condition of the Grecian Cities of Sicily. — Quiet of the Italian Cities. — Restoration of Dionysius in Syracuse.

STILL in proceeding with Sicilian history, much as such guidance as that of Thucydides or Xenophon fails, yet for facts of a public nature accounts remain; ill-connected indeed, and often defective, but consistent and probable, with little important variation from one another. Secret history, in which the writers on Sicilian affairs are more ample, of course should be received with caution, and their

panegyric and their invective those who seek truth will equally disregard. The Syracusan constitution, as it existed under either the elder Dionysius, or Dion, is very defectively reported; but the character of the administration under each may be in a great degree gathered from the circumstances of the death of each, and what immediately followed. The elder Dionysius, as we have seen, died in peace, at a mature age, surrounded by his friends, respected by his enemies, leaving his family flourishing, and his country by far the most flourishing of Grecian states. The first following public measure was to assemble the people, and commit to them the choice of a first magistrate. The accounts come only from the enemies of the family, and yet no violence upon the public voice is pretended: the general favour, which had attached so many years to the father, passed as an inheritance to the son; so that a youth of uncertain merit was, for the father's sake, raised to the first situation in the commonwealth, and with circumstances so advantageous as to retain it peaceably, notwithstanding great disadvantages of character and conduct, during eleven years. When, on the contrary, Dion, after having held the administration four years, was cut off by sedition, the circumstances of the state were far from flourishing; empire gone, revenue gone, population diminished, faction raging. Instead then of an assembly of citizens, an army of mercenaries decided the succession to the first magistracy; and Callippus, a foreigner of Ionian race, an Athenian, of character stained with imputation of the murder of Dion, ruled with sovereign power during thirteen months.¹⁶ Callippus was no doubt a man of talents, which he is said to have improved in the school of Plato; and what was his real guilt seems ill ascertained. The family of

Athen. l. 11.
c. 15. p. 250.
vel 508.

¹⁶ Λαμπερός ἦν καὶ κατέχχε τὰς Συρακούσας. Plut. v. Dion. p. 983. Ὅρξε μῆνας τρεῖς καὶ δέκα. Diod. l. 16. c. 31.

Dion continued under his government to live in Syracuse, and apparently might have lived secure, had they avoided plots against it. But the relics of the party moving sedition, they, as implicated in the measures for disturbing the existing order of things, were compelled to fly to Leontini.

That interest then, which Dion during four years at the head of affairs in Syracuse had failed to acquire, the family of Dionysius yet retained. Hipparinus, son of the elder Dionysius by Aristomache, sister of Dion, arriving in a critical moment when Callippus was absent on some expedition, a revolution was effected in his favour, and he held the chief power two years. Callippus, driven to wander with his mercenaries in quest of new fortune, after an unsuccessful attempt upon Messena, made himself master of Rhegium, but soon perished there by assassination.

Of the government of Hipparinus in Syracuse we learn no more than that it was neither flourishing nor lasting. Nor was it succeeded by a government either flourishing or lasting. Syracuse, so long the superintending state, being too much distracted to hold its superintendency, lawlessness and confusion pervaded the Sicilian Greek cities. During five or six years of this confusion history of Sicilian affairs fails. At length, in the third year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, the three hundred and forty-fourth before the Christian era, eight years after the death of Dion, the state of Sicily, the result of his celebrated expedition for its deliverance, is described by his panegyrist Plutarch thus: "Syracuse, under no settled government, but among many

B. C. 351.
Ol. 106. 3-4.
[B. C. 352.*
Cl.] Diod.
l. 16. c. 36.
Plut. vit. Dion.
p. 983.

B. C. 344.
Ol. 108. 2-3.

Plut. vit. Tim.
init.

[* "Callippus governed Syracuse thirteen months: *ἦρξε μῆνας τρεῖςκαίδεκα*, Diod. xvi. 31. and was driven from the city,—*ἠττηθείς ἐξέτισε τῆς πόλεως*, in the archonship of Eudemus, B. C. 353-2. Diod. xvi. 36. The thirteen months bring down his expulsion to the year B. C. 352, near midsummer. He was still living in the year of *Thessalus* B. C. 351-0. Diod. xvi. 45.; and is mentioned by Demosthenes in B. C. 350." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 267. note t.]

competitors for the sovereignty passing from tyrant to tyrant, became through excess of misery almost a desert. Of the rest of Grecian Sicily, through unceasing hostilities, part was absolutely depopulated and waste. The population of almost every town, which had a remaining people, was contaminated by a mixture of barbarians and mercenary soldiers, who, for want of regular pay, were driven to any venture for subsistence." In the colouring of this picture Plutarch has had in view to prepare his readers for panegyric of a new hero; and yet that it is little if at all overcharged appears from other accounts and from the result, which seems not ill summed up in these words of Diodorus:

Diod. l. 16.
c. 65.

"The Syracusans, divided into factions, and compelled to submit to many, and great and various tyrannies, at length came to the resolution of sending to their mother-city Corinth for a general, who might command respect from all parties, and repress the overweening ambition of individuals."

While Syracuse and most of the Grecian part of Sicily were in this wretched situation, the Italian towns seem to have remained nearly in the state of regular government and prosperity in which the elder Dionysius left them. We hear of neither tyrants nor civil war among them, except in the occupation of Rhegium by Callippus, nor of any popular discontent. There, on his expulsion from Syracuse, the younger Dionysius had found an advantageous asylum. Locri, his mother's native city, was mostly his residence. Little disposed to activity, and little troubled by ambition, he would perhaps there have passed the remainder of his days in as much ease as was commonly enjoyed under Grecian governments, if the importunity of friends and partisans suffering under the actual state of things in Sicily, and expecting only increased oppression from any new prevalence of the Corinthian party, had not

again brought him into action. It was not however on any light ground that he engaged in a new expedition to Syracuse. His party there was so strong, and things had been so prepared, that Nesæus, who had acquired the lead in the government, was obliged to retire before him. He was again elected general-autocrator; and, in consequence of the confusion of all the regular powers of government in the course of the long troubles, became a much more absolute sovereign, though within a much narrowed dominion, than when he first succeeded his father.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

AFFAIRS OF THE GRECIAN SETTLEMENTS IN SICILY AND ITALY FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE YOUNGER DIONYSIUS TO THE DEATH OF TIMOLEON.

SECTION I.

Expedition of the Carthaginians into Sicily under Hanno. — Grecian Cities in Sicily under the Government of single Chiefs. — Death of the Widows of Dion and of the elder Dionysius. — Application for Interference of Corinth in the Affairs of Sicily. — Circumstances of Corinth. — Timoleon appointed to manage the Corinthian Interest in Sicily.

FORTUNATELY for the Grecian interest in Sicily the Carthaginian government, whether prevented by domestic troubles or engaged by greater views elsewhere, made no use of those opportunities which the weakness incident to the administration of a man of the character of the younger Dionysius, and the distractions which followed the expedition of Dion, afforded for prosecuting by arms any views of ambition there. Its policy meanwhile, or at least the conduct of its officers, was liberal and able.

Diod. i. 16.
c. 67.

The attachment even of the Grecian towns in the western parts was conciliated; and it appears from Diodorus that those towns shared little in the ruin which Plutarch has represented as so universally sweeping over the island.

Plut. vit.
Timol. init.

After the decay of the great naval force which the first Dionysius raised, the Carthaginians had held complete command of the sea; and this, in the divided state of the Greeks produced by Dion's expedition, would be

perhaps more advantageous to a commercial people than any extension of territorial command. The first warlike measures of the Carthaginian government were professed, and apparently intended, not against the Greeks, but merely to repress the rapine of the Campanians, who, with such faithless violence, had settled themselves in Entella, and retained, to the annoyance of their peaceful neighbours, their habit of war and appetite for plunder.

Among the Grecian cities unconnected with Carthage there seems to have been at this time no regularity of government or security for individuals, but where some one powerful man could hold sovereign sway. With his own party that powerful man had the title of governor, prince, or potentate¹: by an opposite party he would of course be called tyrant. His power indeed could be little defined by law; he must necessarily act according to emergencies; and the character of his administration would be decided by his character, and his sense of his own interest. His situation nearly resembled that of the feudal barons of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Of those who thus held sovereign sway in the Sicilian Greek cities Dionysius perhaps was the most powerful: for, though Syracuse was lamentably fallen, and in Syracuse itself his authority, though little regularly limited, was ill settled, yet his interest in Italy gave him weight. Next, and perhaps for power within Sicily hardly second, were Icetes of Leontini and Andromachus of Tauromenium. Andromachus stood as head of that party throughout the Sicilian and Italian cities which had always been adverse to the family of Dionysius: and by his success at Tauromenium he had acquired the consideration of restorer, or, in the ancient phrase, second founder, of the interest of that party in Sicily.

¹ " Ἀρχων, δυνάστης.

Icetes had been a confidential friend of Dion, on whose death, accompanied by the mercenary force which served under him, and those citizens who desired to avoid the new power in Syracuse, he had withdrawn to Leontini. That place, more than any other in Sicily, had been always well disposed to Dion. Thither therefore his widow and his sister, widow of the elder Dionysius, had retired from the government of Callippus. At first they were treated with apparent tenderness and respect; but, after no long time, under pretence of placing them in better security, they were embarked for Peloponnesus, and, in pursuance of orders, it is said, from Icetes, murdered in the passage. Among infelicities likely to attend haughty and morose tempers, like Dion's, may be reckoned failure in the choice of friends. But though this tale of horror comes from Plutarch, the panegyrist of Dion, it seems liable to some reasonable doubt. The manner of the murder the biographer mentions to have been variously reported. If then Icetes directed it, he did not intend it should be known that he directed it; and how that became known we are not informed. What temptation would lead Icetes to the crime does not appear. That the unfortunate women perished in the passage was probably of public notoriety. If it was by accident, party calumny may thence have gathered opportunity to asperse Icetes. But they may have been destroyed by the pirates who infested those seas; or, in the opportunity among the Greek republics for the worst criminals to escape, the crew, to whose charge they were committed, may have been tempted to murder them for the small riches they might carry. In the want of means to ascertain the fact, where such tales of secret crimes want both authentication and probability, they can rarely deserve regard in history; and accordingly many such, some of celebrity, have been unnoticed here.

Plut. vit.
 Dion. p. 983.

Ibid. & vit.
 Timol. p. 252.

But though this shocking tale, related by the philosophical biographer, the panegyrist of Dion, is of very doubtful appearance, yet the character of Icetes seems not to have been altogether creditable to Dion's choice of a friend. When the return of Dionysius to Syracuse made the residence of the more violent of those in opposition to him unsafe or uneasy there, those most obnoxious for past violence resorted to Leontini. Men of quieter and more respectable character generally, and especially those of higher rank, preferred the refuge of Tauromenium, under the government of Andromachus. Other chiefs held an independent or almost independent authority in some of the smaller towns. Dionysius, Icetes, and Andromachus stood as chiefs of three principal parties, each in a state of war with both the others; and with such a spirit of animosity pervading all, so inflamed and maintained by opposition of interest, that composition between them was hardly possible.

Plut. vit.
Timol. init.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 68.

In circumstances so distressing for all who held property, or desired settled life, among the Grecian possessions in Sicily, the rumour of preparation at Carthage for a new expedition, though the Campanians of Entella, who had given sufficient occasion for it, were alone its avowed object, excited great and reasonable alarm. Union, under the lead of any man, or any city of Sicily, appeared beyond hope. These circumstances being taken into consideration by the refugees in Tauromenium, the proposition was made to solicit the interference of Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse and of a large proportion of the Dorian Greeks of Sicily, as what alone could have authority to conciliate the adverse spirits enough to bring them to a coalition necessary for the safety of all. Precedents of such a measure were numerous. Among the Greeks it was generally held reputable, and pleasing to the gods, for colonies, on important occasions,

to desire a leader from the mother-country. The Syracusans themselves, no longer ago than the Athenian war, had admitted Corinthians to chief commands in their forces. From Tauromenium therefore communication being managed in Syracuse and other towns, numbers were found to approve the proposal.²

But Corinth itself was at this time distracted by contest of factions. To resist aggression from Argos the government had been driven to the resource, which we have seen it formerly using, of employing an army of those adventurers, or they might perhaps be called traders, in military business, commonly distinguished, after the Latin phrase, by the name of mercenaries. Under the able and spirited conduct of Timophanes, of one of the most illustrious families of Corinth, success rather beyond hope had attended the Corinthian arms. His popularity, before extensive, was thus greatly increased; and thus, with his power accruing from command of the mercenaries, gave him great means for purposes of ambition. What the real merit of the contest of parties was, accounts remaining not only are too defective, but too contradictory, to enable us satisfactorily to gather. The historian's expressions however imply that the party was that through which Timophanes was formidable. What remains assured is that the contention in Corinth was at this time, as formerly according to the authentic account of Xenophon, violent; and that the party in which Timophanes had been bred considered him as not only betraying their cause, which alone

Ch. 28. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 65. Plut.
vit. Timol.

² Both Diodorus and Plutarch mention this measure as the act of the Syracusans. They do not however say, and it cannot be supposed, it was a regular act of the Syracusan people, under the newly restored administration of Dionysius. But every party of Syracusans, every knot of Syracusans, in and out of Syracuse, would call themselves, and be called by their friends, the Syracusans. It is in the sequel specified by Diodorus that the communication with Corinth was conducted by the refugees in Tauromenium.

they would allow to be the cause of their country, but by the combined powers of popularity, and of his influence over a standing army, aiming at sovereign command, or in the Grecian phrase, the tyranny of Corinth.³

Timoleon, younger brother of Timophanes, disapproved his conduct and purposes. Failing in remonstrance and dissuasion, and seeing the constitutional powers, or the powers of his party, unequal to contest with the extensive popularity of Timophanes, he engaged in conspiracy against him. Whether better means really became desperate, or the familiarity of the age with assassination so lessened its horror that it was adopted merely as the readiest and surest, assassination was resolved upon. For the manner of the crime, as would be likely for a fact of the kind, accounts differ, agreeing about the result. Diodorus says that Timoleon killed his brother with his own hand, publicly, in the agora. For a different report Plutarch has quoted three authors, Timæus, Ephorus, and Theopompus, all contemporary with the event. According to them Timoleon introduced the assassins into his brother's house, under pretence of desiring a friendly conference; but though he considered the murder as a patriotic duty, yet he yielded so far to nature as to turn his back while the deed was done. The Roman biographer, contrary to both these accounts, relates that Timoleon acted indeed in concert with the assassins, but was not present at the assassination, being employed elsewhere in preventing opposition to their purpose.⁴

Corn. Nep.
vit. Timol.

³ The phrases, *πονηροτάτους ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ*, and *κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν περιγίει οὐ προσποιούμενος ὅτι τύραννός ἐστι*, (Diod. 1. 16. c. 65.) clearly indicate a man raising himself by popular favour. On the contrary Aristotle, in cursory mention of Timophanes, attributes his acquisition of the tyranny to his command of mercenaries. Aristot. Polit. 1. 5. c. 6.

⁴ Plutarch, in his usual way, has undertaken to describe the dark scene in Timophanes's apartment as if it had been acted before him. The difference of writers about this assassination, the circumstances of which, as it was gloried

Corinth was still in the ferment which this atrocious act produced when the Syracusan deputies arrived.⁵ One party was extolling Timoleon as a virtuous tyrannicide, whose magnanimous patriotism was above all praise: the other execrated his deed as a parricidal murder, for which the laws of gods and men demanded expiation by his just punishment. The petition of the Syracusans afforded opportunity for a compromise, in which, with a wisdom and temper oftener found perhaps in Corinth than in other Grecian cities, both parties agreed. Timoleon's birth and rank were eminent; his great talents had been proved in politics and in war; and, according to one party, he had shown himself peculiarly fit for the honourable office of delivering Sicily by the very act which, according to the other, made him unfit to live in his own country. His friends and his enemies therefore concurred in his appointment; with the condition, according to Diodorus, required by the latter, that, provided his conduct in Sicily corresponded with his pretensions to political virtue, he should be forgiven the

in by the perpetrators and their whole party, were as likely to be ascertained as those of such deeds commonly can be, may add to the lessons already gained in the course of the history, to be cautious of giving credit to the pretence of exact reports of any of them.

⁵ This is the account of Diodorus, who seems always to have meant to be accurate, especially in dates. Plutarch, on the contrary, ever straining to make the best story, unsolicitous about the consistency or connection of history, reports that Timoleon had been living twenty years in solitude and repentance when he was called upon to undertake the deliverance of Sicily from tyrants. But though we find Diodorus often detected by the learned and sagacious Dodwell in confounding the chronology of a year or two, yet, for these times, when historians and annalists abounded, he would hardly err, concerning so public a fact, so widely as twenty years. If Diodorus however could want support against Plutarch, we gain for him what is pretty satisfactory from the omission of all mention of these remarkable matters by Xenophon. According to Dodwell's exposition of Xenophon's chronology, it was in the twentieth year before the mission of the Sicilian Greeks to Corinth that the Corinthians, with the approbation of the Lacedæmonian government, made their separate peace with Thebes. Xenophon's history, continued some years after, has not a word about Timophanes or Timoleon, or any circumstances of Corinthian affairs suited to their story.

offence to the laws of the city and of humanity; but otherwise, if ever he returned to Corinth, he should suffer the just punishment for parricide. Plutarch has censured it as weakness in Timoleon, the only weakness of his great mind, that he felt contrition for his brother's murder. The Roman biographer has less affected a philosophy like that of the modern French; and, relating apparently nothing without authority from elder writers, he says the persevering refusal of Timoleon's mother to see him after the fact, and her invective and imprecations against him, of which he was informed, made a most severe impression on his mind. Thus he was prepared for such a proposal as that from the Sicilians; in which he seems to have rejoiced, however offering a field only for almost hopeless adventure among abounding dangers and difficulties, with a resolution never to return to Corinth.

SECTION II.

Expedition of Timoleon to Sicily. — Opposition of Greeks and Carthaginians to the Interference of Corinth in Sicily. — First and second Campaigns of Timoleon. — Final Retreat of Dionysius.

THE fulsomeness of panegyric ordinary among the later Grecian writers, especially Plutarch, is perhaps not less injurious to a great character than the malevolence of invective which abounded among those of the age we are engaged with, and which Plutarch, for the advantage apparently of contrast in his pictures, frequently adopted. It may not be less disadvantageous to Timoleon's fame, among sober inquirers, that we know him only from writers ever straining for eulogy, than to that of the elder Dionysius, that all detailed accounts of him come from his traducers. Timoleon's history altogether bears the character more of a tale of a

hero of the times of the Seven before Thebes than of the authentic narrative of the actions of a contemporary of Xenophon, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Nevertheless, involving a very interesting portion of the history of the Grecian republics, curiosity cannot but be awake to it; and, in the circumstances of Timoleon and of Sicily, the real character of adventures, sentiments, and conduct might have some tinge of the romantic. On careful examination however, those principal matters of fact, which might be of some public notoriety, are generally found not unsatisfactorily unfolded.

To the outfit of Timoleon's adventurous expedition the Corinthian government would contribute little or nothing beyond the credit of its name; and what could reach Corinth from Sicilians friendly to the cause was probably

very small. His own credit would assist, and possibly his private fortune. But the force with which he left the Grecian shores, professing the purpose of delivering the Sicilian cities from tyranny, and avenging the Grecian cause against the Carthaginians, consisted of only ten ships of war and seven hundred soldiers. In failure of transport ships, he put his land force into four of his triremes; an incumbrance so disabling them for naval action that his effective fighting ships were only six.⁶

To infuse then into his little armament an inspiration likely to be wanted, he had recourse to that superstition of

⁶ Diodorus alone has given this detail of Timoleon's naval force. Plutarch agrees with him in stating it at ten triremes. Wesseling has supposed that Aristotle, in his epistle to Alexander, on rhetoric, has had Timoleon's fleet in view, where he says that the Corinthians sent nine triremes to Syracuse against the Carthaginians. Apparently the learned commentator has not sufficiently followed up the historian's narrative, or he would have seen, I think, that Aristotle has rather referred to the fleet stated by him to have been afterward sent by the Corinthian government, as we shall see in the sequel, for the immediate purpose of opposing the Carthaginians.

which the ablest commanders of Greece and Rome are found most to have availed themselves. The priestesses of Ceres and Proserpine in Corinth gave him their valuable assistance in a declaration that those goddesses, appearing to them in dreams, gave assurance that they would accompany Timoleon to that great and fruitful island which was peculiarly sacred to them. Timoleon hence took occasion to consecrate his best ship to the goddesses, and call it by their name. A meteor, more brilliant and lasting than common, was seen in the sky during his voyage. He termed it a lamp, held out by the gods to guide him; and the story afterward passed that this celestial lamp directed his course across the Ionian sea and up the Tarentine gulf to his proposed port Metapontium. Probably he desired to pass unseen from the land, and for such advantage must give up that other, so important for ancient navigation, and especially for the ancient ships of war, of seeing and being near the land; and thence encouragement from confidence in divine protection might be more wanted for his people.

Intelligence reaching Leontini of the negotiation put forward from Tauromenium, and of preparation at Corinth for interfering with arms in the affairs of Sicily, Ictes, who had interest with one party among the Corinthians, sent ministers to counterwork the measure. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army under Hanno had crossed from Africa, and began operations with the siege of Entella. Conquest, such as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly sought, seems not to have been the purpose of Hanno's expedition; yet, in securing the Carthaginian command or influence, to extend them would probably be in his view. Ictes held friendly connection with Carthage, which we have seen not uncommon among the Sicilian Greeks. The interference of the Corinthians in Sicily, highly ob-

Diod. l. 16.
c. 66.
Plut. vit.
Timol.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 67.

c. 66.

noxious to Ictes, was likely to be an object of jealousy to the Carthaginian government. In consequence therefore of concert between Ictes and Hanno, a Carthaginian squadron was sent to watch the movements from Peloponnesus. It seems however not to have been Hanno's purpose to provoke hostilities. A single trireme, sent to Metapontium, met Timoleon there. The Carthaginian remonstrated against the purpose of the Corinthians to interfere with an armed force in the affairs of Sicily, where they had no possessions. Timoleon, little regarding argument, resolved to use the opportunity yet left open by the moderation of the Carthaginian commander for reaching a friendly Sicilian port, and hastened to proceed on his way. Nevertheless an invitation from Rhegium to assist in putting the government of that city into the hands of the party friendly to him appeared of too much importance to be

Diod. l. 16.
c. 68.

neglected. He went thither, and the object was gained ; but he had not time to sail again before a Carthaginian squadron, of twice his force, entered the harbour. The conduct of the Carthaginian commander was that of one instructed to promote peace and respect the rights of others. No way using the power in his hands, he went ashore to meet the Rhegian people in assembly, and argue, in their constitutional method, the matters in question between his own government and the various parties of the Greeks. This respect, from a Carthaginian commander, for Grecian laws and customs, Timoleon regarded only as it afforded opportunity to profit from disingenuous artifice. As soon as the debates had begun to engage all attention, nine of his ships proceeded to sea ; and then, slipping away himself unobserved, he followed in the remaining one. The Carthaginian, indignant, as soon as the deceit was made known to him, hastened in pursuit ; but night was already advancing, and Timoleon reached

Tauromenium without obstruction. Andromachus and the Syracusan refugees, the first promoters of his expedition, greeted his arrival.

It seems to have been late in the summer for beginning military enterprise; but things had been singularly prepared by war between those against whom Timoleon meant to direct his arms. Icetes had besieged Dionysius in Syracuse, but, making no progress, withdrew. Dionysius pursued. Icetes, turning, defeated him, entered the city with his flying troops, and became master of all except the island. Against the extraordinary strength of that fortress he would not waste his exertions; but he proceeded to besiege Adranum, the colony of the elder Dionysius, now holding connection with the refugees in Tauromenium.

Information of these circumstances decided the measures of Timoleon. Marching to relieve the Adranites, he attacked Icetes with such well-planned surprise that, with very inferior force, he put him presently to flight. In the instant of victory then he decided his next measure. Proceeding immediately for Syracuse, he marched with such speed, it is said, as to outstrip the retreating enemy; and, arriving wholly unexpected, he became master of the two quarters which he first approached, Tyche and Epipolæ. The strong separate fortifications of Neapolis and Achradina made farther attempt unavailing; but he retained what he had acquired; and thus the unfortunate city was divided between three powers at war with each other.

Winter now put that stop to farther military operations which, divided as the Greeks were among small republics, scantiness of revenue made for them, it may be said, fortunately unavoidable. The season of leisure for arms then seems to have been diligently and ably employed in negoti-

B. C. 343.
Ol. 108. 4.
[See p. 204.]

Diod. l. 16.
c. 68.
Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 241.

[B. C. 344.
Cl.]

ation. The numerous garrisons of small fortresses, scattered over the Syracusan territory, began in the existing circumstances to despair of the cause of Dionysius, to which they were attached. Vehemently averse to Icetes, they were little inclined to Andromachus; but to a general from the parent-city Corinth, unversed in Sicilian quarrels, if he might be able to protect them, they had no particular objection. Timoleon was ready with fair promises, and most of them made terms with him.

This success prepared matters for a greater acquisition. Mamercus, chief of Catana, bears among ancient writers the title of tyrant. But Timoleon, it appears, never disdained friendly connection with a tyrant, if it might be

Diod. l. 16.

c. 69.

Plut. vit.

Timol. p. 241.

useful; and Mamercus, beside that he was a brave and able soldier, holding a well-trained little army under his orders, was, in the biographer's phrase, powerfully wealthy.⁷ The accession therefore of this chief to the Corinthian interest was altogether considered as a highly fortunate event.⁸

But in the following spring, while Syracuse was yet divided between the three contending parties, Dionysius holding the island, Icetes Achradina and Neapolis, and Timoleon Tyche and Epipolæ, a Carthaginian fleet under Hanno entered the harbour, and landed an army, stated at fifty thousand men. It was expected that Hanno would

Aristot. ep.

ad Alex. de

Rhet. c. 9.

3 Diod. l. 16.

c. 69.

have the co-operation of Icetes, and their united strength seemed far too great for either of their opponents to withstand. Energy, for whatever it might effect, was not wanting to the Corinthian party; and Mamercus, and the Syracusans of the country garrisons, showed all zeal in their new engagements. The party in Corinth which sup-

⁷ Πολεμιστῆς ἀνὴρ, καὶ χεῖμασιν ἐβρώμενος. Plut. vit. Timol. p. 241.

⁸ Ἀνέλπιστον εὐτυχίαν. Ibid. p. 242.

ported Timoleon had been also prospering, or report of his first successes had extended his interest there; for in the existing crisis nine Corinthian triremes, filled with soldiers, arrived to act under his orders.

*Aristot. ut sup.
Diod. ut sup.*

Still in extreme anxiety he was looking around for opportunities of attack and means of defence, when he was relieved by the sudden and unaccountable retreat of the Carthaginian armament. Whether news from Carthage, or intrigue ably managed by Timoleon, or dissatisfaction with Ictes, (which following circumstances indicate as probable), or what else may have influenced Hanno, historians have not undertaken to say. The Greeks, on all sides, observed the departing fleet with astonishment, and Timoleon's troops, from expressions of growing despondency, passed to joyful scoffing and ridicule.

This inexplicable conduct of the Carthaginian general produced advantages for Timoleon which might not have accrued, had no Carthaginian force appeared. The Messenians, who had refused any intimacy of connection with Ictes, and nevertheless had formed alliance with the Carthaginians, now, conceiving themselves deserted, listened to proposals from Timoleon, and joined that which appeared the prospering cause. Ictes, pressed by an enemy on each side, hopeless of assistance from Carthage, and fearing blockade from the increased and still growing strength of Timoleon, abandoning Syracuse with his adherents, no small portion of the remaining population of the city withdrew to Leontini.

*[B. C. 343.
Timoleon
completes
conquest of
Syracuse. Cl.]*

*Diod. l. 16.
c. 72.*

Meanwhile Dionysius, no longer, as formerly, possessing a fleet commanding the sea, but shut within his island fortress, had been losing interest in Italy while, with apparently ill-planned and ill-conducted effort, he was endeavouring to serve his friends and recover his property and influence in Sicily. Ease and pleasure, according to all

but the most evidently malignant reports, far more than power and pomp, were the objects of his prevailing passions. A knowledge of his disposition, as well as of his circumstances, seems to have been the foundation of a negotiation, into which Timoleon entered with him in the course of the winter after the departure of Icetes. Corinth itself was proposed for the place of his retreat. The Corinthian state had obligations both to his father and to himself. Some among the principal citizens were likely to be well affected toward him; and that city, whose graver society had engaged the preference of Xenophon's elderhood, might still more, by its gaieties, invite the yet vigorous age of Dionysius. In the following spring the island and its citadel were surrendered to Timoleon; two thousand mercenaries of its garrison engaged in service under him; and Dionysius, with his immediate friends, passed to Corinth.⁹

B. C. 341.
Ol. 109. 1-2.
[B. C. 343.
after midsum.
Cl.]
Diod. i. 16.
c. 70.
Plut. & Corn.
Nep. vit.
Timol.,

⁹ However, in collating Diodorus with Thucydides or Xenophon, we may be disgusted with his deficiencies, yet, compared with the wildness of Plutarch, we find reason often to be gratified with his sobriety, clearness, and consistency. From Diodorus we have a coherent account of the transactions of two summers and two winters after the arrival of Timoleon in Sicily, before he became master of the citadel of Syracuse; which he says was managed by capitulation with Dionysius, without mentioning any assault upon it. Plutarch, a hundred and fifty years after Diodorus, and near five hundred after Dionysius, without either vouching any authority or impeaching any, boldly says that Timoleon, within fifty days after his arrival in Sicily*, took the citadel of Syracuse by assault, with Dionysius in it. Timoleon's first success after his victory at Adranum, against a part of the vast city held by Icetes, without approaching the island held by Dionysius, seems to have served as foundation for this romance.

[* Mr. Clinton considers Mr. Mitford justly dissatisfied with the *fifty days* of Plutarch, but denies that in Diodorus there is any vestige of *two winters*. "Three archons indeed," he says, "are specified: in the year of the first Timoleon sailed; in the year of the second he landed; and in the year of the third he took the citadel. But, as the archons commenced at midsummer, the operations of one campaign, comprehending a spring and autumn, would be distributed into two years by the annalist. Every campaign of the Peloponnesian war belonged to two Attic years. This we may trace in the narrative of Diodorus (xvi. 66—69.) upon this occasion: 'Επ' ἀρχοντας Εὐβοῦλου — Τιμο-

SECTION III.

Desolation of Syracuse. — Difficulty of Timoleon to reward his conquering Troops. — Provocation to Carthage. — New Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. — Mutiny in Timoleon's Army. — Battle of the Crimesus. — New Measures of the Carthaginians. — Measures of Timoleon. — Peace with Carthage.

SYRACUSE, thus brought completely under the authority of Timoleon, was still in buildings the largest city of the Greek nation, but in population, compared with extent of buildings, appeared a desert. With this great unpeopled town, and what territory he could vindicate with it, at his disposal, it was incumbent on Timoleon to reward the services of his now large force of mercenary troops, and to provide for those Syracusans of the Corinthian party who did not prefer a residence under the approved good govern-

λέων ἐξέπλευσεν ἐκ Κορίνθου. — καταπλεύσαντος δὲ τοῦ στόλου εἰς τὸ Μεταπόντιον — ἐξέπλευσεν εὐθέως ἐκ τοῦ Μεταποντίου. — οὗτος μὲν οὖν κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐτέλει τὸν εἰς Ῥήγιον πλοῦν — καὶ καθωρμήσθη πλησίον τῆς πόλεως. — ἐπικαταπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων — ἔλαθε διαδρᾶς — καὶ ταχέως ἐξέπλευσεν — εἰς τὸ Ταυρομενίον. — ἀναξεύζας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ταυρομενίου — ἀνελπίστας ἐπίθετο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰκέταν — καὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐκράτησε. — παραχεῖμα (δὲ) ἐπὶ τὰς Συρακούσας ἀφώρμησεν. — Ἐπ' ἄρχοντος Λυκίσκου — Τιμολέων μὲν Ἀδρανίτας καὶ Τυνδαρίτας εἰς συμμαχίαν προσλαβόμενος στρατιώτας οὐκ ὀλίγους παρ' αὐτῶν παρέλαβεν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Συρακούσαις πολλὴ ταραχὴ κατῴχε τὴν πόλιν, κ. τ. λ. At this point we discern a winter: the winter of the archon *Lyciscus*, B. C. 344-3. But we are at a loss to discover a second. The operations of Timoleon are continued in the following spring [B. C. 343]; still within the year of *Lyciscus*. And *Dionysius* retired to Corinth in the summer; which brings the annalist to the year of *Pythodotus*. The actual interval from the setting forth of Timoleon might be little more than a year: from the last month of *Eubulus* [May, B. C. 344] to the first month of *Pythodotus* [July, B. C. 343]. In the whole period of Timoleon in Sicily *Diodorus* agrees with *Plutarch*. The death of Timoleon in the year of *Phrynichus*, towards the close of B. C. 337, would be accurately described as 'not quite eight years' from his landing in the year of *Lyciscus*, B. C. 344. The real space of time might be seven years and a half." *Fasti Hellen.* p. 269. In his account of Sicilian affairs Mr. Mitford has sometimes appended dates to events not noticed by Mr. Clinton; but dates of the latter will be found introduced at certain distances, which will enable the reader to form a better judgment of the correctness of the intermediate ones of Mr. Mitford.]

ment of Andromachus in Tauromenium. To this then, if to any period, would apply Plutarch's description of desolation in Syracuse; such, he says, that the cavalry actually grazed in the agora while the grooms, probably slaves, indulgently slept upon the luxuriant swarth. The biographer and the Sicilian historian concurrently ascribe to this period Timoleon's legislation for the Syracusans. But by their concurrent account also, beyond the troops to whom he issued his orders as a military commander, there were few for whom to legislate. His employment for the winter seems to have been the assignment of deserted houses and lands to his followers; to his mercenaries, instead of pay, which he had not to give, and to the Syracusans of the Corinthian party in proportion to their zeal in the cause. With this some civil arrangement would be necessary, and it seems every way probable that he adapted it ably to the circumstances.

But it was beyond his ability to convert at once soldiers by trade, and men habituated to revolutions, into sober citizens. Good houses for the winter would of course be gratifying; but the lands he gave were little valuable without slaves and cattle to cultivate them. With spring therefore it became necessary for him again to seek war. Nor was this difficult to find; for between his followers and those whose lands and houses they had seized, though there might be cessation of hostilities, peace could not easily be established. He led his restless people first against Icetes in Leontini; but, finding little hope of ready success there, he quickly turned against Leptines of Engynne, another of those tyrants or chiefs to whose rise Dion's expedition had given occasion. Leptines, less able to resist than Icetes, came to terms similar to those made with Dionysius; surrendering his town, he passed to Peloponnesus. Meanwhile Icetes had confidence enough in

Vit. Timol.
p. 246, 247.

B. C. 340.
Ol. 109. 2-3.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 72. Plut.
vit. Timol.

his strength, or hope enough in a remaining party, to make an attempt upon Syracuse, but was repelled with loss.

The expedition against Leontini having been unprofitable, and Engynne not affording enough for the existing need, it was necessary for Timoleon still to seek a war. Among the Grecian settlements no advantageous opportunity offered; those which had not claim for his protection being able to resist his power. To provoke the might of Carthage seems to have been rash, yet might be popular; and so, want pressing, he sent his mercenaries to find among the people of the western end of the island the large arrears which he owed them. Faction among the Campanians of Entella perhaps invited to the measure, and seems certainly to have afforded the means for bringing under the power of Timoleon a place whose strength had baffled the arms of the first Dionysius. The manner in which he then arranged its affairs was thus: he caused fifteen principal men to be put to death for having been faithful to those engagements in which, whether from necessity of circumstances or choice as a free people, the Campanians had bound themselves and their state to Carthage. With this admonition how the gift should be used, he presented the Entellite people, in the historian's phrase, with liberty. Nevertheless, in a country where the failure of civil government had been so severely felt as in great part of Sicily, where the expedition of Dion, in Strabo's strong phrase, had caused universal disturbance by setting all against all ¹⁰, the order which Timoleon's energetic and steady command established, and the degree of security which it gave, would be extensively beneficial and satisfactory. As soon therefore as it became recommended by the appearance of power to maintain it, not

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 73.
Plut. vit.
Timol.
p. 248. A.

¹⁰ Ἐτάραξεν ἅπαντας πρὸς ἅπαντας. Strab. l. 6, p. 255.

only many of the Grecian towns looked to him for patronage, but, according to his panegyrist, several of the Sicel tribes, and some even of the Sican, solicited his alliance.

Whether Timoleon had foreseen a storm approaching from Carthage, or his aggression drew it, is not to be gathered from the very deficient historians of his transactions. In the next year however a very powerful armament passed from Africa to Sicily.

The land force, Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians, together with the troops

before in the island, is said to have amounted to seventy thousand foot and ten thousand horse; the fleet to two hundred ships of war. If the land force has been exaggerated, Timoleon's means were yet very unequal to meet it. In the flourishing state of Syracuse under the first Dionysius, when hands were wanted for works of peace or deeds of war, sixty thousand Syracusan citizens, at the call of that popular leader, with forward zeal took either spade and mattock, or spear and helmet. The voice of all Grecian Sicily, and it is not from his friends that we have the account, called and almost compelled him to take the command for war with Carthage. But now, when danger so threatened from that enemy, represented continually by the later Grecian and all the Roman writers in such odious colours, Timoleon, as his most zealous panegyrist acknowledges, could persuade no more than three thousand Syracusans to follow his standard.¹¹ Nevertheless,

Plut. vit.
Timol.
p. 248. C.

of whatever activity and courage and policy might

¹¹ We have here a curious instance of Plutarch's carelessness of consistency or arrangement or explanation. He had just before given an account of sixty thousand new citizens added to Syracuse by Timoleon. It is probable that this making of Syracusan citizens took place mostly at a later period. But from the two circumstances, the smallness of the numbers that would follow Timoleon's standard, and the making of Syracusan citizens in great numbers, may be gathered the value of the terms the GREEKS, and the SYRACUSANS, as often used by Diodorus and Plutarch to distinguish the partisans of Dion and Timoleon from those of Dionysius.

do in his immediate circumstances, Timoleon seems to have failed in nothing. Not scrupling to try negotiation with Ictes, now no longer connected with Carthage, Diod. l. 16. c. 77. he engaged that chief to co-operate against the Carthaginians.

But with all his exertions, some of them successful thus beyond reasonable hope, adding to his force of mercenaries every Syracusan citizen that he could c. 78. persuade or compel, he was unable to collect, including the auxiliaries from Ictes, more than twelve thousand men. Nevertheless with this very inferior force he resolved to seek the enemy rather than await attack. Indeed a choice only of great difficulties appears to have been before him. His marauding expedition among the Carthaginian settlements and dependencies; notwithstanding the acquisition of Entella, had not enabled him to pay the due to his mercenaries. The promise of great and ready plunder allured them to march; but, in proceeding by the road of the southern coast, as they passed the Grecian towns, every new report made the Carthaginian force more formidable, the prospect of hard fighting consequently greater, and the hope of ready plunder less. Irritation being thus added to irritation, in approaching the Agrigentine territory they broke out into complete mutiny. "They found it was intended," they said, "that instead of plunder they were to be paid with wounds, or a final settlement was to be made by their destruction: they would return to Syracuse; and, when it was known the Carthaginians were following, they did not fear but there they should obtain their just demands."

Fortunately the rest of the army had no common interest with the mercenaries. Even toward these however Timoleon wisely avoided harshness. In addressing persuasion and promises to them he could little point out any clear prospect of the future, but he managed to interest them by

talking of their past successful fellowship in arms. At length he prevailed upon three-fourths to proceed under his orders. About a thousand persevered in mutiny with Thrasius, the leader of it, and returned directly to Syracuse. Timoleon made light of the loss. "They had foolishly," he said, "deserted glory and large reward, to which he should, in great confidence, hasten to lead the army. It was nothing impossible, or improbable, or unexperienced, that he promised to them and himself. Why should the victory of of Gelon, over the same enemy, be the only instance of the

Diod. l. 16.
c. 79.
Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 248.

kind?"¹² A drove of mules, laden with parsley, the abundant wild growth of the country, commonly used for the soldier to sleep on, was entering the camp. Everything among the Greeks was an omen of good or evil; and the same thing, according to circumstances or fancy, might portend either. Parsley was the material of chaplets usually hung at funerals over the graves. Timoleon was alarmed. The lading might make an impression on the soldier's mind of the most fatal tendency. But parsley was also the material of the chaplet that distinguished the conquerors in the Isthmian games. With ready recollection therefore he cried, "Omen of Victory, I accept you!" and causing a chaplet of parsley to be immediately woven, which he put on his

¹² To the vehemence of Plutarch's zeal for his hero's military fame we are indebted for most unsuspecting testimony to the tyrannical character of his administration, which was supported by four thousand mercenaries, when his popularity was so deficient that he could obtain no more than three thousand citizens for his expedition. The strained panegyric afterward degenerates into puerile absurdity. The reply which Shakspeare attributes to Henry the fifth, before the battle of Agincourt, when a wish for re-enforcement was expressed, admirably paints the real hero, infusing confidence by showing confidence, and using perhaps the most powerful argument in his circumstance to prevent desertion. But Plutarch represents Timoleon absolutely delighted with the desertion of a thousand men; exhibiting thus rather a fool than a hero, and doing injustice to a character which, though very far from faultless, appears to have had much of the truly heroic.

own head, animation pervaded the army while all followed the example.¹³

The confidence of the Carthaginian general in his very superior numbers led him to seek that quick decision which Timoleon's circumstances especially required. While the Greeks occupied a brow overlooking the valley through which the river Crimesus flowed, supposing they would await attack in their advantageous post, he did not scruple to cross the stream in their sight. Timoleon seized a critical moment, when the Carthaginian army was divided by the river, to attack the advanced body; and though he met with strong resistance, he broke it at length and put it to flight. But in the mean time the rest of the army made the passage, and advanced in good order against his flank. In danger of being surrounded, his utmost ability might have failed against well-conducted numbers, when a violent thunder-storm came on. Amid repeated flashes of lightning, hail of uncommon size beat full in the faces of the Carthaginians. Unable to meet the storm, they were pressed by the weapons of the Greeks, not equally impeded by it. Confusion arising, and resistance to the assault of the elements and of the enemy together appearing impossible, all became anxious to repass the river. Numbers hastening in one direction, while the noise of thunder overbore the voice of command, and the alternacy of gloom and vivid flashes disturbed the sight, and the hail and the wind impeded action against an enemy pressing on in a manner as the associate of the storm, among the various nations composing the Carthaginian army an uncommon kind of tumult arose. Unable to turn or even to look around against the enemy, some by mistake, and some perhaps in anger,

¹³ It was not till four centuries after, near Plutarch's time, that pine-leaves were made the material of the Isthmian crown, parsley remaining still that of the Nemean.

fought one another. Still all pushed for the glen, anxious to pass the river. But the foremost, contending with the swoln current, and afterward with the opposite steep, could no longer advance with sufficient speed to make way for those who, pressed by the pursuing Greeks, were still descending. The crowd in the bottom became in consequence intense. Many were overthrown, trampled on, and drowned, and many suffocated by the mere pressure. To restore order was no longer possible : the rout was complete, and the slaughter very great. Report made more than ten thousand of the Carthaginian army killed, and fifteen thousand prisoners. The extravagance of this however is indicated by another report, recorded by the same writers, that only one thousand horsemen's cuirasses, and ten thousand shields from slain and prisoners together, could be collected. The roundness of the numbers, even here, might excite suspicion of exaggeration ; though it was said that the larger part of the shields of the slain were carried away by the torrent. It is however far likelier that many more shields were found than bodies ; for, in flight, to throw away the shield was

Ch. 26. s. 6.
of this Hist.

common¹⁴, and in the authentic account of Xenophon we have seen a Grecian army compelled by

[June, B. C.
339. Cl.]

the mere violence of a storm, where no enemy pressed, to abandon the encumbrance. The victory however was complete ; the Carthaginian camp was taken, and the booty was rich enough to afford gratifying reward for the conquerors.

The consequences of the victory of the Crimesus were very great. However in the divided state of the Sicilian Greeks Timoleon's force might be feared, his credit had hitherto been very doubtful and little extensive. A small party, long considered as outcasts, lately indeed receiving accession through the distractions of the country, but still

¹⁴ ——— “relictâ non bene parmulâ,” is Horace's well-known confession.

apparently a small party, acknowledged him as the representative of the parent-city of Syracuse, commissioned to liberate Sicily. Among far the greater part, even of the Syracusans, and even of those yet residing in Syracuse, he was regarded either with horror, as the patron of their worst adversaries, or with suspicion and fear, as the leader of a band of mercenaries and adventurers. But by the victory of the Crimesus he acquired a solid foundation for the claim to be the protector of the Greeks against barbarians; and the zeal of his partisans would appear not wholly unreasonable in extolling him as a patriotic conqueror, rivalling in merit and in glory the first Dionysius, or even Gelon. Trophies, taken in the battle or found in the camp, were sent to all the principal Greek cities of Sicily; and the ostentatious compliment to Corinth of transmitting a selection of them thither appears to have assisted the promotion of Timoleon's interest there.

Nevertheless the accession to his party, whether from gratitude for his benefits or fear of his power, was not such as to enable him to prosecute conquest against the might of Carthage. On the contrary, to hold his footing in Syracuse required the most diligent exertion of his abilities, and, as his measures show, the utmost stretch of his authority. The crime of the mutineers demanded his first attention. On their secession from the army, with ready prudence he had provided for the quiet of the city by forwarding directions to pay their arrears, and to avoid whatever might exasperate them. He had now no longer to fear what they alone could do; but it behoved him still to consider the interest that his more faithful mercenaries might take in their fate. His severity against them therefore went no farther than to require their immediate departure from Sicily. Not that this was, in effect, a light punishment. For the business of service

Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

in arms for hire, now become almost as regular a trade among the Greeks as any other, required, like all others, character to support it. A body which had earned the reputation of fidelity, as well as of valour and skill in arms, would of course be preferred. Untried men would be the next choice. Those who had once proved false to their engagements would be avoided. Thus arose some security to the employers of mercenaries from the interest such troops had in character. The simple dismissal of the mutineers by Timoleon, with loss of character, involved their ruin. Unable to find a reputable service, and little inclined to peaceful industry, they turned to piracy. Going to Italy, they possessed themselves of a town on the coast of Bruttium. But, quickly blockaded in it by the collected Brutians, they were overpowered, and to a man destroyed.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians were preparing to revenge their defeat by measures founded apparently upon just information of the state of things in Syracuse, and throughout the Grecian cities of Sicily. Instead of sending for troops, as formerly, from the distance of Gaul or Spain, they resolved to use the opportunity which the long and violent distractions of the Grecian interest furnished, for extending the policy, not wholly new to them, of employing Greeks against Greeks. For means to oppose this policy Timoleon's interest in Sicily, notwithstanding the glory of the victory of the Crimæus, seems clearly to have failed. Either mistrusting the Sicilians, or unable to induce them to trust him, he imported five thousand colonists from Peloponnesus¹⁵, among whom he distributed the lands and houses of those Syracusans who had fled or been expelled. This was an effectual addition of that

Diod. l. 16.
c. 81.

¹⁵ Plutarch mentions an ancient writer, Athanis, who made the number fifty thousand. He was contented himself to state it at ten thousand. The still more moderate report of Diodorus has been preferred for the text.

number to his mercenary army: the lands and houses were instead of pay. Thus strengthened he entered into treaty with the Carthaginians, and apparently conducted it ably; for he obtained terms not unworthy of the fame of the conqueror of the Crimesus. The country westward of the Lycus (apparently the same as the Ha-^{Diod. l. 16. c. 82.}lycus, the boundary prescribed in the first treaty with the elder Dionysius) being ceded to the Carthaginians, they engaged not to interfere to the eastward of that river. This advantageous treaty confirmed the power of Timoleon in Syracuse, and added greatly to his weight throughout the Grecian part of Sicily.

SECTION IV.

Measures of Timoleon to reduce the independent Grecian Chiefs of Sicily. — Successes and Cruelties. — Measures to repeople the Country; to restore Law and Order. — Singular Magistracy. — Despotic Character of Timoleon's Administration. — Extent of the Revolution. — Prosperity of the new People. — Fate of Dionysius and his Family.

As in ^{*}making war against the Carthaginians Timoleon claimed to be the assertor of Grecian freedom, the protector of the Grecian interest in Sicily, so in making peace he claimed equally to be the patron of all the Greeks of the island. The Grecian interest however, though divided so that it would have been weak against the power of Carthage, was yet no longer in that state of utter confusion which Dion's expedition had produced. Almost every town, still under the direction of some one powerful man, who bore regularly the title of archon, ruler or chief, had under such superintendency a government of some regularity: but, as everywhere were two parties, the party adverse to the chief would, in the common way of Grecian party-language,

call him tyrant, and be ready to concur in any measures for a revolution. Among such governments, though each seems to have had its sovereign assembly, some would be corruptly and some tyrannically administered. Information however fails of any particular demerits, either of the governments, or of those who presided in them, when Timoleon resolved to abolish all.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

No effectual confederacy existing among those governments, he had little difficulty with the smaller. Nicodemus, chief of Centoripa, fled at his approach, and the people received their law from Timoleon. A message sufficed to make Apolloniades resign the supreme authority in Agyrium. The Campanians of Ætna, obeying no tyrant, governing themselves under a popular constitution, but presuming to resist the exterminator of tyrants, (as Timoleon is called by his panegyrist,) and being overpowered by him, were utterly destroyed.¹⁶

With Icetes, chief of Leontini, Timoleon had friendly connection, as formerly noticed, and, in pressing need, had received from him important assistance. The pretence for hostility with that chief, according to Plutarch, was a report that he had entered into new engagements with the Carthaginians. Diodorus has mentioned no pretence. In tenderness apparently for a favourite hero, he has hurried over the abominable tale in these remarkable words: "Timoleon conquered Icetes, and buried him." Plutarch's garrulity, notwithstanding his partiality, has afforded more information; and, however doubtful the character of the conquered chief, the atrocity of the conqueror seems not doubtful. Icetes, and his son Eupolemus, and the principal military commander under them, Euthymus, were made prisoners.

Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 251.
Diod. ut sup.
Plut. ut sup.

¹⁶ Καμπανούς ἐκπαλοεκήσας διέφθειρε. Diod. l. 16. c. 82.

Euthymus was a man of such excellent character, so generally esteemed and respected, that many of the zealous partisans of Timoleon interested themselves for him. But it was objected that he had once used a sarcastical expression in derision of the Corinthians, and this sufficed to make all interference in his favour vain : Ictes and his son, and their general, were all put to death. Nor did the tragedy end so. The fate of the wives and daughters of these unfortunate men was submitted, nominally, to the decision of that multitude, collected mostly from beyond sea, which was now called the Syracusan people; and the miserable women and girls perished by the executioner. Unable to excuse, and unwilling to condemn, Plutarch says coldly, "This was the most ungracious of Timoleon's actions." ¹⁷

Leontini being thus secured, it was resolved next to have Catana. The pretence against Mamercus, as against Ictes, unless it were only apology afterward, was connection with Carthage. It seems indeed difficult to estimate the value of such an accusation, so loosely stated as it is by Plutarch. Timoleon himself had just made peace with the Carthaginians; and it seems very unlikely that Mamercus, who had joined interest with him against the Carthaginians when his circumstances were almost desperate, would of choice abandon him, now become the arbiter of the Grecian interest in Sicily, to connect himself with the Carthaginians. But if he saw it no longer possible to hold Timoleon's favour or avoid his oppression; if he found himself, as in the account of Timoleon's panegyrist he seems to have been, devoted to destruction, then indeed he would probably seek support from Carthage, or

¹⁷ The expression, as coming from a celebrated moralist, is curious enough to deserve observation in its original language: Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν Τιμολέοντος ἔργων ἀχαριστότατον εἶναι.

wherever it might be found. With crime thus problematical, or rather with imputation undeserving of credit, his merits are acknowledged. Amid the desolation of Sicily, when multitudes were wanting security for private life, he collected a considerable population in the deserted town of Catana, and made it a flourishing little state. Of any discontent of the people with his government we have no information; and Timoleon himself seems not to have owed so much to any one man, excepting perhaps Andromachus of Tauromenium, as to Mamercus. Nevertheless Mamercus was driven from Catana. He found hospitality with Hippon, chief of Messena. But Timoleon, claiming to give liberty to all, would allow none to enjoy any liberty but what he gave. Possibly there had been a party in Catana desirous of rising to power and wealth on the ruin of the existing government. There was such in Messena. Timoleon undertook its patronage, and laid siege to the town. Hippon, pressed at the same time by sedition within, and by an enemy of overbearing power without, attempted flight by sea, but was taken. It is not from an adverse pen, but from the panegyrist of

Plut. vit. Timol. Timoleon, that we have the account. The unfortunate Hippon, like the elder Dionysius, had been moderate enough in the use of power to avoid extensive banishment against the party adverse to him. He was now delivered by Timoleon to that party. A kind of democratical law was thus put in execution against him, which must have had, in some degree, Timoleon's approbation, and is not marked with any reprehension by the moral biographer. Hippon was carried to the great theatre of Messena, and all the boys from all the schools were sent for to take the lesson of atrocity, while, with the most studied indignities, he was tormented to death.

Meanwhile Mamercus, in some confidence apparently of

merit, both with Timoleon and with that multitude which, not without important assistance from him, was become the Syracusan people, had surrendered himself; stipulating only for allowance to plead his own cause freely before the general assembly of Syracuse, with the condition annexed, that Timoleon should not appear as his accuser. Timoleon's accusation however was unnecessary: his interference to preserve some decency of proceeding might have been creditable to him. So was the assembly composed, and so regulated, that Mamercus could not obtain a hearing. Shouts and scoffing drowned his voice. In a mixture of indignation and despair, throwing off his cloak, he ran violently across the theatre, the place of trial, with the purpose of destroying himself by dashing his head against the wall. He was however taken up alive, but being considered as sufficiently tried and condemned, he was put to death in the usual way of execution for those convicted of theft. Not an evil deed has Plutarch found to impute either to Mamercus or Hippon. Nevertheless that admired moralist relates the shocking tales of their fate as if creditable to his hero, and concludes exultingly, "Thus Timoleon abolished tyrannies, and destroyed his enemies."

Plut. vit.
Timol.

Yet it seems probable that Timoleon never wholly wasted cruelty: his atrocity, of which he was on occasion not sparing, was always subservient to his policy. As he repressed an adverse party by his executions at Entella, so he riveted an associated party by conceding Ictes, Hippon, and Mamercus to its vengeance; not merely thus gaining its uncertain good will, but increasing its dependency on him for protection against exalted animosity and hatred, and making any union of the Sicilian Greeks against him more impracticable. The final reward of the party, as likely in such circumstances, was more proportioned to their desert than to their hope.

The mercenary soldiers and adventurers from Corinth and various parts of Greece, who had no interest in Sicily but what they owed to Timoleon, were his principal care. Paid for their services with forfeited lands and houses, the Syracusans were obliged to admit them to all the rights of citi-

Aristot. Polit.
1. 5. c. 3.

zens. Heart-burnings and disagreements arose

between the new citizens and the old, such that arms were taken and civil war ensued. Of this contest no particulars remain; but that the new-comers prevailed, and that the lot of the remnant of Syracusans, resting on the mercy which Timoleon's policy would allow, was more than before uneasy and degrading, is sufficiently indicated.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 82.

Henceforward Timoleon treated Sicily as a conquered country; for so it appears even in the accounts of those who extol him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks. It is remarkable that not a single Sicilian is mentioned by them in either civil or military situation under him.

Plut. vit.
Timol.

Corinthians and other foreigners are named; and Plutarch, the most extravagant of his panegyrists, goes so far as to say that he could not trust the Syracusans.¹⁸ How much of the large population which flourished under each Dionysius was extirpated or exterminated in the troubles preceding Timoleon's expedition, and what he himself destroyed or expelled, history remaining only from his partisans, extant accounts fail to show; but the void altogether was very great. This he determined to repair; and it appears

¹⁸ Perhaps Plutarch, professing not to write history, would claim indulgence for omitting historical facts at pleasure: carelessness and misjudgment have occasioned the numerous important omissions in the narrative of Diodorus. Neither has noticed the war between Timoleon's mercenaries and the Syracusan people, whose support was the original pretence for Timoleon's expedition. Indeed, to make any account of it accord with their panegyric of him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks, must have been difficult. Yet what Plutarch has acknowledged, of the denial of confidence to Syracusans, and admission of strangers only to power, possibly among the causes, would however be a ready and perhaps necessary consequence, of the war of which we get information from Aristotle.

that he was great in the business of reparation not less than of destruction. His first measure was to invite <sup>B. C. 537.
Ol. 110. 1-2.</sup> adventurers, by proclamation over Greece, with the promise of lands and houses and the rights of citizens. Exiles from different republics abounding in Greece, some always from every state, and from some states sometimes half the people, to collect numbers opportunity would be ready. On the immediate territory of Syracuse, ^{Diod. ut ant.} it is said, he established at once four thousand families, and, in an adjoining plain, called the Agyrinæan, of great extent and extraordinary fertility, no less than ten thousand.

The arduous business remained to establish civil order among a mixed multitude, thus new in the country, and to blend his mercenary soldiers with the fresh adventurers, and both with the remnant of Syracusans, if any might be, into one mass of citizens. Nor was this wanting for Syracuse only, but for almost every Grecian town of Sicily; all now brought under his power, through revolutions more or less violent and sweeping. In this very difficult business his principal assistants are said to have been two Corinthians, Dionysius and Cephalus. On a revisal of the old laws, those relating to property and the rights of individuals which had obtained under the autocrator Dionysius were found so unexceptionable that in them little alteration was found expedient. But the political constitution, which seems to have stood under the two tyrants of that name nearly as it had been established by the demagogue Diocles, is said to have been almost wholly altered. Ground however occurs for doubting the justness of this general assertion, unattended with any account of particulars. For, had there not been merit in the institutions of Diocles, the first Dionysius, who seems clearly to have had the power, surely would have altered them; and the alteration would have

been matter for charge against him among the adverse writers. That under Dionysius the constitution was good, the flourishing state of the country under him, and for some years after him, in regard to which all remaining evidence concurs, will at least afford large presumption. But under the constitution of Timoleon also the country flourished. Diocles and Timoleon equally pretended the warmest zeal for democratical sway; though, provident no doubt of those temporary enjoyments for the multitude which were necessary for engaging its favour, they profited from circumstances to rule with severity; a severity for which Diocles was famed, and for which Timoleon appears to have deserved fame, however his superior management or good fortune may have averted the imputation from his party and from posterity. But it seems not probable that two governments of democratical form, under each of which the country flourished, could be upon the whole very dissimilar. Timoleon however made an addition to the constitution of Syracuse well deserving notice. Though his policy led him to avow himself always the champion of democracy, yet, in settling the government of the country, aware of the necessity for a balance to the sovereign power of the people, and of the impossibility of giving sufficient weight to any civil authority for the purpose, he had recourse to the superstition of the age. The magistrate, to whom he committed the salutary power of controlling popular despotism, he called the Minister of Olympian Jupiter. What were the particular functions of this ministry we are not informed; but its permanence through many succeeding revolutions, and the continuance of its high estimation, as we are assured by Diodorus, till his own time, near three hundred years after Timoleon, when its authority was in a great degree superseded and its dignity in a manner overshadowed by the extension of the privileges of Roman citizens to all the Sicilians, satis-

factorily indicate the wisdom with which it was adapted to the temper and circumstances of the people; that new or mixed people which was thenceforward to be called Syracusan.

But Timoleon's care was not confined to Syracuse. Diodorus says, "that he restored liberty to all the Sicilian Greek cities, rooting out tyrants, and receiving the people into alliance." We learn from much higher authority in the course of Lacedæmonian, Athenian, and Theban history, what such liberty and such alliance were. But Timoleon evidently exceeded the ordinary despotism of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes. The accounts remaining from his panegyrists of his introduction of new citizens afford the best ground for estimating the amount of his destruction or expulsion of the old. Scarcely in any city does the chief power seem to have been trusted with natives. In Syracuse, as already observed, not a Syracusan is found in any authority. Agrigentum, under his patronage, was occupied by a colony of mixed people, among whom were many Agrigentine refugees: but the leaders, those to whom he committed the commanding authority, were two Eleans, Megellus and Pheristus. A similar colony, led by Gorgus of the island of Ceos, took possession of Gela. The Camarinæans appear to have been more favoured; being only compelled to admit a number of strangers to share with them the rights of citizens of Camarina. Those Leontines, who neither suffered death with their chief, nor banishment for their fidelity to the cause in which they had been engaged with him, probably not numerous, were removed to Syracuse. The first Dionysius, and Gelon before him, had made many such removals; but a revolution so extensive and so complete, in governments, in property, in population, as that effected by Timoleon in Sicily, had not occurred among the settlements of the Greek nation since the return of the Heraclidæ.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 32.

That the government of Timoleon, even in Syracuse, was highly despotic, is evident from all accounts. Nepos calls him king, and his command a kingdom.¹⁹ Plutarch says,

Plut. vit.
Timol.
p. 253. A.

“ he was believed and venerated everywhere as a founder ;” and then follows the proof ; “ neither war nor peace was made, law enacted, colony established or constitution settled, that was thought rightly done unless he approved.” The same authors furnish anecdotes, indicating the character of the administration of this king and founder. We have seen in Athens, where something nearer to pure democracy than perhaps ever anywhere else had practical effect as a lasting government, what licentiousness of invective was used in the general assembly, and what libellous representation in the theatres, against the truly great Pericles, in the fulness of his power. Many anecdotes, mostly preserved with a view to defame the elder Dionysius, show that, under his administration in Syracuse, public debate was generally very free. But under that celebrated destroyer of tyrants, Timoleon, it was considered as an extravagance for any one to think of opposing the executive power, either in the general assembly or in the courts of law. Demænetus is named as a remarkable instance of a person venturing, in the general assembly, to impeach any part of Timoleon’s conduct, whose well-imagined reply shows how little he had to fear opposition. Not deigning to enter into any refutation of the charges, he said, “ he thanked the gods who had been propitious to his constant prayer for freedom of speech to the Syracusans.” Laphytius was presumptuous enough to in-

¹⁹ “ Cum tantis esset opibus ut etiam invitis imperare posset, tantum autem haberet amorem *omnium Siculorum* ut nullo recusante *regnum* obtineret. Quod ceteri *reges* imperio vix potuerunt, hic benevolentia tenuit.” Corn. Nep. vit. Timol. Those whom the biographer calls *all the Sicilians* were, for the most part, according even to the panegyrists of Timoleon, foreigners, brought into Sicily in the room of Sicilians, either destroyed or made outcasts ; and the *love* was of those who owed to him, and under him only had hope of holding, property taken by violence from the owners.

stitute a suit at law against him, and to require surety, in regular form, that he would stand the trial. Timoleon's warm partisans were so indignant that they excited tumult and began violence. The wiser Timoleon restrained them: "His very purpose," he said, "in all the toil and danger he had undergone for the Syracusan people, was that the law should be equal to all."

But that Timoleon, pretending to give universal freedom, really governed all with despotic authority, should perhaps less be attributed as blame to him, than considered as, in some degree, a necessity imposed by the general deficiency, among the Greeks, of any conception of principles on which that civil freedom might rest, for which they were so generally zealous. The following anecdote, in which, even in Trajan's time, Plutarch seems to have seen nothing but wise decision, marks a deficiency of jurisprudential principle which, even of Timoleon's age, might appear now hardly credible. Timoleon was engaged with the ceremony of a public sacrifice when, in the crowd about him, one man suddenly stabbed another, and fled. A third, hitherto a quiet bystander, instantly sprang to the altar, and, claiming asylum, declared himself ready to confess all. Being told to speak out, and no harm should befall him, he said, "he had been sent by Icetes, together with the man just killed, to assassinate Timoleon; and they were going to execute their commission when his comrade was stabbed; by whom he knew not." Meanwhile the effectual assassin had been overtaken and was brought back, insisting "that he had committed no crime; having only taken just revenge for his father, who had been killed in Leontini by him whom he had now put to death." It happened that some persons present, recognising him, bore testimony to the truth of his account; upon which he was not only set at liberty without reprehension, but rewarded with a sum

equal to thirty pounds sterling, for having been, in committing one murder, so accidentally the means of preventing another. Whether this story were in all points true, or the confession was the invention of the partisans of Timoleon to palliate the cruelties used toward Icetes and his unfortunate family, whose partisans could now little raise their voices for themselves, yet as transmitted from Timoleon's age, and reported in Trajan's, it must deserve attention among indications of the characters of government and jurisprudence in both. Not only the principle of allowing private revenge to supersede public justice is admitted, but encouragement is held out for murder, by showing that as, in the chance of things, benefit might result to the public, so instead of punishment, profit and honour might follow to the perpetrator.

Nevertheless the result, for which we have satisfactory testimony, shows the policy of Timoleon to have been very ably adapted to the temper and circumstances of the mixed people for whom he was to legislate. The first evidence we have from history consists indeed in its silence. That historians were not wanting we are well assured. That they had nothing to report therefore of Sicilian affairs,

Diod. l. 19.
c. 3.

during nineteen years after the establishment of Timoleon's power, excepting some inconsiderable hostilities between Syracuse and Agrigentum, and that at the end of that period, when new and great troubles called their attention, the Sicilian Greek towns were flourishing, nearly as under the first Dionysius, seems unquestionably to mark extraordinary wisdom in the institutions of Timoleon. Diodorus, if our copies give the number rightly, says that he lived only eight years* after his first arrival in Sicily, and only two after his victory of the Crimesus. Plutarch is

[* See bracketed note, p. 204.]

less explicit on this subject. They agree in asserting that he became completely blind for some time before his death; and accounts altogether appear to imply that the period in which he was active in administration, and the period in which he lived honoured in the blindness that in a great degree incapacitated him, must together have been considerably longer than the historian has reported.

If however the many who were indebted to Timoleon for fair possessions in Sicily, some instigated by gratitude, and all by interest, would extol the living founder of their fortune, amplify his merit, and extenuate his failings, yet more would his premature death, or even that blindness which would render him in a manner dead to military and civil business, call forth the voice of panegyric from the zeal or regret of both friendship and party. Had a revolution quickly followed, Timoleon's fame, turbid even in the accounts of his panegyrists, might have been still more blackened than that of Dionysius or of Phalaris. But the long peaceful prevalence of that party to which he gave possessions and power provided security for his reputation. Andromachus, chief of Tauromenium, though how his authority was more constitutional in itself, or less exceptionably exercised, than that of Mamercus, Hippon, or Icetes, nowhere appears, preserving Timoleon's friendship, retained his own power. From the pen of his son Timæus therefore, one of the principal historians of Sicily, only eulogy of Timoleon could be expected. Either gratitude, or hope, or fear, or all together, might prompt his exclamation, in the words of the great tragic poet, "O ye divinities, what Cyprian goddess, what god of desire, presides over all his actions!" But recollecting the treatment of Mamercus, of Hippon, of Icetes, and beyond all, the women of the family of Icetes, as reported by the moral biographer, Timoleon's zealous panegyrist, we shall

Sophocl. ap.
Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 253.

hardly agree with that moralist of four or five centuries after, in his unqualified admiration and praise.

While Timoleon's adventure was attended with such extraordinary success in Sicily, the party with which he was connected in Corinth prospered so that opposition was overborne, and the powers of government rested in their hands. The liberal treatment therefore which Dionysius found, on first taking his residence there, may reflect some credit on Timoleon himself. By the Corinthians, and by others resorting to that central city, the great emporium of the nation, the seat of the Isthmian games, Dionysius was treated with such consideration that he appears to have been the most distinguished person of Corinth and of Greece. But this excited a jealousy that threatened his safety: he found it prudent to avoid the attentions of considerable men; and whether led more by considerations of expediency, or by his natural disposition, he is said to have affected low company and frivolous or dissolute amusement, with a carelessness about serious concerns. But Plutarch has had the candour to avow that many anecdotes preserved in his time marked in Dionysius

a manly firmness under misfortune. He has even reported several, which show very illiberal behaviour toward him, and much good temper, good sense, and ready wit in his manner of meeting it. But all did not suffice for obtaining justice from the Syracusan government, or permanence of protection from the Corinthian. Whether still under Timoleon, or more probably not till after his death, the stipulated remittances to Dionysius ceased, and his consequent distress is said to have driven him to seek his livelihood by the occupation of a schoolmaster; for which his literary acquirements and superior manners might give him advantages. At one time he was compelled to fly from Corinth. By birth a citizen of

Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 242.

Ibid.

Cic. Tusc. l. 3.

Athens, the privilege having been given to his father, for himself and all his posterity, the state of the Athenian government however was not inviting for him, and he preferred retiring to the less polished regions of Epirus.

Ep. Philipp.
ap. Demost.
p. 161. ed.
Reiske.

It is difficult to judge what credit may be due to Plutarch's mention of the fate of the women of the family. It was in the way of democratical party-spirit among the Greeks to glory in the most diabolical revenge against an adverse faction; and this spirit was cherished among philosophers under the Roman empire, apparently with the same view with which it has been adopted by the French philosophers of the present age, who have, in truth, been in almost everything copiers, though in atrocity they have at least equalled or perhaps outdone their masters.²⁰ It has been in this spirit that Plutarch has held out ostentatiously the punishment which the younger Dionysius suffered in the calamities of his family, living to see the death of his wife and all his children. The manner in which his sons perished is not said. The treatment of his wife and daughters, mercifully concluded by drowning them, appears to have resembled that which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates had suffered many years before, from the same party. The story is related with so much complacency by the moral philosopher that we are left only to hope his favourite hero, Timoleon, was not implicated in the atrocious wickedness. It was

Plut. vit.
Timol. p. 242.

²⁰ This spirit seems, on the revival of letters, to have been early caught by some of those learned men, far more on the continent than in our island, who undertook the translation of the Greek authors; and it has led them often to outgo their originals in violence of expression, and to prefer the most injurious sense of every doubtful phrase. Thus Plutarch's "Α δ' ἐπράξε τυραννῶν (ὁ Διονύσιος) ὃς ἐπαθὲν ὑπερβαλόμενος, is rendered by Rhodoman and Wesseling, *Hic scelera sua superavit calamitatibus*. Those translators cannot but have known that *τυραννῶν* does not necessarily imply any *scelera*, and the context would rather imply reference to the splendour of the first years of the second Dionysius's reign or administration.

Aristot. Pol.
l. 5. c. 7.

probably when the family of Dionysius were obliged to fly from Locri that the destruction fell upon that city which we find obscurely mentioned by Aristotle.

Timoleon's history has assuredly deserved to be better known; and the account of such a contemporary as Timæus, however partial, could not but have been of high value. Of Dion, who, in the geographer's phrase, set all at variance with all, we should perhaps little desire to know more; nor indeed of Timoleon for his works of destruction, which have been so much the subject of panegyric. But we want information how, through a revolution so violent and so complete, he produced a prosperity and lasting quiet, of which examples, in all history rare, occur among the Grecian republics almost only under the administration of Sicilian chiefs, and those mostly described by the title of tyrants.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA FROM THE REIGN OF PERDICCAS
SON OF ALEXANDER TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PHILIP
SON OF AMYNTAS.

SECTION I.

*Macedonian Constitution. — Macedonian Territory. — State of
Macedonia under Perdiccas Son of Alexander. — Splendid and
Beneficial Reign of Archelaus Son of Perdiccas.*

WHILE among the numerous states of Greece, and their extensive colonies, security for civil freedom had been vainly sought in various forms of republics, and permanence of public strength had equally failed in experiment of various systems of confederacy, there remained on the northern border a people of Grecian race who held yet their hereditary monarchy, transmitted from the heroic ages. This, as we have seen formerly in treating of the times described by Homer, was a limited monarchy, bearing a striking resemblance to the Ch. 2. s. 2.
of this Hist. ancient constitution of England, and in his age prevailing throughout Greece. Of the countries which preserved this constitution, the principal in extent and power, and the most known to us, was the kingdom of Macedonia; whose affairs, for their implication with those of the leading republics, have already required frequent mention.¹ Ac-

¹ The principal passages in the foregoing history, relating to Macedonia, occur in ch. 1. s. 1. and 2., ch. 6. s. 3., ch. 7. s. 3., ch. 8. s. 2. and 5., ch. 9. s. 1., ch. 13. s. 4., ch. 14. s. 2., ch. 15. s. 2., ch. 16. s. 2, 4, 5, 6., ch. 26. s. 2, 3, 4.

Polyb. l. 5.
p. 375. Arr. de
exp. Alex. l. 4.
c. 11. Q. Curt.
l. 6. c. 8. s. 25.
Luc. dial. Alex.
& Phil.

According to the concurring testimony of ancient writers who have treated of Macedonia, the king was supreme, but not despotic. The chief object of his office, as in the English constitution, was to be conservator of the peace of his kingdom; for which great purpose he was vested with the first military and the first judicial authority; as in the governments described by Homer, he commanded the army, and presided over the administration of justice. But he was to command and to judge according to established laws. He had no legislative authority but in concurrence with the assembled people; and condemnation, and the decision of all more important causes, rested with popular tribunals; in which, as among our forefathers, in what thence bears yet the title of King's Bench, the king presided in person, but the court gave judgment. Even in military jurisdiction his authority continued to be limited, even to the latest times of the monarchy.² Thus far our information is positive and clear. What we want farther to know is, what was the composition of the Macedonian people; whether there was any distinction between one part and another in the enjoyment of rights and participation of power; and, what is not a little important in the estimate of any constitution of those times, what proportion the number of those who had civil rights bore to that of those who had none, or next to none, the slaves. The silence however of authors concerning these matters, especially in accounts of civil wars in Macedonia, indicates that the Macedonian government was little disturbed with those pretensions to oligarchal privilege on

² "De capitalibus rebus, vetusto Macedonum modo, inquirebat exercitus: in pace erat vulgi. Nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas." Q. Curt. l. 6. c. 8. s. 25. 'Εξ "Αρχους εις Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδὲ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλυσαν. Arr. de Exp. Alex. l. 4. p. 86. D. A very remarkable instance of the restriction upon the military jurisdiction of the Macedonian kings is related by Polybius, l. 5. p. 375. ed. Casaub.

one side, and to democratical despotism on the other, of which we have been observing the evils among the republics; in some of which, as Lacedæmon and some of the Thessalian cities, honour and office were arrogated exclusively to a few families; in others, as Athens and Argos, the poor oppressed the wealthy: and in all a division of interests subsisted, frequently interrupting the public peace, and always threatening the public safety. How the gradation of rank, necessary in numerous societies, was arranged, we are not informed; but equal law for all freemen appears to have been, as in our common law, our Anglosaxon constitution, the first principle of the Macedonian government³; whence it has been observed that the Macedonians were freer in their kingdom than the Greeks in their republics.⁴ Time, then, not merely a destroyer but often an improver of human institutions, brought them an advantage which seems hardly yet in Homer's age to have gained steady footing anywhere. Popular attachment to the constitution and to the reigning family, the firmest support of political arrangement, the most discouraging check to adventure in revolution, was established among the Macedonians. The rules of succession to the throne indeed unfortunately remained so far defective, as in England before the wars of the Roses, that within the reigning family competition would often arise, and produce civil war. Yet civil war, calamitous everywhere and always, appears to have been of a less atrocious temper among the Macedonians in the struggle for a crown, than among the republican Greeks in the contest for demo-

³ Ælc man rȳ Folcpr̥hter rȳpð, ȝe earne ȝe eaðig. This has been noticed in note 6 of the first section of the fourth chapter of this history.

⁴ By the authors of *Ancient Universal History*, v. 8. p. 398., quoting Arrian, l. 4. and Curtius, l. 6. I think the observation just, but not exactly Arrian's, who, though superior to most of the Grecian writers under the Roman empire, was not entirely free from their common prejudice in favour of that licentiousness of the republics, whence there was more power to do ill than security in doing well.

cratical, oligarchal, or tyrannical sway. Half a people banished or massacred are circumstances at least not reported in Macedonian as in republican Greek history. Against the constitution, and against the rights of the royal family, as the key-stone of the constitution, the salutary prejudices of the people, the growth of ages, would allow no competition.

Nor was this steadier form of free government the only advantage of the Macedonians over their southern neighbours. In extent of territory the Macedonian kingdom far exceeded any of the republican states, and it exceeded most of them in proportionable extent of level country and valuable soil. Its frontier indeed, except where verging toward the sea, was of lofty and rugged mountains, but the interior was mostly champaign. As then the natural division of Greece by highlands and gulfs into small portions of difficult access had contributed much to its political division into very small states, so the freedom from such hindrance of communication in Macedonia had produced, and gave facility for maintaining, the union of such an extent of fruitful territory under one government.

These advantages however were not unattended with balancing evils. The Macedonians were unfortunate in their continental situation, nearly surrounded by powerful hordes of the fiercest and most incorrigible barbarians. If actual warfare was sometimes intermitted, yet the danger of it was unceasing. Nearly excluded then from the sea, their communication with the more polished parts of the world was limited and precarious. Nevertheless the Macedonians appear to have been not ruder than many of the republican Greeks, the Dorians, the Locrians, perhaps the Arcadians; and no account shows them so barbarous as Thucydides has described the Ætolians. Under the first Amyntas, when Darius invaded Europe, the Macedonian

kingdom, though unable to withstand the vast force of the Persian empire, appears to have attracted consideration from the Persian commanders as a civilised country of some importance among the powers of the age; and this was increased under his son, the first Alexander, after the great defeat of the Persian army near Plataea. In the Peloponnesian war, the second Perdiccas, son of Alexander, seems to have maintained its former consequence. Afterward, in the heat of party contest among the republics, the foul language of democratical debate would sometimes stigmatise the Macedonians with the name of barbarians. But this is not found from any others. Among the Greek historians their Grecian blood has been universally acknowledged. Their speech was certainly Grecian, their manners were Grecian, their religion was Grecian; with differences, as far as they are reported to us, not greater than existed among the different republics.⁵

Ch. 15. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Herod. l. 5, 6,
& 7.

But a practice, apparently originating in the purpose of obviating an immediate difficulty, contributed much to disturb and weaken the Macedonian kingdom. It was usual to provide for the younger sons of the reigning family by committing frontier provinces to their government; where their situation resembled that of the lords marchers of the feudal times in western Europe. The revenue of the province supported the dignity of the honourable but troublesome and dangerous office. The employment was worthy of the high rank of those employed, and suited the temper of a martial age. Nor was it probably without its advan-

⁵ We find Isocrates putting the Macedonian name in marked opposition to the barbarian, and the title of king of Macedonia in equally marked opposition to the titles of tyrant and despot: *Ἀμύντα τῷ Μακεδόναν βασιλῆϊ, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ Σικελίας τυράννῳ, καὶ τῷ βασιβασιλεὺς τῆς Ἀσίας κρατοῦντι*. Panegy. p. 250. t. 1. ed. Auger. And this was when the king of Macedonia was allied with the enemies of Athens to oppose purposes which the orator desired to promote.

tages to the state ; the frontier territory being so defended, the interior rested in peace. But, in progress of ages, the multiplication of these appanages, which seem to have been generally hereditary, might reduce the kingdom to weakness and insignificancy ; so that it would be no longer able either to resist foreign enemies or control its own vassals. Accordingly we find from this source jarring interests arising, which not only produced troubles within the kingdom, but

Ch. 15. s. 2.
of this Hist.

afforded opportunity and even invitation for the interference of foreign powers. We have seen one of the subordinate princes, Amyntas son of Philip, becoming an instrument in the hands of the great monarch of Thrace, Sitalces, for overthrowing the supreme government of Macedonia ; and we have seen the leading Grecian republics, Athens and Lacedæmon, by turns forming connection with those princes for nearly the same purpose. It seems therefore to have been a wise policy of Perdiccas son of Alexander, after having baffled the violence of the Thracian monarch, to re-unite those severed principalities with the kingdom, or bring them under a just subordination. In the prosecution of this reasonable purpose he is said indeed not to have been duly scrupulous of foul means.

The measures by which he acquired the territory which had been the appanage of his brother Alcetas, if we should

Plat. Gorgias.

believe the story told by Plato, were highly nefarious. But in Plato's time, books being rare, and authentic history little extensively known, if a statement of facts was wanted for illustration of moral or political argument among philosophers, any report was taken, and whether considered as true or supposed, it equally served the purpose. It is therefore necessary to be careful of assuming reports, so stated, as intended by the authors themselves to be taken for historical truths. The character of Perdiccas however, as represented by Thucydides, is not

pure. But reasonable in his thwarted purpose of re-uniting the severed principalities by the ready interference, sometimes of Lacedæmon, sometimes of Athens, sometimes of Thrace, his success appears to have been incomplete. Nevertheless his administration was evidently altogether able; and though of various fortune as of doubtful character, yet, at his death, which happened about the time of the defeat and destruction of the Athenian fleet and army under Nicias and Demosthenes in Sicily, he seems to have left his kingdom altogether improved to his son Archelaus.

B. C. 414. (6)
Ol. 91. 3.
[B. C. 413.
Cl.*]

It appears very uncertain what credit, or whether any, may be due to report, which apparently had currency many years after in Athens, of the illegitimacy of this prince's birth, and of the crimes by which he acquired or secured the throne. Thucydides, his contemporary, likely beyond others among the Greeks to know Macedonia, calls him son of Perdiccas without mentioning illegitimacy, and speaks of him as the immediate successor, without any intimation of interfering pretensions. In a short summary then of his actions he ranks him effectually with the most illustrious princes. Archelaus son of Perdiccas, he says, raised most of the present fortifications of the kingdom: he formed straight roads, and he improved the military establishment, providing horses, heavy-armour, and whatever else military use might require, more than all the eight kings his predecessors.⁷

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 100.

⁶ The authority on which this date is assigned for the accession of Archelaus will be mentioned in a following note.

[* "Perdiccas king of Macedon was still living as late as the end of summer B. C. 414. Thucyd. vii. 9. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ φέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίῳ, στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας, κ. τ. λ. The accession therefore of Archelaus could hardly be in this year, but at the soonest perhaps in the beginning of B. C. 413." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 74. See Mr. Mitford's note, and the additions to it, below, p. 243.]

⁷ In Plato's dialogue, entitled Gorgias, one of the interlocutors mentions Archelaus king of Macedonia as the illegitimate son of Perdiccas, and as having

In the actual circumstances of Macedonia an improved military was perhaps the first thing necessary toward all other improvement. The Macedonians, like the republican Greeks, were all soldiers; for so the ever-threatening pressure of hostilities around required: but they did not live, like the republicans, especially the democratical republicans, crowded in towns, leaving the country to their predial slaves. Confident in unanimity, all ranks having an interest in the maintenance of the constitution as well as in the defence of the country, they resided on their estates; and, having little commerce, their towns were small and mostly unfortified. But the irruption of the overbearing force under Sitalces during the reign of Perdiccas had made them feel their error, or rather the misfortune of their continental situation. Unable either to withstand his numbers in the field or to defend their unwalled towns, they had been compelled, as we have seen, to abandon their less moveable property, and seek shelter in their woods and marshes.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The measures of Archelaus, possibly not unproductive of following evil, seem to have been at the time in extraordinary amount effectual for their important object, the security and quiet of the country. In a turbulent age he found means to obviate war so as to maintain peace with dignity. With the Athenian democracy indeed, the common

acquired the crown by the murder of the proper heir, the legitimate son of their common father. Athenæus has considered this as scandal, to which he says Plato was addicted. It is however likely enough that a story of this kind was current in Athens, and Plato appears to have introduced it in his dialogue merely for illustration of moral argument by supposed facts, which, whether true or feigned, would equally answer the purpose of illustration. What credit therefore Plato himself gave to the story, which has a mixture of the ridiculous with the shocking, does not appear; but, on the other hand, in the same dialogue, it is clearly indicated that Archelaus left behind him the reputation of a powerful, fortunate, rich, and liberal prince.

disturber of states, as it is called by the great Athenian historian, he could not avoid hostilities. The Athenians excited the people of Pydna, a Macedonian seaport, to rebellion, and supported them in it. Archelaus did not then hesitate to use the force he had prepared, and he was successful: he vindicated his kingdom's rights, and he seems to have prosecuted the purpose of arms no farther.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 70.

B. C. 410.
Ol. 92. 3.
Diod. 1. 13.
c. 49.

The policy then, by which he proposed to secure to Macedonia the valuable possession of an only seaport, will deserve notice. Occasion has occurred formerly to observe how very commonly, in early times, the dangers of maritime situation drove habitation to some distance from the seashore. But spots, which the peaceful tillers of the soil would avoid, sea-faring adventurers would often in preference covet. Hence the Macedonian and Thracian shores became occupied by Grecian colonies; established, perhaps many, with little violence, and some, though not quite in the spirit of Penn's settlement in America, yet possibly without any violence. Peninsulas especially, hazardous possessions for the husbandmen, unless protected by a government possessing a powerful navy, were peculiarly convenient for men addicted to commerce or piracy. Thus the Thracian Chersonese and the Chalcidic peninsulas became early Grecian land. The settlers who emigrated with Perdiccas from Argos to Macedonia would probably carry with them some sea-faring disposition, which would however be likely to be lost among their progeny, led by the circumstances of their new country to establish themselves within land. So late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian war such was the superfluity of fruitful soil within the Macedonian dominion that the prince then reigning, Perdiccas son of Alexander, could furnish settlements for the whole population of several Grecian towns of

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

the Chalcidic peninsulas, emigrating at once to avoid the oppression of the imperial democracy of Athens. The Macedonians therefore, invited by the ample opportunities and better security of inland situation, appear to have neglected the coast and become almost entirely a nation of husbandmen and hunters. The widely differing pursuits and mode of life then of the inlanders and the coastmen led to a difference in habits, in character, and in personal interests, which produced a disposition to separation and even opposition in political concerns. The inlanders lived scattered in villages, subsisting from the produce of their fields, warmly attached to their homes, to their country, to its constitution of government, which ensured their private property and their public strength, and for the sake of these, if for nothing else, to one another. The coasters, on the contrary, traders and navigators, assembled in towns, anxious for fortifications that might afford security for collected stores, careless otherwise of territory, even for subsistence looking to commerce or piracy, averse to connection with any controlling government, ready for communication with all the world, were little attached to any country.

Such a people, so differing from the rest of the Macedonians, the Pydnæans appear to have been. When therefore, after their rebellion, Archelaus had reduced them to submission, he was aware of the difficulty of assuring their loyalty to the Macedonian government. The policy of the Athenian republic, to obviate revolt, often denied its subject towns the fortifications requisite for defence against the ordinary dangers of maritime or any liminary situation. The resource of Archelaus, violent it might appear now, but for his age mild and liberal, was to remove the town to the distance of two miles from the shore. There it might be controlled in rebellious purposes by loyal armies, and not readily assisted by foreign fleets. Its conveniences for trade would

be somewhat lessened ; but they might still at least equal those of Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, and most of the old maritime towns of Greece, placed, originally for security, at a greater distance from the shore, and yet finding means to flourish by commerce.⁸

But with talents for war, and a mind capable of the necessary exertion, the delight of Archelaus, fortunately for his people, was in the arts of peace. He had the just discernment to be aware that his kingdom wanted internal improvement far more than increase of territory. Nor is it little that is implied in the contemporary historian's concise information, "that he formed straight roads."

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 100.

Till assured of ability to defy invasion through a military force prepared with attachment to the government and country as well as with discipline, no prudent ruler of a country, situated like Macedonia, would make roads. But security being provided and roads formed, improvements in agriculture, in commerce, in civilisation, in provincial administration, and in the general comforts of the people, would readily follow. Silent however about these, ancient writers have nevertheless reported what yet largely implies them. Archelaus was sedulous to dispel ignorance and rudeness, and promote science and the fine arts among his people. He was the greatest patron in his age of the learned and inge-

⁸ The urgency, formerly, to avoid maritime situation on account of piracy, is strongly marked even in the circumstances of the English shores. All the existing towns on the coasts of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight are, comparatively, of recent origin. Not one contains the mother-church, or gives name to the parish. Portsmouth is in the parish of Kingston in the middle of Portsea island, where remains the church deserted by its town. With circumstances nearly similar Gosport is the parish of Alverstoke, Lymington of Boldre, Yarmouth of Freshwater, Newtown of Calborn, and Cowes of Northwood, or rather of Carisbrook, the mother-church of Northwood. The Cinque Ports may seem some exception: their maritime strength indeed would assist for their security ; but old Winchelsea alone of them seems to have trusted in its strength of hands: Hastings and Dover depended on the protection of their castles. At Plymouth the very superior situation of the present Docktown, now called Devonport, and the harbour of the Tamar, were neglected for the sake of better safety some way up the narrower water of the Plym.

nious, whom he invited from all parts of Greece. It cannot but be creditable to him to have invited Socrates, though the philosopher's refusal, recorded by Aristotle, Arist. Rhet. l. 2. c. 23. has been taken by declamatory writers under the Roman empire as ground of sarcasm against him. The invitation however which Socrates, for the sake of his fellow-citizens, whose instruction he had undertaken as a sacred duty, not without foresight of their ingratitude, refused, Euripides, the friend whom he has said most to have esteemed, thought not unfit to accept. Euripides lived long at the Macedonian court; which, by the assemblage of talents there, as well as by the security enjoyed under a well-administered free government, seems to have been the most desirable residence, for men of leisure, anywhere to be found in that age.

In the great deficiency of history concerning this interesting reign Ælian's anecdotes will have value; and the more, because his purpose has not been the eulogy which they effec-

Ælian. var. hist. l. 14. c. 17.

tually involve. He informs us that the celebrated painter Zeuxis was among the artists entertained

at the Macedonian court; and that his works, adorning the royal residence, formed an inducement contributing not a little to occasion a great resort of strangers, in the reign of Archelaus, to the capital of Macedonia. It appears to have been in the same spirit with which he entertained Euripides and Zeuxis in his court that Archelaus instituted games in

Diod. l. 17. c. 16.

imitation of southern Greece; the Pythian rather than the Olympian, but apparently an improve-

ment on both. Dedicating them to the Muses, he chose for their celebration the town of Dium in Pieria, that province of Macedonia to which the old Grecian mythology assigned the birth and principal residence of the Muses. These games were called Olympian; perhaps from the neighbouring mountains of Olympus, held equally the seat of the Muses

and of Jupiter. The administration must have been able that, in such a kingdom as Macedonia, could provide funds for all that Archelaus, within a short reign, accomplished; fortifying towns; greatly improving the military; repelling, when occasion required, but mostly deterring hostilities, and thus maintaining peace with advantage and dignity; forming roads; promoting literature, science, and arts; and all so as to give eminence and celebrity to Macedonia, among the Greeks of the time of Thucydides and Socrates.

But, endowed as he was with great and valuable qualities, Archelaus remains accused, on high authority, of giving way to strong and vicious passions, which brought him to an untimely end. Report indeed was transmitted, which Diodorus adopted, that he died of a wound accidentally received in hunting. But Aristotle, to whom the best opportunities which the next generation could furnish must have been open, speaks of a conspiracy as undoubted, though the occasion and manner were so variously related, as usual of that dark kind of transaction, that he was unable to fix his belief of them. All that remains ascertained is that Archelaus, after a short but most beneficial reign, was cut off in the vigour of his age by a violent death.

Aristot. Polit.
l. 5. c. 10.

Diod. l. 1.
c. 37.

B. C. 400.(9)
Ol. 95. 1.
[B.C. 399.*
Cl.]

⁹ Our copies of Diodorus, as it has been well observed by the critics, are evidently corrupted in regard to the number of years, only seven, assigned to the reign of Archelaus; for the historian mentions Archelaus as king when engaged in war with the Pydnæans supported by the Athenians, in the tenth year before that of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, to which he ascribes his death. Prideaux and Dodwell have agreed in fixing upon the term of fourteen years as probably about the extent of the reign; and Wesseling assents to this conjecture, which, unable to mend, I have adopted.

[* "*Archelaus*, the ninth in descent from Perdiccas I., began to reign in the archonship of Pisander, the beginning of B. C. 413. He reigned 14 years: *μετὰ Περδίκκαν Ἀρχέλαος ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν ἔτη ιδ΄. πρὸς ὃν καὶ Εὐριπίδης τραγωδιοποιὸς παραγεννηθεὶς πάντα τὸν χρόνον διῆξεν τιμώμενος παρ' αὐτῷ.* Dexip. ap. Syncell. p. 263. A. Archelaus therefore was assassinated B. C. 399, in the archonship of Laches; where Diodorus (xiv. 35. 37.) rightly places his death, although there is an error in the number of the years assigned to him: *Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἦρχεν Λάχης — κατὰ τὴν Μακεδονίαν Ἀρχέλαος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν τίνι*

SECTION II.

Disputed Succession and Civil War. — Acquisition of the Throne by Amyntas Son of Philip. — Bardylis Prince of Illyria. — Hereditary Interest of the Macedonian Royal Family in Thessaly. — Revival of the Olynthian Confederacy. — Ancient Connection of Macedonia with Athens revived and improved. — Grecian Princes of Lyncestis.

THE Macedonian kingdom, under the administration of four successive able princes, had acquired a consistency, and under the last of them, with great increase of internal strength, a polish that might have given it splendour in the leading situation to which it was rising in the civilised world. Archelaus seems to have prepared it for producing its own historians when his death gave occasion for troubles and confusion in which all history of the country was nearly overwhelmed, his own reputation, and even his birth thrown into doubt and obscurity, and the succession itself of princes after him, when the restored and increased splendour of the monarchy excited new curiosity about it, no longer to be exactly ascertained.

Orestes, son of Archelaus, was an infant when his father perished. The confusion on the occasion was however not such as immediately to disturb the succession. But while

Aristot. &
Diod. ut ant.

Aeropus, one of the royal family, claimed the regency, Craterus, favourite of the late king, and

Plat. Alcib. 2.
p. 141. t. 2.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 37.

author, whether by design or accident, of his death, assumed it. Within four days Craterus was killed, and the unfortunate boy Orestes did not long survive.

Aeropus, by report accused of his murder, as-

κυνηγίῳ πληγῆς ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ Κρατεροῦ τοῦ ἐρωμένου τὸν βίον μετέλλαξε, βασιλεύσας ἑτὴ ἑπτὰ. The error of *seven* years is sufficiently refuted by Diodorus himself, (xiii. 43. 49.) who mentions Archelaus as king ten years before, in the year of Glaucippus B. C. 410-09. The Parian marble, as is well known, has committed an opposite error, placing the accession of Archelaus in B. C. 420, seven years too high." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 223.]

cended the throne, but little to enjoy it. During four years who really held the sovereignty remains unascertained; and indeed it seems probable that the country was rather divided between several competitors than entirely governed during any part of that time by any one prince. In the fifth year Pausanias, of another branch of the royal family, had so far overborne the rest as to be generally acknowledged sovereign.¹⁰

B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. 2.

During these troubles of the Macedonian kingdom the Upper Macedonian principalities, under the government of Derdas and Amyntas, though probably in some degree affected, seem to have been preserved from any violent convulsion. Amyntas, after having been dispossessed by the king Perdiccas his uncle, had, under the patronage of Sitalces king of Thrace, not only recovered his principality, but contended with his uncle for the kingdom. With fairer pretensions now he asserted his claim against Pausanias. That prince, after a precarious reign of scarcely a year, was assassinated. Report of the party adverse to Amyntas would of course impute to him participation in the crime.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 89.

¹⁰ The curious reader may find in Wesseling's Diodorus two good notes, and in Bayle, art. Archelaus, a third, on the uncertainties of this part of Macedonian history.

["After the assassin Craterus was removed, *Orestes*, son of Archelaus, was made king under the guardianship of *Aeropus*: τὴν ἀρχὴν διεδέξατο Ὀρέστης παῖς ὢν, ὃν ἀνελὼν Ἀέροπος ἐπίτροπος ὢν κατέσχε τὴν βασιλείαν ἔτη ἕξ. Diod. xiv. 37. Ἀρχελάου δὲ ἀναίεσθέντος, διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν Ὀρέστης υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἔτη δ'. ὃν ἀνέϊλεν Ἀεροπῶς ἐπίτροπος, καὶ ἐβασίλευσε μετ' αὐτὸν ἔτη δ'. Dexipp. ap. Syncel. p. 263. A. Diodorus, xiv. 84. — περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον [in the year of Diophantus, B. C. 395-4] Ἀέροπος ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐτελεύτησε νόσῳ, βασιλεύσας ἔτη ἕξ. Aeropus reigned four years of this period jointly with Orestes, and the remainder alone. Diodorus ascribes the whole period to Aeropus; Dexippus specifies the distinct portions of each. But the two reigns were not *eight* years collectively, because Pausanias succeeded in the sixth year from the death of Archelaus. We may therefore assign, with Dexippus, *four* years to Orestes the minor and *two* to the sole reign of Aeropus. But the six years were not complete; for between Laches, in whose year Archelaus died, and Diophantus, in whose year Pausanias succeeded, are only four archons." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 224.]

All that seems ascertained is, that in consequence of that crime he became king of Macedonia; and for the connection of Macedonian with republican Greek history it may be convenient to observe that it was nearly about the time of the successes of Agesilaus king of Lacedæmon in Asia.

Would Amyntas have been contented to have held his mountain-principality in secure peace, it was probably little in his power; and yet the change to the more splendid situation at the head of the Macedonian kingdom was only

Diod. l. 14.
c. 92.

from smaller to greater troubles. Pretenders to the crown remained, holding, in parts of the

country, considerable interest among the people. None indeed was able by himself to assert his own cause, but there were neighbouring powers whose ambition or rapacity were ready to profit from the distractions of Macedonia. On its western border the Illyrians, in manners and character much resembling the Thracians, though apparently of different race and language, had been brought more than formerly to union under one dominion by the power and

Cic. de off.
l. 2.

popularity of a chief named Bardylis. Venerated for his courage, activity, and military talents,

Bardylis is said to have extended his power and influence yet more by his discovery of the value of a maxim, before little known among the Illyrians, and not always duly estimated among the Greeks, that honesty is the best policy: he was famous for his equitable division of plunder taken

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 4.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 92.

by his armies of robbers. By his military force and his fair reputation together he had united under his authority all the Illyrian clans, so that

he was become a very formidable potentate. While this new power thus grew on the west of Macedonia, the

Ch. 26. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Olynthian confederacy, of which we have seen formerly the rise and the fall, by its alluring

policy, still more than its military force, pressed the eastern. On that side, the richest of the Macedonian territory, and the readiest for maritime communication, were all its principal towns. Whether the policy of Archelaus, in fortifying these, led to the dismemberment of Macedonia which followed, the defective relics of its history will not enable us to say, farther than that it seems probable. While then Bardylis, avowing himself the protector of Argæus, one of the pretending princes, invaded and ravaged the country on the western side, many principal towns on the eastern renounced their connection with the Macedonian kingdom to become members of the Olynthian confederacy. According to Diodorus indeed, this was not wholly without the consent of Amyntas; who rather chose that his people should owe protection to the Olynthians than become subjects to his rival, or to the Illyrian prince. Unable however, under all the circumstances pressing on him, to maintain himself in Macedonia, he withdrew into Thessaly.

Between the wealthy aristocracy, which mostly governed that fruitful country, and the Macedonian kings, connection old and hereditary has been formerly noticed. One numerous and powerful family, the Alevads, a name said to be derived from a king of the country their reputed ancestor, was bound to the Macedonian royal family through the prejudice of connection by blood, claiming the honour of a common descent from Hercules. The frequent exercise of hospitality, to which the right on both sides was also esteemed hereditary and sacred, upheld this prejudice of kindred, real or imaginary. The Thessalian nobles were frequently entertained at the Macedonian court, not without some claim of right to be entertained there; and they esteemed it equally a duty and a privilege to entertain the Macedonian kings whenever they

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 11.

Diod. 1. 14.
c. 92.

[B. C. 393-2.
Cl.]

Ch. 16. s. 5.]
of this Hist.

Herod. 1. 7.
c. 6.
Diod. 1. 16.

might visit Thessaly. Under these circumstances no struggle of faction in Thessaly could be indifferent to the Macedonian princes, nor any contention for the Macedonian throne to the principal families of Thessaly. Teeming with inconvenience as such connection might be to governments, by their own consistency and the force of the country under them, capable of maintaining complete independency, yet for narrow territories, with defective constitutions, divisions of one people under different governments rather than distinct nations, such might be the need of the advantages that they might overbalance the evil.

Whether Amyntas was considered by the Thessalian nobility as the truer representative of the Macedonian branch of the family of their common great ancestor Hercules, or, in his mountain-principality, he had better cultivated the connection, he found favour among them such as to encourage him to attempt the recovery of his kingdom. Probably he relied also upon assistance from his kinsman Derdas prince of Elymia; a brave and active soldier, always upon friendly

Diod. l. 14.
c. 92. & l. 16.
c. 2.

terms with him. The difficulty seems to have been to obviate opposition from the Illyrian prince;

but his acquiescence was purchased. Argæus then, deserted by the protector to whom he owed his throne, was compelled to fly, and Amyntas became again sovereign of Macedonia.

But the richest and most populous part of his kingdom, the eastern towns and their cultivated territories, far more valuable than many times the extent of ill-inhabited lands of the interior, was yet held by the Olynthian confederacy.

l. 14. c. 92.

He demanded its restitution, the historian says, according to compact. But the Olynthians, already

Ch. 26. s. 2. of
this Hist.

risen to that power which Xenophon has described as alarming to all southern Greece, far

from disposed to restore acquisitions, were bent only upon aggrandisement. Not only refusing therefore to surrender

anything, but prosecuting still zealously their plan of association, and supporting everywhere political intrigue with military force, they gained Pella, the largest town of Macedonia; and Amyntas, as Xenophon intimates, was again in danger of losing his kingdom.

It was an unfortunate combination of circumstances that made the overthrow of the most liberal and advantageous system of republican government hitherto seen in Greece necessary to the preservation of the last relic of the patriarchal constitution, the balanced monarchy of the heroic ages. The Lacedæmonians, for so much Xenophon indicates, would hardly have undertaken the war against Olynthus without assurance of co-operation from the Macedonian princes; and, without that co-operation, would have been little likely to have succeeded in it. The Macedonian forces, joining them, were commanded by the prince of Elymia, Derdas; who, at the head of the cavalry, Ch. 26. s. 4. of this Hist. as formerly has been noticed, did important service. On the ensuing dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy the Macedonian kingdom recovered all its towns. Whether then better to assure the control of the general government of the country over them, or merely for a more advantageous situation, readier for communication with the sea, and through it with all the more polished countries of the age, Amyntas moved the seat of government from Edessa, otherwise called Ægæ, where it Excerpt. ex Strab. p. 330. had subsisted from the foundation of the monarchy, to Pella, which was thenceforward the capital of Macedonia.

It is almost only when, as in the Olynthian war, the affairs of Macedonia and of Olynthus have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics, that we gain any information about them. From the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy therefore, till some time after the battle of Leuctra, which so changed the circumstances of

Greece itself, we have no particulars of their history. But after that battle, Lacedæmon being no longer able to control Olynthus, and Thebes of course disposed to support everywhere a party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest, the Olynthian confederacy was restored, and quickly so prospered as to become again formidable to Macedonia.

Intercourse has been observed formerly, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, between the Macedonian kings and the Athenian commonwealth. The event of the Peloponnesian war, depriving Athens of the dominion both of the Ægean sea and of the towns on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, removed almost all ground for farther political connection between them. But, with the restoration of the Athenian marine by Conon, the pretensions of the Athenian people to their former sovereignty over so many towns around the Ægean, and to hold control over all the commerce of that sea, being revived, Athens and Macedonia became again interested in each other's affairs; and Olynthus, formerly subject to the imperial sway of the Athenian people, and recently threatening the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom, would, in its new independent power, be looked upon with jealousy by both. The peace of Antalcidas however, which soon followed, controlling the Athenian naval empire without establishing the Lacedæmonian, relieved Olynthus from immediate danger, and diffused indeed over all the various members of the Greek nation, severed by seas from those called imperial republics, a more real independency than they had for ages known.

In the denial of dominion, to which the Athenian people were thus obliged to submit, no portion of their former empire seems to have been so much and so constantly regretted as Amphipolis on the Strymon; a conquest, inasmuch as the territory was usurped by force of arms, but otherwise a colony, settled under the protection and at the

expense of the Athenian government. The Lacedæmonians however, after it had yielded to their arms directed by Brasidas, had added to its population a large body of settlers from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa; and the congress of Grecian states held at Lacedæmon, a little before the battle of Leuctra, had confirmed the independency given to it by the treaty of Antalcidas. Athens was a party both to that treaty and to the decrees of the congress. But through the event of the battle of Leuctra, and the consequent depression of Lacedæmon, the comparative importance of the Athenian commonwealth among the Grecian powers was considerably augmented. Another general congress was soon after held at Athens. Representatives of almost all the Grecian states attended, and, among them, a minister from Macedonia, as a Grecian state.¹¹ The professed purpose of this congress, like that of the former, was to obviate the pretensions of any that might aspire to be imperial people and hold command over other Grecian people, such as Lacedæmon and Athens had alternately held; a revival of which both Lacedæmon and Athens now dreaded in Thebes. With this view it was proposed to enforce the strictest execution of the provisions of the treaty of Antalcidas, confirmed by the congress of Lacedæmon, which denied to every Grecian state the sovereignty over any other Grecian state. The Athenian representative asserted the claim of the Athenian people to hold the people of Amphipolis, their colony, as their subjects; he said it was a distinct case, and imputed injustice to the denial of it. On the contrary it was contended that the Amphipolitans, not Athenian colonists only but Lacedæmonian, Grecian people from various parts, had the common right of all Greeks to be free.

Isocr. Or. ad
Philip. t. 1.
p. 316.

Ch. 27. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Æschin. de
legat.

¹¹ Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἰς ἃν τούτων Ἀμύντας, ὁ Φιλίππου πατήρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον, κ. τ. λ. — Æschin. de legat. p. 216. ed. Reiske.

It seems probable that the political connection was already begun, which became afterward close, between Amphipolis and Olynthus, and that the king of Macedonia found reason again to be apprehensive of the growing power of Olynthus. His deputy in the congress Æschin. de
legat. tended strenuously in favour of the Athenian claim; and this was at length allowed by a majority of votes, principally obtained through his arguments and the Macedonian interest. The advantage resulting to Macedonia, not perhaps at the time generally obvious, appears to have been very considerable. The acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian dominion, except as a loss to the Olynthian, could not indeed be desirable for Macedonia. But the Amphipolitans, regardless of the vote of the congress, continued to assert their independency successfully, yet Amyntas gained credit among the Athenian people as a valuable and beneficial ally. Communication with the commanders of the Athenian fleet, generally maintained on some part of the Thracian coast, was of course ready for him; and he formed a particular intimacy with Ibid. that eminent and highly respectable officer Iphicrates. These circumstances would be favourable to the maritime commerce of Macedonia; and the constant hostility of Athens toward Olynthus would make both the arms and the policy of Olynthus less formidable and less troublesome to Macedonia.

The power acquired by that extraordinary man, Jason, tagus of Thessaly, his military force and his avowed ambition, could not but demand the attention of a neighbouring prince, and especially one so connected as Amyntas with the principal Thessalian families. It seems probable that Jason's interest was connected with that of those families. For this great purpose then, the restoration to Thessaly of its ancient superiority among the southern republics, usurped,

as the Thessalians might term it, successively by Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, peace on his northern border would be necessary, and accordingly not only peace but alliance was maintained between Macedonia under Amyntas and Thessaly under Jason.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 57. & 60.

The practice subsisted in Macedonia, which in the times described by Homer prevailed throughout Greece, and, as far as Homer's history extends, through Asia, for princes generally to choose their wives without their own dominions, among the daughters of other princely families. Nor were princely families, boasting high Grecian blood, yet wholly wanting, among whom the Macedonian royal house might choose. Others, beside the Temenidæ of Argos, driven to seek among the northern wilds a repose which the spreading republican system of the southern parts denied, had been fortunate enough to find, how far repose we know not, but honour there. The princes of Lynceus or Lyncestis, a country bordering on Macedonia and Epirus, generally acknowledging some subordination to the Macedonian kings, claimed their origin from the illustrious house of the Bacchiadæ of Corinth.

Ch. 16. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Ch. 4. s. 2.

Ch. 16. s. 4.

Strab. 1. 7.
p. 327.

Of these princes we have seen Arrhibæus oppressed by the late king of Macedonia, Perdiccas, and relieved by the generous policy of the Lacedæmonian general Brasidas. Amyntas, in a milder way, succeeded better in the purpose of strengthening the Macedonian interest in Lyncestis, marrying Eurydice grand-daughter of Arrhibæus by his daughter Irra.

Farther of the reign of Amyntas, said to have been of twenty-four years, we gather only its general reputation of having been wise, vigorous, and beneficial. Dying in advanced age he left, by his queen Eurydice, three sons, Alexander, who succeeded him, scarcely arrived at manhood, and Perdiccas and Philip, still boys.

B. C. 370.
Ol. 102. 3.
[B.C. 370-69.
Cl.]

SECTION III.

Reign of Alexander, Son of Amyntas. — Macedonian Interest in Thessaly maintained. — Accession of Perdiccas, Son of Amyntas. — The Family of Amyntas supported by the Athenian General Iphicrates. — Breach of Alliance with Athens, and Connection with Thebes. — Illyrian Invasion, and Death of Perdiccas.

WHEN the youthful Alexander was called to the Macedonian throne, circumstances, produced by the recent assassination of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, pressed for the attention of the Macedonian government, and especially interested the royal family. In the administration itself perhaps of Jason, but very eminently in the events following his death, was manifested the danger of preponderant standing armies to free governments. Jason had ruled Thessaly with the constitutional title of tagus, and, possibly, for history tells nothing to the contrary, with the constitutional authority. His successors also, even those for whom crimes

Ch. 27. s. 1.
of this Hist.

opened the way, were raised to the same constitutional title and power, as far as history tells, in all constitutional form. Wanting however possibly Jason's inclination, and certainly his talents, to make their administration smooth through popular esteem and respect, they soon recurred to the use of the means of violence which he had left to their hands. The worthy Polydamas of Larissa, whom even as an opponent Jason had always respected, was murdered, with eight of his principal friends: numbers fled; and the tyranny ensuing seems to have been among the most really cruel of the many, among the various states of Greece, execrated by Grecian writers.

But these Thessalian tyrants did not overlook the ordinary and necessary policy of those who affected sovereignty in the Grecian republics; they courted the rabble of the

towns; and their army, which served equally by sea and land, was held at their devotion, through the profits of a general piracy, which they encouraged. The government of Pheræ, and its chiefs, appear then to have resembled those of the northern states of Africa in modern times. The nobility, and in general the landholders, suffered under their administration. These therefore, looking round for succour, applied to their hereditary ally and host the young king of Macedonia.

Alexander was not deaf to the calls of their interest and his own. His measures were so well concerted and so rapid that, though the tagus, apprised of his purpose, was prepared to give battle on the borders, the Macedonian army, evading him, reached Larissa, the principal seat of the friendly party, without opposition. The tagus followed, but found the united strength of his opponents such that, avoiding action, he withdrew again to Pheræ. The king, thus left at leisure to arrange matters with his friends, placed a part of his force in Larissa, and a part in Cranon, and, having fulfilled the purpose of his expedition without bloodshed, he returned into Macedonia. Pretence for invective nevertheless was found by those who were disappointed by his success. They exclaimed against what they termed the garrisoning of the cities; not only as a measure of tyranny, but a direct breach of faith, plighted to the Thessalians for their freedom. Diodorus, from whom alone we have the account, has given credit to the historians of their party. But we have seen enough of Grecian politics to be aware, and the course of events even in the account of Diodorus shows, that another party would not only approve, but earnestly desire the measure, as that without which their liberty, property, and life itself would be utterly insecure.

Meanwhile in Macedonia the good government and tran-

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 61.
B. C. 369. Ol.
102. 4.
[B. C. 369-8.
Cl.]

quillity of a few years, closing a reign, like that of Amyntas, begun in a train of revolutions and bloodshed, had not sufficed for radical correction of the looseness of principle, political and moral, among the Macedonians, which had given occasion to those evils, and which such evils have in themselves a strong tendency to nourish and increase. Two pretenders to the throne, Argæus, who had been competitor with Amyntas, and Pausanias, perhaps son of him by whose death Amyntas had risen, still had each his party

among the Macedonian people. Alexander, soon after his return from Thessaly, was assassinated.

B. C. 369.
Ol. 102. 4.
[B.C. 368-7.*
Cl.]
Diod. l. 15.
c. 71.
Demosth. de
legat. p. 402.
ed. Reiske.

Concerning the conspiracy which produced this catastrophe our only trustworthy information, incidentally given by Demosthenes, amounts to

no more than that a citizen of Pydna was principal in it. That either of the pretending princes was implicated in its guilt is not said, but both were at the time preparing to prosecute their claims to the throne.¹²

Such was the clouded prospect under which the right of Alexander devolved to his next brother, Perdiccas, yet a boy. Pausanias hastened to profit from the confusion likely to prevail among the young prince's friends. Prepared with numerous adherents to his cause among the people, he engaged

Æsch. de legat.
p. 211. t. 5.
Athen. l. 14.
p. 629.
Justin. l. 7. c. 4.
Æsch. de legat.
p. 212.

[* Dexippus (ap. Syncell. p. 263. A.) specifies a year as the duration of the reign of Alexander II.; but Mr. Clinton considers the narrative of Diodorus, as well as Justin's account of his reign, as implying a longer space, nearly two years; his succession taking place B. C. 370-69, and his death 368-7.]

¹² The stories of Justin and Athenæus, dealers in wonderful tales of dark private history, seem unworthy of notice. The account of Diodorus, in the want of better, seems most reasonably to be taken, under correction from what the orators indicate of Macedonian affairs, and especially the scanty but unsuspecting testimony of Demosthenes, reported in the text. ["Mr. Mitford places this fact of the assassination of Alexander by Ptolemy among the stories of Justin and Athenæus which seem unworthy of credit. We have this fact however, that Ptolemy was the murderer, upon the authority, not of Athenæus, but of *Marsyas*, (ap. Athen. xiv. p. 629. d.) almost a contemporary; whose means of information upon Macedonian affairs cannot be disputed." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 226. note r.]

a force of Grecian mercenaries, and, entering Macedonia, he quickly became master of Anthemus, Therma, Strepsa, principal towns, and some others of less importance. The expected confusion among those about the young king followed. Some, who had been supposed loyal, went over to the rising power; the intention of others became suspected, and the few of clear fidelity were at a loss for measures.

In these distressing circumstances, when manly wisdom and courage failed or were unavailing, the queen-mother, Eurydice, resolved to take upon herself to act for her unfortunate family; not by assuming any manly office, though in the foregoing history successful examples of such an undertaking have occurred for notice, but in her proper character, as a woman and a mother. Iphicrates was then commanding an Athenian squadron on the Thracian coast, for the general purpose of maintaining and extending the empire of the Athenian people, but more particularly for restoring their dominion over Amphipolis, still asserting independency. The particular intimacy of the late king Amyntas with that general formed the ground of hope for the distressed queen. She sent her supplication to Iphicrates, who in consequence went to Pella. The interview ensuing, which the decency of ancient manners required to be very public, remains shortly and simply, but interestingly, described by a contemporary Athenian who was afterward ambassador from his commonwealth at the Macedonian court, the orator Æschines. The queen-mother, entering the chamber of audience with both her sons, introduced the young king Perdiccas to the hands of Iphicrates, and placed her younger boy Philip on his knee. Addressing him then, in the manner usual among the Greeks, as a suppliant, "she conjured him, by the ties of that private friendship borne him by the late king Amyntas, who valued him no less," she said, "than as an adopted son, and by the claims of public alliance between the Macedo-

nian kingdom and the Athenian commonwealth, subsisting of old with the forefathers of the children now presented to him, and especially cultivated by their lost father, to take those children under his protection."

The purpose of the queen's pathetic address, favoured as it might be by the generous feelings of the Athenian general, would obviously be favoured also by his consideration of the interest of his commonwealth. In the circumstances and with the views of the Athenian government it remained much an object to hold its interest in Macedonia. With the family of Amyntas the connection was already old: with the opposing families it remained to be formed, and probably they were already engaged with hostile powers, Olynthus, and perhaps Thebes. Accordingly, whether using the force under his command, or only his influence and the terror of the Athenian name, Iphicrates interfered so effectually that Pausanias abandoned his enterprise, and the government of the young king Perdiccas was established over all Macedonia.

But when the authority and wisdom of Iphicrates were withdrawn, troubles, in the existing circumstances of Macedonia too likely to attend the minority of a reigning prince, arose. Female rule, we have seen, was not unknown among the Asian Greeks: the examples of Artemisia and Mania might afford encouragement for the attempt. But the Macedonian sceptre had never been borne by female hands. The direction of the government therefore was committed to a prince of the blood royal, named Ptolemy, and distinguished by the addition of Alorites. Troubles of no small amount followed; but what precisely they were, and whether more arising from the ambition of Ptolemy, or any perverseness of Eurydice, though both are accused, while the pretensions of Pausanias and Argæus, and the hostility of foreign powers, appear to have been concurring causes, trustworthy inform-

ation fails. Still it is only where Macedonian affairs have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics that we find light beaming upon them ; and even that light, given, as through painted glass, by some celebrated writers of the later antiquity, especially Plutarch, with a dazzling splendour of colouring, shows too often but imperfect, incongruous, and distorted forms.¹³

When the Macedonian government, implicated in domestic troubles, could no longer extend its protecting arm to the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, who had resisted the tyranny of the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, that tyranny threatened them again with redoubled violence. Fortunately however about this time a new protecting power appeared on their opposite border, through the rise of Thebes to a leading situation among the Grecian republics. The Theban government, with all the energy of recently acquired power, was willing to interfere as a protectress anywhere, for the sake of advancing that power. Accordingly a strong army marched, as formerly related, under the command of Pelopidas, to sup-

Ch. 27. s. 4.
of this Hist.

¹³ Trogus, or his abbreviator Justin, for historians far over-fond of tragical effect, tell of strange intrigues and horrid dark crimes, in which Eurydice was deeply implicated. But these tales, though such as in the violence of faction among the Greeks appear to have been ordinary, were either unknown to Diodorus and even to Plutarch, or even by them thought unworthy of notice. Diodorus makes Ptolemy Alorites a son of Amyntas, (meaning apparently an illegitimate son,) and the murderer and successor of the eldest legitimate son, Alexander.* But some notice of this crime, had it been real, could hardly have failed among the orators, especially Demosthenes, who, as we have seen, mentions the assassination of Alexander ; and, for the succession of Ptolemy, it is clearly marked by Æschines to have been only to the regency. We find the republican Greek writers frequently careless in applying the titles βασιλεὺς and τύραννος indifferently to kings, or to regents, or to men in commanding situations who were neither kings nor regents. Hence apparently has arisen much of the confusion, found among later ancient writers, concerning the Macedonian succession.

[* It appears from Dexipp. ap. Syncell. p. 263. B, that Ptolemy Alorites was ἀλλότριος τοῦ γένους. That he was the assassin of Alexander, see additional testimony appended to note 12.]

port the Macedonian party against the tagus. Co-operation from the Macedonian government was highly desirable, but the existing alliance of Macedonia with Athens was adverse to a connection with Thebes; for Athens had then lately withdrawn itself from the Theban alliance, and become again the confederate of Lacedæmon in war against Thebes. Such being the obvious difficulty, Pelopidas quitted his army in Thessaly to act as ambassador from his republic at the Macedonian court. In this office his conduct appears to have been able, not less than in his famous embassy to the court of Susa; and the success was answerable. Not indeed that it could be a very hard task to show either the importance to Macedonia of preserving its Thessalian interest, or the impolicy of assisting so ambitious and restless and unscrupulous a government as the Athenian to hold so commanding a place as Amphipolis on the Macedonian frontier. The promised support therefore of the

Æsch. ut ant.

Theban confederacy in opposition to the Athenian pretensions, with perhaps some stipulated means for Macedonia itself to hold a commanding influence in Amphipolis, (for the sequel shows this probable,) induced the regent, Ptolemy, to desert the Athenian alliance and engage in the Theban.

But alliance with a regency, the regency too of an ill-settled kingdom, could not but be precarious; and Pelopidas desired to give permanency to the advantage of the Macedonian connection which he had acquired for his country. It was already becoming a common practice among the Grecian states for youths of wealthy families to go, for the completion of their education, wherever any of those teachers, afterward dignified with the title of philosophers, acquired fame. Athens drew by far the greater number.

*Isocr. de
permut.*

There the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, had placed his sons under the tuition of Isocrates. Thebes,

though no rival to Athens in literary fame, was, for politics and war, the focus of everything greatest in Greece, and at this time it is said to have been also the residence of some eminent philosophers. To Macedonian prejudice it would be moreover a recommendation that Thebes was the birth-place of Hercules, the reputed great progenitor of the Macedonian royal race. Opportunity therefore for the king's younger brother Philip, with some other youths of the principal families, to go under the protection of such a man as Pelopidas to complete their education at Thebes, might be esteemed, by the queen-mother and regency, an advantage highly desirable. It is indeed said they accompanied his return from Pella not voluntarily, but as hostages, for ensuring due attention from the Macedonian court to the imperial will, whether of Pelopidas or of the Theban people. But however this may have been, it seems probable that the Theban general's able negotiation produced effects important and lasting. When, arriving at years of discretion, Perdiccas assumed the government, he followed the line of policy taken by the regent for him in his minority, and persevered in it. He supported the Amphipolitans in their claim of independency; he sustained a war with Athens in their defence; and that he was not unsuccessful in that war is evident from the result; for the Athenians made peace with him, leaving Amphipolis free.¹⁴

Plut. vit.
Pelop.

Æschin. de
legat. p. 213,
214.

¹⁴ Diodorus makes Perdiccas put Ptolemy to death to get possession of the government. But the silence of the contemporary orator concerning such a matter, when relating the succession of Perdiccas and its consequences, and mentioning Ptolemy in the situation of regent, renders this more than questionable; and the refutation is still strengthened by the line of conduct which, as we learn from the orator, the king pursued after he had assumed the government.

It should be observed that the oration, whence all the circumstances mentioned in the text have been gathered, was pronounced by Æschines in defence of himself, when it was most important for him to conciliate the favour of the Athenian people, and avoid whatever might give them the least umbrage.

For the other circumstances of this reign, certainly interesting, we want authority like that of the contemporary orator, which deserts us in the moment when the Macedonian affairs cease to be implicated with those of the leading Gre-

Caryst. ap.
Athen. l. 11.
c. 15, p. 250.
vel 508.

cian republics. According to the shreds of information remaining, while the prince gave his time to science and literature, corresponding with Plato at Athens, and unfortunately misplacing his confidence in an unworthy scholar of that philosopher, the more important concerns of his kingdom, its military force, its foreign affairs, and its civil economy, were misconducted or neglected. Nevertheless, when necessity became pressing, he showed

Hence apparently he claims for them the honour of general success in a war in which they were evidently, upon the whole, unsuccessful, and imputes to their generous confidence in the uprightness of their enemies the disadvantageous terms of the peace. Some partial success of the Athenian forces may have given some ground for his assertion ; but we know that, without ratification from the people, no compact of their generals was allowed to be valid. When therefore a disadvantageous peace was made, it may be apparently concluded with assurance that their success in the war was not great.

The amount of evident romance, extravagant romance, in Plutarch's *Life of Pelopidas*, which has been noticed in a note to the fifth section of the twenty-sixth chapter of this History, makes credit difficult for any part not in some degree confirmed by other writers. The succession of Perdiccas, the regency of Ptolemy, and the opposition of the Macedonian government, under the regency and after it, to the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, are simply authenticated by the contemporary orator *Æschines* ; but for the transactions of Pelopidas in Macedonia, where Plutarch makes him do more with a word than Hercules with his club, and for Philip's journey to Thebes and residence there, we wholly want any comparable testimony. Diodorus is the oldest extant author from whom we have any mention of them. He places the embassy of Pelopidas into Macedonia (and here Plutarch follows him) in the short reign of Alexander. But this, if it was not refuted by the orator's better authority, would ill accord even with his own narrative, compared with his dates. Of Philip's journey to Thebes he has given two irreconcilable accounts ; an inconsistency on which Wesseling has given two good notes, in the second volume of his edition of Diodorus, p. 55. 8. and p. 82. 58.

It is remarkable that Nepos, supposed contemporary with Diodorus, neither in his *Life of Pelopidas*, nor in that of *Epaminondas*, mentions either Philip or Macedonia ; though he speaks of the war of Pelopidas in Thessaly, and of his captivity in one expedition and his death in another. Nevertheless that negotiation from Thebes was carried into Macedonia, and ably and successfully managed there, the account of *Æschines* seems to warrant belief.

no deficiency of spirit. A very inconvenient and disgraceful claim is said to have devolved on him from his father. In the distressing pressures against which Amyntas had had to struggle he had purchased the friendship or forbearance of the Illyrians by payments of money. Whether farther payments were engaged for or no, the Illyrians, whose profession was predatory war, founded on past concessions new demands. These Perdiccas refused: the Illyrians were indignant, and the veteran Bardylis, perhaps otherwise unable to appease his turbulent and greedy people, led them into Macedonia. Perdiccas, taking the command of his forces to repel the invaders, in a battle ensuing was defeated and slain.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 2.

SECTION IV.

Accession of Philip, Son of Amyntas. — Pretenders to the Throne. — War and Negotiations with Illyrians, Pæonians, Thracians, and Athenians. — Renewed Alliance of Macedonia with Athens.

By this disastrous event, in the summer of the third year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn, and the second after the death of Agesilaus, which happened in winter, the Macedonian crown devolved to Philip, only surviving son of Amyntas. According to the account, in itself by far the most probable, and also the best authenticated, Philip was then settled in the government of a frontier province, committed to him by the late

B. C. 360. *
Ol. 105. 1.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 2.

Caryst. ap.
Athen. j. 11.
p. 249. vel
506.

[* According to Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 227., Philip succeeded in the beginning of B. C. 359, at 23 years of age. In p. 278. he notices Mr. Mitford's remarkable inconsistency in giving the right date of the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 362, in Vol. VI. pp. 295. 361, yet here dating the accession of Philip B. C. 360, "in the summer of the *third* year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn;" and again, in p. 297. of this vol., assigning this battle to B. C. 363.]

king his brother as an appanage, according to the ancient manner of providing for the younger branches of the Macedonian royal family; the recommendation of Plato, it is said, who had conceived a high opinion of the young prince, and held great sway with Perdiccas, having overborne the obvious objections to such dismemberment of the kingdom. Here Philip had been diligent in training the military strength of the country in a system of tactics, improved upon the best practice which he had had opportunity to learn in Greece; and, from the advantage with which he was thus prepared for meeting the various dangers pressing upon him on succeeding to the throne, it became a favourite observation, among the schools of philosophy, that he owed his kingdom to Plato.

Nevertheless the circumstances around him were highly Diod. 1. 16.
c. 2. perilous. More than four thousand Macedonians are said to have fallen with their king in the battle, and the victorious Illyrians were pursuing measures to profit from their success by extensive plunder. Excited by the desire of sharing in advantages thus opened, the Pæonians descended from their mountains upon another part of Macedonia. The unfortunate people knew not which way to turn to defend, if they might be at all able to defend, their property. Thus hope arose for the former rivals of the family of Amyntas, and they proceeded to put forward their pretensions. Pausanias, supported by the great sovereign of the Thracian hordes, Cotys, successor of Sitalces and Teres, prepared to invade the eastern border. Argæus had already a party, not inconsiderable, in some principal towns; and the Athenian government, resenting the conduct of the late king Perdiccas in joining the Theban confederacy and opposing the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, sent a fleet with a land force of three thousand men, under Mantias, to support him.

Fortunately the young king, who had to defend his own claim, and the welfare of that large majority of the Macedonian people which had a common interest with him, against so many formidable enemies, was in no ordinary amount qualified for the arduous undertaking.

Blessed by nature with very superior powers of mind, and, in a degree scarcely less uncommon, with that grace of person which gives to mental powers their best advantage in communication among mankind, these natural excellencies had been improved by a very advantageous education. How far this was gained at Thebes, whether at all at Athens, and how far at Pella, among the learned Greeks, especially of Plato's school, whom Perdiccas had entertained there, all information is very doubtful; but that the opportunities must have been very advantageous, the result, of which we have full assurance, amply shows. Even among the Athenians Philip's eloquence was allowed to be, not only of the readiest, but of the most correct, and his manners were universally admired as singularly polished and engaging.¹⁵

Æsch. de
legat.

Ibid.

¹⁵ Considering the confidence with which the residence of Philip at Thebes is mentioned by Diodorus as well as by Plutarch and other later writers, it appears extraordinary that, in all the various mention of him in the yet extant writings of contemporaries, Æschines, Demosthenes, and Isocrates, not a syllable should be found indicating their knowledge that he had ever been, in his youth, at Thebes, or elsewhere among the Grecian republics. In the third of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip is a phrase which Auger has translated as if the rhetorician meant to say he had never seen Philip; but the phrase is far from necessarily meaning so much: Οὐ γὰρ συγγενῆσθαί σοι πρότερον. It relates to seeing him within a particular time, when a particular purpose might have been answered by it, and may be paraphrased: "I had never seen you between the time when you might first have projected war against Persia, and the time when I first wrote to recommend it to you." Any personal acquaintance of Philip with Isocrates however is thus left uncertain; but that the prince's education, whether at Thebes, at Athens, or wherever else, was completely Grecian, and excellent, is unquestionable. We find Æschines reproaching Demosthenes for low illiberality in joking on Macedonian phrases which Alexander, a boy when Demosthenes was at the Macedonian court, would be likely occasionally to use; but no opportunity was found for any such joke against Philip: his speech was the best Grecian.

These qualifications, advantageous for all men everywhere, were peculiarly so for a prince in Philip's circumstances, and in a country where the powers of government were distributed among all ranks. His hope rested wholly on the energies of his own mind, and the attachment of his Diod. 1. 16.
c. 3. people to him; for he had no allies. He held frequent assemblies of the Macedonian people: how formed, and whether general meetings, or several assemblies in the several cities, information fails. The fact however, such as it is stated, and the phrase used by the historian, the same by which the general assemblies of the Grecian democracies are found described¹⁶, mark the freedom of the Macedonian constitution. In the assemblies his eloquence obviated despondency and infused animation; and wherever he went the manly confidence he expressed in his addresses to the people encouraged those attached to his cause, alarmed those disposed to any adverse party, and won the indifferent. In his free and extensive communication with individuals the readiest affability, dignified by justness of manner and obvious superiority of talent, ingratiated him with all. Sedulously then he applied himself to spread among the Macedonians generally that improved discipline which he had already established among the people of his little principality; and hence is said to have originated the fame of the Macedonian phalanx. Nevertheless, on a comparison of his own yet ill-prepared means with the combined power of his numerous adversaries, aware of inadequacy for contest with all together, he resolved, with ready decision, whither to direct the energy of his arms, and whither the policy which might obviate the want of them.

In the course of Grecian history occasion has frequently

¹⁶ Ἐκκλησία.

occurred to see how rarely the maintenance of conquest, or any use of a conquered country, was the purpose of ancient warfare. The Illyrians appear to have thought of no profit from their great victory but plunder, with the means to bear it off unmolested, for enjoyment in their own country. If their view went farther, it was only to new and extended plunder, or, in their utmost refinement of policy, to being paid for abstaining from plunder. Those rude conquerors therefore being gone, the Pæonians, who remained within the country, required Philip's first attention. He threatened at the same time and negotiated; and, by many fair words, with, it was said, though such assertions must commonly rest on suspicion, a dextrous distribution of money among their chiefs, without the shame of a public payment, he prevailed upon them to return quietly home. Negotiation, upon the same principle, would be the easier with the rude monarch of the Thracian hordes, because among them, we are told, it was held, nearly as among the Turks at this day, not less honourable for princes and great men to receive presents than, among other nations, to make them. A suspension, at least, of the measures of Cotys in favour of Pausanias was procured; and thus Philip was enabled to direct his military force entire against Argæus and the Athenians, by whom alone he remained immediately threatened.

Herod. 1. 5.
c. 6.
Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 97.

But the power and the opportunities of these remaining enemies were formidable. Methone, a Grecian colony on the coast of the Macedonian province of Pieria, the key, on the seaside, to the richest part of the kingdom, the nearest seaport both to Pella, the new, and Edessa, the ancient, capital, at this time acknowledged the empire of the Athenian people. There the Athenian fleet under Mantias landed three thousand men, whom Argæus joined with the troops he had collected. In Edessa itself a party favoured the

cause of Argæus; and, encouraged by the powerful support of the Athenian republic, its leaders sent him assurance that, would he only show himself before the walls, the gates would be opened to him. Under this invitation Argæus and his allies marched to Edessa, the distance about thirty miles; not without prospect that, by the acquisition of so important a place, Pella itself, lying between Edessa and Methone, might be brought under his obedience, and that the submission of the rest of the kingdom must follow.

But Philip's friends in Edessa, holding still the powers of government, used them watchfully and ably in his cause and their own. When Argæus appeared before the walls his partisans feared to stir, and nothing was indicated but readiness for vigorous resistance. Disappointed thus of promised co-operation, it became his care that, instead of making acquisition, he might not incur loss, and he hastened his retreat for Methone. But Philip, prepared to profit from contingencies, attacked him on his march. Argæus fell, and the troops about him fled. The Athenians, with those nearest in the line to them, altogether a considerable body, retreated to advantageous ground, where they repelled assault. Unable however to move, and unable to subsist without moving, pressed at length by evident necessity, they surrendered at discretion.

A victory more complete or more critical was perhaps never won. To use it was the complex and difficult task remaining. The most formidable competitor for the throne was no more, but numerous and powerful enemies remained. To obviate enmity by benefits, so as to make the farther prosecution of the hazardous trial of arms, as far as might be, needless, became Philip's object. To show his disposition, he began with dismissing all his prisoners without ransom. But among his foes were Greeks and barbarians; and, of the former, two powerful states adverse to him,

Athens and Olynthus, were so hostile to each other that peace with both was out of all hope. Could he choose, he could hardly hesitate to prefer the friendship and alliance of Athens, the old ally of his family, and less, through interference of near and deep interests, necessarily an enemy than Olynthus.¹⁷ With youthful warmth then he seems to have proposed to overbear the repugnance of the Athenian people by a liberality approaching extravagance. Having, contrary to all common usage of the times, given unbought liberty to all his prisoners, he distinguished the Athenian with peculiar kindness, inquired after those losses of every individual which are incident to defeat in war and the condition of prisoners, caused restoration to be made or recompence, and provided conveyance for all to Athens. Knowing then that, of all their former empire, the Athenians most coveted the recovery of Amphipolis, he sent immediate orders for a body of troops stationed there, probably from the time of his brother Perdiccas, perhaps of Alexander, to be withdrawn; and, with this preparation, he sent ministers to Athens to propose peace, and, if a favourable disposition should be found, to cement it by alliance.

Demosth. in
Aristocr.

Demosth. ibid.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 3.

This generous policy was not unproductive of its proposed effect. The enfranchised prisoners, arriving at Athens, sounded the praises of the young king's liberality, affability, and magnanimity, which, so to their surprise, and out of all common course, they had experienced. Soon after came the account of the withdrawing of the Macedonian troops from Amphipolis. It was difficult then, for those who had been most forward for the support of Argæus against him,

¹⁷ In the defective accounts remaining of this contest for the Macedonian throne, Olynthus is not mentioned; but, had the actual government of Olynthus not been adverse to Philip, it would have assisted him in opposition to Argæus, whom Athens assisted; and had Olynthus assisted Philip, the notice of it, if falling from historians, would hardly have failed from the orators.

to contend that the interest of the commonwealth required still that opposition to him which was founded on the ground that he was successor to the politics of his brothers, who had connected themselves with the Thebans and supported the rebellious Amphipolitans. Rather, it would be contended, he succeeded to the better politics of his father, who had procured the allowance of the common congress of the Greek nation for the Athenian claim of dominion over Amphipolis, and of so many former kings of Macedonia, allies and friends, bound in hereditary hospitality with the Athenian people. A party nevertheless endeavoured to interpose impediments. The right of sovereignty of the Athenian people over Amphipolis, they said, should be formally acknowledged by the king of Macedonia. But those who obtained the lead were more liberal or more prudent. In return, they said, for conduct very uncommonly generous, to demand of a victorious prince to debase himself in the eyes of all Greece, by a breach of faith toward those whose common right of a Grecian people to freedom had been once declared by the common voice of the nation, and still existed in general opinion, a right of which the Macedonian kings had long been protectors, was not likely to produce cordiality in a restored alliance. A treaty of peace and alliance accordingly was concluded, in which all mention of Amphipolis was avoided.

Matters being thus accommodated with the Athenians, Philip had leisure to direct his measures against those of his remaining enemies whose deficiency of policy lessened the danger of their force. Of these the Illyrians, the least tractable, and altogether the most formidable, were fortunately not disposed for new enterprise while the fruit of their former victory remained to be enjoyed. Meanwhile the circumstances of PÆONIA attracted attention. Accord-

ing to tradition preserved by Hippocrates, the Pæonians were once a more civilised and powerful people than the Macedonians. But this seems to have been in those very early ages, before Homer, when Thrace was held by a people capable of civilising the savages of Greece; when the river Hebrus, the vales of Pieria, and the mountains of Hæmus and Olympus were the favourite haunts of the Muses, while the Castalian fountain and the heights of Parnassus and Helicon were yet less known in song. When Thucydides wrote, part of Pæonia was a province of the Macedonian kingdom, within the bounds of that called the Lower Macedonia. Whether this had been separated, or they were the highland Pæonians who, after the battle in which Perdiccas fell, invaded the plains, we are not informed. It seems however to have been a powerful principality under the dominion of a prince bearing the Grecian name of Agis. This prince dying, Philip suddenly marched into the country. No claim being made of any heir to the principality, as far as extant authors tell, nor any resistance by the people, he quietly annexed the whole to his kingdom.

Hippocr. de
Epidem.

Ch. 1. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

B. C. 359.
Ol. 105. 2.

The succinct and ill-connected narrative of Diodorus, with all the little incidental information dropping from the orators, affords but a glimpse of able and rapid measures, assisted by popularity of manners and growing popularity of name, by which these acquisitions were effected. The very silence however of the orators, especially Demosthenes, enough indicates that, in the opinion of the age at least, nothing in the transactions was uncreditable to the Macedonian prince. It is a misfortune for history to be reduced to conjecture, yet, in the failure of direct testimony, it may behove the historian to offer that for which ground appears. The

tradition then preserved by Hippocrates concerning the Pæonians, and their settlement within the Lower Macedonia, concur with the Grecian name of their prince to imply that they were a people of Grecian blood and language; whether originally, or through some colony, like those which had migrated from Argos into Macedonia, and from Corinth into Lyncestis; and all the circumstances together may perhaps warrant conjecture that the principality was the appanage of a younger branch of the Macedonian royal family, which became extinct with Agis. Thus, on his death, it would be the right and the duty of the Macedonian king to re-unite it with the kingdom; and thus the scheme of policy of the second Perdiccas, perseveringly directed to the acquisition of the severed principalities, would be completed.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 4.

Threatened still by the Illyrians Philip resolved, instead of awaiting inroad, to invade their country.

The veteran Bardylis headed the Illyrian forces to oppose him; and, in a battle which ensued, exerting himself with the spirit of youth, though said to have passed his ninetieth

Lucian. de
Macrob.

year, he fell fighting. Philip's victory was complete; and he so pursued its advantages that,

before the end of the next year, all the Illyrian tribes, so

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.
B. C. 358.
Ol. 105. 3.
[B. C. 359.
Cl.]

formidable to his predecessors, were brought to submit to terms of peace in a great degree dictated by him. The Macedonian kingdom now was extended, if not beyond all ancient claim, yet

far beyond any late possession; and a very advantageous barrier was either acquired or recovered, in the lake Lychinitis, which was to be thenceforward the boundary of the Illyrian lands against the Macedonian.

Called to a throne nearly overwhelmed by two foreign enemies within his country, attacked by a third, threatened by a fourth, and contested by two pretenders, each possess-

ing an interest among the people, this young prince had thus, before the end of the third summer, not only overcome all the more threatening evils by defending his dominion, but, by a considerable extension, had acquired for it new power, and, still more, new security. Uneasy circumstances yet remained for him and for his people; but, to prepare for an account of them it will be necessary to revert to the affairs of the Grecian republics, and especially Athens.¹⁸

¹⁸ Ἀνέκαμψεν (ὁ Φίλιππος) εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν, συντεθήμενος ἑνδοξον εἰρήνην πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς, περιβόητος τε ὑπάρχων παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' ἀνδρείαν πατωθεμένοις. Diod. l. 16. c. 8. Philip's popularity among his own subjects, to which Diodorus here gives testimony, seems never to have been disputed; but, in vindication of the account given of his accession, it may be requisite to say somewhat more than, without inconvenient interruption of the narrative, could be inserted where the matter occurred.

The testimony to Philip's establishment in the government of a Macedonian province, at the time of his brother's death, has been preserved by Athenæus. For its probability only, compared with the commonly received story of his accession by Plutarch, it would deserve high consideration. But, in the opinion of some critics, averse to the contradiction of Plutarch, it has been considerably invalidated by an expression of Athenæus himself: Τοῦτο δ' εἴπερ ἀληθείας ἔχει, θεὸς ἂν εἰδείη. To gather the just meaning of this expression the tenor of the author's discourse must be observed, which relates not to Philip but to Plato, the piece of Macedonian history being introduced but incidentally. (Athen. l. 11. p. 249. vel 506.) The passage runs thus: "Speusippus asserts that Plato, who was most highly esteemed by Perdiccas king of Macedonia," (for certainly we must read Perdiccas instead of the careless transcriber's Ἀρχιλάω,) "was the cause of Philip's acquiring his kingdom. Carystius of Pergamus, in his historical memorials writes thus: 'Speusippus, being informed that Philip had spoken disrespectfully of Plato, wrote in a letter as if it was not generally known that Philip owed his kingdom to Plato. For Plato sent Euphræus of Oreus to Perdiccas,' (Πεδίππας here properly,) 'through whom he persuaded him to allot him a principality to Philip. There established, Philip formed a military force, with which, upon the death of Perdiccas,' (Πεδίππας again justly,) 'he came out prepared for the circumstances.' Whether this was so," says then Athenæus for himself, "God knows." Now it appears to me that Athenæus has not meant this expression to refer at all to the matters in themselves of public notoriety, namely, that Philip, at the time of the death of Perdiccas, held the command of a territory appendant to the Macedonian kingdom, that he had there prepared a well-trained military force, and that, thence issuing, he proceeded to assert his right against his numerous enemies: the doubt expressed by Athenæus, I apprehend, has been intended to relate only to the private history, Plato's interference in favour of Philip, and the effect of such interference; but especially he meant it to relate to the assertion of Speusippus, so flattering to the idle learned,

that Philip actually owed his kingdom to Plato. "Whether this was so," Athenæus might well say, "God knows;" though he considered the rest as undoubted fact, of general notoriety.

It may be farther observed that every circumstance of the account of Carystius carries evident probability. The known favour of Philip afterward to Aristotle assists to warrant the account of Athenæus of the attachment of Perdiccas to Plato and his scholars; surcharged perhaps, but no otherwise improbable. The well-attested accomplishments of Philip make it likely that, whether known from personal communication or otherwise, Plato might think highly of him, and judge him an object for recommendation to the king his brother's favour. Nor is it unlikely that, in maturer years, a preference of Aristotle's different manner of treating philosophical, and especially political subjects, might lead Philip to speak of Plato so far with comparative disrespect as to excite the indignation of Speusippus, a zealous follower of Plato, and induce him to write a letter that might be shown and published, stating the fact of the recommendation of Philip to Perdiccas, and the advantageous consequences; namely, that a principality was given to Philip, which afforded him those opportunities through which he was enabled afterward to vindicate his kingdom.

But instead of eliciting truth out of the varying and contradictory accounts of the later ancient writers, and giving credit only where it may appear most justly due, it has been a prevailing fancy of critics to employ their ingenuity in torturing into accordance those who have themselves evidently had no purpose of accordance, or disposition at all to accord. An instance in Wesseling may the more deserve notice because he is generally acute, and more than most others above prejudice. Nevertheless, in one of his notes, which, in a recent note of my own, I have observed to contain largely just criticism, he has made Diodorus responsible for much more than Diodorus has anywhere said. Diodorus's account of Philip's escape from Thebes really wants no violence to make it accord with the account of his establishment in Macedonia, given in the text from Carystius and Speusippus. "On the death of Perdiccas," he says, "Philip, having escaped from his confinement as a hostage, took upon himself the government of the kingdom. *Τούτου δὲ (Πισδίσκου) πεισόντος—Φίλιππος ὁ ἀδελφὸς, διαδρᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀμηρείας, παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν.*" Diod. 1. 16. c. 2. But Wesseling, apparently holding Plutarch's tale in a respect to which it is not entitled, speaking of Diodorus, says, "Auctor dicit Philippum, *cognitâ fratris cæde*, ex custodiâ Thebanorum elapsum, regni curam in se transtulisse;" thus implying that he did not leave Thebes till informed of his brother's death; which the words of Diodorus, well rendered by Wesseling himself in his Latin text, are far from warranting.

Among extant ancient authors Justin alone tells of an infant son left by Perdiccas, who succeeded him on the throne, and for whom Philip long acted as guardian and regent: *Philippus diu non regem, sed tutorem pupilli, egit*; till at length, *compulsus a populo regnum suscepit*. [l. 7. c. 5.] The Delphin annotator, Cantel, says boldly to this: *Errat Justinus: cum enim hostes imminerent undique, continuo regia dignitas illi delata est*. To judge from Justin, even the great work of Trogus has been a compilation of stories selected for amusement and tragical effect rather than a history, for which political and military transactions were with any care investigated, or with any judgment connected. From Justin we have many horrid tales of the queen Eurydice, wholly unnoticed by earlier writers, and some of them

directly contradicted by the narrative of Diodorus. Were there any truth in them, had they even had any popular credit, some intimation of them from the extant orators would hardly have failed. However then occasion may occur often to mistrust the simplicity of Diodorus, yet Justin can deserve little consideration in the scale against him, and Justin's tale of a son left by Perdiccas, for whom Philip was regent, could hardly be more positively contradicted, by one who could not foresee that it would be told, than it remains from Diodorus. That writer declares his purpose to relate the manner of Philip's accession, thus : *Φίλιππος, ὁ Ἀμύντου υἱός, — παρέλαβε τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας.* Mentioning then briefly his being placed as a hostage, first with the Illyrians, then with the Thebans, and noticing the death of Alexander, of Ptolemy, and of Perdiccas, he proceeds to say, "that, on the death of Perdiccas, having escaped from his confinement as a hostage, Philip took upon himself the administration of the kingdom, then in distressful circumstances. The Macedonians were in the utmost perplexity ; yet, notwithstanding the general consternation and the greatness of the dangers around, Philip was not dismayed, but proceeded immediately to the measures which the crisis required." The whole account implies that the historian understood him to have left Thebes before the death of Perdiccas, and to have been ready in Macedonia for the emergency ; and there is not a hint of his having had, among his numerous difficulties, those of a guardian or regent.

CHAPTER XXXV.

AFFAIRS OF ATHENS FROM THE GENERAL PEACE FOLLOWING THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA, AND OF MACEDONIA FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PHILIP, SON OF AMYNTAS, TO THE RENEWAL OF WAR BETWEEN MACEDONIA AND ATHENS.

SECTION I.

Revived political Eminence of Athens. — Increasing Defect in the restored Constitution. — Uneasy Situation of eminent Men. — Opportunity for political Adventurers. — Unsteadiness of Government. — Decay of Patriotism. — Subserviency of Administration to popular Passion. — Decay of military Virtue. — Tyranny of popular Sovereignty over subject States.

WHEN the Macedonian kingdom, happily rescued from civil strife and foreign war, was placed in circumstances to grow in prosperity and power, the Grecian republics remained in that state of discord and confusion, of mutual animosity or mutual mistrust, of separate weakness and incapacity for union, which we have seen, in the description of Xenophon, following the death of Epaminondas, and which the orators sufficiently assure us did not cease. Demosthenes describes the state of things about the time of Philip's accession in terms very remarkably agreeing with Xenophon's picture: "All Peloponnesus," he says, "was divided. Those who hated the Lacedæmonians were not powerful enough to destroy them, nor were those in the several cities, who had ruled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, able to hold their command.

Ch. 28. s. 8.
of this Hist.

Demosth. de
Cor. p. 231.
ed. Reiske.

Peloponnesus, and, in short, all Greece, was in a state of undecisive contention and trouble." But in the fall of the more powerful the people of the inferior republics found consolation, and even gratification; relieved from dangers, and raised to new importance. For as, in the Grecian system, unavoidably some state must take a commanding part, those which had been secondary rose to the first consideration, and the lower had their proportion of advancement; not in positive improvement, but in a flattering comparison of power and consequence. Hence, among other causes, there remained so extensive an attachment to that system whence unavoidably followed such national discord, with its infallible attendant, national weakness.

We have seen the Athenians, after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, in the conscious feebleness of convalescency, generally submitting their executive government to the direction of able and moderate men. And fortunately, in that period, arose among them men who would have done honour to any government in any age. Thrasybulus, Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, valuable to their country as statesmen, have become conspicuous in history principally through their military achievements. The extraordinary estimation of Niceratus, son of the unfortunate Nicias who perished at Syracuse, a most steady opponent of democratical sway, and yet always highly respected and esteemed by the people, has survived through the contentions of the orators. Isocrates, by his writings, which have fortunately reached us, has transmitted his own fame. Under these men, while Thebes was contending with Lacedæmon for empire by land, the maritime power of Athens so revived that, though the Syracusan navy might be superior in the western seas of Greece, nothing in the eastern could contend with the Athenian. The strength of Lacedæmon then being broken by the arms

and policy of Epaminondas, and the energy of Thebes failing with his death, Athens remained, by her power, and by the reputation of her most eminent citizens, the most respected of the republics.

But the restoration of independency and democracy to the Athenian people by Thrasybulus was far from being attended with a restoration of the state of things throughout Attica, which existed before the Peloponnesian war. It appears to have been the purpose of Pericles, when he brought all the people of Attica within the walls of Athens and Piræus, but what he was unable to accomplish, to persuade all beyond the numbers wanted for army or navy to pass to the islands of the Athenian dominion, where they would be safe, and where temporary support for them might be commanded. The plague ensuing from the failure was a great, but a temporary evil. Had Pericles lived, and brought the war to that early conclusion which appears to have been not unreasonably hoped for, those who had quitted their country habitations would mostly have returned to them, with all their former habits. But when after thirty years Thrasybulus restored the commonwealth, it was to a new generation wholly unpractised in a country life. Lands then, whether by just restoration or otherwise, became the possession of men of whom, if any, so few were disposed to live on them that perhaps none could have a satisfaction in it. No more then do we read of parties of the highlands, the lowlands, and the coast; no more of country residences in Attica superior to those in Athens: the landholders lived in the city, committing their estates to the management of slaves.¹ The habits of the Attic people thus were no longer the same as formerly, or

¹ This state of things seems to have continued to the present day, with the difference only that the present cultivators of Attica, all Albanians, not speaking Greek, are not more slaves than the Greeks who occupy the city.

rather there were no longer Attic people, but only Athenian citizens. With change of habits in one part of the population, and cessation of intercourse with those of such habits in the rest, came a change of disposition, and with change of habits and disposition a great change of national character.

Unfortunately Athens had not a government capable of maintaining a conduct that could either hold or deserve the respect which a large part of Greece was ready to pay. When Thrasybulus, after overthrowing the tyrannical government of the Thirty, and of their successors the Ten, refused to meet any proposal for checking in the restored democracy the wildness of popular authority, it seems to have been because he saw no sufficient Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. s. 29. disposition to moderation among those who put forward such proposals. The faults of both parties had produced violence in both. The profligate tyranny of the former democracy had been such (Isocrates ventured, in a chosen opportunity, to aver the bold truth to Isocr. de Pace, p. 242. v. 2. the people in their restored sovereignty) that a majority, even of the lower ranks, had voted for the oligarchy of the Four-hundred. But the tyranny of the Thirty afterward so exceeded all former experience that, in natural course, the popular jealousy, on the restoration of popular power, would become in the highest degree suspicious and irritable. In this state of things it was a sense of public weakness, while the power of Lacedæmon or Thebes threatened, that enforced respect for the counsels of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, and Niceratus. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, sycophancy again reared its baleful head. Wise men accommodated themselves, as they could, to the temper of the times, endeavouring so to bend before popular tyranny as not to sink under it. But Thrasybulus him-

Ch. 25. s. 6.
of this Hist.

self, as we have formerly seen, though honoured as the second founder of the republic, did not escape a capital prosecution. The great men who followed him began, like the Lacedæmonian kings, to prefer military command abroad to residence in the city. Giving their advice in the general assembly only when pressure of circumstances required, they avoided that general direction of the republic's affairs, that situation of prime minister, which Themistocles,

Cimon, Pericles, and Thrasybulus himself had held. It has been remarked that Conon chose to pass his leisure in Cyprus, Iphicrates in Thrace, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigeum, and Chabrias in Egypt, or anywhere rather than in Athens.

The dereliction of civil situation by the great political and military characters of the republic encouraged the evil which produced it. The field was left open for adventurers, without other recommendation than readiness, and boldness of speech, to take the lead in public affairs; and oratory became a trade, independent of all other vocations. We

have seen Iphicrates, appointed by the voice of the people to a great military command, requesting a colleague, and for that colleague a popular orator, unversed in military command, and not his friend. Such a choice, which elsewhere would be most absurd, was, under such a government as the Athenian, obviously politic. The orator-general became responsible, with the real military commander, for all the consequences of their joint conduct; and his popularity and talents, instead of being employed for the ruin, must, for his own sake, be exerted for the support and defence of his colleague. Perhaps Iphicrates drew from the prosecution of Thrasybulus the warning that urged him to a measure which Xenophon's manner of relating it shows to have been considered at the time extraordinary. But shortly after, if

Theopomp.
ap. Athen. l. 12.
c. 8. p. 264.
vel 532.
Corn. Nep. v.
Chabr.

Ch. 26. s. 8.
of this Hist.

not for the business of the field, yet for that of the assembly of the people, the connection of the orator and the general, the orator commander-in-chief with a general under him (it is the phrase of Demosthenes), became quite familiar.²

When the fear of Lacedæmon or Thebes, long the salutary check upon this vicious government, was removed by the event of the battle of Mantinea, its extravagances soon grew extreme. The people in general assembly being sovereign, with power less liable to question than that of a Turkish sultan, who dares not deny his veneration for Mahomet's law, or his respect for those appointed to high situations under it, any adventurer in politics, who had ready elocution, could interfere in every department of government. Ratification by the people was required for every measure of administration. The most delicate foreign interests were discussed before the people at large, and the contending orators abused foreign powers and one another with equal grossness. Unsteadiness then became a characteristic of the Athenian government. Propositions rejected in the morning, says Isocrates, are often ratified before night, and condemned again at the next meeting of the assembly; and we find even Demosthenes, the popular favourite of his day, complaining that a measure decreed was as uncertain of execution as if it had never been taken into consideration. Assurance therefore for foreign states of any maintenance of public faith was impossible. As soon as a treaty was concluded, it was the business of the opposing orators to persuade the people that they had been deceived and misled. If the attempt succeeded, the consistency of government and the faith of the republic were

Demosth. &
Æsch. & al.
var. in loc.

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 204.

Demosth. pro
Rhod. init.

² Πρώτῳ ἡγεμῶν, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτῳ.

Demosth. περὶ Συντάξ. p. 172.

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2. s. 16.
Isocr. de Pace,
p. 176.
Demosth.
περὶ Συμμαχ.
& al.

equally disregarded: the treaty was declared null, and those who had persuaded to it, rarely escaping capital prosecution, were fortunate if they could escape capital punishment. Seldom therefore, though everything must be discussed, could there be any free discussion. In the sovereign assembly of Athens, as in democratical assemblies in England, a common hall of the city of London, or a county meeting for political purposes, freedom of speech often was denied; the people would hear the orators only on one side. Flattery to the tyrant, as we have seen the people in democracy often called among the Greeks, was always necessary. But honest and plain admonition, tending to allay popular passion, to obviate mischievous prejudice, or even to correct popular misinformation, could rarely obtain attention, unless in times of pressing public danger, and alarm among all parties.³

It seems to have been a liberal spirit that, on the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, gave the freedom of the city to all who had borne arms in the contest for it. Nevertheless the precedent was dangerous for a state where despotic power, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, was constitutionally vested in the whole people. Formerly, though the large patriotism which should have embraced the whole Greek nation was rarely found among the republics, yet that narrower political virtue, the love of the city, was often seen warm. But as, through the successive alterations of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon, security for property, and especially for landed property, was weakened and at length almost destroyed, attachment to the Attic soil would proportionally fail. So many strangers to Attic blood then, admitted among the citizens, would of course be de-

³ Δημοκρατίας οὐσης, οὐκ ἔστι πατρίστια. Isocr. de Pace, p. 176.

sirous that the purity of Attic blood should no longer be the honourable distinction, and would be ready to vote, on all occasions, for the admission of others, who possessed it no more than themselves. Accordingly the freedom of the city became an ordinary favour profusely conferred. Perhaps we should ascribe somewhat to joke in the story of the two youths raised to the once envied dignity of Athenian citizens for the merit of their father, an ingenious cook, in the invention of some approved new sauces. But the reproach which the cautious Isocrates ventured to address to his fellow-countrymen will command credit: "Boasting," he says, "that we hold our country from time beyond all tradition, we ought to afford example of good and orderly government; but, on the contrary, our administration is more irregular, and more abounding with inconsistency, than that of many newly founded colonies. Valuing ourselves upon antiquity of origin, and purity of Athenian blood, we give community in the rights of the city, and in all the honours of that origin and that blood, with less consideration and selection than the mountaineers of Thrace or Italy use in admitting associates to their clans." Demosthenes, the flatterer and favourite of the multitude, has been led in the course of his pleadings to declare, in still more pointed terms, the amount and the manner of the corruption. Decrees of citizenship, he has not scrupled to assert, were become an article of trade among the venal orators; to be procured for their foreign or metic clients at prices proportioned to the labour which deficient claim, or the discredit which bad character, might implicate with the undertaking.

Athen. l. 3.
p. 119.

Isocr. de Pace.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 687.

Long ago Solon's laws for promoting industry and disgracing idleness had been obsolete or ineffectual: a sovereign multitude would not work: they would live by sacrifices

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2.
s. 9. provided by the public treasury, and feasts given
 by the wealthy of their respective wards, or the
 daily salary for attending the courts of justice. Clothed,
Xen. resp.
Ath.
Aristoph.
& Isocr. many of them, as Xenophon assures us, little
 better than the slaves, so much more numerous
 than themselves, and uncertain even of their daily
 food, they had nevertheless their favourite luxuries with
Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2.
s. 10. which they would not dispense. Not the weal-
 thiest individual, says Xenophon, could have his
 baths, his dressing-rooms, his places of exercise, and of
 meeting for conversation, of a splendour comparable to those
 erected for the multitude of Athens. The magnificence of
 the theatrical entertainments provided for them, as the yet
 existing ruins of the theatres show, was what nothing in
 modern times has approached. The excessive fondness of
 the Athenians for these entertainments commanded of course
 attention from those to whom the favour of the many was
 necessary. Pericles is said to have been the first who pro-
 vided, by an act of the people which he proposed, that a
 portion of the public revenue should maintain the theatres,
 and furnish theatrical exhibitions. The example was found
 so commodious by following orators that, in process of time,
 almost the whole certain revenue of the republic became
 appropriated to theatrical entertainments, together with what
 at Athens were nearly congenial, the ceremonies of religious
 festivals; and, when thus the means of former orators were
 exhausted, bold ingenuity, pressed to a last resource, pro-
 cured the decree which has immortalised the name of its
Demosth.
Olynth. mover Eubulus, making it capital even to propose
 the application of the theoric revenue, as it was
 called, to any other purpose. It requires remark however
 that Eubulus is represented as altogether one of the most
 respectable men of his age; the associate in poli-
 tics of the most approved patriots, and a steady
 opponent of the extravagances of democratical

Æsch. de
 legat. p. 347.
 Dinarch.
 in Demosth.
 p. 66.

power. Some light will occur in the sequel on this curious, but altogether dark subject.⁴

When such was the subserviency of the Athenian government to popular extravagance and folly, and such the luxuries which the multitude, living in idleness, commanded, to expect that the Athenian citizen would obey, as formerly, the call for military service abroad, or even bear the restraint necessary for maintaining the ancient discipline and skill in arms at home, would have been preposterous. The ancient law, of every Grecian state, required that every citizen should be trained to arms. Practice with weapons began in early boyhood. From eighteen to twenty the Athenian youth formed the regular standing garrison of the city and country; and thus, even in peace, acquired that practice of acting in bodies which prepared them advantageously for real warfare. But in later times the young Athenians, or their fathers, intent on more profitable employment for them, learnt to obtain excuse very extensively from this duty. Formerly the service of the panoply, or the phalanx, the first name describing the armour of the individual, the latter the formation of the body, was jealously vindicated as the exclusive privilege of the citizen. The most laborious service, and generally the most dangerous, but of overbearing efficacy, it was considered as that on which rested the superiority of Greeks to barbarians, the safety of every Grecian state against neighbouring Grecian states, and even the security of dominion, in every one, over resident foreigners and the slaves who, generally in Grecian states, far outnumbered the freemen. In the perpetual wars of Greece however, the reiterated calls upon the citizen to leave all his domestic concerns for service to the state in arms becoming more

⁴ Some modern writers have undertaken to pronounce judgment very boldly upon this law, and upon Eubulus, its author; but they have left what remains from the contemporary orators upon it, I must own, very dark to me, and, I must add, I rather think to themselves too.

severely felt as civilisation and the arts contributing to the comfort of private life improved, it is not wonderful that any expedient which might obviate such a pressure became popular. The hazardous resource thus of employing mercenaries, as we commonly find them termed from the Latin, soldiers by profession, engaged for hire, and forming what we call a standing army, grew into common use among all the republics. Men in the uneasy and perilous situation of generals under a democracy would be likely to approve and promote the change; for an army of sovereign citizens, impatient of control always, would in its turn, of course, but indeed whenever it pleased, command and judge its generals; whereas a hired army had no pretence but to obey while paid, and, when dismissed, had no legal authority to command or judge those who had been its legal commanders.

For about ten years after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, Athens, without foreign dependencies and unassailed at home, had no occasion for military exertion. But her engagement in confederacy with Thebes against Lacedæmon, and, still more, the revival of her empire over other republics, resulting from Conon's victory, produced necessity for again employing forces of land and sea. After so long a desuetude however, when affections had been engaged by domestic interests and the luxury of public entertainments, and passions by political intrigues and the contentions and flattery of orators, the call to arms was little satisfactorily heard by the Athenian people. Instead of jealously asserting their exclusive right to the honours of the panoply, they would make the metics, not Greeks only, but Lydians, Syrians, barbarians of various countries, share with them its labours and its dangers, and, with these, of course, unavoidably its honours. For this change indeed the admission of so many strangers to the rights of

Ch. 24. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Xenoph.
resp. Ath.

citizens, on the first restoration of the democracy, seems to have prepared the way. Nevertheless, in the first wars, against the Lacedæmonians, and the Thebans and their allies, though mercenary troops were mostly employed, yet a part still of the army was Athenian; both citizens and metics served under Iphicrates and other generals in Peloponnesus. Gradually however the sovereign citizens more and more dispensed with their own service; and when the fear of Thebes and Lacedæmon ceased to press, they would, on any ordinary occasion, serve no more. They did not so soon refuse themselves wholly for the ordinary service of the navy; where the labour and danger were reckoned generally less, and the hope of profit, through means accruing, as will be hereafter seen, from the command which the Athenians possessed of the Ægean sea, was considerably greater. But in time this also, through the same indulgence of the sovereign people to themselves, was extensively avoided. Thus the glory of the Athenian arms, won at Marathon, at Salamis, and in so many battles since, by sea and by land, was in a manner renounced; and the maintenance and extension of the republic's empire abroad, if not its defence at home, was committed to men engaged for pay, from whatsoever country they could be collected.

Demosth.
Olynth.
Æsch. de
legat.

Xenoph. &
Isocr. &
Demosth.

Such, according to the remarkably agreeing testimonies of contemporary writers of different views and opposite interests, was the state of the

Xenoph.
Isocr. Lys.
Demosth.
Æsch.

Athenian government, when the decline of the Lacedæmonian power and the Theban energy left Athens, principally through her navy, and the revenue which it commanded from numerous little commercial republics, the first potentate of Greece. While the contest between Thebes and Lacedæmon lasted, Athens could disregard the treaty of Antalcidas, and other following conventions, whose purpose

was to establish the independency of every Grecian commonwealth. That purpose indeed was evidently enough impracticable. In universal independency the incessant strife of each with its neighbours was found to produce greater evils than the admission of the superiority of one ; and partial superiorities would arise while the general superintending power was denied. Piracy, meanwhile, with the endless opportunities afforded by the division of the islands and shores of the *Ægean* among almost numberless sovereign powers, threatened the annihilation of maritime commerce, for it was not confined to the private adventure of men in the situation of outlaws. There were states, powerful among those of Greece, which (like the barbarians of Africa, who have been tolerated to the shame of modern Europe) avowed piracy. It was a trade that suited equally

*Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 675.*

republics and tyrants. Of the former, *Alopecconesus* particularly is mentioned as principally subsisting by it ; though Athens itself is not without its share of imputation ; and Alexander, tyrant of *Pheræ*, is

*Diod. l. 15.
c. 95.*

said to have acquired the wealth which enabled him to hold the tyranny chiefly by the plunder of the Grecian seas and shores, for which he sent out fleets and armies. The smaller maritime states therefore, feeling their insufficiency for the vindication severally of their own security, and little disposed to concede enough to one another for coalition in any firm confederacy, were prepared for submission to a protecting power.

In this situation of things, the conduct of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, acquiring the reputation of liberality for the Athenian government, most of the islands, and many cities of the Asiatic and Thracian shores, desirous of the protection of the Athenian navy for their trade, and perhaps not less to avoid its oppression, became again tributaries, and effectually

subjects, of the Athenian people. The assessment of the just Aristides was restored, not without some degree of general satisfaction; recommended, not only by its moderation, but probably also by the advantageous regulation from which he had derived renown. Athens thus became again the head of a great confederacy. Timotheus alone, in his various commands, is said to have acquired to that confederacy seventy-five cities, of importance enough to have each its representative in the congress, or, in the original term, *synedrium*, which assembled at Athens. Nevertheless the little information remaining on the interesting subject of the constitution of this assembly, and the privileges of its members, as they stood indeed at a somewhat later day, does not show them calculated to give that security to the subordinate states which could make the Athenian empire satisfactory to those under it. To have protection against all enemies they renounced the right of separate war and peace, binding themselves by oath to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians. To provide for a just attention to their interests in the councils of the sovereign people, their deputies at Athens had their separate assembly to consult together on their common interests; and either in common, or severally, as occasion required, they communicated with the executive council of the Athenian republic, the Five-hundred. They were admitted to the general assembly of the people only with the approbation and through the introduction of the Five-hundred; and only under restrictions, nearly as foreign ambassadors, they were allowed occasionally to address the sovereign people. But they had no vote; and in all other points they were upon the footing of foreigners, excluded from all rights of Athenian citizens. Nevertheless, for the readiness with which so many little states appear to have

*Demosth.
pro Rhod.*

*Æschin. de
legat. p. 247.*

admitted again the supremacy of the Athenian people, though abundantly indicating uneasiness in their former independency, this restoration of empire, like its original rise, was honourable to the Athenian name.

While Athens, with this empire growing beyond sea, was held in check and alarm at home by Lacedæmon or Thebes, the administration was so generally discreet, and the willing attachment of the synedrian allies was so obviously important, that the means of tyranny, which the imperial republic held, seem to have been little used. Even the old title of the subordinate ally, *hypecoös*, nearly synonymous with subject or dependent, a term familiar in the time of Thucydides, appears to have been avoided. The Grecian word which we render *ALLY*, thus becomes, with the writers after the age of Epaminondas, a term often of doubtful import; being used indifferently to imply independent sove-

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

reign states, or the tributary allies. Nevertheless, as we have formerly seen, while Thebes was successfully contending with Athens for the lead of the democratical interest through the Greek nation, and even aiming at a maritime rivalry, three of the most powerful of the synedrian confederated states, whether suffering real evil or seeking only prospective good, revolted. This possibly may have been taken as ground for new severity by the sovereign people, when the rebelling states were compelled again to submit to its authority. After the battle of Mantinea, when the decay of Theban influence over the confederacy whose councils Epaminondas had been able to guide became manifest, an altered disposition toward the subject states appeared. Interested adventurers in politics quickly saw the opportunity, and hastened in contention to profit from it. The former empire of Athens, and the advantages resulting to the body of the people, became the favourite topics of declamation in the general assembly.

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2. s. 2.
& seq.

The people heard with eager attention, when it was asked, "Whence was the want of energy, that the fleets brought no treasures home? Why was free navigation allowed? The Athenian navy commanded the seas. Why then was any republic permitted to have ships and maritime commerce that would not pay tribute as formerly?" Thus wrought into fermentation, the public mind, with a favourite object in view, would no longer bear contradiction. To urge the injustice of arbitrary exaction would have been dangerous for the most popular orator. Even for showing the impolicy without venturing to name the iniquity of such measures, none could obtain a hearing. Fleets therefore were sent out, under the imperial mandate of the people, with general instructions to bring home tribute. For command in such enterprise, military ability and experience were little requisite; and, as the cautious Isocrates did not scruple publicly to aver, men of such mean estimation, that for managing any private concern none would trust them, were commissioned, with dictatorial powers⁵, to conduct the affairs of the republic with the Greek nation. A sovereign multitude, and the orators who by flattery ruled the sovereign multitude, would be likely to allow great indulgence to those ordered, without limitation by any precise instructions, to extend empire and bring home money. Complaints ensuing, endless from the injured allies, were generally disregarded. Money, judiciously distributed among the officers of the courts which ought to take cognizance of such complaints, was generally necessary even to bring the matter to a hearing; and then any justice in decision was very uncertain. Fraud, rapine, all sorts of iniquity and violence, not only went unpunished, but the people often

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 188—194.

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 170. & 190.

p. 206.

p. 200. Xen.
resp. Ath.

⁵ *Ἀντιπράξιας*. Isocr. de Pace.

Isocrates,
ut sup.

showed themselves even amused with the attested reports of enormities, committed by their tribute-gathering armaments.

SECTION II.

Projects for improving the Athenian Revenue. — Affairs of the Athenian Colony of Amphipolis. — Produce of the Thracian Gold Mines. — Summary of Affairs of the Olynthian Confederacy. — Opposition of Olynthian and Athenian Interest. — Alliance of Olynthus with Amphipolis.

THE renewal of the old tyranny of the Athenian republic over its allies and subjects was professedly what gave occasion for that curious treatise, formerly noticed, Ch. 29. s. 1. of this Hist. which remains from Xenophon, on the revenue of Athens. His plan, more immediately concerning the revenue, as a necessary foundation for the rest, extended however to a general improvement of the government. Far from visionary, like Plato's, it might nevertheless have been difficult, or even impossible, to execute; less from any inherent impracticability than from its interference, real or apprehended, with the existing private interests of powerful men. That from which Xenophon proposed the greatest, or however the most immediate advantage, was an improved management of mines of the precious metals; and this appears to have been always a favourite purpose of those who actually held the principal direction of the popular will. But, though the objects were similar, the principles on which it was proposed to pursue them were widely different. Xenophon's first purpose, what he considered as most important, was to obviate all necessity for that oppression exercised by the Athenians against others; not only as the oppression of others was abominable, but as the evil would recoil on themselves. His project therefore was

confined to the mines of Attica. But the individuals to whom the working of these was already engaged, not indeed in perpetuity, but for terms of which they hoped renewal, would strenuously oppose any proposal for alteration of management. The Attic mines moreover gave only silver, whereas those of the Thracian mountains, in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis, afforded gold. For the superiority therefore, real or imaginary, of the object, and for avoiding interference with the private gains of fellow-citizens, perhaps friends and relations, persons however whose votes and influence might be important, they disregarded violence against any others.

We have formerly observed the Thracian mines furnishing the first temptation for the Athenian republic, almost immediately on its rise to empire, and while Cimon son of Miltiades yet commanded its forces, to oppress those whom it had undertaken, as a sacred duty, to protect. The people of the little island of Thasos were driven, by the injustice of the Athenian government, to a renunciation of alliance, which was resented and punished as rebellion against the sovereignty of the Athenian people. The Thracian mines were then seized, as the proper possession of the Athenian people; and, to secure it, a colony of no less than ten thousand persons, Athenians, and citizens of the allied republics, was sent to occupy the neighbouring territory. The resentment of the surrounding Thracians, so exerted as presently to produce the total destruction of this numerous colony, seems to mark a sense of injuries, such as they had not experienced from the less powerful islanders of Thasos. The calamitous event however did not deter the Athenian people from new pursuit of so inviting an object. Under the able and benign administration of Pericles the colony led by Agnon, father of the unfortunate Theramenes, was apparently conducted

Ch. 12. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 100.

with juster policy; and the town which he founded, with the name of Amphipolis, quickly became flourishing.

But the people of this colony, collected from various parts of Greece, respecting the Athenian government under Pericles, and attached to their leader Agnon, would be little likely to retain any firm attachment to a government tyrannical and capricious as that of Athens afterward became.

Ch. 16. s. 4,
5, 6. of this
Hist.

Accordingly when Brasidas marched into Thrace, little more than ten years after the foundation of Amphipolis, disaffection was ready; and, with the assistance of a large party among the citizens, that able soldier and politician gained this favourite colony from the Athenian empire to the Lacedæmonian. By the treaty of peace however, which soon followed, while the other Grecian towns on the Thracian shore had their freedom assured, paying only the assessment of Aristides for the maintenance of the Athenian fleet, Amphipolis, as an Athenian colony, was restored unconditionally to the dominion of the Athenian people. Seventeen years it seems to have so remained, when the battle of Ægospotami gave it again, with all the other transmarine possessions of Athens, to be dependent on Lacedæmon.

Herodot. 1. 6.
c. 46, 47.

According to Herodotus, who says he made inquiries upon the spot, the Thasians drew from their Thracian mines a yearly revenue of from two to three hundred talents; at a medium perhaps fifty thousand pounds; which he appears to have reckoned, for them, very considerable. It seems probable that the Athenian government, while it held Amphipolis, though always intent upon the mines, yet distracted by various troubles, never worked them to any great profit. The Lacedæmonians, implicated with a great variety of new and great concerns, and especially allured by prospects of golden harvests in Asia, were likely to be indifferent to adventure among the Thracian

mountains, of a kind for which their institutions peculiarly unfitted them. We have seen even the highly cultivated settlements of the Thracian Chersonese, touching almost on Asia, so neglected by them as nearly to become the prey of neighbouring barbarians. Towns therefore farther removed from the countries whither their principal solicitude was directed would still less be objects of any very earnest care. Thus apparently the Amphipolitans were left to make the most they could of independency; and it appears they defended themselves against the Thracians, and managed their intestine disputes, but were little able to vindicate the possession and carry on profitably the working of the mines, so that these seem to have been abandoned.

Ch. 23. s. 1.
and ch. 24. s. 1.
of this Hist.

It was in this dereliction by the Lacedæmonians of their dominion over the Thracian colonies that the growth of Olynthus, formerly noticed, and the rapid extension of its confederacy, almost overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and became formidable to Lacedæmon itself. On the dissolution of the confederacy, which the united arms of Lacedæmon and Macedonia effected, those towns which had not been before of the Macedonian kingdom received the gift of nominal independency, each holding its separate government; but under conditions of alliance, which made them, with Olynthus itself, effectually subject to Lacedæmon. Taught then by experience the importance of maintaining its interest in Thrace, the Lacedæmonian government, to hold the Thracian towns in subserviency, resorted to the common policy of the age, giving its patronage to a party in each, which, for the sake of that patronage, would obey its commands. Then perhaps it may have been that, under Lacedæmonian patronage, new colonists, principally from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa, were established in

Ch. 26. s. 2,
3, & 4. of this
Hist.

Or. Isocr. ad
Philipp. p. 316.
t. 1. Ep.
Philipp. ap.
Demost. p. 164.

Amphipolis, in number so large that occasion was afterward taken to call it a Lacedæmonian colony. The Lacedæmonian authority however was thus altogether so maintained in those northern parts that, while so many of the southern republics, as we have formerly seen, joined Thebes in war against Lacedæmon, a body of Olynthian horse served with the Lacedæmonian armies in Peloponnesus.

Ch. 26. s. 7.
of this Hist.

But when, after the battle of Leuctra, fought about eight years after the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy, Lacedæmon, pressed by the war with Thebes, became less and less able to stretch a commanding arm to the northern shore of the Ægean, those raised to power under Lacedæmonian patronage began to totter in their situations, and the prospect of success in opposition to them invited ambitious, and perhaps patriotic citizens. Olynthus, in its glory, had been the ally of Thebes. The party which had then led its councils would of course seek to share in that patronage which Thebes, become the leading state of Greece, was extending on all sides, and most ready in opposition to Lacedæmon. Thus it seems to have been that the administration of Olynthus reverted to that party. But Thebes, separated by many intervening states, and possessing little naval force, though she might check exertions of Lacedæmon against them, was little able to prevent the Olynthians from taking their own measures in their own concerns. To restore their dissolved confederacy therefore becoming their object, it was quickly effected to a very considerable extent; how far upon the former model is not sufficiently said; but so that Olynthus became again a very powerful city, with influence over perhaps the whole of that fruitful part of the continent called the Chalcidic, and extending to the towns of the three adjoining peninsulas.

B. C. 371
Ol. 102. 2.

Olynthus thus reviving in opposition to the decaying power of Lacedæmon, while Athens, to check the alarming growth of the Theban power, became the ally of Lacedæmon, the interest of the Olynthian would be placed in necessary opposition to that of the imperial Athenian people. About eight years after the battle of Leuctra followed that of Mantinea. In the state of things after that event the Athenian people, no longer,

B. C. 363.
Ol. 104. 2.
[B. C. 362.
Cl. See
p. 263.]

as before, restrained by the dread of Thebes, looked for empire wherever their fleets could sail. Among many and greater objects then, which their orators put forward in the general assembly, in a manner more adapted to promote their own interest with the many than the popularity of the Athenian name in Greece, or indeed any real interest of Athens itself, the recovery of their colony of Amphipolis became a favourite point. But in two successive congresses of the Grecian states, as we have formerly seen, (for, in unfolding the complicated interests of Greece, repetition is often unavoidable,) the claim which the Athenian people asserted of sovereignty over the Amphipolitan people, was denied. In a third congress it was at length allowed, principally through the interest of Amyntas king of Macedonia, father of Philip. The Amphipolitan people nevertheless resisted, and being supported by the Olynthian confederacy, the able Iphicrates was in vain placed at the head of an armament to reduce them to obedience. It was among the imprudent boasts of the Athenian orators, in flattery to their sovereign the many,

Æsch. de
legat. p. 212.

Demosth.
Olynth.

that the Athenians had been formerly lords, not of Amphipolis only, but of Olynthus too. Circumstances indeed abounded to admonish the Olynthians, for their own safety, to support the Amphipolitans, and the Amphipolitans, if they would avoid the dominion of the Athenian people, to profit from the ready alliance of Olynthus. But the Amphi-

politan people, a recent colony, were less divided, in the manner of the old republics, into parties of the many and the few, the rich and the poor, than into such as arose from their various origin, partly established under Athenian patronage, partly under Lacedæmonian, and accustomed to receive protection sometimes from Olynthus, sometimes from Macedonia. Now however the Athenian interest had been long overborne; Lacedæmon was utterly without means to support friends across the Ægean, and the king of Macedonia had abandoned his interest in favour of Athens. Thus for those averse to the sovereignty of the Athenian people the patronage of Olynthus only remained, and accordingly the connection between Amphipolis and Olynthus became intimate.

SECTION III.

Armament under Timotheus. — Expedition proposed to Asia; diverted to Samos. — Measures of Timotheus against Olynthus. — Co-operation of the King of Macedonia. — Injurious Conduct of Athens towards Macedonia.

B. C. 359.
Ol. 105. 2.*

AFFAIRS in Lesser Asia, the most favourite of all fields for military adventure, drawing the attention of the leading men of Athens, gave a temporary relief from the pressure of their ambition to the Grecian states on the northern shore of the Ægean. Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, having engaged in that extensive revolt of the western provinces of the Persian empire which we have formerly seen excited by Evagoras of Cyprus, desired to strengthen his military force with Grecian troops. Evagoras was the ally and adopted citizen of

Ch. 28. s. 8.
of this Hist.

[* "B. C. 360. Timotheus repulsed at Amphipolis in the year of Callimedes: Schol. Æschin. p. 755. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ ΚΑΛΑΜΙΩΝΟΣ [leg. ΚΑΛΑΙΜΗΔΟΥΣ] ἄρχοντος." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 120.

"The expedition to Eubœa was in B. C. 358, and the intermediate transactions, between the repulse at Amphipolis and the Eubœan expedition, might well have happened in the course of two years." Id. ibid. p. 122.]

Athens. Ariobarzanes, forming connection with the Athenian people, accepted also the honour of becoming one of them. The Athenian government, professing to hold inviolate its peace with the Persian king, nevertheless sent an armament to co-operate with the citizen-satrap in rebellion; and Timotheus, for so inviting a field as Asia, did not refuse the command. His instructions forbade, in general terms, whatever might be contrary to the articles of the treaty with Persia: but it was common, as formerly observed, for the satraps to make war effectually against the king, pretending it to be only against one another.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.
p. 192.

Ch. 23. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Timotheus was on his way to join Ariobarzanes when intelligence reached him of the dissolution of the confederacy of the revolted chiefs. The tide thus turning in favour of the royal cause produced revolt on the other side. In the island of Samos, as in many Grecian states of the Asiatic main, was a party which preferred the patronage or sovereignty of the Persian king to that of the Athenian people. Cyprothemis, head of that party, assisted by Tigranes, the king's commander-in-chief in Lesser Asia, effected a revolution, by which he became chief of the island. Timotheus was still on the Asiatic coast when news of this revolt reached him. He hastened then to Samos, overbore Cyprothemis, and, with the re-establishment of democratical government, restored the dependency of the Samian upon the Athenian people.

It was about this time that Philip king of Macedonia had completed his successes against the Illyrians, and established security for his western border, hitherto so much threatened. Olynthus and its confederacy remained his most dangerous and troublesome neighbour. A plan was concerted between the Athenian and Macedonian governments for the reduction of Olynthus by their combined arms. But with regard both

to the leading circumstances, and to the stipulations on both sides, we are left by ancient writers wholly in the dark. Timotheus commanded still the Athenian fleet. For the Asiatic service perhaps it was needless to put the republic to expense in maintaining troops; volunteers being probably ready for adventure under a general of the reputation of Timotheus, in a field where so many Grecian soldiers of fortune had found large success. But for the war in Thrace, where stubborn resistance was in near view, and far less amount of gold even in distant prospect, volunteers could not be found without an expense which the orators dared not propose. For that service accordingly Timotheus appears to have been without a land force. This deficiency however the king of Macedonia undertook to supply. A

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.

Macedonian army and the Athenian fleet together laid siege to Potidæa, the contest for which had given birth to the Peloponnesian war. Potidæa was so critically situated, near Olynthus, as to give great opportunity for intercepting the communication of that town with the sea, and it completely commanded the way by land into the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, full of commercial towns, and altogether the best territory of the confederacy. Yielding to the Macedonian arms, it was conceded to the Athenian general, and an Athenian garrison was placed there. Torone, the principal town of the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia, was presently after taken by the confederate forces, and also received an Athenian garrison. Olynthus was thus so circumscribed in territory, reduced in strength, and checked in maritime communication, that its ruin seemed hardly avoidable.

For the next event, the hinge on which the following history of Athens and Macedonia turns, the historian wholly fails us, and the orators, to whom we owe certain knowledge of the important fact, have avoided all detail. The purpose

of Athens in the Olynthian war evidently was conquest; nor have the orators disguised it. The views of Philip are less obvious. To reduce or even overwhelm the power of Olynthus, which could not but be inconvenient and dangerous to Macedonia, would be among them; but to establish the power of Athens over the whole Macedonian coast on its ruin, without any recompence for Macedonia, would seem to be carrying to excess the generous policy by which he had formed his first connection with the Athenian government. Athens had long possessed Methone, the nearest sea-port to both his capitals; and Pydna was the only maritime town remaining to the kingdom, preserved, as we have formerly seen, by the policy of Archelaus. But those who obtained the lead in

Ch. 34. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Athens had no disposition for liberality toward Macedonia. The term of the command of Timotheus seems to have been ended. Who led the Athenian fleet we are uninformed. It went however to Pydna, and, giving its assistance to the party, generally powerful in all the

Demosth.
Phil. 1. p. 13.

Grecian maritime towns, adverse to connection with the government of the adjoining country, enabled it to effect a revolt, and assured it of the support and protection of the Athenian people. Philip sent ministers to Athens complaining of the gross injury, and demanding reparation; but none was obtained. It is obvious that a change must have taken place among the leading men in the Athenian administration; and this indeed the exultation expressed by Demosthenes on the acquisition to Athens and loss to Macedonia, avoiding notice of all the circumstances, assists to prove. Justification of the profligate measure seems to have been no more attempted at the time than by the great orator afterward. But the forms of a democratical government gave

Theopomp. ap.
Ulp. & Suid.

Demosth.
ut sup.

facility for procrastination, and for shifting responsibility

from shoulder to shoulder, while insult was added to the injury by professions, in the name of the republic, of the purpose of still honourably maintaining peace and alliance.

SECTION IV.

Expedition under Iphicrates against Amphipolis. — Supercession of Iphicrates by Timotheus. — State of the Thracian Chersonese. — Acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian Empire. — Honours to Charidemus of Eubœa.

FARTHER co-operation from the king of Macedonia in making conquests for the Athenian people being no longer now to be expected, the prosecution of hostilities immediately against Olynthus was suspended; and it was resolved to direct the energy of the republic to the conquest of Amphipolis, in the hope apparently that Olynthus, in its reduced state, could not interfere, and the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the provocation given him, would not. Eminent men, we have seen, could not live at Athens in quiet: they must lend themselves continually, not only to public service, but to popular passion. Many circumstances strongly recommended Iphicrates for the command against Amphipolis. None had more military experience, or higher military reputation. He had then the extraordinary advantage of close connection with the great sovereign of Thrace, Cotys, the successor of Seuthes, Sitalces, and Teres, by having received his sister in marriage.⁶ Among the Amphipolitans themselves moreover,

⁶ Demosthenes calls Iphicrates ἀνδιστῆς of Cotys, (Or. in Aristocr.) which is generally understood to mean brother-in-law. Cornelius Nepos calls the wife of Iphicrates daughter of Cotys. There can hardly be a doubt in preferring the contemporary orator's authority. But, if the father of the Cotys, of whom he spoke, was also named Cotys, which seems not improbable, the biographer's error would be only deficiency of explanation.

a mixed people, with an Athenian party, a Macedonian party, an Olynthian party, and a Thracian party, esteem for him was extensive. And farther, for his important services formerly to the Macedonian royal family, he was likely to be respected beyond others at the Macedonian court. Those then who led the Athenian counsels, while they evaded redress of injury, desiring nevertheless to obviate obstruction to their purposes from resentment, the popular vote directed Iphicrates to take the command of the fleet on the Thracian station.

But the favouring party in Amphipolis was not such that success could be reasonably expected from a fleet without a land force. Troops therefore were to be provided; and the command by land and sea, being, in the usual manner of the ancients, committed to the same officer, the levy, or rather the hire of a mercenary force, was to be managed by Iphicrates. Of those who made the command of mercenaries, ready to fight the battles of any state, their profession, Charidemus of Oreus in Eubœa was eminent, and he was recommended to Iphicrates by his conduct in a service already of three campaigns under him. Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 669. That officer with the body attached to him was therefore engaged, and the fleet and land force proceeded together to Amphipolis.

The losses and consequent weakness of Olynthus, the increased and daily growing power of Athens, the formidable appearance of the armament, the reputation of the general, and his popularity, had together such effect that the Amphipolitans presently listened to negotiation. Terms were agreed upon; the gate was named of which possession was to be given to the Athenian troops, and hostages were delivered by the Amphipolitans to ensure performance of the conditions. Through what jealousy or what intrigue the Athenian people defeated Demosth. ut sup.

their own fond hope, so long entertained, and now so nearly fulfilled, we have no information. Timotheus, hastily ordered to supersede Iphicrates, arrived in the critical moment. Alarm and hesitation of course arose among the Amphipolitans. Their confidence had rested, not in the Athenian people, but in Iphicrates, supposed capable of answering for the Athenian people. The character of Timotheus might perhaps have been not less respected than that of Iphicrates; but it was made inefficacious by a decree which presently followed him, commanding that the hostages, which had been specially intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates, should be sent immediately to Athens. This profligate decree however was rendered vain by the provident integrity of Iphicrates; who, in surrendering his command to Timotheus, had committed the hostages to the general of the mercenaries, Charidemus; and, apparently with the consent of Iphicrates, we may hope also with at least the tacit approbation of Timotheus, they had been restored to their friends.⁷

The ungracious office remained for Timotheus to take up the negotiation, necessarily resigned with his command by Iphicrates. But the Amphipolitans would no longer treat with an agent of the Athenian government, though that agent was Timotheus. Force was therefore again to be employed; but the ready means of effective force were done away by the same violent and improvident measures which had overthrown an almost concluded negotiation. It

⁷ It is remarkable enough how, in relating these transactions, Demosthenes, the favourite orator and minister of the Athenian democracy, has adopted and encouraged the profligate sentiments of the Athenian democracy. His object being to incense the Athenian people against Charidemus, he has not imputed to him any dishonesty; it sufficed to describe an honourable deed, adverse to the interest of the Athenian republic. It is then perhaps not less remarkable that the fascination of his oratory, even in the dead letter, has wrought upon some modern writers, especially the good Rollin, all the effect that could have been desired upon the Athenian multitude.

seems probable that Charidemus and the troops under him had engaged with Iphicrates, whom they knew, for little or no present pay, under promise of large profit from success in enterprise. Disappointed of hope nearly realised, and altogether dissatisfied with the Athenian government, they refused now to serve under Timotheus, to whose personal character it is little likely they would have objected. Meanwhile the Olynthians, greatly relieved by the cessation of pressure from Macedonia, exerted themselves to provide support for the remains of their confederacy against the arms and the policy of Athens. They engaged large assistance even from the Thracian hordes; and, marching with the utmost Grecian strength they could assemble, they were so superior by land that Timotheus found it expedient to embark and withdraw.

It behoved him then to find enterprise within the limits of his commission, and not beyond his means, by which, if possible, he might maintain his credit with his wayward sovereign. Against Olynthus no hope remained: but the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, formerly under the Athenian dominion, afforded some prospect. That rich territory, once held by the celebrated Miltiades nearly as an independent principality, afterward brought under the direct dominion of the Athenian people by the great Pericles, at this time acknowledged a barbarian

Ch. 12. s. 4.
of this Hist.

sovereign. The principal object of Pericles seems to have been to provide a resource, which the circumstances of the Attic government required, for occasionally disburthening the country of a superfluous growth of free population. For where industry became considered as the virtue of slaves, the number of citizens must necessarily be limited. Many then, who could not or would not maintain themselves by sober industry at home, might in the Chersonese, through adventure more suited to their disposition, find

subsistence, and some even affluence. Land highly fruitful was nearly open for occupancy: the Thracians valuing it the less, as the Greeks far the more, for being nearly surrounded by the sea. The ready sword indeed was necessary to guard the spot to which value might be given by husbandry; for the Thracian, little solicitous about the possession of land, was in his vocation fighting for plunder. The wants then of warring and mountainous Greece, and especially of rocky and restless Attica, made cultivation profitable wherever the soil was advantageous for produce, and the situation for export, and means occurred for procuring slaves to perform the labour. It was from the countries around the Chersonese that the Grecian slave-markets were principally supplied; and inroad, and violence, and surprise, such as, in the course of this history,

Ch. 18. s. 4. &
ch. 23. s. 5. of
this Hist.

we have had occasion to notice as ordinary with the Greeks, would provide either hands for husbandry, or an object of trade, for which, not in Greece only, but in all the richest countries within the sphere of Grecian navigation, there was a constant demand. Agriculture thus, in alliance with commerce, flourished so that the Chersonese became, next to Eubœa, the chief resource

Arist. Rhet.
1. 3. c. 10.

for supplying Athens with bread; and Sestus, the principal port for exportation, was called the corn-bin of Piræus.

But though the Chersonesites had a double advantage in their peninsular situation, which made the escape of slaves as well as the approach of hostile armies difficult, yet, through some deficiency in their policy, they remained always unequal to their own defence against the thirst for plunder and unceasing enmity of the Thracians, from whom their country had been usurped. The gift of independency, given on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war by Lacedæmon, brought them shortly in danger of utter ruin; from

which they were saved, as formerly seen, by the private adventure of a Lacedæmonian exile, Ch. 23. s. 1. of this Hist. Clearchus. That able and enterprising soldier of fortune being called by more alluring adventure elsewhere, their dangers and sufferings recurred, and again they owed their relief to the voluntary exertion of a Lacedæmonian officer, vested indeed with more regular Ch. 24. s. 1. of this Hist. authority, Dercyllidas. If then, when through Conon's victory the Athenians recovered naval empire, they were to require tribute again, nowhere apparently, if protection were duly given in return, might it be required on fairer claim than from the Chersonese; not only as its Grecian inhabitants were mostly settled under Athenian protection, but as they never ceased to want protection. Little able, with their own means, to profit from independency, again restored to them by the peace of Antalcidas, it was fortunate for them that, though the barbarism of the Thracian people was little improved by any communication with the Greeks, yet the Thracian princes had gained better views of their own interest. They had discovered that more profit might be made by protecting than by plundering the Grecian settlements on their shores. The Chersonese was in consequence, without effort, as far as appears, re-vindicated to the Thracian dominion; and the Grecian towns flourished, while the Thracian monarch drew Demosth. from their lands a revenue of thirty talents yearly, and from their trade three hundred: making together not less than six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

This revenue, from a country colonised from Athens, and made effectually Grecian, the Athenians, leaders and people, might not unnaturally see in the hands of a barbarian prince with some mixture of indignation and desire. But the barbarian prince, Cotys, had acquired it apparently as rightfully at least as they had ever acquired any dominion

beyond Attica; and moreover they had admitted him to alliance with them, and even acknowledged benefits received from him, by the double compliment of associating him in the number of Athenian citizens, and presenting him with a golden crown. It seems probable that Timotheus, however unlimited his commission to prosecute the interests of the Athenian people, may have been restrained by such considerations; and that two or three sea-port towns, which he added to the republic's dominion, were not torn from that of the Thracian prince.

With the accomplishment of these acquisitions the term of Timotheus's command appears to have ended. It is remarkable that, as in reporting measures against Macedonia contrary to all faith, the orator, though extolling the deed, has avoided naming the doer, so in reporting similar measures, which followed against the king of Thrace, the name of the

Ibid.

officer directing the business is omitted. Attempts were made by the Athenian fleet to gain some towns from the dominion of Cotys. Iphicrates did not scruple to take the direction of the fleet of the king his brother-in-law against the officer commanding the fleet of his own country to oppose them, and he opposed successfully. In the failure, which there has been so often occasion to notice, of historians, we owe some interesting facts to the very profligacy of the times. The orators have little scrupled to avow matters indicating the grossest ill-faith in their party, if so the assertion of any claim to have promoted the good of the Athenian people might be assisted. At the same time it appears creditable to a large portion of the Athenian people, in these profligate times, and yet marks a strange versatility and inconsistency in the government, that Iphicrates, who, in the service of a foreign prince, had so opposed the measures of an Athenian armament, could pre-

sently after return to Athens, and without being called to any account for his conduct, resume his former importance there. It seems probable that against the Thracian towns, as before against the Macedonian, measures were ventured without regular instructions of just authority; and failing of success, it was judged not advisable to stir the question how they had failed, in fear of exciting the farther question why they had been undertaken.

Charidemus, with the troops attached to him, lately serving under Iphicrates, had passed into the Olynthian service, and a squadron of ships was intrusted to his command. No battle is noticed by the orator, from whom alone account remains, when Charidemus was made prisoner by the Athenian fleet. Vengeance against him as a deserter apparently might be expected from the sovereign many of Athens, were they still under the same guidance as when, refusing to serve under their general Timotheus, he engaged in the service of their enemies, the Olynthians. But, on the contrary, he was presently taken into the republic's service: he was even recommended to the people to be appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace; it was urged in his favour that he alone held that influence with the Amphipolitans which might draw them from the Olynthian to the Athenian interest, and that he would effectually exert that interest. Amphipolis not long after was actually brought over to the Athenian interest; but how, the orator, who desired that Charidemus should have no credit with the Athenian people for it, has avoided to say. It seems likely that Iphicrates was the principal mover, and Charidemus his dextrous instrument. Some treachery to Olynthus is strongly implied in the orator's account; but, according to the principles always asserted in his orations, treachery, whence advantage accrued to the

*Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 669.*

p. 625.

Athenian people, was no matter for reproach to any one.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.

That for some service Charidemus was esteemed to have deserved highly of the Athenian people direct information remains from the orator his violent enemy.

Ibid. p. 650.
& 659.

Testimonies in his favour, transmitted to Athens by persons in the highest situations in the republic's service, or pronounced by them before the people, were numerous. Accordingly he was rewarded with the freedom of the city. But this, though probably valuable to him, being become a vulgar honour, he was farther presented with a reward reserved yet by the custom of the republic for merit in high station, a golden crown, placed on his head before the assembled people in pursuance of their decree; and he was thought worthy of a particular privilege, to which the frequency of the crime of assassination among the Greeks gave high value, a decree making any person who should attempt his life amenable to the Athenian courts from all the territories of the subject allies of Athens.⁸ Little as this may appear among us, or among any, familiar only with the liberal governments of modern Europe, it seems to have required a far greater exertion of influence at Athens, and to have been esteemed a much more extraordinary favour, not only than admission to the freedom of the republic, but than the honour of a golden crown.

⁸ It is one among numerous instances of oversight or negligence in Diodorus that he has omitted all mention of so important an occurrence as the recovery of Amphipolis to the dominion or alliance of Athens, though, in the sequel of his narrative, he speaks of that city as actually recovered.

SECTION V.

Restored Extent of the Athenian Empire. — Mal-administration of Athens. — Growing Oppression of the Allies. — Revolt of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, and War ensuing, commonly called the Social or Confederate War. — Revolt of Eubœa. — Summary History of Eubœa. — Interference of Thebes in Eubœa. — Expedition under Timotheus, and liberal Composition of the Affairs of Eubœa. — War impending from Macedonia.

THE empire of the Athenian people was now again approaching the extent which it had obtained before the Peloponnesian war. Their navy was not less preponderant; all the islands of the Ægean were tributary. The cities of the Asiatic main indeed, preferring the more liberal patronage of the Persian satraps, appear to have found that patronage effectual, both for their security and their prosperity, and far more favourable to their civil liberty than their former subjection to the Athenian people. But on the Thracian shore all was subject to Athens except Olynthus, (which, with the small relics of its confederacy, maintained a precarious independency,) and the towns of the Chersonese, which were under the patronage of the Thracian, nearly as the Asiatic of the Persian king. Toward these the ambition of the Athenian people was continually excited by the leaders of the high democratical party, and the Chersonese appears to have been the first object.

Isocrates, Areop.

Demosth. in Aristocr. & Olynth. & *περί συνταξ.* & Philipp.

But with ambition in excess the republic's affairs were now misconducted in excess. Military commanders of high reputation led its armaments; orators, among the most celebrated of antiquity, were contending for popular favour, and yet who directed the administration does not appear; or rather it appears that there was no regular administration.

Never was more complete democracy. Every measure of executive government was brought before the assembled people. Candidates for the first places in public favour were numerous, and none held a decided lead. To flatter the multitude, and to flatter excessively, was the burthensome, disgraceful, and mischievous office principally incumbent upon all. There was a constant canvass for popular favour, which nothing perhaps, in modern Europe, has resembled so nearly as the contest for the representation of a county in England, especially Middlesex. Amid so general and constant a fermentation of the popular mind, which those who have had most experience of contested elections in England will perhaps best, and yet but inadequately conceive, the three great men, whom all the respectable part of the community respected, and whose characters have been transmitted singularly pure from so corrupt and calumnious an age, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, unfortunately were not perfect friends: they did not lead opposite factions, but they seldom completely coalesced in public business. Their influence thus was not what it ought to have been. In public calamity and danger the public mind would turn to them: but, in prosperity, those who would flatter more were better heard, and public affairs at least appeared yet prosperous.

In every Grecian town of the Chersonese, as in Grecian towns everywhere, there would be an Athenian party, or a party ready for any revolution; but in every town also were those, and perhaps mostly a majority, interested in preserving the actual state of things. Expense then, such as the republic, if not unable, was unwilling to provide, would be necessary for the preparation and maintenance of a force equal to the proposed conquest; for the restless and imperious many of Athens would neither serve nor pay, but

Xenoph. ut
ant. Isocrates,
ut ant.
Demosth.
περι συμμαχ.
& al.

rather require distribution to themselves from the public treasury; and the wealthier few were constantly, and not unnecessarily, intent upon obviating or evading the evils of the arbitrary and oppressive system of democratical taxation. Even the quiet and cautious Isocrates, who never sought military or civil honours, who had more extensive friendships and fewer interested enmities than perhaps any man of his time, could not avoid the pressure of the tyrannical law of exchange. Under authority of that law a person, required by a decree of the people to equip a trireme for public service, called upon Isocrates, at Isocr. de permut. the age of eighty-two, to take the burthen from him, or make a complete exchange of property with him. Perhaps Isocrates could afford the expense better than many others who had been compelled to bear it, and yet possibly not better than the person who brought the action of exchange against him. Isocrates however, as the less evil, took the burthensome office, while the other, such was the inequality of that kind of taxation, escaped, for the time at least, all payment, all risk, and all farther trouble.

A people in the circumstances of the Athenian, possessing power to tax others and spare themselves, would be likely, in the use of such a power, to exceed moderation. When the assembled many were told that the treasury was empty they would be indignant, and their indignation was always dangerous. Those who managed the administration at home endeavoured to put the blame upon those commissioned to collect tribute from the allies abroad. There could be no money in the treasury, they said, if none was brought in. Reproaches and threats then commonly followed against the commanders of the tribute-gathering Isocr. de pace. squadrons. "If there was not dishonesty," it was insisted, "there was negligence. The tribute should be more exactly collected: the requisition should be extended: no state

which had any maritime commerce should be excused the payment: free navigation should be allowed to none who refused tribute."

Against such effusions of popular sovereignty the party for which Xenophon and Isocrates wrote, and with which Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias acted, vainly remonstrated. On the other side it was urged that

Demosth.

"men whom the people might trust, men of their own sort, ought to command the fleet, and direct the tribute-gathering business." The people decreed accordingly, and oppression and insult to the allies increased. The

Æschin.
Demosth. de
Cherson. p. 96. commander of the tribute-gathering fleet made his own terms with all the numerous maritime states of the shores of the Ægean. Paying him as he required, they were to have protection for their commerce: not so paying, they would be open to depredation from pirates, especially the greatest of pirates, the commander of the Athenian fleet. The peculation was reduced to a system. Every man in the fleet, according to his rank, had regularly his share. The treasury profited little: but every individual seaman being interested in the corruption, and the fleet being a large part of the commonwealth, not only to bring any to punishment was seldom possible, but the peculator, through the interest he acquired by allowing a share in peculation, was generally safer than the honest commander, who would dare to deny to those under him the wages of corruption.

About six years before the acquisition of Pydna to the Athenian empire, while the extravagance of popular sovereignty was yet restrained by the fear of Thebes, three of the most powerful of the allied states, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, nevertheless feeling the pressure of that sovereignty, had revolted, as we have formerly seen, against the Athenian, and engaged in the The-

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

ban alliance. The same three states now united with the newly flourishing commonwealth of Cos to resist a dominion which they considered as intolerably oppressive and degrading; and they engaged in their alliance Mausolus, prince of Caria, who suffered with them from Athenian exactions upon the commerce of his subjects. Measures being then concerted, they joined in declaring to the Athenian government "that they were resolved thenceforward to protect their own commerce with their own fleets, and wanting thus nothing from the Athenian navy, no more tribute could be required from them for its support."

Isocr. de pace.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 21.B. C. 358.
Ol. 105. 3.
[Cf. note
p. 298.]

This declaration was as a stunning blow to the public mind at Athens. Felt as an injury, it excited indignation; but it excited also universal alarm. The multitude became furious, while the more serious and informed entertained perhaps more apprehension. How to maintain the navy, necessary to the pre-eminence and wealth of the republic, and which that very pre-eminence and wealth made the more necessary to its safety; how either to pay mercenary troops, or persuade the people to take military service upon themselves; how to feed the numbers habituated to profit from the various business of building, fitting, and equipping ships, and to share in the exactions of the commanders; and, what pressed perhaps not less than all these, how to appease or withstand the popular indignation, should the funds fail for public sacrifice and theatrical exhibitions, were considerations urgently interesting all who possessed property at Athens. The circumstances of the moment nevertheless offered what, as the first emotions of alarm subsided, might not only elate the many, but encourage the ambition of leading men. The power and influence of Athens might be esteemed at this time predominant among

the Grecian states. Lacedæmon and Thebes were become inert. The rising means of Olynthus were severely checked by Athenian garrisons almost blockading the city itself; and Macedonia, hardly yet reckoned formidable, was, by the loss of Pydna, nearly deprived of means to communicate with the sea but at the pleasure of the Athenian people. The interest of a party powerful among the many met these considerations, and the result of popular deliberation was a decree declaring "that the rebellion of the allies should be repressed by arms."

We find it the frequent reproach of Demosthenes to the sovereign people of Athens, that they were quick and spirited in resolving, but slow and deficient in executing. To resolve was the easy business of a moment: to execute required plan, money, selection of men. Little seems to have been done in prosecution of the decree against the rebellious allies when the alarming intelligence arrived of a revolt still more nearly interesting the commonwealth. Of all dominion beyond the bounds of Attica, that of Eubœa was most important to the Athenian people. On the produce of Eubœa Athens principally depended for subsistence. Nevertheless a civil war among its towns, for some time now going forward, had been little noticed by the Athenian government; perhaps reckoning it rather good policy to leave them at full liberty, if they had no other liberty, to vent their passions and waste their strength against one another. But as soon as it was announced that a Theban force had entered the island, and there was great danger that the whole would be subjected to Thebes, indignation with alarm pervaded Athens.

Why the people of Eubœa, the largest island of the Ægean sea, whose principal city, Chalcis, so flourished in the early ages as to establish in Italy, Sicily, and Thrace, colonies the most numerous of any one Grecian state, were, through all

the more splendid times of Greece, mostly in a state of subjugation and always of political insignificance, seems not to be completely accounted for. The form of the country indeed was evidently a contributing cause; divided, like the neighbouring continent, by lofty mountains into portions not commodiously accessible from each other. Chalcis, on the Euripus, from early to late times the largest and most powerful city, maintained generally a fortunate harmony with Eretria, its nearest neighbour, and next in power. Oreus at the north-western and Carystus at the south-eastern end of the island were next to these. Some of the other towns might claim independency; the whole effectual dominion commonly rested with those four. Wars and seditions among the people probably gave occasion to the early colonies from Athens, of which both Chalcis and Eretria are said to have been. Before the first Persian invasion we find the greatest part of Eubœa was under the dominion of Athens. In proof of the importance of that dominion we have observed Thucydides remarking that, when in the wane of the Athenian affairs in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, among the disturbances of the revolution of the Fourhundred, Eubœa revolted, Athens was more agitated than by the news of the destruction of all the best military and naval force of the republic under Nicias and Demosthenes in Sicily.

Strab. l. 10.
p. 446. 7, 8.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 691.

Ch. 19. s. 7.
of this Hist.

With the reduction of Athens by the Lacedæmonian arms Eubœa became of course, with all Greece, dependent on Lacedæmon; but after Conon's victory at Cnidus it reverted again to the dominion of Athens. The rise of Thebes to eminence among the Grecian states gave much occasion for division among the Eubœan cities, but little to any assertion of independency. Bordering as Eubœa was on Bœotia, divided only by a water at times fordable, the dis-

contented under Athenian sovereignty would of course look to Thebes for patronage. Connection between some of the Eubœan towns and Thebes appears to have been of long

B. C. 377.
Ol. 100. 4.
Ch. 26. s. 8.
of this Hist.

standing. So early as toward the beginning of the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon we have seen a party in Oreus faithful even to Thebes

in distress, and prevailing even while a Lacedæmonian garrison held their citadel. With the advancement then of the Theban power under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, when Theban patronage became extensively desired among the Grecian states, Theban influence spread over all Eubœa.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 4.

It had been under the patronage of the Athenian democracy that Themison of Eretria became the

leading man of that city, with power so preponderant and lasting that, with some Grecian writers, he had the title of

Æsch. con.
Ctesiph.
p. 478. t. 3.
ed. Reiske.

tyrant of Eretria. Nevertheless when the Theban democracy undertook the patronage of those Athenian citizens whom the Athenian democracy

had driven into banishment, Themison, in concert with the

Ch. 28. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Theban government, assisted the exiles to get possession of Oropus, an Attic town on the

confines of Bœotia, which they continued to hold under the protection of Thebes. Afterward however, when Thebes became less able to protect and Athens more able to revenge, Themison seems to have had the skill to make his peace with the Athenian government, so that Eretria returned quietly to its former dependency on Athens, though Oropus remained under the dominion of Thebes.

But when the revolt took place among the allies on the eastern side of the Ægean, Eubœa was ripe for a similar measure. The troublesome and dangerous sea between them however, with the command which the Athenian navy held in it, made communication difficult, and mutual support uncertain. The Eubœans therefore negotiated with Thebes ;

fallen indeed since the death of Epaminondas, yet still in power and reputation considerable. The passage of the narrow strait separating Eubœa from Bœotia was easy. A Bœotian force was welcomed by the two principal cities, Chalcis and Eretria; and though there was in every town an Athenian party, yet the revolters had the superiority throughout the island.

On news of this rebellion, the Athenian people being hastily summoned, consternation and dismay pervaded the assembly. The usually forward talkers, accustomed to accuse the best men of the republic, and arrogantly to claim all political wisdom and probity to themselves, fearing now to be silent, yet feared to speak. Such circumstances invite and urge forward conscious worth. Timotheus, so often the leader of the republic's forces to victory, the surety of its faith in negotiation, diffident generally and backward in debate, now mounted the speaker's stand. "What!" said he (we may perhaps trust Demosthenes for the words, which he probably heard), "are the Thebans in the island, and is there a question what should be done? Will you not cover the sea with your ships? Will you not, breaking up instantly this assembly, hasten to Piræus and go aboard?"

*Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 108.*

This energetic address from a man so respected surprised the people into animation and energy; for so only now could the Athenian government be directed. The wisdom of the ablest in cool argument availed nothing: sober reason were in vain applied to: the fate of the republic depended on the popular passion that could be in the moment excited. Fortunately the quick and just judgment of Timotheus, which could excite the feeling that the moment required, was able also to conduct it to its proper end. Of the animating speech reported by the greatest of the contemporary orators, the fortunate result remains reported in panegyrical

Æsch. con.
Ctesiph.
p. 479. strain by his principal rival. "Only five days," says Æschines, "after the Theban forces landed in Eubœa, the Athenians were there. Within thirty the Thebans were compelled to a capitulation, under which they quitted the island; and the Athenian democracy gave freedom to the Eubœan towns, which it was the purpose of the Theban democracy to enslave."

We shall be aware that a Theban orator would have given a different turn to his account of the same transactions. If his candour, or the notoriety of the facts, compelled him to admit all the success that the Athenian orator claimed for the Athenian arms, he would still have asserted the good principle of his own and the bad of the Athenian democracy; he would have contended that the Thebans, solicited by the Eubœans themselves, went to restore to them the freedom which the Athenians had oppressed. But for the real character of the Eubœan war the account of Diodorus may deserve attention; apt as he is to be misled by party-writers, but least disposed to partiality where the Theban and Athenian democracies were in opposition. "The Eubœans," he says, "torn by faction, called in, some the Thebans, some the Athenians. War pervaded the island in little conflicts, without any general action. After much slaughter on both sides, and war carried into every part of the country, the people, hardly at length admonished by their sufferings, settled into concord, and made peace with one another. The Bœotians then withdrew, and interfered in their affairs no more."

Comparing this account with what remains from the orators, we may gather that while the Eubœans contended only among themselves, the Athenian government was little solicitous about the event. Like some of the Italian governments of ages past, (what is to come remains to

be seen,) as amends for the want of other liberty, it indulged the people in that of killing one another. But as soon as the Thebans interfered jealousy became at once violent. Under the wise guidance of Timotheus however, preponderance being restored to the Athenian interest, the Theban troops, without any military action that caught much the common eye, were reduced to such difficulty as to be glad to have means, under a capitulation, to leave the island. The liberality then shown toward the vanquished party of the Eubœans is eulogised by both the orators. Apparently the popular temper, chastened by alarms and dangers, restrained the noisy adventurers in the field of oratory, and allowed a just influence to the magnanimity and humanity of Timotheus. It was settled that every town should acknowledge, as formerly, a political subjection to Athens, and, for the benefit of protection against each other, as well as against foreigners, pay a tribute, but of fixed amount; that, for the purpose of a regular and just superintendency of the general concerns of the island, every town should send its representative to reside at Athens, and attend the council and assemblies as occasion might be; but, for the management of affairs merely civil, that each should preserve its former constitution and its independent administration. All then being highly jealous of one another, and the governing party in every one jealous of another party among their fellow-citizens, all conscious of the want of a superintending power, and no other sufficiently powerful appearing, all were led to attach themselves again, by a subjection in a great degree voluntary, to the imperial democracy of Athens.

Thus the most pressing of the dangers which had threatened the republic was averted, and hope began again to soar high in the popular mind. Nothing was seen remaining to prevent the direction of the full force of the state against

Strab. & Plut.

Demosth. de
cor. Æschin.
ut ant.

the contumacious allies, whose resistance, hitherto so distressing, could not, it was supposed, then be maintained much longer. They being subdued, not only the empire of the Athenian people might resume its former extent and splendour, but the public view might, with fair expectation of success, be extended to farther conquest. Such, as the

Isocr. de pace,
& in Areop.

contemporary patriot Isocrates informs us, were the intemperate purposes which a large part of the ill-judging multitude were led to hold.

On the return of the force under Timotheus from its truly glorious expedition the city was given up to gladness; and the greetings on the joyful occasion were still going forward when the vain hopes of the ambitious were checked, and the just gratification of the more moderate turned

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.

again into anxiety and apprehension. Ministers arrived from Amphipolis with the alarming news that Olynthus and Macedonia were united in confederacy to carry their arms against that favourite colony of the Athenian people, so recently recovered to their dominion, and that it must fall, unless that speedy support were given which they were sent to supplicate.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

AFFAIRS OF ATHENS AND MACEDONIA FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THEM TO THE END OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE ATHENIANS AND THEIR ALLIES, CALLED THE CONFEDERATE OR SOCIAL WAR.

SECTION I.

Historical Memorials from the Orators. — Alliance of Macedonia with Olynthus against Athens. — Negotiation between Athens, Macedonia, and Olynthus. — Hostilities prosecuted. — Successes of the Allies.

IN all Grecian history there is hardly any period more interesting than that with which we are now engaged; and for that interesting period we are almost without an ancient historian. The Sicilian annalist, Diodorus, fuller on the concerns of his native island, assists for the general history of Greece principally by the ground he affords for connection and arrangement of materials given by others, especially the orators, but even for this often failing. Occasional assistance is given by Plutarch, but the orators furnish incomparably the richest mine. The testimony of an orator however must be received with much caution. For facts indeed, of general notoriety among those before whom he spoke, his first object, persuasion, would generally forbid gross falsehood. But whatever he might venture to disguise would receive a colouring from the purpose of his argument: where he might venture to feign, even fiction may be suspected. Toward ascertaining truth, adverse orators, in the scanty opportunities offering, should be

compared; the course of events, the character of the times, the characters of parties, the character of the orator himself, his purpose in the moment, and the opportunity for answering him, should be considered. The task of the modern writer on this portion of history thus becomes laborious, and sometimes, from an unsatisfactory result after all labour, irksome; but to do any justice to the subject it must be undertaken. Those who, like Rollin and some others, give entire confidence to Demosthenes, may produce an amusing romance, with touching panegyric and invective, but their narrative will be very wide of real history.¹

The war against Olynthus, prosecuted with such advantage to Athens while she had the benefit of co-operation from the Macedonian arms, had nearly slept since that co-operation had been repelled by the insolently injurious aggression at Pydna. The situation of Macedonia meanwhile was such as could not but excite apprehension and anxiety in its government and among its people. After having lost Pydna, its last sea-port, it had seen Amphipolis pass from the alliance of Olynthus under the dominion of

Athens. Demosthenes rated the importance of Amphipolis to the welfare of Macedonia very high: "While the Athenians," he said, "held Amphipolis and Potidæa, the king of Macedonia could not reckon himself safe in his own house." When, with Amphipolis and Potidæa then, Methone and Pydna also were subject to Athens, and all the rest of the Macedonian coast was

Demosth.
Phil. 2. p. 70.
& Phil. 3.

¹ One cannot but wonder in what confidence Rollin has represented even the private character of Demosthenes good and even perfect. Auger, whose translation of the orators has obtained wide estimation, eulogising, after the manner which is not new with the French school, the politics of Demosthenes, and reckoning him a consummate patriot, admits, though with professed regret, that his private character did not assort with his public reputation: "Je suis fâché (he says) pour l'honneur de Démosthène, qu'il nous ait laissé lui-même des preuves de sa mauvaise foi, et de son défaut de probité." Note 51. on his translation of the speech on the Embassy, p. 230.

held by the Olynthians, against whom he had waged war for Athens, the danger to himself and to his people must have been great indeed.

It was hardly possible for two powers more to have interests unavoidably interfering, jealousies in consequence necessary and extreme, hostile disposition therefore ever ready, and real conciliation impracticable, than Macedonia and Olynthus; they were as Scotland formerly and England, or even worse; they must be completely united, or ever hostile. As then Olynthus was in a way to be subdued by Athens, but not to be united with Macedonia, and in subjection to the Athenian empire would be still more dangerous than in independency, it seems to have been fortunate for Macedonia that the Athenian government, by conduct apparently little less impolitic than profligate, prepared the way for what was of all things most desirable, but otherwise most impracticable. Alliance with the Macedonian kingdom, which the ambition of the Olynthian leaders, in the prosperity of their confederacy, would have scorned, was looked upon, in the present pressure, with more complacency. Philip used the open opportunity. Peace was made between the two governments, and an alliance followed, the express purpose of which was to profit from the existing embarrassment of the Athenians, in unsuccessful war against their allies, for driving them entirely from the shores of Macedonia and western Thrace.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.
B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. 3.
[Cf. p. 329.]

This alliance appears to have been a complete surprise upon the administration of Athens; who seem to have depended upon the speculation that friendly connection between Macedonia and Olynthus was impossible. The occasion was fair for reproach to that party which had so embroiled the republic, and great contention of oratory ensued. Of the particulars no information remains; but it

appears that the result was not altogether favourable to those who, by the nefarious aggression at Pydna, had forced a valuable ally to become a dangerous enemy. Though not driven from their leading situation, they were unable, or, in the existing circumstances, fearful to follow up their own measures, which nevertheless they would not abandon. The decree which the sovereign multitude at

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.
p. 19. length was persuaded to ratify, declared, "That no military force should at present be diverted from the important purpose of reducing the rebellious allies; but that negotiation be entered upon for obviating the injury threatened by the Olynthians and Macedonians."

Ibid. In pursuance of this decree ministers were sent into Macedonia; and, in return, ministers came from both Macedonia and Olynthus. The Macedonians appear to have been received with some due respect; but the spirit of freedom in the republicans of Olynthus was ill accommodated to the spirit of dominion in the republicans of Athens. These, holding the Olynthians themselves as rebellious subjects, heard with scorn the arguments of their ministers in favour of the freedom of Amphipolis, though it had been decreed by successive congresses of the Greek nation. Philip's ministers are said to have proposed that

Theopomp.
ap. Ulpian.
& Suid. the Macedonian forces should be withdrawn from Amphipolis, provided Pydna were restored to Macedonia. The Athenian administration however coming to no conclusion, yet pressing for a cessation of hostilities, Philip, in a letter to the Athenian people, if an oration of the time, transmitted among those of Demosthenes, may be trusted, declared that "he would conquer Amphipolis for them."² But the orator has carefully avoided notice of stipulations which Philip, taught by experience when he

² The character of the oration on Halonnesus, in which this is found, will occur for future notice.

conquered Potidæa and Torone for them, would hardly fail now to annex to such a promise. The proposals however, of which the orator has avoided an account, appear to have excited serious attention, and produced much discussion. But the party, bent upon war and conquest, provided that decision should be delayed while ministers from the republic went again into Macedonia; and, they naming the ministers, nothing was concluded.³

Meanwhile measures were put forward by the Macedonians and Olynthians for confirming their alliance, of the need of which the circumstances of their unsuccessful negotiation at Athens had afforded abundant proof. In this business we find Philip still pursuing that system of liberality approaching extravagance, by which he accomplished his first connection with Athens, and in which he persevered while Athens allowed the connection to hold. Anthemus, a principal town of Macedonia, in the neighbourhood of Olynthus, had formerly, in the early part of the reign of Amyntas, been among those which renounced their connection with the distracted kingdom, to join the then flourishing Olynthian confederacy. On the dissolution of that confederacy it was restored to

Demosth.
Philip. 2.
p. 70.

³ Should the reader, having perchance looked at the account of these negotiations in Rollin's *Ancient History*, or in Leland's *Life of Philip*, suppose that I have not related them so fully and clearly as ancient authorities would warrant, and especially that I have been deficient in exposing the wiles and falsehood of Philip, I would request him to look into Demosthenes, rather certainly into the original, but even Leland's translation, and see whether even Leland's Demosthenes will warrant half what is to be found in Leland's *Life of Philip*, for which the authority of Demosthenes is there claimed. The good sense and even perspicacity which Rollin has shown in treating the early part of Grecian history seem to have been bewildered when he lost those invaluable guides, the contemporary historians. For Sicilian history he has bowed to Plutarch, and for Macedonian he has been imbued with all the venom, that Demosthenes could have wished to infuse into the Athenian multitude. Demosthenes himself is no such unfair historian. His credit and the ready means for conviction forbade. Guarding only against the fascination of his colouring, for facts necessarily of public notoriety he may apparently be generally trusted; though occasion will occur in the sequel to notice some important and curious exceptions.

the kingdom, of which, before its defection, it had been a member from time immemorial. Philip now, resigning his right of dominion, allowed it to become again a member of the confederacy of which Olynthus was again the head.⁴ The knowledge of a strong predilection among the Anthemuntines for the Olynthian connection was probably among Philip's inducements to such a concession.

On the other hand we are told that, among the Amphipolitans, there was a Macedonian party of such fervent zeal that they paid divine honours to Philip, as a hero or demigod, the lineal descendant of the god Hercules. Among parties extravagance is apt to be mutual; a beginning on one side excites it on the other. Where it began among the Amphipolitans we are without information; but it seems to have

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 8. pervaded them extensively. The party adverse to the Macedonian interest, holding the principal power in the city, proceeded to violences, which are no otherwise described by the historian than as very offensive, and giving large and repeated provocation for the direction of the Macedonian arms against them. Hence apparently, omitting for the present the nearer concerns of Potidæa, Methone, and Pydna, the united arms of Macedonia and Olynthus were directed against Amphipolis.

For this interesting period much of our information comes from most consummate politicians, the Athenian orators; but writers with the military knowledge, as well as the candid impartiality, of Thucydides and Xenophon wholly fail. We learn however that the art of sieges had been much improved since the Peloponnesian war. Battering engines, then little known, or from inartificial construction and unskilful application little efficacious, were now brought to considerable perfection and into extensive use. The

⁴ Thus, I think, the orator's phrase, 'Ἀνθεμόυντα μὲν αὐτοῖς ἡφίει, may be with most exactness represented.

siege of Amphipolis being formed by the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia, under the orders of the Macedonian king, battering engines were applied against the walls, and a breach was soon made. Some bloody assaults followed. According to Diodorus, the town was taken by storm. The contemporary orator's words indicate a capitulation; where, his purpose having been to excite odium against both Philip and the Amphipolitans of the Macedonian and Olynthian party, he has attributed the loss of the place to treachery. The fact, as far as it may be gathered, seems to have been that, when, after repeated assaults at the breach, defence became at length desperate, the leaders of the Athenian party could no longer hold their authority over the many, less deeply interested in the event. The friends of Macedonia and Olynthus then, regarded as those who alone could avert impending destruction, acquired a leading influence; and the surrender of course followed, which the orator, pleader for the Athenian interest, equally of course called treachery. [B. C. 358.*
Cl.]

On this occasion the humanity and the magnanimous liberality, which had before shone in Philip's conduct, were again conspicuous. Executions, so common among the Greeks, and not least among the Athenians, were wholly avoided. The violent only of the Athenian party either were banished, because they could not be safely trusted in the place, or voluntarily withdrew, because they could not trust themselves among their fellow-citizens. According to Philip's custom, all prisoners of war were freely dismissed. None of the remaining inhabitants suffered for party opinions or past conduct. The king's usually engaging affability and civility were extended to all; but those who had exerted themselves in the Macedonian cause were re-

* ["B. C. 358. Amphipolis taken by Philip, ἐπὶ Κηφισοδότου, after his victory over the Illyrians. Diod. xvi. 8. — Polyænus iv. 2, 7." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 122.]

warded with marked attention. In uniting Amphipolis to the Macedonian kingdom no violence appears to have been put upon its municipal constitution : it became a member of the Macedonian state nearly as our colonies, holding their several constitutions, are members of the British empire.

The necessary arrangements being made in Amphipolis, Philip marched to Pydna. A large party there had remained attached to the Macedonian connection, and with this party matters had been so prepared that the Macedonian army no sooner appeared before the town than the gates were opened. This important place being thus easily recovered to his kingdom, Philip proceeded, without delay, to employ his military force and his military abilities where the interest of his new allies the Olynthians most pressingly wanted them. In conjunction with the Olynthian forces he formed the siege of Potidæa. A majority of the people were enough dissatisfied with Athenian sovereignty to have renewed long ago their connection with Olynthus, but that an Athenian garrison restrained them. Presently therefore, after the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia appeared before the place, the Athenians and their friends found themselves obliged to seek personal safety by withdrawing into the citadel. The town immediately opened its gates to the besiegers, and the citadel, being invested, was soon reduced to surrender at discretion.

We have many times seen, and we shall again have occasion to see, how very wretched, among the Grecian republics commonly, was the condition of prisoners of war, and how deplorable the lot of a town taken. The elder Dionysius had been giving examples of liberality and clemency, not only in foreign but even in civil war, scarcely heard of before among the Greeks. This is so uncontested that it may seem to have been in envy of his superior character that his reputation has been otherwise so traduced. Philip, who

appears at least to have equalled him in nobleness of sentiment and conduct, has met with nearly an equal share of such malice. The clearest courage and extraordinary military talents have been his undisputed merits; yet, in the chequered accounts of him, his generous anxiety to obviate, by a liberal policy, the necessity for using arms, shines through all the clouds of party invective, so that it seems to have been really the more prominent part of his character. Conceding Potidæa, with all its appurtenances, to the Olynthians, he was careful to require that the Athenian prisoners should be his; aware how necessary his interference would be against the revenge of the Potidæans of the party adverse to Athens, who had been held in a subjection so severe that we find it marked by a term implying almost slavery. Philip not only gave his prisoners present security, but liberally supplied their wants; and then, without requiring anything of the ransom which we have seen the republics, in their utmost liberality to prisoners of war, requiring of one another, he provided conveyance for them to Athens.⁵

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.
p. 19, 20. & in
Aristocr. p. 656.

⁵ Modern writers have sometimes made ancient history wonderful, on the claimed authority of ancient writers, who really give them no warrant for miracles. Thus Leland, in his Life of Philip, says, "The Amphipolitans were obliged to surrender themselves to the mercy of the conqueror, whom they had provoked by an obstinate defence, though, by an unaccountable inconsistency of conduct, they continued to pay him divine honours." The wonder will vanish when it is observed there were at least two, but rather three or even four parties in Amphipolis. Diodorus, though not always so clear and explanatory as might be wished, has given here all necessary explanation: *Τοὺς μὲν (τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν) ἀλλοτριῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν (τὸν Φίλιππον) διακείμενους ἐξυγάδευσε, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις φιλανθρώπως προσήνεχθη.* It is obvious that the *ἀλλοτριῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενοι* would not be those who paid him divine honours, and that the *ἄλλοι* were not those who obstinately resisted him.

But, though Leland seems to have resigned his judgment often most weakly to the presumptuous liveliness of his French predecessor in the history of Philip, yet we sometimes find from him sober criticism, apparently his own, which does him credit. "The revolt of Pydna," he says, "afforded Phillip a fair occasion of marching against that city, to reduce it to his obedience. The siege was formed, and the Pydnæans, unsupported by their new sovereigns" (the Athenian people,) "were soon obliged to surrender. Libanius and Aris-

SECTION II.

Cotys, King of Thrace. — Expedition of Philip into Thrace. — Acquisition and improved Management of the Thracian Gold-mines. — Affairs of Thessaly. — Liberal Conduct of Philip in Thessaly, and Advantages ensuing.

By these rapid measures the scheme of offensive operations concerted between the Macedonian and Olynthian govern-

tides have both asserted that, at the very time when the people were performing those solemn rites, by which the terms of their capitulation were ratified, Philip ordered his soldiers to fall on them without mercy, and thus cruelly massacred a considerable number of the citizens. But such an instance of barbarity would not, it may reasonably be presumed, have been omitted by Demosthenes, who represented all the actions of this prince in the blackest light; nor is it at all consistent with the tenor of his actions: for, although his humanity was, on many occasions, made to yield to his policy" (even for this accusation however I must say I know not what good authority is to be found), "yet unnecessary barbarity was neither consistent with his temper nor his interest. It seems therefore more reasonable to suppose that he accepted the submission of the inhabitants without inflicting any extraordinary severities, and without disgracing his present to the Olynthians, to whom he now gave up Pydna, by putting them in possession of a city depopulated, and polluted by the blood of helpless wretches who had laid down their arms and yielded themselves to his mercy." Leland's Life of Philip, book 1. sect. 2.

It is enough indicated by Demosthenes that Pydna was recovered to the Macedonian kingdom, through a party among the people, without any great effort in arms. That no execution of rebels, whom all law and policy would condemn, followed, were too much to conclude from the mere silence of one habituated, like Demosthenes, to the operation of the cruel law of treason of the Athenian and other surrounding republics; but that the report of Aristides and Libanius, if even it had such executions for some foundation, was grossly exaggerated, Leland seems with good reason to have judged. Demosthenes, who, with all his fire and vehemence, was a wise and discreet speaker, would not risk the assertion of falsehoods such as Aristides, who had less eminence to fall from, might hazard; but he was most ingenious in the use of hints and half-sayings, to raise or to confirm scandalous reports that might promote his purposes, without incurring the imputation of asserting falsely. Such we find concerning those who served Philip's cause at Amphipolis and at Pydna: *Καὶ ἴσασιν (οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι) ἃ τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους.* Olynth. 1. p. 10. "The Olynthians know what he did to those Amphipolitans who surrendered their town to him, and to those Pydnæans who admitted his troops." If by such hints he could excite any mistrust of Philip's frequent friendly proposals to the Athenian people, or obviate, in any degree, his growing popularity, it would be so much gained to

ments was completed. The Athenian republic was deprived of every tributary dependency on the northern shore of the *Ægean*, from the border of Thessaly to the Thracian Chersonese, unless some small sea-ports, strong on the land side by situation, and subsisting either by commerce or piracy, might find urgency yet to respect the Athenian navy, and hope of needlessness to respect any other power. Meanwhile in their distressing war with their allies the Athenians had made no progress. Philip therefore proceeded to use the leisure afforded through the embarrassment of that war to the Athenian government for improving the acquisitions he had made; and he directed his attention particularly toward the gold-mines which seem to have given Amphipolis, in the eyes of the Athenians themselves, its principal value.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 8.
B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. 3.
[Cf. date
p. 329.]

The Amphipolitans, even when supported by a close political connection with Olynthus, yet always threatened by the claims and growing power of Athens, appear to have been either unable or fearful to profit from the riches which

his cause without risk. On this indeterminate phrase of Demosthenes seems to have been founded the story that Plutarch has preserved, of merit for its moral tendency, though utterly unlikely to be true. The Macedonian soldiers, says the biographer, reviled the Amphipolitans, who surrendered their town, with the name of traitors. The Amphipolitans complaining to Philip of this he told them, "they must not mind it: his soldiers were plain men, who always called things by their names." The inconsistency of this with the deep and unremitted policy so frequently attributed to Philip, is obvious. But as the plain account of Diodorus, compared with all that remains from the orators, leaves no room for doubt but that it was a party from of old friendly to the Macedonian interest that delivered Amphipolis to Philip, it does not appear that the imputation of treachery could at all attach upon them.

Leland has followed the common reading of the passage of Diodorus, which says that Philip gave Pydna to the Olynthians. But the supposition of Barbeyrac and Wesseling, that in that place Pydna has been inserted, by the carelessness of transcribers, for Potidæa, is so warranted by Gemistius Pletho, by the scholiast on Demosthenes, citing Theopompus, and even by Demosthenes himself, who, in the second Philippic (p. 70.), mentions Anthemus and Potidæa as given by Philip to the Olynthians, without any notice of Pydna, that I have no scruple in following their proposed correction.

the mountains of their neighbourhood contained. In this neglect of the mines by others, the people of the island of Thasos, their earliest Grecian possessors, again directed adventure to them, and had now a factory there. It seems probable (for in the loss of the many Grecian histories of the time we are reduced to rest upon probability) that the Thasians purchased the forbearance, and perhaps the protection, of the nearest Thracian princes by the payment of a tribute. Thus the Thracian mines, in the hands of the people of Thasos, would produce a profit to those princes which would never have accrued through their own labour-scorning people; and here appears probable ground for the war which, without noticing its cause, Grecian writers report to have ensued between the king of Macedonia and the sovereign of all the Thracian hordes, that successor of Seuthes, Sitalces, and Teres, whom those writers have described by the name of Cotys.⁶

This prince is said, first among the Thracian kings, to have deviated from the ancient rough way of living of his nation, of which the authentic picture from Xenophon has been formerly noticed, and to have set the example of a soft and enervating luxury. His purpose however altogether seems to have been good; he desired to improve the ignorance and rudeness of his people by introducing Grecian science and arts among them. But, whether aware of the gross corruption of Grecian manners, and the extreme evils of Grecian politics, or habitually disliking confinement within the walls of a town, the favourite scenes of

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

⁶ The king of Macedonia, in his letter to the Athenian people, extant among the works of Demosthenes, calls this prince Sitalces. Whether either Sitalces or Cotys may have been rather name or title, or whether the Thracians may have borne several names, as the ancient Romans, or several titles, as some of the modern orientals, or what else may have occasioned the variety in the appellation, is fortunately of little consequence, the person being sufficiently ascertained under either name.

his luxury, and even of the conviviality in which after the disposition of his nation he delighted, were the banks of rapid streams among shady woods, chosen, as the account indicates, with taste and judgment, and improved at great expense by art, probably Grecian art, which Greeks might admire. The misfortune of a supervening derangement of understanding, rather than any original deficiency, seems early to have checked his improvements and thrown his government into confusion. He is said to have fancied himself enamoured of the goddess Minerva, and sometimes to have supposed her his bride. Athens, as her favourite seat, had a large share of his respect; and his disordered imagination led him to insist that he would wait at table upon his brother-in-law Iphicrates, the general of the armies of her people.

Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 12. p. 531.

Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 4. p. 131.

These anecdotes, from a contemporary, though of fabulous aspect, are probably not wholly unfounded. Another from a far more respectable contemporary may deserve attention, as it marks both the character of Cotys and that of the government of the Grecian commercial colonies; showing the freedom of those colonies while tributary to the Thracian prince, and expecting protection from him.

Aristot.
(Econ. l. 2.

Cotys, wanting money to raise a force of mercenary troops, applied to the rich citizens of the commercial town of Perinthus on the Propontis for a loan.⁷ This being refused, he requested that the Perinthians would undertake to garrison some towns for him, so that he might safely withdraw his own troops, and employ them on the service for which he had proposed the new levy. The Perinthians, thinking they saw here opportunity for advantage with little hazard, consented: once in possession of the towns they would keep them, or be paid their own price

⁷ That Perinthus was among the tributary towns of the dominion of Cotys is marked by Demosthenes, in the or. ag. Aristocr. pp. 674, 675.

for restoring them. Perinthian citizens accordingly marched to the several places. But Cotys obviated the perfidy by concealing an overbearing force in every town, so that the Perinthians, on entering, were made his prisoners. The plan being everywhere successfully executed, he sent information to the Perinthian government, that he had no purpose of injury to them or their fellow-citizens; if they would remit him the loan he had desired, all should be released. Thus he obtained the money, and on his side was faithful to his bargain.

Cotys however was no emulator of the military virtues of his ancestors. When Philip invaded the
Plut. Apophth. Thracian territory, if we may believe Plutarch for the anecdote, Cotys fled, and wrote him a letter. Probably Teres and Sitalces could not write. The simple mention of a letter from Cotys is said to have excited wonder and ridicule among the Macedonians, already beginning to esteem themselves a superior people. Of its contents we are no farther informed than that they drew a smile from the polite Philip; who proceeded unopposed to Onocarsis, one of the Thracian prince's favourite forest residences on which much expense had been bestowed, and still found no resistance prepared. His object then being not to oppress a weak prince, or conquer a wild country, but only to provide security for the territory containing mines of the precious metals, which he reckoned, as the Athenians had reckoned them, an appendage of his new acquisition, he turned his march to Crenidæ.

It would be under the impression rather of an opinion of possible future advantage than in any expectation of great immediate profit that Philip proceeded with his usual discernment and his usual liberality to take measures for an improved management of that much coveted possession. No way oppressing the Thasian settlers, he provided for

them the protection which they were likely to want against the fierce votaries of Mars and Bellona around them, and which they might be still more anxious to have against the abler conduct of the tribute-gathering generals of Athens. By encouragement he added greatly to the population of the place; and, as a pledge of future attention, he gave it, from his own name, that new appellation of Philippi, under which it acquired fame some ages after through the decision of the fate of the civilised world, by the victory which Octavius and Anthony obtained there over Brutus and Cassius.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.

It was not without great expense that he improved the manner of working the mines. The abundance of subterranean waters, increasing as the veins of ore were pursued deeper, had confined the scanty means of the Thasians to superficial labours, and to adventure daily less promising. In the want of the astonishing powers of the steam-engine, which give such advantages to the modern miner, Philip did what might be done by the best mechanical art of his age, assisted by numerous hands. With well-directed perseverance he is said so to have succeeded at length as to draw from his Thracian mines a revenue of a thousand talents, nearly two hundred thousand pounds yearly. Small as this sum appears now for great political purposes, the Thracian mines have been supposed by some later ancient writers, and more confidently asserted by some modern, to have furnished a revenue which gave him preponderancy among the potentates of his time. But, from mention of the Macedonian revenue remaining from Demosthenes, it appears that, at least till late in his reign, Philip could not be a very wealthy prince; and that the produce of the Thracian mines never made any very considerable part of his revenue. The customs of some sea-ports in Thessaly are mentioned as an

Diod. ut sup.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1. p. 16.

important source: even his share of prizes made by his cruisers was considerable to him: but of the mines no notice of any contemporary orator is found. Importance is attributed by Demosthenes to the possession of Amphipolis, only for the security of Macedonia. Indeed it is obvious that, though the produce might be considerable in the end, the expense, at first, would greatly reduce, or perhaps even overbear the profit; and after all possibly the plain between the mountains and the sea, one of the most extensive and fertile of that fine part of the world, when duly cultivated under the protection of a benign and steady government, would be a more valuable accession to the Macedonian kingdom than the mines at their utmost improvement.

B. C. 329. Ol.
105. 3-4. [Cf.
date, p. 329.]

In the next spring, while the Athenians were still engaged in doubtful war with those Grecian republics which they called rebellious allies, and at the same time distracted by contests of their orators at home, affairs

Ch. 34. s. 2.
of this Hist.

in Thessaly called the attention of the king of Macedonia. We have seen his father Amyntas owing his throne to his hereditary interest among the principal families of that productive country, and his

s. 3.

eldest brother, Alexander, repaying the obligation by protecting those families against the tyranny of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ. During the ensuing troubles of Macedonia the tagus had again extended his authority among the townships where it had been reduced to constitutional, or perhaps narrower than constitutional bounds. With the restoration of tyrannical power grievances were renewed and augmented; insomuch that the crime by which the tagus had perished gave general satisfaction, and a momentary popularity accrued to the assassins. But the supreme dignity to which they succeeded, hazardous in the best-balanced government, would, in the defective consti-

tution of Thessaly, be hazardous in extreme. To carry the necessary authority, and hold with it popular favour, would require the greatest talents united with the greatest prudence. The new tagus Tisiphonus and his brother Lycophron, who is said to have shared his authority, were soon found not less tyrants, though far less able rulers, than Alexander. The Alevads, whom we have had occasion already to notice, connected by hereditary hospitality and intercourse of good offices, and, as they flattered themselves, by blood, with the Macedonian kings, looked with satisfaction toward one in whose conduct, with uncommon vigour and uncommon prudence, had been seen united such uncommon liberality as in that of Philip. They solicited his assistance, and he marched to their relief.

Ch. 34. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We have now seen too much of the Athenian democracy to be surprised that it should make common cause with the worst tyrants that ever oppressed a Grecian people. Nevertheless it must be recollected that in Athens were always two or more parties, and that not all Athenians, and often not a real majority, approved the profligate measures for which the authority of the sovereign people was in legal course procured. Often also the government became, through imposition upon the folly of the sovereign many, so implicated that the best citizens would be at a loss to decide between what its necessities in the actual state of things required, and what should have been done in circumstances of freer choice. The power of the king of Macedonia, growing in a manner out of the injustice of Athens, was becoming an object of jealousy perhaps not wholly unreasonable. That party which had excited the injurious conduct toward him, professing to be the high democratical party, watchful of course of all his measures, led the people to vote assistance to the Thessalian tyrants

Demosth.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 14.

against him; but they were unable to procure effect to that vote, and none was sent. Diodorus, whose account receives support even from the hostile orator, relates what followed thus: "Philip," he says, "marching into Thessaly, defeated the tyrants; and acquiring thus freedom for the cities, he showed a liberality which so attached the Thessalians that in all his following wars and political contests they were his zealous assistants, and remained such to his son." Tisiphonus and Lycophron continued to hold the chief authority in Pheræ; but in Pharsalus and Larissa, the principal seats of the Alevads, and nearly throughout the rest of Thessaly, the king of Macedonia was thenceforward looked to as the protector of the constitution of the country.⁸

SECTION III.

Affairs of Thrace. — Different Views of Parties in Athens concerning foreign Interests. — Measures for recovering the Dominion of the Thracian Chersonese. — Charidemus of Eubœa, Citizen of Athens, and Son-in-law of the King of Thrace. — Assassination of the King of Thrace, approved and rewarded by the Athenian People.

THE Athenians had now been engaged two years in war with their allies, upon terms so equal, and with consequences so little striking, that no account of the transactions has been transmitted. Indeed the ambition and avarice of the people seem to have been so variously directed in rapid succession from one object to another, as this or that set of orators prevailed, and occasionally interrupted in all by the momentary prevalence of those who desired quiet,

⁸ Demosthenes himself has been led to confess, in plain terms, Philip's assistance to the Thessalians against their tyrants: Θετταλοῖς — ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν αἰχίαν ἐβόηθησι. Olynth. 2. p. 22.

that, with much undertaken, little was or could be done. But while great public purposes were thwarted or neglected, each party would pursue its own objects, amid all interruptions and disappointments, with persevering ardour and watchfulness. Thus, though the decree for assistance to the tyrants of Thessaly produced them no assistance, and even the Confederate war in a manner slept, yet the active spirit of Athenian politics was busy. That party which had embroiled the republic both with its independent ally the king of Macedonia and with its subject allies the Chians, and others, now found a new object to engage a preference of their attention. Miltochythes, a prince of the royal family of Thrace, raised rebellion against Cotys the actual sovereign, the ally of Athens, who had been honoured by the Athenian people with the two most flattering presents yet in use toward foreigners, the freedom of the city and a golden crown. Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the complicated circumstances and adverse events of wars in which the republic was already engaged, that party which had distinguished itself as the war-party persuaded the people to undertake a new war, in support of the rebel against his king, their ally and fellow-citizen. Just ground for the measure the able advocate of the party, Demosthenes, has utterly failed to show. Nor did success immediately reward the iniquity. The first commander commissioned to put it forward, Ergophilus, was superseded before he had done anything of which notice has reached us. The next, Autocles, was not only soon recalled, but prosecuted, and condemned for deficient zeal in the dishonest business. The party, successful in a measure so generally gratifying to the Athenian many as the prosecution of an eminent man, were still unable to procure the appointment of a commander hearty in their cause.

Demosth.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 655.

p. 659.

Ch. 35. s. 4.
of this Hist.

After that train of mysterious circumstances, formerly noticed, the capture of the chief of mercenaries, Charidemus, by the Athenian fleet, the ensuing acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian dominion, and the honours that followed to the captive general from the

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 672.
Aristot.
Econ. l. 2.
p. 394. t. 2.
ed. Paris.

Athenian people, that officer, with his band of mercenaries, had passed into the service of Artabazus satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, who was in rebellion against the king of Persia. Whether then the military adventurer was unreasonable, or the satrap faithless, disagreement arising between them, Charidemus was without means for the remuneration to his troops for which they reckoned him responsible to them. The difficulty and danger immediately ensuing he obviated by dextrous management, through which he raised contribution from the towns of Æolia, which were within the Bithynian satrapy. But in a wide country, with the government hostile, though his small numbers with superior discipline might resist direct assault, he had to apprehend being at length starved into a submission which must be destructive to him. From these threatening circumstances he was relieved by a new favour of the Athenian people, a decree, directing their new commander on the Hellespontine station, Cephisodotus, to transport him and his troops to the European shore. Such a decree would not be the measure of the party promoting the rebellion against the king of Thrace, which on the contrary was ended by it: for Charidemus was taken with his troops into the king of Thrace's service; and Miltocythes, seeing his rival thus strengthened, and the Athenian people issuing decrees indicating that he was to expect no more support from them, abandoned his enterprise.⁹

⁹ The orator's words, *τεινῶν ἐπιπορήσας παρ' ἑμῶν*, Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 672., seem fully to imply a decree of the people authorising the conduct of Cephisodotus; and such a decree was obviously adapted to produce that de-

Charidemus, who, through the force of mercenaries attached to him and his reputation for military and political abilities, had risen to be one of the most important characters of the age, was, if we should believe the invective of Demosthenes, the son of a woman of Oreus in Eubœa by an uncertain father, and began his military career in the lowest rank in the lowest service, a slinger in the light-armed. His first eminence, according to the same authority, was in the command of a small pirate-ship, in which he did not spare the allies and subjects of the Athenian people. The profits of his skill, activity, and boldness, in that line, enabled him to raise a considerable land force, ready for adventure under his orders, in the cause of any state among the almost numberless around the Grecian seas, which were now in the habit of employing such troops. From the silence of the orator, his vehement enemy, about any previous service, it should seem that the first in which he engaged was the Athenian, under that highly respectable general Iphicrates. The same orator's testimony then, still in the midst of invective, is positive to the advantageous circumstances already noticed, that, after having acted three years under that great man's orders, Charidemus was not only again engaged by him for the critical service of the siege of Amphipolis, but trusted as his most confidential friend; that his services were rewarded by decrees of the Athenian people with the freedom of the city, the honorary gift of a golden crown, and the still more extraordinary favour of a decree of privilege for the protection of his person against assassination. And though the recommendation of him to the people for the high trust of commander-in-chief of the republic's forces in Thrace was unsuccessful, yet that

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 691. & 668.

spair of Miltocythes which he has attributed to a decree of the Athenian people, Or. in Aristocr. p. 665.

the proposal could be ventured for one not born an Athenian largely indicates a superiority of reputation. The esteem which it thus appears he held with the aristocratical party in Athens would no doubt assist to recommend him at the court of Thrace; and such was his estimation there that, apparently to secure his services for the support of a weak prince on a tottering throne, he received in marriage the daughter of Cotys, niece of the wife of Iphicrates.

Imperfectly as the military and political transactions of these times have been transmitted, yet the views and principles of the contending parties in Athens remain largely indicated in the works, which we have the advantage to possess, of an orator of each party, Isocrates and Demosthenes. The party for which the former wrote, and with which Iphicrates acted, adverse to the oppression of subjects and to injurious and insulting measures against independent allies, proposed to repair, as far as might be, the error of alienating Macedonia by improving the old connection with the king of Thrace, and by supporting the Thracian monarchy as a valuable balance against the growing weight of the Macedonian. But the other party, whose leading orator Demosthenes afterward became, were not discouraged by their defeat. The right of the Athenian people to the rich dominion of the Chersonese was a topic on which they were likely to be favourably heard, and nearly secure against contradiction, which might afford opening for the charge of corruption, or of disaffection to the popular cause. The intrigues however of the party its orator would not disclose. We can only draw conjecture concerning them from the events, for which also we are nearly confined to those which his purpose in public speaking led him to mention. The next transaction of which we find notice is, that Charidemus besieged and took two Grecian towns of the Chersonese, Crithote and Eleus. The tenor of the orator's information

sufficiently indicates that a party in those towns, holding correspondence with the war party in Athens, had led them to rebellion against the king of Thrace, in hope of support from the Athenian people.¹⁰

Not long after this Cotys was assassinated, in the midst of his court, such as a Thracian court might be, by two brothers, Heraclides and Python, citizens of the Grecian town of Ænus in Thrace. Both escaped, and both found places of refuge for assassins. Python went to Athens, presented himself to the assembled people, avowed the deed, and glorying in it, demanded the reward which the Athenians, universal patrons of democracy, had been accustomed to give for tyrannicide. The motive to the crime, according to the orator, was private revenge for the death of the father of the assassins; which however, for anything said to the contrary, may have been suffered in legal course and for just cause. The Athenian people however were persuaded to adjudge the murder of the king, their adopted fellow-citizen, to be highly meritorious. They decreed the freedom of the city both to the bold petitioner and to his absent accomplice; and they added for each the honour of a golden crown. Obviously the party of Iphicrates did not then guide the popular voice. It were indeed somewhat saving for the general credit of the Athenian

Demosth.
in Aristocr. i.
p. 659.

¹⁰ Demosthenes, in his oration against Aristocrates, having in view to incite the Athenian people to the utmost against Charidemus, speaks of these two towns as the last remaining to the Athenian dominion in the Chersonese. But the tenor of his following argument shows that the conduct of Charidemus on that occasion, was not, at the time, considered as any act of hostility against Athens. Indeed it appears that Charidemus never ceased to hold his connection with that party in Athens with which he had originally been connected, which would not have ventured to countenance an act of notorious hostility against the republic. But if, as is probable, a powerful party in those towns remained always connected with that party in Athens of which Demosthenes became the leading orator, this would be ground sufficient for his assertion, to the Athenian people, that Charidemus had wronged them by reducing towns, friendly to Athens, under the dominion of the king of Thrace. In the sequel we shall find a Charidemus intimately connected with Demosthenes.

people, might we believe, what the orator would not avow, but his account affords ground to suspect, that a political purpose did combine with the passion of revenge in prompting to the atrocious deed, and that the assassin confided in a party in Athens, from whose intrigues and incitement, rather than from any general sentiment deliberately held among the people, he derived his reward. Yet, on the other hand, when we find the greatest orator known to fame recalling to popular recollection both the assassination and the public approbation of it, solemnly given in a decree of the sovereign assembly, when we find this brought forward not for reprobation, but as a just and solid ground on which public measures should be thereafter taken, it must be difficult to find apology, even for the people. For the orator, it may be doubtful whether the impolicy of his doctrine should most excite wonder, or its flagitiousness indignation and disgust.

SECTION IV.

Cephisodotus Athenian Commander in Thrace. — Political Principles of the Athenian Administration. — Rebellion encouraged in Thrace. — Admirable moral Principle of the Thracians. — Athenodorus Athenian Commander. — Pressure upon the young King of Thrace. — Mission of Chabrias to Thrace, and liberal Composition of Differences.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 674.

WHEN the unfortunate king of Thrace was murdered, his son and legal successor, Kersobleptes, was yet a boy. Those then who had persuaded the Athenian people to cherish and reward the assassins of the father were not slow in endeavours to profit from the weak age of the son. War with Thrace was not avowed, the pressure of the confederate war and the strength of the opposing party forbidding; but, as before against both Thrace and Macedonia,

while still peaceful purpose was pretended, the most injurious and insulting hostility was committed. In the wealthy commercial town of Perinthus, opportunity, such as before at Pydna, inviting, Cephisodotus led the fleet thither. Fortunately Charidemus was at hand to assist the councils of the young king his brother-in-law; and to his abilities and superior acquirements the Thracians had the moderation and prudence to defer. He went to Perinthus; the party proposing revolt there was checked, and the purpose of the Athenians was defeated. Cephisodotus received then orders to besiege Alopeconnesus, a town situated at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, and, equally as Perinthus, within the acknowledged dominion of the Thracian king. Nevertheless, in directing their officer to take possession of this town, the Athenian rulers did not scruple to aver that the hostility was not at all intended against the king of Thrace, but only against the pirates, robbers, and drowners, as the orator calls them, who found refuge there.¹¹ Charidemus however, judging that, within the Thracian dominion the Thracian government should undertake the repression of wrong rather than an Athenian officer, marched to Alopeconnesus. Cephisodotus, hopeless of success through violence, entered into negotiation with him, and a treaty was concluded. Of the terms we have no information, except that they were dissatisfactory to the high democratical party, who procured the recall of Cephisodotus, and brought him to trial for his life. To institute prosecution against the officers commanding the republic's forces was now become so ordinary, that of itself it seems to involve no reasonable presumption of any guilt: and Cephisidotus appears to stand exculpated by the

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 675.

p. 676.

¹¹ The similarity of the French republic's professions in invading Egypt, and on other occasions, cannot but occur to the informed reader.

failure of the orator to specify any objection to the treaty, or misconduct of any kind in his command, if the treaty was not objectionable. Nevertheless death, in the usual form of Athenian prosecution, was the punishment proposed in the indictment; and, of the multitudinous court, a majority of three votes only saved his life. His condemnation to a fine, the delight of the Athenian many, to the amount of five talents, about a thousand pounds, his friends were unable to prevent.

The leaders of the party at this time governing Athens, the party which prosecuted Cephisodotus, proposed to oppress the infant monarch of Thrace, and decreed high reward for the assassination of his father, are not named by ancient writers; but the principles of that party, should we doubt Isocrates, or did the facts reported leave them doubtful, we learn from authority utterly unsuspicious, that of the

Demosth.
in Aristocr.

great orator who became its advocate. "The troubles and jealousies of your neighbours," Demosthenes told the Athenian people, "are the best foundation and surest support of your power and dominion." Mentioning then the frequent wars and unceasing discord of the principal Grecian cities, he says, "they are what Athens should always rejoice to see." Coming afterward to the consideration of the concerns of the Athenian people in the affairs of Thrace, he does not scruple to contend, in direct terms, that Charidemus, brother-in-law of the Thracian monarch, and trusted by him with the situation of first minister and commander-in-chief of his forces, ought nevertheless, being also an Athenian citizen, to have betrayed the king and people of Thrace to the people of Athens. "Charidemus," he says, "ought to have made the Chersonese yours; and not only so, but when Cotys was assassinated, he ought to have consulted you how the Thracian throne should be disposed of; and, in common with you, he should

have established one king or several, as your interest might require."

When talents like those of Demosthenes were prostituted to the purpose of so instructing the sovereign many of Athens, it cannot appear wonderful that the sceptre in its hands was ill wielded; nor will candour attribute the vices of the government to anything in the natural character of the people. Profligate conduct only could be expected when a party, avowing such principles, carried a majority of votes in the general assembly. Accordingly not only ratification of the treaty made by Cephisodotus with Charidemus was denied, but Miltocythes, who had before taken arms against Cotys, was now encouraged to resume them against Kersobleptes. The Eubœan adventurer still was the support of the Thracian monarchy. He got possession of the persons of the rebellious Miltocythes and his son. Aware then of a deficiency in the Thracian policy, which, though highly honourable to the Thracian character, was of a kind to be highly dangerous to any government, he committed his prisoners to the custody of the Cardians.

After observing in the Greeks, founders of science and fine taste among mankind, the shocking deficiency of moral principle, and all the horrors of practice ensuing, which so darkened and deformed the brightest days of that illustrious people, it is a phenomenon equally surprising and gratifying, a meteor, not surely out of the course of nature, yet seemingly out of all analogy within human comprehension, that we find among the barbarian Thracians; enemies of science and useful industry, votaries of the horrid imaginary deities of war and rapine, they held, in opposition to the Greeks, principles of the purest morality and humanity, and carried them in practice even to excess. "Charidemus knew," says the same great orator who has reported with complacency the murder of Cotys and the honours granted by the

Athenians to his assassins, "that, had Miltocythes been surrendered to Kersobleptes, his life would have been secure: BECAUSE THE LAW OF THE THRACIANS FORBIDS TO KILL ONE ANOTHER." The Thracians, it appears, not only abhorred that flagitious and base assassination, so familiar among the most polished of the Greeks, but their institutes forbade all killing of those who had been once admitted to friendship; so that even treason against the state did not, in their idea, justify capital punishment. Nothing in the history of mankind can be found more honourable to human nature than such principles, followed up by such practice, among such barbarians. Those eulogies of Scythian virtue, which might otherwise appear extravagance of fancy, imagined by Greek and Roman writers only for the purpose of reproaching, with more powerful effect, the profligacy of their own polished ages, seem thus in no small degree warranted. From such barbarians may seem to have been derived that generous spirit of chivalry of later times, which held it meritorious to seek combat everywhere, yet a sacred duty to spare the lowly and relieve the oppressed; and from such barbarians, could we trace our origin to them, we might be proud to derive our stock.

Whether Miltocythes was really more criminal or unfortunate we are without means to judge; any farther than as the support of a considerable party among the Thracians might speak in favour of his pretensions, and, on the contrary, the total omission of so able an advocate as Demosthenes to state them implies their deficiency. The conduct of Charidemus however appears to have been prudent; and nothing, even amid the orator's invective, affords fair presumption that it was in any point justifiable. To have shocked the generous principles of the Thracians by delivering Miltocythes to the executioner would have been

impolitic; but to have allowed the means of renewing attempts against the actual government would have been to betray the high trust confided to him. The Cardians, to whom he committed his illustrious prisoners, were distinguished for persevering assertion of their independency against all claim of dominion of the Athenian people. Obloquy from the Athenian orators would thus be earned; but the presumption seems warranted that the Cardians would not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Thracian kings unless upon liberal terms. That they should be wholly free from the ordinary vices of the republican Greeks were however too much to expect. In revenge apparently for the purpose of reducing them under the subjection which they abhorred, or perhaps judging it necessary for the prevention of so great an evil, they put Miltocythes and his sons to death. The great orator, from whom alone the account remains transmitted, adds that the execution of those princes was rendered shocking by circumstances of studied cruelty. Too consistent as this is with what we find ordinary among the Greeks, it should perhaps not be admitted without some allowance for the obvious and avowed purpose of the oration, to incense the Athenian multitude against those who had disapproved the patronage granted to Miltocythes, and the honours to the assassins of Cotys.

The party in Athens however which had so perseveringly coveted the dominion of the Chersonese for the republic, or for themselves, was not, by the death of Miltocythes, deprived of resources. The branches of the royal family of Thrace were numerous; and most of them, like Seuthes son of Sparadocus, known through the service of Xenophon under him; appear to have held appanages, such as those of the Macedonian princes, by which they might be formidable to

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 624.

the king on the throne. Two of the blood-royal of Thrace, Berisades and Amadocus, were connected with Athens by marriage; a sister of the former being wife of Athenodorus, an Athenian, and two sisters of the latter married to Bianor and Simon, Thracian Greeks by birth, but adopted citizens of Athens.¹² These were now excited to rebellion against Kersobleptes. What hopes were held out to them

does not appear, but explicit information of the purpose of the ruling party in Athens remains from the great orator, who became one of its leading members. It was, first, that Athens should gain the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and of all the Grecian towns as far as the Euxine; and then that even the wild remainder of the extensive country should not be given to the two friendly, but divided between the three princes; that so, through their separate weakness and mutual animosity, all might be always dependent on Athens.

To carry this purpose into execution the party, after some struggle, obtained the appointment of commander-in-chief for one zealous in their cause, Athenodorus; apparently him who had married a sister of the Thracian prince. They feared however to press their interest with the people so far as to ask the service of Athenian citizens in the army to be employed; and, if they obtained any money, it was in very inadequate amount. A fleet, the wealthy as usual being charged with the equipment, was

¹² Leland has supposed, I know not on what authority, that Berisades and Amadocus were younger brothers of Kersobleptes, and entitled to divide the sovereignty of Thrace with him. It is amply marked by Demosthenes that they were not so nearly related, either to Kersobleptes or to each other; nor am I aware of anything in any ancient author to warrant the supposition that the kingdom of Thrace was legally so divisible. Younger brothers of Kersobleptes could not themselves have managed any such contest with him; for Demosthenes expressly says (or. in Aristocr. p. 656.) that Kersobleptes was a boy when his father was assassinated.

readily granted. For raising and maintaining a land force they probably hoped that the influence of an Athenian general, and the zeal with which Bianor and Simon and Berisades and Amadocus would support him, might suffice, so that they might have the credit of making a great acquisition to the Athenian empire, free of cost to the people. The measures seem to have been ably concerted: a large force of mercenaries was raised; and Kersobleptes was so pressed that he was reduced to treat about the surrender of the dominion of the Chersonese to Athens, and a division of the remainder of his dominions. If the orator might be believed, the treaty was concluded. But from the sequel it appears probable that, increase of troubles arising for the republic, Charidemus found opportunity to protract the negotiation. Evidently no surrender had been made, either to the Athenian republic, or to the Thracian princes, when the want of pecuniary supplies, which we have seen in better times crippling or deranging the measures of the greatest Athenian commanders, disabled Athenodorus so that he could neither command nor persuade his troops to continue their service. This being once known to Kersobleptes and Charidemus, no surrender was likely to follow.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 677.

The sudden and total failure of the expedition under Athenodorus, after great hopes raised, appears at least to have assisted to produce a change of men and measures in the government of Athens. The sway reverted once more to that party which, with Isocrates and Xenophon, always reprobated a policy oppressive to allies and injurious to all neighbouring powers. Chabrias was sent, without any new force, to take the direction of the republic's affairs in Thrace. He found Kersobleptes and Charidemus, as Demosthenes himself confesses, disavowing the treaty pretended to have been concluded by them; but

Ibid.

disavowing equally any purpose of enmity to the Athenian people, and professing, on the contrary, a readiness and desire to renew alliance upon any equitable terms. Chabrias meeting them with only just views, a treaty was presently concluded. What advantages were stipulated for Athens, the treaty having been managed by those adverse to his party, the orator would not say; but he has mentioned as of injury to the Athenian people, and so matter for complaint, that the dominion of the Chersonese, with the undivided sovereignty of Thrace, remained to Kersobleptes.

SECTION V.

Slowness of the Athenians in the Confederate War. — Expedition under Chares. — Death of Chabrias. — Characters of Chares and of the Athenian People. — Offensive Operations of the Allies. — Exertion of the Athenians. — Relief of Samos. — Trial of Timotheus and Iphicrates.

WHEN the affairs of Thrace were thus for the present composed, the Confederate war still held a threatening aspect. The states, combined to resist the sovereignty of the Athenian people, not without some thought and preparation, had engaged in a contest in which failure, as from all experience they must expect, would bring a lot the most severe. Ships, such as the ancients used in war, being soon built and equipped, they had raised a fleet capable of balancing the naval power of the imperial republic, and disputing with it the command of the Ægean. At Athens on the contrary hitherto, through the opposition of opinions, the contention of parties, and the fluctuation of a commanding influence in the general assembly, decrees for the prosecution of the war were slowly, interruptedly, and at last defectively, carried into execution. To repair and augment the fleet and to engage mercenary troops would be ne-

cessary; while the existing force could ill be spared from the important business of awing the remaining allies and subjects, and preventing farther defection. Enterprise therefore, through the first year, was confined to depredations on commerce, and invasions without view beyond plunder.

Diod. l. 16.
C. 7.
Ol. 105. 2-3.

At length, after the establishment of peace with Thrace by Chabrias, some serious consideration, among all men, of the waning state of the republic's affairs appears to have led to a coalition of parties, apparently through concession of the moderate to the high democratical or war party. Chares, the most eminent officer of that party, was appointed to the command; Chabrias consented to serve under him¹³, and it was resolved to carry attack first against Chios.

B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. 3-4.

Assistance meanwhile for the Chians from their confederates was ready; and so powerful that the meditated blow must be rapidly struck, or it would be obviated, and before invasions and sieges could be undertaken the command of the sea would be to be vindicated. The land force under Chares and Chabrias being small, the co-operation of the fleet was necessary for any measures against the city of Chios. The resolution was therefore taken to force the way into the harbour. In this enterprise Chabrias led; and, not being duly supported, he was overpowered. Others engaged with him found personal safety by throwing themselves into the sea. Thinking this an example at all risk to be discountenanced, Chabrias refused to quit his ship, and fell fighting. The loss of the Athenians, beyond the

¹³ Diodorus joins Chabrias in the command with Chares, assigning him however the second place. According to Nepos, he served as a private individual, but, even so, was more respected and more consulted, says the biographer, than any officer of the armament. The sequel of the account rather marks him to have held the command of his own trireme, which seems more probable. In comparison of the commands to which he had been accustomed he might be called in that situation, as the biographer calls him, *privatus*.

valuable life of Chabrias, appears not to have been great; but the enterprise wholly failed; and, in the course of that year, nothing farther of importance was attempted.

It may be gathered from scattered information, regular history for this period failing, that the loss of Chabrias to the republic, in its existing circumstances, was as great as that of one man could easily be.¹⁴ The Roman biographer seems justly to rank him among the first characters that

Aristot. rhet.
l. 3. c. 10.

Greece had produced. Aristotle has left an anecdote indicating the exalted estimation in which he was held, and which yet had not secured him against a criminal prosecution. Even Demosthenes has been led to high eulogy of him; and it is remarkable that, in an age of such licentiousness, and such violence of party-spirit, detraction of him is found from none: while of Chares, whose associate and advocate Demosthenes afterward became, no good remains reported even by his own party. Favourite as he was of the multitude, and always the most eminent military man of the high democratical party, yet we find him vehemently decried by those later writers who have favoured that party; while his opponents, not Chabrias only, but Timotheus and Iphicrates also, have received from them large eulogy. It is to the candour of Xenophon that

¹⁴ Diodorus has related the death of Chabrias among events of the first year of the Confederate war, Ol. 105. 3., but this is hardly to be reconciled with what the contemporary orator has left concerning the transactions of Chabrias in Thrace. [Mr. Clinton places the death of Chabrias B. C. 357, without question.] Indeed Diodorus seems often, in reporting matters summarily, to have gone on beyond the year of which he was particularly treating. Thus we shall shortly find him, in regard to the siege of Methone, stating its beginning perhaps in the proper place, but proceeding immediately to relate its conclusion, which probably did not happen till the next year, when he again relates the same story more circumstantially. For all such matters I miss, in this part of the history, my valuable assistant for them in the former part, Henry Dodwell. Reiske's gleanings of chronology are little satisfactory: *Congessi hunc indicem*, he says, *ex observatis Schotti, & Corsinii, & Tylori, in schedis. Universe præmonendum duco hos tres auctores interdum in annis discrepare; aliis eadem eventa vetustiora anno, aliis juniora facientibus.* Observing then that the Attic year began at midsummer, he says justly, those writers may seem to differ by a year when they really differ only by a month.

the character of Chares is indebted for refutation of the sarcasm, which Plutarch has not scrupled to attribute to Timotheus, "that Chares was fit only to be a baggage-carrier." Xenophon describes him in his service in Peloponnesus during the Theban war, an active, enterprising, brave, and able officer. Less equal to greater commands, he was nevertheless, according to the observation of a contemporary writer, more made for the times than his more virtuous and higher-gifted opponents. It was probably not a discovery peculiar to Chares that, in the Athenian service, real merit little found its just reward or credit: but he, less than most others, scrupled to take advantage of the vices of the Athenian government; careless of the duties of command, indulging himself to excess in the gratifications it might furnish, and diligent principally in watching and flattering the fancies and passions of the people. In figure, in bodily strength, and in speciousness of conversation, supported by boldness of manner, he confessedly excelled. Confident thus in his power to maintain popular favour, he even made a parade of luxury, carrying about with him, on foreign command, a train of musicians, dancers, and harlots. Public money and private fortune he spent freely together on the ministers of his pleasures and those supporters of his conduct, the leading orators, framers of decrees, and all who gave their time to their courts of justice. Thus not only he obviated resentment of his profligacy, but became and remained, longer perhaps than any other since the great Pericles, the most popular man in Athens. "And this," says the same contemporary writer, the Chian Theopompus, "was no more than fair; for just so the Athenian people live themselves. The young men pass their time in hearing music and conversing with prostitutes: the elder in playing at dice, and other such dissipation; and the people, whose imperial

Ch. 28. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Theopomp. ap.
Athen. l. 12.
c. 8.

voice disposes of the public money, require more for public banquets and distributions of meat than remains for all public services."

With such claim for public favour, notwithstanding his failure at Chios, Chares remained commander-in-chief of the republic's forces. Zeal however for the prosecution of the war seems to have become less general, and exertion in consequence deficient. The allies meanwhile were active.

B. C. 356. Ol. 105.4—106.1.
Diod. i. 16.
c. 7. [See p. 361.] In the next spring, while Chares had only sixty ships, they put to sea with a hundred, and proceeded to offensive operations. The islands of Imbrus and Lemnus had been allowed, even by the peace of Antalcidas, to remain under the dominion of Athens. These they plundered, and then proceeded against Samos, perhaps the richest of the republic's remaining tributaries. The critical circumstances of the commonwealth then either produced a renewal of the coalition, or gave it new vigour. Iphicrates and Timotheus consented to serve with the favourite general of the multitude. If the Latin biographer should be trusted, Menestheus, son of Iphicrates, who had married a daughter of Timotheus, was appointed to the command, and the illustrious veterans embarked with him only to assist with their advice. It appears however that responsibility, and of course effectual command, rested with them. Sixty triremes, rapidly equipped, were hastened under their orders to join the fleet of equal number under Chares.

The fleet of the allies then would no more quit the harbour of Samos, but lying there assisted in the prosecution of the siege. The Athenian commanders judging attack upon it in its station too hazardous, sailed for the Hellespont; judging that, of two desirable events, this could hardly fail to produce one: if the enemy followed, Samos would be relieved; if they remained, Byzantium might be

assailed, weak in the absence of its principal force at Samos. The result answered expectation. The course taken by the Athenian fleet was no sooner ascertained than alarm, in some degree pervading the allies, was among the Byzantines vehement; and it was quickly resolved by all to postpone the begun enterprise against enemies for protection of friends.

They reached the Hellespont before the Athenians had entered it, but found them in a situation forbidding the passage. It happened that the wind became violent, yet not contrary to their course, which they resolved at all hazards to pursue; the disturbance of the elements, if it should not become extreme, being favourable for their purpose of progress, and adverse for that of the enemy to prevent it. The storm then did increase, so that Iphicrates and Timotheus concurred in opinion, that the danger of attempting action overbore all reasonable hope of advantage from it. Chares held, or affected afterward to have held, a contrary opinion. Action however was avoided, and the enemy passed up the Hellespont, molested only by the storm. The project against Byzantium was then necessarily abandoned, but relief of Samos, the great object of the re-enforcement recently sent to the fleet, was fully accomplished.

Nevertheless Chares, thinking the opportunity favourable for ruining his colleagues, whom he considered as his rivals, resolved to use it. In his letters to the sovereign people, he averred that the enemy's fleet would have been destroyed, but for the failure of Iphicrates and Timotheus in their obvious duty. The suspicious and irritable multitude was inflamed: Timotheus and Iphicrates were recalled, and put on trial for their lives. We have an anecdote from Aristotle implying the conscious integrity of Iphicrates and the notorious profligacy of his opponent: "My speech," said the veteran general, whose rhetorical talents are noticed by Dionysius of Hali-

Aristot. rhet.
1. 3. c. 10.
Dion. Hal. in
Lys. p. 85.

carnassus, "must take its way through the middle of the actions of Chares." But when a party-purpose was to be served, calumny of every kind was vented by the accusing orators, with licentiousness of which a conception can be gathered only from perusal of their extant works. Aristophon, who conducted the prosecution, averred that the accused generals had taken bribes from the Chians and

Dinarch. orat.
in Demosth.

Rhodians. We find it asserted by a later orator that Timotheus confessed having received money from the Lesbians. He would however hardly confess a dishonourable transaction. It was ordinarily incumbent upon Athenian commanders to find supplies for the force under them, by taking money wherever it could be obtained. Such courts then as those of Athens could not always enter into very accurate examination, and would not always require the most regular proof. Bold assertion would suffice to excite suspicion, and suspicion often, even where party-views did not warp, would suffice to decide the vote. Not in the sovereign assembly only, but in the courts of justice also, freedom of speech was always liable to be overborne by the turbulence of party. Against such injustice Iphicrates is said to have provided himself in a way which the licentiousness only of democracy could ad-

Polyæn. Strat.
l. 3. 9. 29.

mit, and only the profligacy of democracy could in any degree justify. Some daring youths, whether of low or high rank is not said, but known favourers of his cause, attended the trial with their daggers under their cloaks, which they managed to show so far as to inti-

Ch. 21. s. 2.
of this Hist.

midate his opponents. The same measure practised, as formerly observed, under the tyranny of the Thirty, may very possibly have been repeated in the lawlessness of the following democratical sovereignty. But in attending to such stories, even where the fact may be perfectly credible, we must guard against the colouring

which may be given by a contemporary, through party interest or prejudice, and by a late writer (and it is from a very late writer among the ancients that the story in question comes), through utter inexperience of the character of republican times. The result of the trial however affords some presumption in favour of the report. Iphicrates was acquitted; while Timotheus, than whose reputation hardly a purer has been transmitted from antiquity, and who, if the aversion of Æschines to the Athenian people was not exaggerated, had in the course of his long services added to the republic's empire seventy-five cities of consequence enough to be represented by their several deputies in the assembly of the allies, was condemned in a fine of nearly twenty thousand pounds sterling. This operating as a decree of banishment for life, he spent the remainder of an honourable elderhood at Chalcis in Eubœa.¹⁵

Corn. Nep.
v. Iphicr.
& Timoth.
Æschin. de
legat. p. 247.

¹⁵ Diodorus speaks of Timotheus and Iphicrates, without discrimination, as condemned to pay many talents; not specifying the sum, nor mentioning any consequence. But the acquittal of Iphicrates, positively asserted by Nepos, receives confirmation from Demosthenes in his oration against Aristocrates, so far at least as to show that he was not driven into banishment; and the biographer's account is farther supported by the contemporary orator, Dinarchus, who mentions the amount of the fine on Timotheus. Dinarch. or. adv. Demosth. p. 11. t. 4. or. Gr. ed. Reiske.

[Mr. Mitford seems to make the trials of Iphicrates and Timotheus contemporaneous, and to place them in the year in which the transactions occurred that gave rise to the prosecutions. Mr. Clinton has thus dated the events of this period of history:

B. C. 357. *Commencement of the Social War.* — Death of Chabrias. — Delphi seized by the Phocians.

— 356. *Second campaign of the Social War.* — Birth of Alexander.

— 355. *Third campaign of the Social War.* — Peace concluded with the confederates "about midsummer." — *Trial and acquittal of Iphicrates.*

— 354. *Trial and condemnation of Timotheus*, who, according to Mr. Clinton's computation, must have died almost immediately after his retirement to Chalcis.

See Fasti Hellen. pp. 124—130.]

SECTION VI.

Deficient Supply to the Armament under Chares. — Irregular Measures of the Armament. — Oration of Isocrates on Peace. — Peace with the Confederates.

B. C. 356.
Ol. 106. 1.
[See note.] THE political victory of Chares was for the moment decisive: he remained sole commander of the great armament on the Asiatic station. But that great armament, of which the land force was wholly mercenary, wanted great funds for its support; and his friends at home either dared not ask the people for supplies, or could not obtain them. He was therefore to find them, in the way to which we have seen the most renowned commanders before him driven, often to the great interruption of the public service, by exactions from any states weak enough to be readily compelled to pay them, or, like Athenodorus lately, he must dismiss his forces. But those allies, who had principally supplied former commanders, were now the enemy to contend with whom the supplies were wanted; and to dismiss his forces would have been to ruin at once the public service, the power of his party, and his own greatness.

An extraordinary resource happened to occur. The satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, Artabazus, whose rebellion against the king of Persia Charidemus Diod. l. 16.
c. 22. had assisted, was now again threatened with overbearing numbers marching from the interior provinces. Report made them seven hundred thousand fighting men. Hopeless of resistance with any barbarian force he could collect, Artabazus saw his only safety in Grecian troops, could he obtain them timely in sufficient number. Need thus pressing, his offers probably were high. The temptation sufficed for Chares, who, with the whole armament

placed under his command for the reduction of the rebellious allies of the Athenian people, went to Bithynia to assist Artabazus. Demosthenes, who became afterward the leading orator of the party of which Chares was the principal military character, bound to apologise for his friend, has been reduced to plead his deficient authority over those he was appointed to command, and even to hazard imputation against the Athenian people. In the failure of remittances from home, he says, it was im-^{Demosth. Phil. 1. p. 46.} possible to retain the unpaid and starving troops; they would go into the satrap's service, and Chares did not lead, but was led by them. The historian Diodorus, following probably some elder writer, calls it a very irregular measure.¹⁶ Chares however did not disappoint the satrap's hope or his own. The royal army was^{Diod. ut ant. Theopomp. ap. Athen. l. 12. p. 264.} defeated; and the amount of reward for the important service enabled him to conciliate so many orators, and so to gratify the Athenian people with sacrificial suppers, that he obtained, not pardon, but approbation and applause.

In this extraordinary state for a government to exist in, alarm arose for all Greece, but especially for Athens. Report came that great naval preparation was making by the Persian government in the harbours of Phenicia. The purpose was not declared, but it was said that the great king, incensed at the support given to rebellion in his dominion by Charidemus, but more especially afterward by Chares, would send his Phenician fleet of three hundred ships of war to assist the revolted allies of Athens against their oppressors, and revenge the Persian name for the defeats formerly suffered from Athenian arms.

Under this disadvantageous impression negotiation was opened with the hostile confederates,^{Isocr. de pace, p. 186.}

who seem to have made no difficulty of entering into treaty.

Isocr. de pace,
p. 178. Ministers from their several states came to Athens, and a decree of the Athenian people authorised negotiation with them. All the better men of the republic, and men of property in general, desired to use opportunity, thus far opened, for making peace with all powers with whom the republic was at war, and putting an end to the system of war and troubles. But Chares and the orators his associates had acquired such command over the many that none in opposition to them could speak in the general

p. 168. 172. &
176. assembly. Disapproving voices, and the tumult of overbearing numbers, prevented their being heard. Thus denied their right of addressing the sovereign assembly in the way which the constitution prescribed, the peaceful resorted to the resource, with us so familiar, of circulating their opinions and arguments among the public

Ch. 4. s. 3.
ch. 5. s. 3.
ch. 11. s. 1.
& ch. 16. s. 6.
of this Hist. by pamphlets. In earlier times, as we have formerly seen, when writing and reading were less familiar, poetry was commonly used for such purposes. Now the form of an oration such as might be spoken from the bema was preferred, and Isocrates in this crisis published his oration entitled "On Peace;" one of the most interesting for its matter, as it is also one of the most ingeniously composed, and most exquisitely wrought and finished, of any remaining from him.¹⁷

In this publication, managing argument with much art and delicacy, and introducing public facts to support it, he proceeds by degrees to strong imputation against those whom he describes only as having possession of the public ear and the direction of the affairs of the commonwealth. Bad men he calls all; notorious drunkenness he mentions of

¹⁷ The oration on peace has been a favourite of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who has chosen it for exemplification of the author's powers and best manner in political discourse, in preference to the more artificially adorned compositions of his earlier age.

some, and speculation he repeatedly imputes to them generally. "Ruin," he says, "must come upon the com-
Isocr. de pace,
p. 178.
 monwealth, if counsellors and measures are not changed. The decree just made, concerning peace, will avail nothing, unless a general reformation follow. Peace should be made, not with the Chians, Rhodians, Coans, and Byzantines only, but with all mankind; and not upon the terms now offered for your consideration, but upon the liberal principle formerly established by the king and the Lacedæmonians," (in the convention commonly called the peace of Antalcidas,) "requiring that all Grecian states should be independent, and garrisons of the troops of other states allowed nowhere. Not justice only, but
p. 184.
 the republic's interest requires it. Were we just to others, we should neither have war with Kersobleptes for the Chersonese, nor with Philip for Amphipolis; but seeing us never contented with what we possess, continually grasping at what does not belong to us, they are reasonably fearful of such neighbours. Opportunity is abundantly open for increasing the power and wealth of the republic in better ways. Colonies might in many parts be established, as many have been, without injury to any; and this would more become those ambitious of being esteemed the first people of Greece, than what now is the favourite purpose, to be eminent by making continual war with hired troops. Far from such extravagance, it should be our care not only
p. 186.
 to make peace, but to maintain it. But this will never betill we are persuaded that quiet is more profitable than disturbance, justice than injustice, the care of our own than grasping at what belongs to others. Of these matters nevertheless none of your orators has ever dared to speak to you, while, on the contrary, some have not scrupled to contend that, though injustice may be shameful, yet it is
p. 190.
 profitable, and even necessary; that uprightness,

honourable indeed, is however a starving virtue, beneficial to others rather than to its owner. It were easy to show such arguments as false as they are disgraceful.¹⁸

Isocr. de pace,
p. 198. “The popular passion now is to command all the world, and yet avoid arms; committing the honour and safety of the republic to vagabonds, deserters, runaways for all crimes, ready always to leave our service for better pay in any other. Hence we are obliged to indulge such miscreants as if they were our children. If complaint comes to us against them of rapine, violence, every kind of disorder, not only we do not resent their misconduct, but rather seem amused with it; p. 200. and, while in want, many among us, of daily necessities, we oppress our allies with exaction of tribute to pay these common enemies of mankind. Those of our forefathers who made themselves most obnoxious by their ambition went to war however with a treasury able to support it, and they carried arms themselves; but you, poor as you are, and numerous as you are, will, like the great king, have your hired armies. They, when they sent out a fleet, employed foreigners and slaves to pull the oar, and themselves took shield and spear; but now those who aspire to be lords of Greece go ashore in foreign parts in the garb of galley-rowers¹⁹, while the vagabonds, whom I have described, bear the honours of the panoply.”

p. 202—208. The orator adverts afterward to the pains taken to persuade the people that the desire of peace marked a disposition to oligarchy, while the promoters of war were all sure friends of democracy; to the unsteadiness of administration and frequency of contra-

¹⁸ We shall however in the sequel find Demosthenes avowing these maxims.

¹⁹ *Ταγείσιον ἔχοντες* — *remum* in manibus habentes. Auger. This seems the bold guess of a Parisian, the idea gained from the wherries on the Seine. Had Auger ever been at Marseilles, such a notion would surely have been corrected. The uncertainty of the meaning of the term *ταγείσιον* has been noticed in a former note.

dictory measures; to the carelessness and profusion with which the rights of the city were given to strangers; to the neglect of the important law, making it death to give money for votes to obtain offices, so that the most important situation in the commonwealth, that of general, on which rested not only the supreme military command, but the principal direction of executive government, was obtained by the most notorious bribery; to the departure from ancient practice in electing to that exalted office men incapable of speaking from the bema, and dependent upon professed orators to communicate with the sovereign assembly for them. "It may be asked," he proceeds to observe, "How, with all this mismanagement, do we exist? How is it that we are inferior to no Grecian state in power?" I answer, because our adversaries are no wiser than ourselves. They make allies for us by their tyranny, as we for them by ours; and so we are balanced."

The most difficult subject, yet that on which he laid principal stress, was the tyrannical empire which the Athenians asserted over the *Ægean*; requiring, from every island and every shore, tribute for permission to sail on the business of commerce without interruption from the Athenian fleets maintained for the purpose of such interruption. This he insisted ought wholly to be abandoned; not only as the injustice was glaring, but as the object was neither attainable nor desirable; and this he proceeded to show by arguments supported by reference to all past experience both of their own and of the *Lacedæmonian* government.

Drawing toward his conclusion, he spoke more at large of those actually holding popular favour, and directing the republic's affairs. "Pericles," he said, "took the administration when the constitution was already injured considerably, yet he used his power in no degree for his private profit; but, on the contrary, leaving

his own estate, at his death, less than he received it from his father, he carried into the public treasury eight thousand talents (nearly two millions sterling) exclusively of the dedications and sacred money. But these men so differ from him that while they dare tell you their care of the public interest is such as to prevent all attention to their own, we see those neglected affairs of their own so improving as formerly they would not have ventured to pray the gods for : while we, for whom they profess so much care, are faring worse than the people of many states under oligarchal government. None live in any ease, but the whole city abounds with complaint : some being obliged to declare publicly their poverty and wants ; some lamenting them among their friends ; all, who have anything, feeling the pressure of troublesome duties, expensive offices, requisitions for contribution to the treasury, or demands for change of property ; altogether bringing so many evils that those of some estate live more uncomfortably than those in absolute poverty.

Isocr. de pace,
p. 252. 254. “ I wonder then you cannot see that there is
p. 256. no race of men more evil-minded toward the people than ill-principled orators and demagogues. It is for their interest that, in addition to other evils, you should be scanty even of daily necessities. For they observe that those who are able to live upon their own are attached to the republic, and look to better men for advice on its concerns ; but those who depend for their livelihood upon the pay of juries and general assemblies, and emoluments in whatever way thence arising, are compelled by want to look up to them, and are always ready to thank them for the accusations, prosecutions, sycophancies of every kind, which they put forward. They would therefore gladly see all the citizens in that penury through which themselves are powerful. And of this you have the most evident demon-

stration; for you see all their measures directed, not to provide an independent livelihood for the needy, but to bring all, who possess anything, to one level of want."

He finishes then with summing up his advice for mending the evil state of things; reducing it to two points: "First," he says, "with regard to government at home, we must take such men for advisers on public affairs

*Isocr. de pace,
p. 258.*

as we should desire for our private concerns; we must cease to reckon sycophants friends of the people, and men of worth friends of oligarchy. Then, for foreign interests, we must treat allies as friends, and not, while we give them independency in words, permit our generals, in fact, to use them as they please; knowing as we may now from experience that, though we are stronger than any one state among them, we are weaker than all united. We should show our equal aversion to all tyrannical power: we should imitate and emulate the regal authority of Lacedæmon; where the kings are more restrained from committing injury than any private persons, yet so honoured that those who in battle show any unreadiness in their defence to lose their lives are subjected to greater ignominy than those who quit their ranks and abandon their shields. Such is the supremacy that it should be our ambition to obtain among the Greeks: and it might be ours, would we show that our power is directed, not to their subjection, but to their preservation."

This picture of the party of Chares is from an adversary, but a most respectable adversary: checked also by the irritable jealousy of the sovereign people whom he was addressing; and it is contradicted by nothing, but on the contrary supported by everything, remaining from antiquity, though far most remains from those partial to the opposite, as more the democratical cause. This appeal to the reason of the Athenian people seems to have had considerable effect, but it was very far from completely successful. The party of

Chares, that they might not be compelled to treat, as the other party desired, with all those with whom the commonwealth was at war, and thus abandon their system, hastened to make peace with the confederates. Arrangement clearly would have been readier, friendly connection and confederacy might more easily have been restored, could those have had the direction on the part of Athens who had always shown themselves adverse to the tyrannical system which had occasioned the war. With those of the political principles publicly avowed by the orators of the party of Chares, the allies would of course treat with diffidence, and not readily engage in any new alliance.

Accordingly the terms were, for Athens, very disadvantageous and even degrading. Every object for which the war had been undertaken was abandoned. The claim of the Athenian people, equally to military command over the forces, and to political authority over the states of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, was abandoned. Ships were no more to be required from them to swell the Athenian fleets, nor pecuniary compositions instead. The Athenian tribute-gathering squadrons were no more to visit their ports, nor were their subjects any longer to be liable to the intolerable inconvenience of being summoned to the courts of Athens by others, or necessitated to go thither to solicit justice for themselves. Nor does it appear that, in return for so complete a renunciation of long exercised despotism, together with, what was far more important, the revenue which so contributed to the power of the imperial republic,


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anything was conceded by the allies. Demosthenes, afterward apologising for the conduct of his friends on this occasion, has admitted that the terms of the treaty were not what the republic might have expected; but he says, the blame was due to those who terrified the people into acceptance of them, by spreading the alarm,

which he asserts to have been unfounded, of war threatened from Persia. The success nevertheless of the party of Chares in their principal purposes was complete. Not only they obviated treaty for peace with Macedonia, with Thrace, with Thebes, with any except the revolted allies, but they so held their influence that they could soon engage the republic to pursue the purpose, to which Isocrates so energetically objected, of conquest with mercenary armies. But circumstances meanwhile occurred, deeply involving the interest of all Greece, to which it will be necessary to give some attention, previously to proceeding with the particular history of Athens.


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